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ABSTRACT
Since the early 1980s the established neoclassical economic interpretation of the role of 
government in East Asian industrialisation has been challenged on two fronts. The 
first -  the new trade theory -  purports to show how a country that promotes industries 
characterised by external economies of a particular kind can help shift its pattern of 
comparative advantage in a manner that can accelerate economic growth. External 
economies, it is asserted, are most conspicuous in technology-intensive industries. The 
second -  the governed market model -  contends that the state in East Asia (especially 
Taiwan and Korea) anticipated shifts in comparative advantage and intervened 
aggressively to develop new export industries.
This study uses quantitative techniques to assess the question of whether industrial 
policy interventions were a necessary or major factor explaining Taiwan's 
industrialisation during the 1980s. Taiwan's adoption in the early 1980s of a 'strategic 
industry policy' focusing on high technology industries provides the focal point to test 
the hypotheses presented by the competing explanations. Of particular interest is 
whether Taiwan necessarily displays the characteristics presumed to fit the new trade 
and governed market model. While most of the analysis focuses on Taiwan, the 
Korean experience is drawn upon for additional insights.
The first part of the analysis is directed to measuring the structure of incentives to 
Taiwan industry. The incentive structure in the early 1980s is found to be neutral in 
the sense that it did not discriminate amongst industrial activities. By the late 1980s 
this had changed. However, departures from neutrality are found not to be associated 
with industries characterised by increasing export specialisation and by implication 
comparative advantage.
The second part of the analysis focuses on determining whether there is a relationship 
between industry policy interventions and comparative advantage. No distinct 
tendency is found for the designated 'strategic industries' to exhibit increasing export 
specialisation following the introduction of the strategic industry policy. Indeed, a 
number of industries are found to have already possessed relatively strong export 
specialisation prior to the introduction of the policy. Cross-sectional regression 
analysis is then used to establish the determinants of incentives. Such an approach is 
useful because the competing explanations employ the same set of observable industry 
structural characteristics but make opposite predictions about their association with 
comparative advantage. The empirical results strongly contradict the predictions of the 
governed market model and new trade model that the incentive structure was designed 
for industries with an increasing comparative advantage. Instead, the incentive 
structure during the 1980s is found to have discriminated in favour of industries 
characterised by a declining comparative advantage. Some of the strongest results in 
support of this conclusion are those indicating a negative association between the 
incentive structure and indicators of export growth and technology-intensity.
The issue of whether there is a relationship between the incentive structure and the rate 
of growth in total factor productivity is also examined. This is a critical test of the 
argument that judicious encouragement of the right 'infant industries' accelerated 
growth. Interventions are found not to have had a pronounced impact on the sectoral 
evolution of the industrial structure. In raising the question of what generated Taiwan's 
industrial growth over this period, it is suggested that the attributes associated with 
strong outward-orientation largely explains high productivity growth. This adds 
support to similar studies showing a positive relationship between productivity 
differentials among industries and export-orientation.
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1- CHAPTER 1 -
INTRODUCTION
Economic miracles are a public good: each economist sees in them a 
vindication o f his pet theories (Bhagwati 1988:98).
1.1 Introduction
The role of the state has occupied the minds of generations of economists. It remains a 
central concern for those attempting to assess relative economic performance of 
different countries. Discussion of the topic is controversial and within the literature 
polarised, encompassing as it does the fundamental economic problem — how to 
allocate scarce resources. There is no ideal model for the role of government. As 
Riedel suggests, 'consensus has eluded economists because they insist on finding the key 
to growth and development, when in fact history suggests human progress works like a 
giant combination lock for which there is no key' (Riedel 1988:2-3).
In recent years, though, as the interdependence of the world economy has increased, 
there has been something of a global search for a 'model' to cope with a more 
competitive international economy. According to Krugman (1990a:26-9), 'the state of 
the theory is now ripe for a revival of inquiry into the big question of development — 
why some countries succeed while others do not, and what governments can do to 
transform their countries ... And the policy recommendations that emerge from new
2models are likely to involve sophisticated intervention, not a blanket endorsement of 
markets'.
This call for a ’rethinking' of the analytical basis for the role of government is seen as a 
necessary response to a changing international economic environment and to intellectual 
progress within the field of economics. Some of the greatest pressure for this rethinking 
has come in the area of trade and industry policy. Theoretical and empirical research on 
the subject have been stimulated by, inter alia: perceived difficulties in explaining the 
industrial success of East Asia in terms of traditional theories; a heightened concern in 
the United States over trade imbalances with East Asia, centred on the view that the 
more interventionist policies adopted by Japan, Korea and Taiwan were a major cause 
of the competitive problems of United States industry; and continued popular appeal of 
commercial policy to protect and foster domestic industry.
In questioning the causes of East Asian industrial growth, discussion has centred on the 
nature of government intervention in the economy. Most attention has focused on the 
subset of interventions known as industry policy —  that is targeting or 'picking winners', 
where government can intervene to change the allocation of investment (as opposed to 
its overall level) so as to favour particular industries in which the private market is 
believed to underinvest.1 This question of the government's role in the allocation of 
investment is at the centre of a lively debate.
The present study applies this debate to Taiwan's industrialisation experience during the 
1980s. The majority of analysis focuses on Taiwan, although the Korean experience is 
drawn upon to provide additional insights. Quantitative techniques are used to answer 
the question of whether industry policy interventions were a necessary or major factor 
explaining Taiwan's industrial performance over this period. Of particular interest is 
how Taiwan has managed its intervention, and whether government should be assigned 
the preeminent role.
1 Though widely used, the term 'industry policy' has no standard definition. As defined by Itoh et al. 
(1988:234) industrial policy is 'any policy that attempts to achieve the national economic and 
noneconomic goals of a country by intervening in the allocation of resources among industries or 
sectors of the country, or in the (industrial) organisation of an industry or sector'. At a general level 
this may involve the promotion of new/sunrise and strategic industries; upgrading of existing 
industries; and promotion of technological development, exports and regional dispersion (Chia 1993). 
This study embraces a narrower definition as stated above.
31.2 The Debate Over the Role of Government Intervention in East Asian 
Industrialisation
Critics of the neoclassical explanation of East Asian success challenge what they term 
the 'neoliberal' arguments. ’NeoliberaT refers to a subset of neoclassical economics.
Its members believe that as a general rule the neoclassical prescriptions for short-run optimal 
resource allocation are also the core recipe for maximising the rate of long-term growth. Other 
neoclassical, by contrast, draw more of a distinction between the two kinds of analyses, 
introducing a more complex array of variables into growth issues than they use for questions of 
optimum resource allocation. Neoliberals are inclined to think that 'getting the prices right' is 
both a necessary and a nearly sufficient condition for maximising the rate of long-term growth 
... other neoclassical would say that it is no more than necessary. Relatedly, neoliberals 
believe that most market failure is a result of government policies and that, even in those 
uncommon cases where market failure occurs for other reasons, the welfare costs of remedial 
government intervention can often be expected to be greater than the welfare gains (Wade 
1992:271).
It is not clear that any known neoclassical economist would feel altogether comfortable 
with Wade's rather parsimonious characterisation of the neoclassical explanation. 
Nevertheless, the Wade definition of a neoliberal position, whether or not it is a realistic 
caricature of a real position, has entered the discussion. It is a useful shorthand for the 
view that Wade and others of like mind believe that they are rejecting. The term is used 
in the Wade sense through the thesis.
For their part, proponents of the neoclassical view attribute East Asian economic 
success to the use of neutral, efficiently administered policies that gave economy-wide 
price-signals to consumers and producers (Hughes 1993:5). Specifically,
[liberal economists argue that the soundness of these underlying policies — fiscal, monetary, 
financial, trade, labour and infrastructure — determined the speed, sustainability and equity of 
growth. The East Asian growth experience is seen to underline that extensive regulation and 
picking winners, far from encouraging growth or equity, has high long-term economic costs 
and encourages inequitable income distribution. Government intervention can be a far more 
serious cause of market failure than domestic or induced imperfections (Hughes 1993:5).
This view has its origins in the more general observation of the superior economic 
performance of market-oriented East Asian developing countries compared with the 
relatively mediocre performance of other countries which followed more closely the 
inward-looking policies widely prescribed in the 1950s and 1960s. This observation 
nurtured a ’new orthodoxy’ in development economics. The new orthodoxy was in
4essence mainstream, neoclassical economics, dismissed by the old orthodoxy as 
inapplicable to developing countries. The experience of East Asia was interpreted 
initially as proof positive that competitive markets, operating broadly on neoclassical 
principles, could, even in developing countries, generate high levels of economic 
efficiency and rapid, self-sustained growth' (Riedel 1988:1-2). In particular, the 
adoption of an export-oriented strategy was believed to be associated with higher 
export growth rates and better economic performance. Rapid growth of exports 
combined with the superior performance in creating and allocating human capital 
provided the means by which East Asian economies had attained high rates of 
productivity-based catch up and total factor productivity growth (World Bank 
1993:316). High rates of savings and investment, including rapid accumulation of 
human capital, were the principal engines of growth.
In characterising the East Asian experience, the neoclassical approach has been to argue 
that while relying on assistance at varying stages, both Taiwan and Korea ensured their 
trade regimes were more neutral than most economies between import substitution and 
export activities, still enabling specialisation on the basis of comparative advantage.2 
Great importance is attached to the ongoing process of trade liberalisation and 
strengthening of the market mechanism in maintaining the growth momentum. 
Government industrial policy interventions are not the sine qua non. Rather good 
economic management is largely thought to account for superior economic 
performance. Included in this is the relatively strong outward-orientation of trade and 
industry policies, implemented by successful management in the areas of macroeconomic 
management, agriculture, human resource development (particularly education), and 
population policies. Macroeconomic stability in particular is emphasised as the 
cornerstone on which East Asia's export success was built. As Hughes (1993:18) says:
Fiscal effectiveness made it possible for monetary policies to concentrate on price stability, that 
is, on keeping inflation rates low and exchange rates in equilibrium. Rapid growth encouraged 
private savings and enabled public savings to be invested in infrastructural developments, 
reducing overall costs of production. Relatively high domestic savings and investment indicate 
the effect o f successful macroeconomic policies on growth.
2 Both Korea and Taiwan share many common characteristics. Both were first integrated into a 
regional economy as primary product suppliers under Japanese auspices. Both faced problems of 
reconstruction from war, and severing of traditional markets. Both also experienced successful land 
reforms. In the wake of slower economic growth and declining aid commitments, both undertook 
policy reforms that launched export-led growth at roughly the same time: in Taiwan between 1958 and 
1962; in Korea, after 1961.
5The neoclassical view in emphasising the importance of 'good' policies, also stressed 
that government had a key role to play in the process of economic development. While 
'unshackled exports' had been the key to East Asian economic success, it is also clear 
that successful performance needs several policy strands:
Political stability and rule of law are essential. Economic policies apparently distorted prices 
less than was the case in most other developing countries; macroeconomic management was 
relatively successful, all economic sectors, particularly agriculture, were developed, and 
public investment in social and physical infrastructural facilities was productive ... 
Governments thus provided the environment for growth; but private enterprise, despite risk 
and uncertainty, made the investments necessary and through exposure to international 
competition became efficient and profitable (Hughes 1988:xv-xvi).
During the 1980s two sources of heterodoxy — the governed market model and new 
trade model — emerged to contend the neoclassical explanation of East Asian 
development. According to the governed market model, East Asia's rapid
industrialisation has 'resulted from the state deployment of a range of industrial 
promotion policies, including ones to intensify the growth of selected industries (Wade 
1990a:370). The East Asian experience is thus thought to demonstrate that markets 
cannot be relied upon consistently to guide investment to industries that would generate 
the highest growth for the overall economy. Governments in East Asia remedied this 
by deliberately 'getting the prices wrong' — altering the incentive structure — to boost 
industries that would not otherwise have thrived. In the case of Taiwan and Korea, it is 
argued, governments did not maintain a relatively neutral policy regime over the 
postwar period, but rather, actively promoted infant/strategic industries using non­
neutral policies and purposefully encouraged internationally competitive industries. 
Industry policy interventions are thought to have been motivated by the belief that 
shifting the industrial structure towards increasingly sophisticated sectors would 
increase the opportunities for capturing dynamic scale economies that result from 
learning. The governed market model contends that a relatively neutral policy regime 
may not be a necessary condition for industrial growth.
This view, while asserting the object of industry policy has been quite different in each 
development phase, argues that, in general, it has been to change comparative advantage 
in anticipation of changing market conditions. In the 1980s, governments in East Asia 
are considered to have continued their role as facilitators of industrial growth in 
response to the pressures of technological upgrading. Implicit then is a rejection of the
6notion hat government became less dirigiste as industrialisation proceeded, at least at 
this sta'e of development.
The new trade model asserts that 'a country that systematically tries to promote 
industres subject to external economies will raise its standard of living at the expense of 
other countries' (Krugman 1992:436). Proponents cite the alleged importance to 
moderr industrial competition of economies of scale, of leaming-by-doing, and 
extemaities stemming from research and development. These 'dynamic effects' thought 
to be issociated with the development of 'strategic' high-technology industries are 
considered to provide productivity-enhancing spillover effects. Support for industries 
possesang these characteristics is considered crucial if a country is to stay at the 
technobgical frontier and improve productivity (Tyson 1990).
East A:ian governments are considered to have been accomplished practitioners of such 
policie: through the course of their industrialisation (Tyson 1992:4).3 Richardson 
(1991:38) in a survey of the new trade literature and its relevance to the Pacific region 
notes üat
American and European perceptions are that selected Asian technological protectionism and 
trade-policy activism have actually succeeded ... [they] have come to believe that Japan, Korea, 
and probably Singapore and Taiwan as well, have been the most accomplished practitioners of 
new-view trade policies. Out of that perception comes the desire to establish new ground rules, 
to ’even the playing field’ (Richardson 1991:34).
Similar.y, according to Krugman (1990a:37), ’the very magnitude of the success of 
outwari-oriented strategies in the Pacific tells us that the kind of economic model in 
which markets always get it right cannot be appropriate; it is impossible to explain such 
spectacular results without appealing to some kind of externality'.
The ca;e for promoting sectors in which positive externalities exist is not new. The role 
of positive externalities as a justification for special promotion of particular sectors has 
been known for a long time and was the central theme of the postwar literature on 
economic development (Krugman 1987b, 1992). While externalities have in the past 
been regarded as a normal consequence of market behaviour, new trade theorists stress 
the need to reconsider the externality argument on the basis that they are likely to be
3 Tyson includes within this assertion the governments of Korea, Taiwan and Japan, as well as the 
European Community and Brazil.
7much stronger in some sectors than in others because of the nature of dynamic 
externalities.
New trade theories, emphasising the role of scale, learning, and market structure, have 
also been said to be more relevant to the developing countries, because of their small 
and imperfect markets, than to the industrialised world for which most of the writing 
on them has been intended (Krugman 1986, Rodrik 1988).4 Yet while increasingly 
being applied in the context of developing countries, the theoretically-based new trade 
literature has largely ignored the debate surrounding East Asian industrial 
development. The new political economy literature on the other hand has sought 
support for selective government intervention, by drawing on the insights of the new 
trade literature (Wade 1990a; Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura 1988).5
1.3 Framework for Analysis
There are two clearly opposing interpretations of the contribution of industry policy 
interventions to the industrial success of Taiwan and Korea. Both the new trade and 
governed market models portray the industrial experience of East Asia as indicating 
that emphasis on trade considerations is secondary to technological ones in searching 
for an understanding of industrialisation that is relevant to policy making. According 
to the governed market model, when technological change rather than trade is 
emphasised as the centrepiece of industrialisation, an economic rationale for selective 
industrial promotion then follows for two reasons. Firstly, because comparative 
advantage is not simply the result of given endowments, but also rests on the 
accumulated capital and skills which can be enhanced by a long-term national strategy. 
Secondly, some sectors and products are more important to the economy's future 
growth prospects than others (Wade 1988:152-3). The presence of externalities is 
thought to have provided the grounds for industry-specific interventions so that the 
incentive structure observed in Taiwan was correcting for such market failures. 
Interventions are considered to have been on a large enough scale to successfully make 
a difference in investment and production patterns between industries.
4 But at the same time these authors have expressed concern that these 'new approaches' might provide 
a convenient rationale for familiar 'old' policies that could be particularly costly in small countries.
5 An exception is Helleiner et al. (1992).
8Both models emphasise the importance of managing technological change in achieving 
dynamically efficient industrialisation. The strongest implication to emerge from these 
models is that a non-neutral policy regime is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for the rapid sustained growth of East Asia. The appropriate policy strategy is thought 
to be one that encourages the flow of resources toward industries with a perceived 
future comparative advantage.
The present study examines and tests the conclusions of both strands of literature that 
argue that the industrial development of Taiwan provides validating evidence of what a 
more interventionist approach to industrial policy formulation can achieve. This 
literature is characterised by scepticism, and in some cases rejection, of the neoclassical 
explanation based on the market price system and its contribution to efficient resource 
allocation in driving economic growth. Instead, coordinated policy intervention to 
reallocate resources among industries is thought to be desirable.
The study concentrates on the period 1980-1989 when government strategies in Taiwan 
began to focus on the development of technology-intensive industries in order to 
upgrade the industrial structure. The Taiwan government's adoption of a 'strategic 
industry policy' in 1982, providing preferential incentives to high technology sectors, 
provides the ideal case in which to test the propositions put forth by the competing 
models. This is because the competing hypotheses presented by the models are readily 
transferable into testable —  that is refutable —  propositions about the structure of 
incentives and their relationship to economic performance. But while different in their 
conclusions, the competing hypotheses are similar in one important respect —  the 
incentives received by an industry are seen as a function of that industry's structural 
characteristics. Reference is made to the Korean experience insofar as the Korean 
government's history of greater government involvement in the allocation of resources 
between industries is thought to confirm more strongly the hypothesis presented by both 
models.
Determining the significance of interventions is assessed by quantifying the interindustry 
structure of assistance (incentive structure) by estimating nominal and effective rates of 
assistance as well as effective rates of subsidies to industry in Taiwan. Cross-sectional 
regression analysis is then employed to test the relationship between changes in the 
incentive structure over time with changes in Taiwan's comparative advantage. If in 
measuring the incentive structure, interventions were found to be associated with
9industries exhibiting strong growth performance, this would be consistent with the 
view that the government was correcting for externalities associated with the growth 
process. Moreover, this would indicate that the government had a forward looking 
strategic view on how the industrial structure should be evolving and was directing 
resources to industries with emerging comparative advantage. While it would not 
establish beyond doubt that the interventions were related causally to growth 
performance, it would represent the first step in a definitive test. If, however, 
departures from neutrality were found to be associated with industries characterised by 
declining comparative advantage, then this would call into question the positive and 
normative presumptions of the new trade and governed market models.6
The study seeks to answer the following questions:
• Did the policy regimes in both Taiwan and Korea in the 1980s display the 
characteristics presumed to fit either or both the new trade and governed market 
models? Were the Taiwan and Korean governments dirigiste, and did they become 
more or less dirigiste over time as industrialisation proceeded?
• Was the policy regime non-neutral?
• Were departures from neutrality correlated with characteristics of industries that 
have been thought by some to be associated with superior growth performance? In 
particular, is there a relationship between government sectoral intervention, as 
recently suggested forth by statist models, and industry expansion of output and the 
achievement of international competitiveness?
• Was the policy regime causally significant in the sense of contributing to sustained 
industrial and export growth?
• Did the industrial structure evolve in line with a shifting (factor-based) comparative 
advantage and changing factor endowments?
6 While unlikely, it should be noted that it is possible that industries with declining comparative 
advantage could be associated with externalities. In these circumstances, problems arise in attempting 
to interpret the empirical results.
10
• Have industrial policies been significant in affecting either the sectoral structure of, 
or rates of, productivity growth?
• What additional factors were sufficient? While there is a consensus that a number 
of factors have contributed to the rapid growth of Taiwan, dissension centres on 
whether these factors were sufficient, or whether there exists a further necessary 
element. That is, did the adoption of an export-oriented strategy and its associated 
competitive disciplines offer the best route to industrialisation through the fostering 
of efficient allocation of resources and dynamic scale economies or was 
government intervention the necessary condition underlying growth over this 
period?
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 outlines the governed market view of East Asian industrialisation. It 
discusses the points of divergence between this view and that of the neoclassical 
explanation, centred on the incentive regime, industrial structure and the significance of 
institutional mechanisms thought to be associated with a strong developmental state. In 
questioning whether this model represents a fundamental challenge to the neoclassical 
paradigm, it discusses several analytical deficiencies of the governed market view.
Chapter 3 discusses the externality argument for assistance and the new trade view as to 
why external economies may provide a legitimate reason for government intervention 
following developments in the modelling of imperfect competition. It discusses the 
applicability of the externality argument to developing countries and, in particular, the 
relevance of earlier oligopoly models in demonstrating how import protection can act as 
export promotion. It sets the theoretical scene for subsequent tests of the presence of 
externality effects presented in Chapter 9.
Chapter 4 in focusing on the changing nature of Taiwan's industry policy in the 1980s, 
discusses whether the Taiwan experience necessarily conforms to the characteristics 
associated with the governed market or new trade models. It discusses the external and 
internal pressures to restructure industry and outlines the incentive structure to industry 
over the 1980s. The government's pursuit of a more sectoral approach to industrial 
policy formation through various preferential fiscal and financial measures directed to 
industry during the 1980s is summarised and evaluated. Of particular interest is whether
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the government's preferential financing policy in promoting high technology 'strategic' 
industries was important in furthering Taiwan's industrial development over the 1980s. 
Taiwan's experience is then used to focus on the practical limitations and shortcomings 
of new trade theory when some of the policy implications are taken into account
Chapter 5 contrasts the Taiwan experience with that of Korea and also discusses the 
applicability of the governed market and new trade model to the Korean experience in 
the 1980s. It focuses on the reduced role for government in Korean industry policy in 
the 1980s and discusses the factors influencing this policy change.
Chapter 6 quantifies Taiwan’s interindustry structure of assistance to manufacturing in 
the 1980s. It focuses on whether the policy regime in the 1980s was neutral and the 
extent that departures from neutrality were correlated with characteristics of industries 
that were associated with superior growth performance. It also explores whether the 
government was assisting industries characterised by a declining/emerging comparative 
advantage.
Chapter 7 presents the first of three tests assessing the relationship between changes in 
the incentive structure and changes in comparative advantage. In focusing on export 
shares and trends in export specialisation7 of the strategic products identified by the 
Taiwan government, it explores whether there was a distinct tendency for 'strategic 
industries' to display an increasing comparative advantage following the introduction of 
new policy measures. It also focuses on the question of whether the industrial structure 
evolved in line with a shifting (factor-based) comparative advantage and changing factor 
endowments as predicted by neoclassical trade theory.
Chapter 8 explores the relationship between interventions, on the one hand, and industry 
expansion of output and the achievement of international competitiveness on the other, 
as asserted by the new trade and governed market model. It employs cross-sectional 
regression analysis to test which (or if either) of the competing interpretations and their 
associated hypotheses are statistically significant. Various proxy variables are used to
7 This is based on the presumption that strong export specialisation implies comparative advantage. As 
Balassa (1965b) noted, a country's export pattern is usually less distorted by trade policies than the 
import pattern. For this reason a country's export pattern is assumed to say something of the 
comparative advantage of an industry (country).
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represent the industry structural characteristics associated with the interpretations 
presented by the competing models.
Chapter 9 assesses whether industry policy interventions have been significant in 
affecting rates of productivity growth, and thus had a pronounced impact on the sectoral 
evolution of the industrial structure. It discusses how rates of total factor productivity 
growth between more or less assisted industries constitutes a test for the empirical 
validity of the infant industry argument. To determine whether the infant industry 
argument is valid, it tests whether there was a systematic tendency for more highly 
assisted industries in Taiwan to have a higher growth of output per unit of input than 
less assisted industries. If rates of productivity change in industry were lower in 
promoted sectors relative to other sectors, this would be evidence that industrial policy 
did not meet its productivity enhancing objective. It also focuses on determining the 
factors explaining Taiwan’s productivity growth over the period 1960-86.
Chapter 10 offers a summary of the thesis and its conclusions, as it seeks to answer the 
questions raised in this introductory chapter.
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- CHAPTER 2 -
THE DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN 
THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF TAIWAN AND KOREA
The object [of government policy] has been to encourage investment on a 
scale sufficient to capture economies of scale where these are important; to 
coordinate the development of backward and forward links so that external 
economies from any one activity are captured within the national unit; and 
to encourage domestic producers to upgrade their technological capability 
by tying some of the incentives to such upgrading. I f  one accepts that 
external economies, economies of scale and learning-curve economies are 
major sources of technological advance and productivity growth, the efforts 
of the state to make sure that market conditions do not obstruct their 
realisation within the national unit take on great significance in explaining 
the superior economic performance of the East Asian three (Wade 
1988:154).
2.1 Introduction
The salient characteristics of East Asian growth have received much attention.1 Yet 
despite the great deal that has been written about the East Asian economies, there is 
little consensus on how to characterise their experience. As Riedel (1988:2) says:
Some explain the East Asian ’miracle' in terms of unique advantages or pre-conditions for 
growth that were not shared by other developing countries; to others, the hand of government 
is more visible than that of the market as the force behind the region's unique success. 
Political scientists also, naturally, put much stock in the role of government, but emphasise the 
importance of the type of government (authoritarian versus democratic) rather than the kind of
1 The Korean experience is the best documented among the East Asian developing countries. See Cole 
and Lyman (1971); Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975); Krueger (1980a); Mason et al. (1980); and Kim 
(1991).
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policies which government's pursued. And finally, for those who are baffled by die plethora of 
conflicting explanations and contradictory evidence, there is refuge in the cultural factor.
Typically then the historical interpretation of the East Asian industrial experience differs 
depending on which paradigm one chooses. Berger (1987:156), for example, states that 
the 'East Asian evidence falsifies the idea that a high degree of state intervention in the 
economy is incompatible with successful capitalist development.' Others view the East 
Asian experience as an exception to the general rule, citing the role of government as 
the important influence in the successful industrialisation experience, but argue that the 
same results could not be emulated elsewhere because of a 'softness of state' 
characterised by weaker political institutions, low administrative capacity, and a high 
risk of 'government failure'. It is, however, difficult to draw definite conclusions about 
the overall effect of the role of government intervention in East Asian development 
despite those that have assigned government the preeminent role, beyond that of 
correcting market failure.2 As Gamaut (1990:10) says, 'it depends on the nature of the 
intervention and of the society and polity within which it operates'.
Yung Chul Park (1990a: 120), in drawing policy lessons from the Taiwan and Korean 
experience, concluded that:
[i]n both Korea and Taiwan, initial conditions, structural, and institutional characteristics have 
been more important than the strategy itself, or development ideologies in shaping the role of 
government. Institutional and structural characteristics explain why Korean planners have 
always sought to adopt increasing return technologies whereas Taiwanese policymakers have 
not. Technology differences in turn brought about differences in the role of government 
between the two countries.
K.T. Li, a chief architect behind much of Taiwan's postwar policy formation has 
remarked that governments were strongly committed to economic development in a 
market context, adopting a pragmatic rather than ideological approach to problem 
solving. Hence:
[pjolicy evolution in Asian countries has been characterised by a continuity, an almost 
irreversible linearity, that almost implies a lack of excitement, less ideological oscillation 
between left and right (1988:147) ... What can almost be called a rejection of ideology lies at 
the heart of a healthy pragmatism that has guided policymakers in Taiwan and has supported a 
social consensus for growth and economic liberalisation (1988:143).
2 Several studies question the neoclassical argument to varying degrees. See for example Mason et al. 
(1980); Westphal (1982); Rhee, Ross Larson and Pursell (1984); Boltho (1984); Cumings (1984); Pack 
and Westphal (1986); Luedde-Neurath (1986); Kuznets (1988); Amsden (1984, 1989); and Wade 
(1990a).
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Of particular importance was the ability of government to determine policies 
independently of various interest groups.3 Many commentators attribute the land reform 
policies implemented by both governments as largely contributing to this ability. Land 
reform measures, in effectively destroying the political power of the landed aristocracy, 
were largely responsible for the subsequent emergence of a commercial and industrial 
middle class as the dominant elite. Importantly, policy decisions were given firm 
backing by political elites for whom economic performance was a central component of 
political legitimation, explicitly invoked in some instances to justify authoritarian rule. 
These political structures have given economic policy uncommon credibility, while 
permitting flexible responses to changing conditions (Haggard 1988:262). The social 
backdrop of relatively weak 'rent-seeking groups of distribution coalitions' enhanced the 
ability of policymakers to launch and sustain policy reforms (Olson 1982).
But the role of government has also differed. Scitovsky argues that while both Taiwan 
and Korea pursued similar economic development strategies, their philosophies guiding 
the strategies were different in some important ways. The most fundamental difference, 
for example, between Taiwan and Korean development philosophies lay in their views 
on what role government should play. Specifically:
the government’s efforts to control private enterprise were more considerable in South Korea 
than in Taiwan. Taiwan certainly implemented a variety of economic controls, but these 
tended to be more selective and less intrusive than in South Korea. Where South Korea tended 
to vigorously enforce an elaborate roster of 'dos' and 'don'ts’, Taiwan aimed instead to create an 
economic environment conducive to growth (Scitovsky 1990:9).
Scitovsky (1990:9) notes that the result of this policy stance in Taiwan was to foster the 
proliferation of small business and keep businesses relatively small. Small firms were 
more adaptable to changing conditions than large ones, and helped to keep the market 
competitive and the entrepreneurial spirit alive. Most importantly though, the plethora 
of small business in Taiwan was significant in reducing income inequality.4 Korean
3 Olson's (1982) theory is posited on the assumption that a free market is efficient, and that inferior 
performance is explained by 'interferences' (by politics and special interest groups) with the free market. 
Olson also argues that social stability engenders social and economic rigidities in the form of 
inefficiency-fostering special interest groups. It is the relative extent to which nations are plagued by 
these interest groups that is the primary determinant of economic growth rates. Thus those present-day 
industrial democracies whose social order was shattered by World War II or other similar 'invasion and 
upheaval' (Olson 1982:5) are those that possess the least entrenched interest groups and enjoy the 
highest rates of economic growth.
4 For studies on Taiwan's income distribution see Chcnery et al. (1974); Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1979); 
Kuznets (1979) and Kuo (1983). Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1979) in particular identify two policies that they 
believe largely explain Taiwan's equitable postwar distribution: land reform in the early 1950s, and the 
switch from import substitution to export-oriented, labour-intensive industrialisation in the early 1960s.
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intervention is generally regarded as having been more pervasive, with the government 
adopting a collaborative and at times coercive role with the private sector. However as 
Datta-Chaudhuri and Westphal point out:
the intervention schemes have worked closely with the market, and the state's alertness in 
using signals emanating from world markets to judge dynamic efficiency has helped keep 
firms on their toes and prevent infant industries from turning into inefficient geriatric 
protection lobbies. However convinced one may be of the pervasiveness of market failures in 
developing countries, one must recognise the vital disciplining function of competition in 
encouraging quick learning and cost and quality consciousness. It is, of course, a paradox of 
liberalism that one needs a strong state (far from the minimalist state of classical liberalism) to 
ensure the operation of dynamic competition (quoted in Bardhan 1990:4).
What remains open to controversy is the significance of the role of government industry 
policy interventions to East Asian success. Grilli and Riedel (1993:5-6) suggest that this 
controversy stems largely from 'the dualistic nature of industrial growth in the early 
phase of rapid growth in East Asian countries [and this] has created a good deal of 
confusion among those who have tried to interpret the East Asian experience and draw 
out policy lessons for other countries'.
Some (Wade 1990a, Amsden 1989) in particular have tended to focus more on the 
direct support given by government to the heavy, import substituting industries, even 
during the period of export-oriented growth, and have concluded that government was 
directly responsible for East Asian success (Grilli and Riedel 1993:5-6). Thus 
disagreement is largely over interpretation and implication for policy.
This chapter discusses the first of two sources of heterodoxy that arose during the 1980s 
to challenge the neoclassical explanation East Asian industrialisation. The competing 
explanations of the importance of industry policy interventions as presented by the 
neoclassical and governed market models are outlined in Section 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively. Section 2.4 in discussing several analytical shortcomings of the 
government market model, questions the empirical validity of this model in satisfactorily 
establishing a relationship for the question it poses, namely the relationship between 
state and strategy. The chapter concludes by highlighting the central hypothesis raised 
by the neoclassical and governed market models as a prelude to assessing which of these 
competing models best explains the role of government in the industrialisation of Taiwan 
and Korea during the 1980s.
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2.2 The Mainstream Neoclassical View
The impressive body of empirical research on trade and industrialisation undertaken in 
the 1970s,5 along with improvements in the theoretical analysis in the 1960s,6 provided a 
devastating critique of 1950s arguments for protection and import substitution strategies 
by documenting 'the failures and disasters of regulatory, interventionist states' (Bardhan 
1990:3). Many of these studies related the economic success stories of the export- 
oriented East Asian economies and that their development accelerated as they liberalised 
their foreign trade regimes and adopted an outward-looking strategy of export 
promotion.
Whereas in the 1950s the literature sought to determine grand theories of why 
underdeveloped countries were underdeveloped, the focus in the 1960s and 1970s 
instead concentrated on the heterogeneity of developing countries. This 'new 
orthodoxy' emphasised not differences in initial conditions but differences in economic 
policies as the principle cause of disparate economic performance of developing 
countries. Inadequate domestic policies, rather than adverse external conditions, 
explained why some countries were not taking advantage of their external economic 
opportunities (Meier 1987). Thus, the proper role for government was one of 
improving and strengthening the market price system, and removal of distortions in 
internal price relations that had resulted from the use of specific controls. Most heavily 
criticised was the strategy of import substituting industrialisation, characterised by 
government-induced price distortions — overvalued currencies, import licensing, high 
tariffs, and varying levels of investment planning. Proponents of import substitution 
policies had appealed to 'dynamic' considerations and infant industry arguments as the 
basis for their departures from free trade, static first-best policies. But the infant 
industry, protected from international competition more often than not failed to become 
self-supporting. Such policies encouraged rent-seeking, distorted investment decisions, 
eroded productive structures, and generally contributed to economic and political 
instability.7 The extent and frequency of market failure, the main justification for trade 
intervention, was considered to have been greatly exaggerated.
5 See for example Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970); Balassa (1971, 1981, 1983); Krueger (1978) 
Bhagwati (1978); and the World Bank (1983, 1987).
6 These included the distinction between domestic and foreign trade distortions (Bhagwati and 
Ramaswami 1963; Johnson 1965); the concept of effective protection; (Balassa 1965a; Corden 1966); 
and the concept of domestic resource cost (Krueger 1966).
7 See Olson (1965) and Krueger (1990b, 1990d).
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A chief contribution of this research also lay in its assertion of the importance of 
appropriate domestic policies in enabling a country to expand its exports. Getting 
policies right essentially meant providing ample scope for prices and markets to work 
well. These policies would include not only trade policies but also supporting policies 
to remove distortions in resource allocation such as:
appropriate pricing policies in the markets for products and factors of production to reflect 
relative scarcities of resources within the country, appropriate macroeconomic policies to 
control domestic inflation and correct the overvaluation of the exchange rate, and appropriate 
investment policies for social overhead capital to bring out the potential comparative 
advantage (Myint 1987:116).
Those who highlighted the problems of interventionist industry policy did not argue that 
the state has no role to play in the process of industrial restructuring. Contemporary 
mainstream neoclassical discussions (Chapter 9, Corden 1974) in fact argued that 
'dynamic' economies provided the strongest, if not the only valid, reason for promoting 
industrialisation in the sense of allocating resources between industries on a 
discriminatory basis. But selective intervention is not advocated 'because dynamic 
economies are not seen to imply market failures that could best be overcome by using it 
to foster international competitiveness' (Pack and Westphal 1986:107). Rather, 
contention centred on the appropriate forms of government intervention to mitigate 
dynamic market failure. Parametric measures (across the board R&D incentives, 
provision of training facilities, incentives to develop a broad-based venture capital 
market and other such direct methods) were advocated rather than industry and firm- 
specific interventions, which are thought to be less effective in offsetting dynamic 
market failure.
Also stressed are the dynamic arguments associated with a country pursuing its 
comparative advantage. In particular, rates of total factor productivity growth were 
much faster in countries with outward-oriented trade strategies than countries with 
import substitution (World Bank 1993). As Krueger (1993c:27-8) points out, reasons 
for more rapid total factor productivity growth may be several:
the ability of low-cost producers to increase their share, and expand beyond the scale of the 
domestic market; the more competitive environment, and the incentives provided by it for 
finding more efficient ways of combining inputs; and the more productive utilisation of newly- 
accumulated resources with it, the more rapid rate of shift of the labour force toward more 
productive employment. In addition, there is at least a once-and-for-all increase in output per 
unit of input as firms increase their rate of capacity utilisation. This occurs both because 
import licensing regimes under import substitution constrained firms to fewer intermediate 
goods than would have been purchased had firms not been quantity-constrained and because
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some firms are enabled to concentrate their production in one or a few lines, and produce 
profitably (at least covering marginal cost) for export.
An outward-oriented trade strategy thus provided considerably greater advantages than 
was earlier recognised. The cause of persistent low productivity and therefore low 
economic growth observed in the underdeveloped world, especially in those countries 
pursuing import substitution policies, was insufficient competitive pressure. An export- 
oriented trade regime in contrast, tended to encourage the expansion of industries where 
comparative advantage lay by concentrating resources in a country’s most productive 
industries. Competition induced much greater attention to costs, and considerably 
greater effort towards reducing them, than did a sheltered domestic environment 
Moreover, export growth assisted the process of ’catching up’ technologically by 
allowing the imports of goods embodying new technology and the increasing overseas 
contact which accompanied trade introduced firms to new ideas on production and 
management. There was thus a "virtuous trade cycle’ linking trade expansion to 
technological improvement and back to trade expansion again" (Gamaut 1989:43).
Neoclassicists stressed that the economically successful economies were by and large 
those that had got their prices right and had not greatly inhibited market signals driving 
resource allocation. To adopt the World Bank (1987:71) definition 'they had maintained 
a competitive exchange rate and implemented policies that do not in aggregate 
discriminate between broad groups of industrial activity'.8 The most important prices to 
get right were those 'governing incentives for export, relative to production for the 
home markets'. 'Open foreign exchange policies and regimes were also important for 
getting the foreign trade prices right' (Garnaut 1990:14-5). The appropriate role for 
government in allocating resources between industries was then to adopt a sectorally 
neutral role, avoiding the policy of industrial targeting.
Mainstream neoclassical economics or 'the establishment' to use Pack and Westphal's 
(1986) phrase, also successfully popularised the theory of changing comparative 
advantage as the central element in the framework for analysing industrial development. 
The doctrine of comparative advantage, originally enunciated by Ricardo, isolated 
differences in technology as the source of differences in relative costs of production that 
provided a basis for trade. Hence the comparative advantage case for free trade simply 
stated that unless a country has a monopoly power in trade, it would attain a higher
8 However, as the World Bank stressed '[GJetting the prices right ... should not necessarily be 
interpreted as an argument for a laissez faire approach’. Similarly 'getting policies right’ should not be 
taken to justify wholesale government intervention (Agarwala 1983:46).
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level of welfare if it permitted trade at international prices, producing those 
commodities that are comparatively cheaper at home and exchanging them for those 
that would be relatively more expensive to produce (Krueger 1990:69). The Ricardian 
theory of comparative advantage thus has a very clear implication: trade generates gains 
by allowing specialisation between countries.
The comparative advantage case for free trade though was independent of why there 
may exist cost differences (Krueger 1990c). Comparative advantage could arise from 
factor endowments differences (Heckscher, Ohlin and Samuelson), from differences in 
technology (for whatever reason), product differentiation with increased market size, or 
for other reasons (Krueger 1990c:70). The Heckscher-Ohlin theory as one such 
determinant of comparative advantage was 'presented explicitly as a contribution to the 
'positive' theory as an attempt to explaining the structure of foreign trade, rather than 
with a view to establishing welfare propositions of trade theory' (Bhagwati 1964:18). 
Warr (1992a:4) notes that while the assumptions underlying the classical theory of 
comparative advantage have rightly been challenged, the literature has also shown how 
the concept of comparative advantage has been modified without requiring the 
abandonment of the central analytical principle — the emphasis on costs. The gains 
from trade thus resulted from differences in comparative costs, with such gains being 
present even when comparative advantage was not based on resource endowments.
Beyond such broad principles there were no theoretical criteria that governments can 
use to predict the industries in which a country will become internationally competitive. 
As Bhagwati (1964:4) discussed, the Ricardian model represented an idealisation 
which affords a significant clue to the structure of foreign trade. There are a number of 
propositions concerning the pattern of trade. These theories provide alternative 
explanations of the pattern of trade and 'should be distinguished clearly between the 
formulations as deductive, analytical propositions (which are logically true under a 
specified set of sufficient conditions) and formulations as testable hypotheses.’
2.2.1 The Taiwan and Korean Experience
Several factors have been treated with differing degrees of emphasis by neoclassicists 
as being major contributions to Taiwan and Korea's overall economic performance. 
The standard, and probably most important explanation of Taiwan's spectacular growth 
in exports is that the foreign trade regime made exporting profitable (Lee and Liang
21
1982; Little 1979; Ranis 1979; Scott 1979). As described by Ranis and Mahmood 
(1992:4):
A more pronounced external orientation and the greater willingness to subject themselves to 
the competitive discipline of the market are identified as the major contributory factors to 
their relative success. This has made them more successful by instilling in them a flexibility, 
a sensitivity to technological change, and an ability to adjust to the (inevitable) exogenous 
shocks, which are the hallmarks of the industrially advanced market economies.
Deyo (1987:227), while sympathetic to a more statist view of East Asian development, 
notes also that 'given the extent to which these small and relatively open economies 
rely on foreign markets, capital, and technology, responsive flexibility may indeed be 
the fundamental explanation for their continued economic growth'.
Empirical evidence indicated that these countries had adopted outward-looking 
strategies, whereby their aggregate (economy-wide or average) effective incentives for 
exports came close to matching aggregate effective incentives for import substitution 
(Lee and Liang 1982; Westphal and Kim 1982).9 Hence, a relatively neutral trade 
regime enabled exporters to compete with foreign competition in world markets on an 
equal footing in regard to undistorted markets and policies. And although a variety of 
policy measures (preferential access to rationed credit, tax breaks etc) were designed to 
stimulate export growth, especially in the early years as the policy reforms were started, 
incentives were almost entirely uniform and across the board, in the sense that they 
applied to all exporters. The hallmark of trade policy, therefore, was a lack of 
discrimination among export activities. Moreover, as exports grew in importance, 
policy makers increasingly found that it was costly to rely on tax credits, credit 
rationing, or export subsidies, and there was a tendency to place increasing reliance on a 
uniform realistic exchange rate as the principal means of encouraging exports (Krueger 
1993c: 17-8). It was stressed that, even when these countries did countenance the 
emergence of new activities with government support (more often in the form of access 
to credit and tax incentives than in the form of protection), it was always expected that 
those industries would become competitive exporters. In Korea, export performance 
has been important as the practical yardstick for monitoring progress toward the 
objective of international competitiveness. Infant industries have been expected to 
begin exporting soon after commencing production (Pack and Westphal 1986).
9 In Balassa et al. (1982).
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Ranis and Mahmood (1992:116-7) argue that the Taiwan government was active in the 
creation of a favourable environment to economic growth, but successfully resisted the 
temptation to push growth beyond its 'natural levels', maintaining policy flexibility in 
response to changing economic conditions. Fiscal and monetary policy remained 
restrained and flexible, and the government resisting the temptation to intervene 
heavily. To the extent that it did intervene it exhibited the political courage of relying 
on overt rather than covert means of transferring resources either to itself or private 
interest groups. The end result was not only a consistent increase in Taiwan's external 
orientation, but much higher average rates of growth, achieved with an egalitarian 
distribution of income. Moreover, competitive primary input markets, together with an 
outward-looking development strategy, resulted during the 1960s and 1970s in full 
employment despite increasing populations and raising labour force participation. A 
relatively undistorted labour market that, along with some movement toward market 
rates of interest (especially in Taiwan), kept the wage-rental ratio closer to its scarcity 
value than in other developing countries (Pack 1993:297). Impressive rates of real 
wage increases were generally consistent with higher real growth rates.
Also important was that the process of gradual liberalisation continued, and in some 
cases even accelerated, during economic downturns: 'the rapid advent of tax reforms 
once deficits disappeared, the raising of nominal interest rates once inflation 
threatened, quick adjustments in nominal exchange rates to keep real exchange rates at 
realistic levels, institutional reforms in financial markets, and continuous reductions in 
trade restrictions all attest to this' (Ranis and Mahmood 1992:129).
It is thought difficult to attribute Taiwan's economic success solely to government 
intervention given the existence of these factors. Initially, the relative ease of 
acquiring and mastering the relevant technology, the combination of low wages and a 
foreign exchange regime neutral between production for the domestic and foreign 
markets is probably a sufficient explanation of the early rapid growth in labour- 
intensive exports (Ranis 1992:83). In then moving into the production of new 
products, the explanation for success is that substantial investment, made possible by 
the growing domestic saving rate and to a much lesser extent by foreign investment 
(Ranis and Schive 1985) were directed to sectors along the ladder of comparative 
advantage as measured by domestic resource cost (Ranis 1992:83).
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Pack (1993) notes that until the 1970s, it is likely that much of the growth in 
productivity was the unplanned consequence of getting the prices right.10 Neither 
Korea nor Taiwan employed explicit technology policies,* 11 so that technology policy 
was implicit in the standard economic responses, stimulating further growth in 
production and exports as a consequence of reduced production costs (Pack 1993:296). 
The ability of these two countries to close the productivity gap was thus the result of 
firms' responses to the incentives contained in national economic policies. The 
response to these incentives led to a set of favourable but unintended technological 
consequences. For example, as a result of the rapid rates of export growth that these 
policies encouraged, there was a substantial inflow of non-proprietary technology, 
embodied in equipment and in the knowledge provided by customers (Westphal, Rhee, 
and Pursell 1981).12
However, while the initial choice of appropriate labour-intensive technologies and 
sectors in response to relatively undistorted price signals was important in achieving 
both output and employment growth in the early decades of rapid growth, the ability to 
adjust to a rapidly growing capital-labour ratio, growing real wages, and changing 
international product markets, required considerable flexibility (Pack 1992a: 102). 
Without the corresponding investment in human capital, the economy would have been 
forced, despite its rapid capital accumulation, to remain with more traditional sectors 
and technologies, yielding a lower rate of return on new investment than was in fact 
realised (Pack 1992a: 103). A characteristic feature of Taiwan's development was that 
the growing level of education and investment were complementary in permitting a 
shifting industrial structure, altering the constellation of production possibilities.
A more explicit policy towards technology acquisition appeared in the 1970s (Pack 
1993:297). In Korea, selected credit and other instruments were employed to 
encouraged the growth of large firms. As domestic real wages rose and lower-wage 
competitors entered the international market, large Korean firms were encouraged to 
acquire the technological capacity to enter the sectors that were more capital and 
technology-intensive and to achieve best-practice productivity (Pack and Westphal
10 Dollar and Sokoloff (1990), for instance, find that total factor productivity growth in labour- 
intensive sectors in Korea exceeded that in the capital-intensive sectors.
11 An exception in the case of Korea was the restrictions placed on direct foreign investment and 
technology licensing agreements. In Taiwan, foreign investment and technical cooperation agreements 
began to increase in the mid-1960s and 1970s.
12 Westphal, Rhee and Pursell (1981) find that a considerable amount of the knowledge of production 
engineering possessed by Korean firms came from purchases of Korean exports. Scott (1979:367) 
reports some evidence of a similar mechanism in Taiwan.
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1986). Information about production technology in these more complex producer 
goods sectors was likely to be more closely guarded than in the consumer goods 
industries, and importers in industrial countries were less likely to transfer such 
technology. The Korean government during the 1980s encouraged firms to obtain 
technology licences, acquire advanced equipment, and engage in their own R&D. In 
Taiwan, the transfer of knowledge in the consumer industries in which the early export 
drive period was concentrated, was similar to that in Korea. But in entering newer 
areas, the government did not encourage the growth of large-scale firms. The 
industrial structure was characterised by small firms, reflecting the prevalence of high 
interest rates and the limited use of selective credit directed to large firms. Therefore, 
Taiwan utilised technology diffusion institutions (such as the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute) to introduce new technologies, develop new products and processes, 
diffuse knowledge, and scan international markets for both products and processes. 
Moreover, the ability to attract back Taiwan nationals or to utilise the knowledge of 
those who remained abroad has been critical since the 1980s (Pack 1992a).
2.3 The Governed Market Model
Since the early 1980s, an alternative explanation has emerged which has sought to 
explain the economic success of the major East Asian economies as depending on the 
active involvement of the state. The neoclassical explanation has been challenged by a 
'statist counter-revolution', a theoretically eclectic group which has sought to reinterpret 
the dynamism of the East Asian economies as flowing from 'the logic of the 
development state' (Onis 1991). This view, in drawing its initial inspiration from the 
parallel literature on Japanese economic success, suggests that contrary to neoclassical 
accounts, one crucial factor explaining rapid growth and structural flexibility has been 
a strong, developmentalist state. The state's commitment to economic expansion and, 
more important, its capacity to implement well-chosen development strategies 
differentiate these countries from other developing countries (Wade 1990a:228).
The concept of the development state was first put forward by Johnson (1982) in the 
context of Japan,13 and variants of it have been used to a greater or lesser degree by
13 Johnson (1982) in originating the expression 'corporate state' or 'development state' attributes Japan's 
postwar industrial growth to the 'special nature' of the government's approach to policy making, which 
in turn is thought to result from Japan's historical experience. In particular, the interventionist role of 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in influencing corporate decision making and 
other commercial outcomes is considered to largely explain Japan's strong industrial performance. 
Abegglen (1970) had earlier used the expression 'Japan Inc.' to describe a similar relationship.
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several authors.14 These include Amsden (1989, 1991); White (1988); Wade15 (1988, 
1990a); Jones and SaKong (1980); Deyo (1987, 1989); Lee and Naya (1988); and Lee 
(1992). Various terms such as 'revisionist', 'statist', 'new political economy', 
'developmentalist state' have been applied to this literature. The term used in the present 
study to encapsulate the central tenets of this literature is the 'governed market model' 
which has its origins in Wade (1990a), one of the more prominent proponents in the 
context of the Taiwan experience. While differences exist among authors, all challenge 
two central features of the neoclassical account. First, attention is drawn to the fact that 
the East Asian economies are characterised by widespread sector-specific interventions 
(Amsden 1989; Wade 1990a, 1990b). Second, it is argued that the reason why the state 
in East Asia has not fallen prey to the rent-seeking proclivities of societal groups has to 
do with the particular institutional arrangements which it employs to insulate itself from 
such groups (Haggard 1990) (Islam 1992:70).
The political economy 'governed market' approach 'treats capital accumulation as the 
principal general force for economic growth' (Wade 1990a:297). East Asian success is 
interpreted as the result of a higher level and different composition of investment from 
what neoclassical policies would have produced, and different also from what the 
'interventionist' economic policies pursued by many other less developed countries 
would have produced. The difference in investment is due, in important if  difficult to 
quantify (emphasis added) part, to government actions to constrain and accelerate the 
competitive process' (Wade 1990a:297).
In particular, the superiority of East Asian economic performance is considered to have 
resulted from the combination of high levels of productive investment enabling a more 
rapid transfer of newer techniques into actual production; more investment in certain 
key industries than would have occurred in the absence of government intervention; 
and exposure of many industries to international competition, in foreign markets if not 
at home. These features are themselves considered the result of a set of government
Similarly Kuznets (1988) has described the expression 'Korea Inc.’ as a more apt description of 
government-business relations in Korea than in Japan.
14 Many of these authors have also made much use of the neoclassical paradigm.
15 Wade argues that the ’development state’ theory of East Asian industrial success (Johnson 1982) 'is 
not, however, much of a theory'. Wade (1990a:26) contends that its specification of institutional 
arrangements is descriptive rather than comparative-analytic, so what the developmental state is 
contrasted with is not so clear. It also says little about the nature of policies and their impact on 
industrial performance. Instead, Wade contends the governed market theory builds on both the idea of 
the development state and on the older development economics understanding of the nature of the 
development problem.
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economic policies, involving incentives, controls and other mechanisms to spread risk. 
These policies are thought to have enabled the government to guide or govern market 
processes of resource allocation so as to produce different production and investment 
outcomes than would have occurred with either free market or simulated free market 
policies.16 In turn, these polices were supported by a certain kind of organisation of the 
state and the private sector. In particular, the corporatist and authoritarian political 
arrangements of East Asia have provided the basis for market guidance. Market 
guidance was effected by augmenting the supply of investible resources, spreading or 
'socialising' the risks attached to long-term investment, and steering the allocation of 
investment by methods which combine government and entrepreneurial preferences 
(Wade 1990a:27).
Sectoral histories are drawn upon to provide evidence of government leadership in 
such sectors as cotton textiles, synthetic fibres, plastics, petrochemicals, basic metals, 
shipbuilding, machine tools, automobiles and industrial electronics. For example, 
government intervention of a 'leadership kind is considered to have focused on 
industries which are capital intensive (steel, petrochemicals), or which use technology 
that must be imported from a small number of potential suppliers (Wade 1990a:303). 
'Leadership is concentrated on industries that are expected to become internationally 
competitive but have not yet become so, and on industries which, though losing 
international competitiveness, the government considers important for future growth 
(Wade 1990a:303-5). This view is tempered by the disclaimer that, while not implying 
government intervention has necessarily been effective in promoting economic growth, 
it cannot be dismissed as having made a negligible difference to outcomes.
But in acknowledging that the theoretical basis for a selective industrial strategy is less 
well developed than that which supports a non-interventionist approach, the governed 
market model contends that this merely reflects the neoclassical emphasis on trade rather 
than technological change as the central process of industrialisation (Wade 1988:152-3).
16 Wade (1990a:24) concentrating primarily, but not exclusively, on the Taiwanese experience, 
distinguishes two variants of the neoclassical interpretation of East Asian development. The free 
market theory which says that markets for goods and factors of production were freer than in other 
countries, and the simulated free market theory which recognises the existence of market distortions 
and industrial policies in East Asia, but says that industrial policies merely offset existing market 
distortions, creating overall neutrality in resource allocation. The 'simulated free market differs from 
the Tree market' theory in terms of the distinction between a free (or liberal) trade regime and a neutral 
trade regime. The former is open with no or few impediments to imports; the latter is one where any 
incentive for domestic producers to sell on the domestic market rather than export, because of 
protection, is offset by export subsidies.’
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When technological change is made the centrepiece, an economic rationale for 
selective promotion follows from two propositions. The first is that national 
comparative advantage is not simply the result of given endowments of resources, but 
also results from government promotion. The second is that some sectors have major 
'externalities', in the sense that the people affected by a decision about production and 
price go far beyond the buyer and seller (Wade 1988:153). The governments of East 
Asia (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) have acted as though externalities were very important 
in some sectors, which have then been treated as part of the industrial infrastructure' 
(Wade 1988:153). The governed market model then, like that of the new trade 
literature, emphasises that effective learning in developing countries requires sector- 
specific intervention involving preferential finance and various measures of protection 
(Wade 1990a). Wade, for example offers this ex post explanation for East Asian 
industrialisation:
Some of their industrial policies make sense as an attempt to lower entry barriers and thereby 
allow quick capture of economies of scale and leaming-by-doing —  in other words, as an 
attempt to use public resources and influence to offset the effects of both deficient capital 
markets and limited internal firm capacity to generate the capital necessary to finance new 
ventures. Some make sense as an attempt to capture externalities (or spillover effects) within 
national boundaries. In the absence of intervention these externalities would result in slower 
productivity gains due to underinvestment in research and development, human capital, and 
leaming-by-doing. Externalities may also cause inadequate investment in relatively capital- 
intensive activities with significant scale economies, when profitable entry to a new upstream 
(downstream) activity is precluded by die nonexistence of downstream (upstream) buyers or 
suppliers ... (Wade 1990b:262).
In another variant of the statist view, Amsden (1989) argues that Korea and Taiwan 
belong to a subset of developing countries which are characterised as late 
industrialisers. Along with Brazil, Turkey, India and Mexico, they have in common 
industrialisation on the basis of learning, which in turn has conditioned how 
governments have behaved. In particular, these countries have industrialised by 
borrowing foreign technology rather than by generating new products and processes, the 
hallmark of earlier industrialisation. While concentrating on the Korean experience, 
Amsden makes the stronger claim that:
At issue is not merely the quibble that the government of Taiwan has intervened far more in 
the Taiwan economy than liberal economists who champion export-led growth acknowledge. 
The point, rather, is that the government of Taiwan has never been guided by free-market 
principle as such; so to attribute Taiwan's success to a commitment to such principles, whether 
in theory or practice, is misleading (Amsden 1985:90).
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The state is similarly considered to have acted as the key agent in the process of capital 
accumulation. Through the allocation of subsidies the government has acted not only 
as a banker, but also as an entrepreneur, using the subsidy to decide what, when, and 
how much to produce (Amsden 1989:143-4). Moreover, it has deliberately distorted 
the price structure by way of subsidies, protection, price controls, and restrictions on 
finance and investment. The end result has been an industrial structure different from 
what the market would have produced. The actions of the Korean state have also been 
complemented by large, diversified business groups which occupied a dominant 
position in the economy. Their size and level of diversification meant they were less 
subject to the discipline of the market than to the discipline of managerial hierarchies.
The most controversial of these contentions is that the state intervened to foster 
development through the creation of multiple prices for loans —  the implication being 
that a repressed financial system facilitates rapid economic growth (Amsden 1989, 
1991; Wade 1988, 1990a). Credit, it is argued, was allocated by the government to 
selected firms at negative real interest rates in order to stimulate specific industries. 
Amsden (1989) argues that the Korean government established multiple interest rates 
for loans, only one of which could have been 'right' according to the law of supply and 
demand. The credit-based financial system was used as a political device to assist 
governments in the implementation of industrial strategy. In addition, importers and 
exporters faced different prices for foreign currency. Amsden (1989:144) contends that 
while 'exchange rates were not grossly distorted, they did succeed in stimulating exports 
only when they operated in conjunction with other policies. Exports have heavily 
subsidised and coerced, so inside the range of reasonableness, the relative price of 
foreign exchange has been altogether irrelevant'. By intervening to establish multiple 
prices in the same market, the state cannot be said to have gotten relative prices 'right'. 
Rather, it is considered to have set relative prices deliberately 'wrong' in order to create 
profitable investment opportunities (Amsden 1989:13-4). Therefore, insofar as there is 
a single symbol that is the distinguishing feature of latecomers, it is the subsidy, which 
changed the process whereby relative prices are determined (Amsden 1989:143-4). 
But what distinguishes the experience of East Asia is that the state exercised discipline 
over subsidy recipients. In exchange for subsidies, the state imposed performance 
standards on private firms.
As late industrialisers, much of the technological change in Korea and Taiwan has 
consisted of assimilating and adapting foreign technology, based on learning-curve 
economies as firms acquire technological mastery over a newly introduced technology
29
(Westphal 1982; Pack and Westphal 1986; Amsden 1989).17 Acting as the central 
agent, the government's role in selectively intervening to promote infant industries is 
interpreted as aiming to overcome constraints on the private sector’s ability to acquire 
the technical, institutional, and marketing wherewithal needed to achieve and maintain 
international competitiveness. In other words, technological change is seen as having 
been the focus of selective intervention.18
The government is also perceived as having successfully overcome market failure 
caused by imperfect knowledge and capital market imperfections by being directly 
involved in investment decisions, through allocating credit as well as through 
establishing public enterprises (Pack and Westphal 1986) in a deliberate effort to adapt 
technology. According to Wade (1990a:354-55):
One would expect that if prices and quantities are left wholly to the instabilities of the market, 
investment in industries or technologies which require a large commitment of time or capital 
may not be made, and a higher than desirable proportion of the economy's investment will go 
into quick return projects. Individual firms on their own may be more inclined to stick within 
a narrow range of familiar product lines than branch out into new industries or products ... 
Again a role for industrial targeting can be warranted by the fact of differences between 
industries in prospects for long-term growth in output, profits, and wages. Unassisted 
entrepreneurs may not have either the foresight or access to capital to follow long-term 
potential. Their decisions may lock the country into specialisation in industries with inferior 
prospects (an issue beyond the scope of comparative advantage theory).
2.3.1 Incentive Regime
There are features of the industrial experience of Taiwan and Korea that proponents of 
the governed market model agree fit the neoclassical accounts better than the political 
economy governed market theory (Wade 1990a:71-72). It is agreed, for example, that 
many of the conditions prescribed by neoclassical economics were present in Taiwan 
by the early 1960s. Generally, it is agreed that the real exchange rate has been kept 
relatively stable and undistorted, and that the economy was outward-oriented in the 
sense that the inequality between incentives for producers to sell abroad or on the 
domestic market has not been significant (exports have not been discriminated against).
17 The work of Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) is thought to support the proposition that the more 
successful European latecomers used a political mechanism to channel the competitive process in the 
direction of higher-wage and higher-technology activities.
18 The concept of technology is a broad one encompassing not only technical knowledge but 
knowledge of procedural and organisational (institutional) arrangements for carrying out the 
transformations (Pack and Westphal 1986).
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But beyond this, statists claim that the neoclassicists have some of their crucial facts 
wrong about individual country cases (Wade 1990a; Alam 1989; Amsden 1989; and 
Luedde-Neurath 1988). Others argue with evidence that price distortions do not in fact 
correlate closely with inward or outward-oriented trade regimes or with measures of 
national economic performance (Bradford 1984). This questions the proposition that 
market liberalisation could have been the driving force behind the success of East Asia.
The governed market model argues that the empirical research used to support the 
neoclassical explanation is characterised by methodological weaknesses. Proponents 
claim that the level of assistance was much higher than the figures indicate and that the 
dispersion in assistance levels to different industries was also much higher. Reference 
is made in particular to the Lee and Liang's (1982) study of Taiwan's incentive 
structure for 1969 and Westphal and Kim's (1982) study of Korea’s trade regime for 
1968.19 These studies concluded that Taiwan and Korea on average have a neutral 
trade regime. Export subsidies offset the incentive bias of protection, resulting in no 
overall discrimination in favour of importables and against exports. However, the 
governed market model argues, firstly, that these studies have predominantly relied on 
implicit rates of assistance rather than weighted average tariff rates in estimating 
nominal rates of assistance. As the weighted average tariff rates were considerably 
higher than the implicit rates, the levels of nominal assistance, it is argued, have been 
underestimated.20 Secondly, a high proportion of items in both the Korean and Taiwan 
price comparison sample had negative price differences between international and 
domestic prices.21 Most of these were included at zero rates of protection rather than 
excluded on the grounds of quality differences. According to the governed market
19 In Balassa et al. (1982).
20 The procedure adopted by the authors of these studies in selecting the relevant rate of nominal 
assistance for export commodities was similar to that usually employed in studies of this nature. That 
is, if the export price of a commodity was greater than or equal to the domestic price of the 
commodity, the nominal rate of assistance was taken to equal zero. The implicit assumption of these 
studies was the commodity did not enjoy any benefits of the assistance and the tariff assistance was 
thus redundant.
21 Wade, however, is prone to exaggerate the extent to which the number of items whose world prices 
exceeded domestic prices were taken to be zero. Wade argues that 39 per cent of these items had 
negative price differentials (domestic price lower than the international price). 'But most (emphasis 
added) of them (amounting to 25 per cent of the whole sample) are included at zero protection. This 
procedure produces a lower average level of protection than would have resulted had they excluded the 
items with negative price differentials on the grounds that the two halves of the comparison are not 
really the same item because of quality differences. On the other hand, had they included the items at 
negative rates the average would have been still lower’ (Wade 1990a: 115). However, while 39 per 
cent (or 230 of the 587 commodities) had negative price differentials, only 25 per cent (not most) of 
this sample (45 of this 230 commodities) were taken at zero rates.
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model, caution is required in accepting the conclusion that protection in the domestic 
market has generally been quite low by international standards.
Thirdly, interindustry dispersion around the average level of subsidy is considered to 
have been quite high relative to other developing countries. The governed market 
model asserts then that to rely on economy-wide average levels of subsidy is incorrect 
since they conceal substantive trade biases for individual industries. The estimated 
effective rate of subsidy for Korea in 1968 revealed substantial export biases in 
established industries, with the more capital and technology-intensive industries being 
characterised by import substitution biases.22 At the same time, the effective rate of 
subsidy for total sales across industries showed a strong bias toward import competing 
industries. The same pattern of incentives was discernible in a similar study on Korea by 
Nam (1981) for 1978. Similarly, the effective rate of subsidy for Taiwan in 1969 
revealed export biases in established industries, whereas capital and technology-intensive 
industries were characterised generally by import substitution biases.
The governed market model argues that resource pulls created by government policies 
had the net effect of favouring export sales in export industries while they had the net 
effect of favouring domestic market sales in import competing industries (Biggs and 
Levy 1988:22; Alam 1989:31-4; Wade 1990a:116) The trade regime was therefore 
dualistic whereby export production enjoyed near free trade status while domestic 
production was protected with the aim of encouraging the rapid development of 
comparative advantage in more capital and technology-intensive industries. In 
particular, they stress that the dispersion of the effective rate of subsidy implies 
intersectoral differences. What the governed market model contends is that this 
dispersion results from intended differences between industries rather than from 
accidental causes.
22 But as Biggs and Levy (1988:15) point out, Westphal and Kim (1982:232-4), in fact, concluded that 
'the government has subsidised exports that were inefficiently produced ... through high nominal 
protection on the domestic market'. Pack and Westphal (1986) go further, suggesting that 'inefficiently 
produced' exports often were exports from infant industries. As they put i t , '... the Korean government 
discriminated in its treatment between established internationally competitive industries and new, 
infant industries that were deemed worthy of promotion ... Something closely approximating neutrality 
has characterised the government's policies affecting the established industries but there has been 
substantial bias in favour of the promoted infant industries (1982:94).
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2.3.2 Industrial Structure
The governed market model also disputes Taiwan as a model of 'fast-growth-cum-small- 
scale capitalism'. Amsden (1989:164) argues that the small enterprises cannot be 
credited with developing the forces of production in late industrialising countries, even 
in Taiwan. Large state enterprises in the early phases of development in Taiwan 
accounted for a large share of industrial output, and while this share declined over time, 
they were first movers in such industries as cement, iron and steel, shipbuilding, 
fertilisers, heavy machinery, and machine tools (Amsden 1985). Similarly, Wade 
contends that the small unit size of Taiwan's manufacturing sector can easily be 
exaggerated. Taiwan's dualistic industrial structure is thought to be densely 
interconnected, so that the export success of the smaller firms cannot be understood 
independently of the productive performance of large firms. While acknowledging 
small and medium enterprises have been the major exporters, the large firms were also 
important indirect exporters in their role as suppliers of inputs to small and medium 
scale firms. The role of state enterprises was also seen as an important training ground 
for economic leadership in the central state bureaucracy. Therefore, economic policy 
formulation in Taiwan grows out of a 'little understood but apparently vigorous policy 
network which links the central economic bureaus with public enterprises (and) public 
banks’ (Wade 1990a:97).23
In emphasising the importance of 'government leadership' in Taiwan's industrial 
development Wade (1990b:249) notes that:
to say there has been a long-term decline [in government leadership] is not to say that 
government leadership today is unimportant. The government still intervenes in a leadership 
role to push the international competitiveness of industries it identifies as important, as in 
autos and semi-conductors. Leadership is applied to a shifting band of industries, (emphasis 
added)
The state is thought to have anticipated shifts in comparative advantage and intervened 
aggressively to develop national champions for international markets. But while 
acknowledged within the literature that the Taiwan state operates effectively with a less 
dense set of public-private network ties than the Korean or Japanese versions of the 
development state (Evans 1992:161), its lack of embeddedness should not, according to
23 But Wade then acknowledges that the organisation of firms —  their size, the way they grow, their 
methods of doing business, and the relationships between them —  is a major gap in his analysis. 'Any 
discussion of an economy's development should give a central place to the organisation of firms and 
industries. But since little evidence is available on this subject for Taiwan, and since my primary 
interest is the uses of public power, I say little more about if  (Wade 1990a:70).
33
Wade (1988, 1990a), be exaggerated for the reason that the relationship between the 
government's bureaucracy (notably the Industrial Development Bureau) and Taiwan 
firms closely resembles MITI's 'administrative guidance'. As in Johnson's model of 
Japanese industrial development, a parsimonious characterisation of Taiwan's model of 
the development state would similarly include an elite bureaucracy staffed by the best 
managerial talent in the system and an authoritarian political system, whereby the 
political exclusion of the labour movement provides the elite bureaucracy with 
sufficient scope to implement policy initiatives. Wade (1984:70) states for example 
that Taiwan's experience suggests that while government officials anywhere can be 
obstructive of economic progress, once they are geared to promoting technological 
change they can facilitate industrialisation by exercising foresight in a way that the 
ordinary businessman simply could not afford to cultivate'.
But while Wade's (1988:153) policy prescription based on the Taiwan experience 
asserts that 'an exogenous (non-market) force is needed to favour such shifts',24 the 
degree of government involvement he advocates in this process is ambiguous:
...when the international productivity frontier is itself advancing rapidly (electronics), the time 
needed for an infant industry to catch up may be long and the amount of assistance large. 
This strengthens the case for selective rather than across the board assistance ... the existence 
of externalities or spillovers, means market prices may not adequately signal the 
interdependence that exists among these investment decisions, and uncoordinated firms may 
invest at suboptimal levels from a national perspective. A big push, involving simultaneous 
expansion of several industries, can ensure the profitability of each investment, even though 
each on its own would be unprofitable. One important reason is that such simultaneous 
expansion helps to overcome the constraint of a small domestic market, when entry and 
participation in world trade entails significant costs (Wade 1990a:352-3).
2.3.3 Authoritarian States
All proponents of the developmentalist state emphasise the virtues of a strong state in 
being able to formulate and implement policies broadly in line with societal interest, as 
contributing to East Asian growth. The characteristic features of the Japanese policy­
making process are believed to provide the archetypical institutional mechanisms of the 
strong, developmental state — limiting conflict between major economic interest 
groups and promoting continuity of institutional forms, both of which helped sustain 
high levels of investment, and protected the central bureaucracy from interest groups.
24 This is reminiscent of the earlier writings of Nurkse and Hirschman.
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As the original proponent, Johnson (1982) argued in the case of Japan, and then 
extended the argument to Korea and Taiwan, that state intervention in East Asian 
capitalist countries relied on organisational and institutional links between politically 
insulated state development agencies and major private-sec tor firms (Johnson 1987).25 
Controls over access to credit, export licenses and foreign exchange, enabled public 
agencies to manipulate systematically economic incentives in accordance with 
changing strategic goals. The efficacy of intervention was amplified through the 
fostering of powerful, state-linked, private-sector conglomerates, banks, and trading 
organisations that tended to dominate strategic economic sectors (Deyo 1987:19).26 In 
the case of Taiwan, Wade (1990a:29) also emphasises the 'developmental virtues a 
hard or soft authoritarian state in corporatist relations with the private sector, able to 
confer enough autonomy on a centralised bureaucracy for it to influence resource 
allocation in line with a long-term national interest —  which sometimes conflicts with 
short-run profit maximising'. According to Amsden (1989), Korea has an outstanding 
growth record because the institutions on which late industrialisation is based have been 
managed differently and have functioned more effectively than elsewhere.
All share the view that an authoritarian political system typically entailing the political 
exclusion of the labour movement, enabled an elite bureaucracy staffed with the best 
talent, sufficient scope to take policy initiatives. However, practitioners vary in the 
importance they attach to these features. Ng and Fong (1993) conclude that the quality 
of intervention was a critical factor in Korea's successful industrial policy — a capable 
bureaucracy responsive to a determined and focused government was able to direct a 
nationalist entrepreneurial class to new activities.27 Lee (1992) and Lee and Nay a 
(1988) focus on the nature of government-business relations in East Asia, suggesting 
that the East Asian developmental state is best viewed as a 'quasi-internal organisation'. 
There are two variants of the quasi-internal organisation, one in which the state operates 
as an 'internal capital market' and channels subsidised credit to carefully targeted firms 
and industries, and the other in which the state develops a subtle network of long-term 
ties with the corporate sector (Islam 1992:76-7). However, Lee (1992) cautions that 
the quasi-internal organisation will be more prone to organisational failures as an 
economy becomes more complex. In the case of Taiwan, the bureaucracy is thought to 
operate as a 'filtering mechanism’, focusing the attention of policy makers (and the
25 In a subsequent contribution, Johnson (1987) uses the epithet 'capitalist development state' to 
characterise the political and policy making structures of Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
26 Deyo's summary of Johnson (1987:136-64).
27 Similarly Bardhan (1990) argues that industry policy in East Asia differs from that in other countries 
not in terms of the extent of intervention, but in the quality of such intervention.
35
private sector) on sectors, products and processes crucial to future industrial growth 
(Wade 1990a).
Haggard (1990:15) argues that the shift in East Asia to export growth was also 
accompanied by economic, legal, and institutional reforms that the neoclassical 
interpretation has generally ignored. In particular, he points out that institutionalised 
patterns of policy making, government intervention, and business-government relations 
were also important in shaping the process of industrial adjustment and upgrading. In 
Korea, a highly centralised leadership style, the government's use of the state-owned 
financial sector as an instrument of industry policy, and close relations between the 
executive and the large number of industrial groups produced a dirigiste approach to 
industrial upgrading. In Taiwan, by contrast, technocrats enjoyed greater influence, and 
the political relationship between government and the private sector was less close. As 
a result, the government used state-owned enterprises to develop selected industries 
rather than create national champions and relied on arms-length fiscal and trade 
instruments and infrastructural investment to support the private sector (Haggard 
1990:127).
Moreover, Haggard stresses that the reform process during the 1980s phase of industrial 
restructuring cannot be understood solely by reference to sectoral and international 
pressures, but needs to be considered in the broader political and institutional context. 
In both Korea and Taiwan, reforms were initially launched under the aegis of 
governments that retained substantial autonomy from social pressures. In Korea, in 
particular, autonomy contributed to the government's ability to liberalise and restructure 
economic policy. But by the end of the 1980s, this political context had changed. With 
political liberalisation, interest groups and opposition parties mobilised around economic 
policy, and governments became more responsive to societal demands, including those 
from such previously excluded groups as labour (Haggard 1990:128).
2.4 Does the Governed Market Model Represent a Fundamental Challenge to the 
Neoclassical Paradigm?
Islam (1992:77) in a survey of the literature on the topic concludes that while the 
development state paradigm clearly represents a challenge to dependency theory,28 it is
28 Amsden (1979:342) argues that dependency theory is 'unable to come to grips with the Taiwan 
paradox because it employs a methodology which elevates imperialism to the primary analytical
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less clear whether it represents a challenge to mainstream economics. It depends on 
how the model is used. If the thrust of the analysis is that particular institutional 
arrangements in East Asia endow the state with an unusual capacity to pursue efficient 
policies (for example export-oriented industrialisation or prudent macroeconomic 
policies), then the statist story merely extends the neoclassical explanation of the success 
of the East Asia. If the implication is that the model of the development state explains 
why dirigiste policies can work in the East Asian economies and not elsewhere, then this 
stronger version of the hypothesis would appear to provide an alternative perspective. 
It seems that the stronger version is supported by Wade (1988, 1990a), Amsden (1989) 
and Lee (1992), while the much weaker and more sophisticated version of the statist 
model is reflected in the writings of Haggard (1986, 1988b, 1990). Even the stronger 
version of the development state model does not constitute a fundamental challenge to 
neoclassical development economics if the latter is taken to imply that the exposure to 
international competition of domestic firms and industries in the form of outward- 
oriented policies is the key to national economic success. Most writers in the statist 
tradition agree that international competition as a yardstick of performance of domestic 
firms and industries has limited the incidence of government failure in these economies 
(Chowdhury and Islam 1993). Islam suggests then that the development state is a 
historically specified phenomenon, more relevant in some periods than others (Islam 
1992:77-8).
Meanwhile, neoclassical economists have offered several responses to the assertions of 
the governed market model. Intervention may have been extensive in these economies, 
but it has been less extensive than in Africa, South Asia and Latin America (see 
Bhagwati and Krueger 1973:420). The key argument against intervention is that faulty 
intervention is worse than neutrality. Many so-called 'export promotion' measures 
undertaken within import substitution regimes were really nothing more than offsets to 
the disincentives otherwise created for exporting or else they tied the profit to be made 
in selling in the home market to a precondition that the firm also export some fraction of 
its output. Moreover, government efforts at sector-specific steering have either had 
little effect on overall development or were positively detrimental. Also stressed was 
the fact that the basic causation of success on the policy front could be traced to the 
lessening of government interferences in the market economy during the export- 
oriented phase.
category. Only when endogenous productive and social relations are taken as primary can both 
successful and unsuccessful instances of development be understood'.
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However, the statists reject the important neoclassical point of the willingness of the 
government to become less dirigiste as circumstances change. Simon (1992:119) for 
example, notes that 'the international market for high technology is much too dynamic 
to permit the Taiwan state to relinquish its role as initiator, facilitator, and regulator'. 
Amsden asserts that 'industrial policy in Taiwan became more rather than less active 
over time, to the extent that, by the end of the 1980s, the government had begun to play 
a larger, direct role in promoting up-scaling and the growth of high-tech industries than 
it played in the 1960s and 1970s in initiating industrialisation and the growth of mid­
tech industries' (Amsden 1992:46; 1991:284-5). Similarly, what Wade (1990a:ll) 
calls 'state leadership episodes' in industry became greater after 1970. Sectoral 
interventionist policies are thus considered to have been important in supporting export 
expansion in the late 1960s, industrial deepening in the 1970s, and technological 
upgrading in the 1980s.
Hughes (1993:11-3) argues that Wade (1990a) and Amsden (1989) have ignored the 
distortions created by the unreformed components of policy and the extent to which 
interventions were necessary to offset these distortions. Moreover, they pay little 
attention to the costs imposed by rent seeking corporations and public officials. 
Reformers were not politically strong enough in either Taiwan and Korea to abolish 
protection or to induce a competitive financial system because the buildup of vested 
interests in protection and regulation during the 1960s and 1970s. Both countries 
therefore attempted to reach 'neutral' policies by offsets to protection in agriculture and 
for exports and by credit rationing. Of the measures taken to counter protection, the 
most important, and the only one that did not have harmful side effects, made it 
possible for exporters to import inputs at world prices by exemption from import 
restrictions and import duties. Other incentives such as subsidised credit and tax 
holidays were of doubtful value in stimulating output and exports (Herderschee 1990), 
distorted the economy, and required administrators to make judgements were which 
arbitrary and often counter-productive.
Similarly, Chia (1993:10) notes that the governed market model rests on the 
supposition that governments have the capability to pick winners, and that government 
decisions could be made rationally without pressure from vested interest groups. The 
cumulative impact can be highly positive if the industrial choices turned out to be the 
right ones; otherwise, it could also mean a cumulation of negative impacts and a 
colossal failure. Government intervention can be a far more serious cause of market 
failure than domestic or international market imperfections.
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From this perspective, the East Asian experience underlines the argument that 
extensive regulation and picking winners, far from encouraging growth or equity, has 
high long-term economic costs and encourages inequitable income distribution. As 
Hughes (1993:11) argues, overcoming the distortions created by protection and 
counter-intervention was very costly. Financial 'repression' distorted investment 
among, and within, sectors. Elaborate rural poverty alleviation programs were 
introduced to offset the effect of biases against agriculture which by the early 1980s 
had become agricultural protection policies, damaging the Korean and Taiwan 
economies (Anderson and Hayami 1986). Much direct intervention in manufacturing 
and service industries was necessary to offset the effects of 'tailor-made' tariffs. Such 
intervention benefited large corporations and their workers but was a major cost for the 
low income earners, who made up the majority of the workforce. Those in the 
informal workforce not only had to absorb both the costs of protectionist policies, but 
also those of the interventions and subsidies used to counter them. The fiscal and 
macroeconomic costs created by distorting policies reduced the availability of funds for 
social and environmental concerns.
Hence, what the governed market model cannot accommodate is that Korea and Taiwan 
were saddled with conspicuously high levels of inefficient agricultural protection 
(Anderson and Hayami 1986). While receiving little attention in the statist model, it 
needs to be understood why the agricultural sector, although lacking economic clout, 
can turn out to be such an important political constituency in Korea and Taiwan. As 
Islam (1992:78) notes, '[i]f economic nationalism is the driving force behind inefficient 
protection in agriculture in the two countries, why did policy-makers not succumb to 
these pressures in other areas of the economy?' (Islam 1992:78).
Despite adopting a more market-oriented approach than Korea, state intervention in 
Taiwan also met with criticism from within the bureaucracy. A persistent group of 
neoclassical economists questioned the wisdom of any sector-specific interventions, 
particularly in relation to the role of state enterprises.29 The increased costs of inputs 
associated with industrial policy was a consistent source of controversy and pitted 
protected or monopolised upstream industries against downstream suppliers. For 
example, the synthetic fibre industry resisted the import protection given to upstream 
petrochemical production (Haggard 1990:143).
29 For example, S.C. Tsiang was a persistent critic.
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Pack and Westphal (1986:125) note in the case of Korea that '[o]vert government 
promotion has not played a role in the development of some successful infant 
industries. Not all overtly promoted infant industries have been successful, at least not 
in the time frame explicit in the planning documents. And selective intervention has 
also been practiced to rationalise existing industries whose continued success was 
considered to require major restructuring'. They point out that the East Asian 
experience 'can also be read as testimony for the efficiency of pursuing an export-led 
strategy and of maintaining an appropriate factor-price regime that roughly conforms 
to relative factor endowments over time (Pack and Westphal 1986:34). Moreover,
... successful use of aggressive selective intervention requires the technical and administrative 
skill to implement desired strategies intelligently and the political ability to terminate 
intervention if there is no movement toward the desired goals ... reliance on the standard 
neoclassical prescription probably constitutes the best policy across-the-board (Pack and 
Westphal 1986:124).
Islam (1992) concludes that the empirical validity of the Amsden/Wade hypothesis has 
not generally been accepted. In the case of Taiwan, both Wade (1990a) and Biggs and 
Levy (1988, 1991) document evidence of various forms of government assistance to 
specific industries and argue that they were made in anticipation of comparative 
advantage. However, they are unable to establish satisfactorily the effectiveness of such 
policies. Even in the case of Korea, Westphal (1990) and others found that numerous 
policy mistakes were made during the 1970s when the government aggressively 
intervened in favour of heavy and chemical industries and sought to promote too many 
infant industries at once. For Taiwan, Wu (1991) finds evidence of failures in 
attempting to pick winners with the car industry failing to produce a winner in export 
markets. Biggs and Levy (1988:5) conclude that 'notwithstanding Pack and Westphal's 
suggestion that investment coordination to capture simultaneous externalities was an 
important feature of government intervention in Korea, coordination per se was not 
central to the successful pursuit of industrial strategy in Korea (or Taiwan).
2.4.1 Analytical Deficiencies of the Governed Market Model
Chowdhury and Islam (1993) note that while the new political economy literature may 
have drawn attention to some of the less balanced neoclassical interpretations of East 
Asian economic success, more recent versions have in the context of East Asia 
overstated their case. This point can be established by highlighting several analytical 
deficiencies of the governed market model.
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Firstly, while acknowledging that neoclassical theory, in unambiguously ranking policy 
instruments based on welfare analysis, is backed by an impressive body of theoretical 
reasoning, the governed market model asserts that once one moves beyond the 
theoretical system of neoclassical economics, 'they are not compelling guides to 
decision-making in the real world'. Hence what the Taiwan and Korean experience 
provide is evidence that 'protection can be used to help create an internationally 
competitive set of industries' (Wade 1990a:358). In fact:
[t]he East Asian evidence —  whose challenge to mainstream trade theory has produced little 
more than an elliptical pirouette by way of response —  suggests that protection can also be 
used in combination with other measures to foster the creation of internationally competitive 
industries ... All this suggests an important analytical point, that the international trade 
literature is wrong in identifying some policy instruments as unambiguously better or worse 
than others without regard to the way those instruments are administered. Quantitative 
restrictions administered in a conditional way are not the same as unconditional quantitative 
restrictions. Protection may be administered more easily than subsidies, and so more reliably 
achieve the intended effects (Wade 1990a:361).
And yet what the postwar domestic distortions literature convincingly demonstrated was 
that moving away from import substitution probably entailed a gain simply in eliminating 
some of the excess costs associated with quantitative restrictions. This could be either 
because quantitative restrictions themselves have costs, or because import substitution 
policies also lead to detailed controls of a type that are simply incompatible with export 
promotion. Moreover, the costs of encouraging different industries were more readily 
apparent to policy makers under regimes where incentives, rather than controls were 
used (Krueger 1981:17).
Secondly, the statist model focuses on the controversial point that financial repression 
has facilitated rapid economic growth in East Asia (Wade 1988; Lee 1992). Wade, for 
example, asserts that Taiwan industrial experience reflects the importance of promoting 
a bank-based financial system under close government control. In order to foster key 
sectors, a bank-based financial system gives it a powerful mechanism for inducing 
firms to enter sectors they otherwise would not. Where, on the other hand, capital is 
allocated mainly in decentralised markets, the government's ability to extend a visible 
and vigorous hand in the functioning of the industrial economy is limited, because 
firms are less susceptible to state influence (Zysman 1983). Control over the financial 
system can thus be used to build up coalitions needed to support the government's 
objectives, thus helping to implement the industrial strategy. State-controlled credit- 
based systems are also alleged to produce rapid growth by permitting a faster rate of
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investment, be less prone to speculative attacks, and avoid the bias towards short-term 
profitability associated with stock markets. Moreover, government must maintain a 
cleavage between the domestic economy and the international economy with respect to 
financial flows. Without this, the government's own control over the money supply 
and cost of capital is weakened, as is its ability to guide sectoral allocation (Wade 
1990a:364-8).
As Islam (1993:87-8) points out, in developing this view Wade relies heavily on the 
distinction that Zysman (1983) makes between a credit-based system and a capital- 
market based system. In the former, firms rely heavily on bank credit for financing 
investment plans. In the latter, borrowers can choose from a broad spectrum of capital 
and money market instruments offered competitively through a large number of 
specialised financial institutions.30
Chowdhury and Islam (1993) then suggest that this view confuses a credit-based 
system with a state-controlled credit-based system. Financial repression is a necessary 
feature of the latter, not the former. Moreover, the major advantages of a credit-based 
system as identified by Wade (1988) do not require the existence of state control (and 
hence financial repression). 'The only way in which financial repression can contribute 
to economic growth in this framework is to presuppose that a strong-willed 
government has the capacity to overcome the inadequacies of private capital markets 
without the corresponding risk of government failure' (Chowdhury and Islam 
1993:142-3). In the case of Korea, the early 1980s were characterised by frequent 
financial bail-outs of large financial corporations. As Kwack (1990:236) emphasises: 
'[fjrequent bailouts have not only created moral hazard problems but given firms a 
strong incentive to maximise borrowing'. In Taiwan, a series of financial scandals in 
1985 revealed a variety of structural weaknesses in the banking sector and led to the 
formation of an Economic Revitalisation Committee that proposed an array of 
liberalising measures (Haggard 1990:143).
Further evidence can be cited to cast doubt on the efficacy of a state-controlled 
financial system. For example, Cole and Patrick (1986) argue that the inefficiencies of 
financial repression may not always manifest themselves because of the behaviour of 
the informal credit market. Thus when formal financial institutions are regulated,
30 Korea and Taiwan may be seen as special cases of a credit-based system, which until recently had 
state-controlled, credit-based financial systems. Governments dominated the allocation of bank credit 
through a combination of regulation and direct ownership.
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informal credit markets expand. Such markets can act as a channel for diverting 
official (regulated) credit to more profitable opportunities, thus mitigating the 
inefficiencies of a repressed financial system. The Korean experience of the 1970s is 
apparently consistent with this interpretation. Also, Biggs and Levy (1988) contend 
that in the case of Taiwan, informal sources of credit, rather than specific government 
lending programs, were the mainstay of finance for small firms. Indeed, long 
experience in a wide range of countries confirms that formal credit institutions lack the 
information and incentives to lend to promising, but not yet established, progressive 
small and medium enterprises. Governments cannot directly promote lending in curb 
markets. But the Taiwan experience points to a range of possible mechanisms for 
strengthening the market mechanism. 'All of these interventions are nondiscretionary, 
and increase the transactional efficiency of a market that can raise the allocative 
efficiency of credit by meeting the financial needs of small borrowers rationed out of 
the formal market and by reallocating financial resources that are misallocated because 
of official credit programs (Biggs and Levy 1991:392-3).31 In any case, the empirical 
relevance of the Wade paradigm to Taiwan is questionable in light of the other 
analyses offered by Cheng (1986), Yang (1990), and Shea and Yang (1990).32
Thirdly, while Wade asserts also that it is plausible that, accepting the potential 
benefits of governed market polices, most states should move quickly toward free 
market polices, on the grounds that softer states can sustain these policies more easily 
than governed market ones. He then goes on to cite Krugman's assessment that while 
new trade theory may provide a rationale for an activist trade strategy in certain 
conditions, the gains may not be large and the strategy is difficult to implement 
because of its vulnerability to hijacking by special interest groups. Hence, free trade 
rules are best 'for a world whose policies are imperfect as its markets' (Krugman 
1987a: 143).33 But Wade then argues that proponents of this argument 'fail to explain
31 Moreover, the idea of the state acting as an internal capital market cannot be applied to all East Asia 
economies. While the case of Hong Kong and Singapore would be readily acknowledged, the Taiwan 
case is more debatable, with Wade arguing in favour of the hypothesis, but Park (1990b) suggesting 
otherwise. Even in Korea, the internal capital market is historically specific, being more applicable to 
certain periods than others.
32 In the East Asian context, surveys focusing on the patterns and trends of financial development have 
been undertaken by Arndt (1983) and Cole (1988).
33 Wade (1990a:378) comments that instead of political factors being blamed for the inability of 
governments to follow economically rational free trade policies, political factors are now introduced to 
explain why free trade remains politically best even after it is shown to be not always economically 
best (Helleiner 1988). This is but a special case of the 'practical optimality' of free markets. Even if 
free markets can be shown to be suboptimal according to some ideal allocation system, the argument 
runs, they are the method which produces the least inefficient resource allocation in practice. The
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why, if vested interests are strong enough to defeat sensible selective interventions, 
they will not also be strong enough to distort markets and defeat free trade. Free trade 
is not self-enforcing. Vested interests seek to maintain the structures in which their 
interests are vested, rent-seekers seek to preserve the conditions that create rents' 
(Wade 1990a:378).
In advancing this argument, Wade neglects the significant body of economic 
literature34 directed specifically at explaining why interventionist (protectionist) 
policies prevail where free trade remains the first-best policy. The 'political economy 
of protection' literature sets out explicitly to identify how vested interest groups in 
practice defeat free trade. This area of positive trade literature is nonetheless totally 
consistent with a normative recommendation, such as Krugman's, in favour of free 
trade on economic and/or political grounds.
Of the research pertaining to industrialised countries, the overwhelming conclusion is 
that governments in industrial democracies have tended to protect those industries 
characterised by comparative disadvantage.35 In particular, it is the labour-intensive 
manufactures, in which these economies are at a comparative disadvantage to 
developing countries, that are shown to receive the greatest protection. The 
quantitative approach to analysis of industry-government interaction has been most 
frequently applied to the area of tariff policy making in developed countries.36 
Research pertaining to the experience of developing countries is discussed in Chapter 
8 .
This then raises the related point of Wade's characterisation of the 'neoclassical 
explanation’. In contrasting the governed market model with that of 'neoclassical 
model', Wade fails to rigorously take account of the central tenets on which the
alleged alternative, administrative allocation, will produce worse results because it is not subject to 
anybody's bottom-line constraint. There is something to be said for this argument'.
34 See Baldwin (1984) for a survey of the relevant literature.
35 Basevi (1966), Baldwin (1976), Anderson and Baldwin (1981), Lavergne (1983).
36 These studies share the technique of regressing rates of nominal and/or effective tariff protection 
and/or proportionate changes in these rates on industry structural characteristics, although they differ 
with respect to the motivation and mechanisms underlying tariff policy formulation that they postulate. 
See for example McPherson (1972), Cheh (1974), Pincus (1975), Fieleke (1976), Baldwin (1981), and 
Ray (1981) for the United States; Caves (1976), Helleiner (1977), Bale (1977)*, Finger and De Rosa 
(1979)*, and Sanders (1980)* for Canada; Anderson (1978) and Conybeare (1978) for Australia; 
Findlay and Gamaut (1986) for ASEAN and Australia; Tharakan (1980)* for Belgium; Shouda (1980) 
for Japan; Cable and Rebelo (1980) for the United Kingdom; Lundberg (1981) for Sweden; and Riedel 
(1977) and Gilsmann and Weiss (1980) for Germany; Bobe (1980)* for France; and Kokkoek, Kol, and 
Mennes (1981) for the Netherlands. * Denotes those works not sighted by the author.
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neoclassical explanation of East Asian industrialisation rests and why they are believed 
to hold. For example, in discussing policy recommendations for the creation of 
internationally competitive industries, thought to be representative of the Taiwan 
experience, Wade (1990a:353-370) makes little reference to the distortionary effects of 
the govemed-market-type policies he advocates. As the earlier reference to Hughes 
(1993) pointed out, scant attention is paid to the contribution of the neoclassical 
literature in documenting the distortionary effects of past interventions in both East 
Asian and other developing economies. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the lack 
of analysis of the welfare effects of such policies and the failure to acknowledge the 
contribution of neoclassical economics in providing a well-developed theory of 
government failure. It is only in a later contribution that Wade defines, albeit still 
broadly, the paradigm in which he asserts has misrepresented what is a much narrower 
question, namely the role of industry policy interventions in East Asian 
industrialisation.37
Fourthly, the governed market contends that if it is accepted that Korea and Taiwan 
departed significantly from comparative advantage and were still outstandingly 
successful, one could conclude that something is 'seriously wrong with the theory of 
comparative advantage'. Wade argues that:
there is remarkably little evidence on this central question. It is true that exports have been far 
more labour-intensive than overall production, a predicted line with comparative advantage 
theory. But it is also true from the early 1960s, capital-intensive industries producing 
intermediates have experienced rates of growth much higher than the manufacturing average, 
a phenomenon less readily reconciled with comparative advantage theory (Wade 1992:297).
The neoclassical interpretation has argued that a great deal of evidence can be found in 
support of these countries following their comparative advantage. In the case of East 
Asia they stress that the shift from traditional labour-intensive industries to new 
industries characterised by more capital and technology-intensive processes and the 
adoption of new technologies was facilitated by the simultaneous growth in the level of 
human capital (Pack 1992a: 102). Pack (1992a: 101-3) argues that:
if any one factor allowed the rapid changes in sectoral structure that permitted the staving off 
of the diminishing returns attributable to the growing capital-labour ratio, it is likely to have
37 As stated previously in Chapter 1, Wade (1992:270-1) defines the 'neoliberal' interpretation as 
referring to a 'subset of mainstream neoclassical economics whose members believe that as a 'general 
rule the neoclassical prescriptions for short-run optimal resource allocation are the core recipe for 
maximising the rate of long-run growth'. East Asian countries are considered to have been more 
successful than others in terms of long-run growth because they stuck more firmly to this prescription.
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been the dramatic rise in education levels ... Moreover, insofar as the product mix is changing 
quickly, the investigation of new products and market niches were required, all of these being 
skill-intensive activities. While industrial policy may somewhat accelerate the inter-industry 
and intra-industry shifts in technology, a key enabling factor has been the high level of 
education which facilitates the efficient introduction of the requisite technologies.
Hence the shift to capital and technology-intensive production after the end of the 
labour surplus period occurred exactly as predicted by the theory of comparative 
advantage. Moreover, to maintain high growth rates it became necessary to rationalise 
the industrial structure by removing subsidies and protection of the relatively inefficient 
import substituting industries in favour of further expansion of the relatively efficient 
export-oriented industries (Grilli and Riedel 1993:5). At the empirical level, there is 
much evidence that confirms specialisation in international trade based on factor 
endowments. Countries moved through different stages of comparative advantage as 
the product composition of exports shifted along a spectrum of factor intensities.38
Finally, as Chowdhury and Islam (1993:54) point out, the dense organisational network 
which the governed market model asserts is supposed to exist between policy makers 
and the private sector is primarily of a subtle and informal nature and hence not readily 
observable. Moreover, the governed market model exhibits the tendency to treat the 
policymaking process in a mechanical fashion, with the private sector responding 
passively to bureaucratic initiative and guidance. They argue:
a better characterisation of the complex dynamics of the policy-making process in East Asia is 
the ’politics of reciprocal consent' (Samuels 1987), where a fragmented state authority (caused, 
for example, by inter- and intra-burcaucratic rivalry) negotiates with a powerful private sector. 
This portrait of the policymaking process strongly implies that consensus building is often a 
matter of negotiation and compromise, carrying with it the risk that state preferences may not 
necessarily prevail over private preferences (Chowdhury and Islam (1993:54).
They also point out that the new political economy pays insufficient attention to the 
fact that there is a range of institutional arrangements for achieving relative state 
autonomy (Haggard and Moon 1990). As a result the new political economy falls into 
the trap of implying that authoritarianism is necessary for economic growth, providing
38 Balassa (1977a) maintained that the emergence of East Asia economies as major exporters could be 
explained by a 'stages' approach to comparative advantage. Initially a typical developing country 
would have a comparative advantage in labour-intensive activities. As wage rates rose and living 
standards improved, it lost competitiveness in such products to lower wage rate countries. Therefore, 
labour-intensive activities were phased out and the economic structure moved towards capital-intensive • 
industries. A country's approaching industrial maturity would be gauged from the secular movement 
from capital-intensive to skill-intensive industries.
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an easy target for those eager to highlight stories of labour repression associated with 
the East Asian success story (Deyo 1989).
What emerges from the preceding discussion is a clear distinction between approaches 
aimed at drawing conclusions about the role of government in the industrialisation of 
East Asia. The governed market model has argued that direct government 
interventions made a substantial contribution to creating dynamic comparative 
advantage by selecting and encouraging industries through the use of subsidies in their 
'infant industry’ stage (Hughes 1993:4). Close cooperation between government and 
business is also considered to be an essential component of an industry policy strategy. 
The governed market model has highlighted this dimension by devoting attention to the 
economic, political, and social circumstances that contributed to effective policy 
formulation and implementation (Deyo 1987:17).
The neoclassical explanations, on the other hand, identified with such authors as 
Bhagwati, Krueger, Fei and Ranis, and Balassa, have sought to describe the way a 
developing country changes its structure as it moves into modem growth. The objective 
of most of these efforts has been, on the one hand, to describe a variety of sectoral and 
aggregative dimensions of performance and to link these causally to initial conditions; 
and, on the other hand, to relate policy to bottom-line success or failure in reaching 
underlying development objectives. The common feature of most of these approaches 
resides in the recognition that organisational and policy choices were basic to the 
explanation of development success and failure. In particular, increased openness and 
reduced government intervention are generally associated with improved development 
performance (Ranis and Fei 1988:102).
Wade (1988:150-1) asserts that the differences of opinion between scholars over the 
role of the state in economic growth ’stem from the absence of an economic theory of 
sufficient credibility to provide a legitimate base from which technical economic 
analysis can act as a constraint on admissible arguments'. While acknowledging that 
the governed market model can be challenged, 'it is not sufficient for neoclassical 
economists to query their validity; they must themselves provide counter-evidence. This 
evidence cannot be limited to economy-wide averages like 'outward' and 'inward' 
oriented, but must address the issues of dispersion around the average and the question 
of causality' (Wade 1988:151). This challenges economics to deploy or invent theories 
which will make the non-neoclassical facts of East Asia analytically tractable' (Wade 
1990a:345).
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Wade goes further to issue a number of rhetorical challenges to the neoclassical 
paradigm. For example, on the contributors to Achieving Industrialisation in East Asia 
(1988) (of which he is one) Wade contends:
Much of what these authors say about the causes of East Asian success is unexceptional and 
pretty anodyne stuff... [T]he problem is that these and other neoliberal economists shy away 
from subjecting their beliefs to serious empirical test, yet they are powerful enough to get those 
beliefs widely accepted, especially via international financial institutions like the IMF and 
World Bank (Wade 1992:275).
Where are the detailed neoliberal analyses of the vigorous government efforts that are 
intended to be selective between industries and that therefore conflict with the injunction 
against targeting? (Wade 1992:280) ... My own evidence ... suggests that neoliberal 
economists have been pioneering a whole new principle of causal inference — that to explain 
superior economic performance one may either simply ignore everything that is not in line 
with neoliberal prescriptions or assert that it hindered what would otherwise have been an 
even better performance ... Assertions like 'success has been achieved [in Korea] despite 
intervention' are put forth without a shred of evidence. In this way the circle is closed, the 
paradigm is protected, and minds can be set at rest (Wade 1992:283-4).
But it is not only the neoclassicists who are subject to denunciation. Wade asserts there 
are some serious weaknesses in Amsden's argument that the Korean government 
deliberately distorted prices. For example:
[s]ome key propositions are poorly supported, some key concepts are treated as self-evident 
when they are not, and some alternative mechanisms for which there is reasonable evidence 
are not considered. Einstein's aphorism that 'imagination is more important than knowledge' 
is taken a bit too literally. In particular, Amsden misses many opportunities to incorporate 
neoclassical findings into her story, thereby rendering it much weaker than it need be in terms 
of economic analysis. Nowhere is this more apparent than in what she says about prices 
(Wade 1992:291). 'In Korea, the 'wrong' prices have been right because government 
discipline over business has enabled subsidies and protection to be less than elsewhere and 
more effective' (Amsden 1989:vi). This is an intriguing idea, but it is asserted without a shred 
of evidence. If Korean price distortions have in fact been less than in most other countries, 
how can we distinguish this argument from the central neoclassical claim that it is precisely 
because price distortions have been less that Korea was more successful? (Wade 1992:293).
Wade then concludes that:
... this central plank in Amsden's theory remains in urgent need of empirical reinforcement. A 
generous reading might say that Amsden has done what many economists before her have 
done, which is to present a series of 'stylised' facts about how, in her understanding, the world 
works, leading it to those who disagree to muster the counterevidence. A less generous 
reading might say that Amsden displays the same disdain for established principles of 
scientific knowledge (emphasis added) as do the neoliberals ... (Wade 1992:294-5).
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All this is despite Wade’s own admission that there is little 'hard' quantitative support for 
the governed market paradigm. Yet in addressing the role of government in Taiwan's 
industrialisation (in which most would concede, it has been less pervasive than in Korea) 
Wade asserts that:
[g]ovemment policies deliberately got some prices 'wrong' so as to change the signals to 
which decentralised market agents responded, and also used nonprice means to alter the 
behaviour of market agents (Wade 1990a:29) ... by means of politically determined constraints 
and rigged prices, they have steered the competitive process into higher-wage, higher- 
technology alternatives and away from short-term speculative or labour cost-reducing 
alternatives within or beyond the national territory (Wade 1990a:297) ... if the government is 
to exercise leadership it must have instruments for affecting investment decisions ... Such 
instruments are needed for getting prices 'wrong' and in other ways altering market behaviour 
... The governed market theory leads us to expect substantial variation between industries in 
the effects of government policies on relative prices, corresponding to the objectives of 
government promotional activity (Wade 1990a:32-3).
In issuing a number of challenges to the neoclassicists, the governed market model falls 
short of providing the convincing empirical support for the question it poses — that of 
the relationship between state and strategy. Instead, to a large extent statists, in their 
sectoral histories of Taiwan and Korea, rely heavily on the government plan as an 
indication of the degree of intervention within the economy. Observers usually 
associate growth strategies with state intervention. But retrospective, strategy-centred 
interpretations of economic development must also make a contribution in 
demonstrating rather than in assuming that strategies in fact matter.39 The existence of 
strategy that appears to be consistent with actual economic outcomes does not in itself
39 For example, Wade asserts the best approach would be to 'take a number of industries and examine 
case by case the connection between promotion measures and subsequent growth. But problems 
include holding other things constant between high-assisted and low-assisted industries; problems of 
interpretation; and obtaining information on conditions of intervention'. Wade also says that ’[i]t is 
tempting to use aggregate production function analysis to estimate the extent of 'national' optimality, 
with the size of residuals indicating the maximum possible extent of the government's contribution. 
The problem is that the size of the residuals depends on how the production function is specified, 
which is a matter of very subjective judgement'. Wade states then that '[f]aced with the manifold 
difficulties in determining the economic effects of government attempts to steer the market, we can use 
more indirect evidence to take the debate forward. First, we can assess the degree of price 'distortions' 
in different products and factor markets; second, we can get evidence of sectoral industrial policies by 
examining the histories of particular industries to see what kinds of activity the government was 
undertaking. The governed market theory leads us to expect big fellowship or big leadership in some 
important industries. Third, if the government is to exercise leadership it must have instruments for 
affecting investment decisions. Such instruments are needed for getting prices 'wrong' and in other 
ways altering market behaviour ... The governed market theory leads us to expect substantial variation 
between industries in the effects of government policies on relative prices,' corresponding to the 
objectives of government promotional activity ... Fourth, we also have to be able to identify the 
institutional locus of the instruments — one or more central agencies vested with the powers to plan 
and coordinate within parts of the economy and with some responsibility for industrial success ...' 
(Wade 1990a:30-33).
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demonstrate causality between strategy and performance. And as Deyo (1987:16) 
argues, 'strategies may sometimes follow rather than precede economic trends. They 
may be little more than vague pronouncements addressed less to the needs of 
development than those of political legitimation and stability'. An example is 
Amsden's (1985:99) assertion that '[i]n terms of scope, Taiwan is simply a particular 
striking example of the positive association between state intervention and the 
acceleration of economic growth that is now generally accepted to prevail in cases of 
Third World capitalist development'. Similarly Wade (1984:68) asserts that '[rjeading 
the lists of items eligible for various fiscal incentives, one has the distinct impression that 
the Taiwan planners know exactly where they want the economy to go. The 
compilation of the lists involves them in a considerable exercise of judgement about 
which products should be promoted'.
The most general criticism of the development state paradigm is that its advocates have 
made a leap of faith from the existence of an industrial policy having a certain goal to 
the achievement of the intended effects — they have neither demonstrated nor 
theoretically grounded the causal connections. As Haggard (1990:14) notes: ’[t]he 
effect of industrial policy was ... never measured against the more substantial influence 
of consistent and credible macroeconomic policies, the provision of public goods and 
incentives to private risk taking'. Instead, proponents of the statist view have employed 
the related arts of persuasion and rhetoric, writing to convince with passion as well as 
with technical logic.
Discussion about the nature of the Taiwan political economy in general, and its 
industrial policy in particular, has tended to be characterised by broad propositions 
supported by anecdotal evidence. Proponents argue that in Taiwan (and East Asia in 
general) the state is strategic and rational, pursuing a national industrial policy which 
maximises social welfare by maximising national income. But the majority of studies 
of Taiwan's industrial performance do not seek to evaluate policy success explicitly and 
quantitatively. Rather, evaluation is typically based on one of two criteria: the overall 
success of economies whose governments use targeted policies or the eventual 
competitiveness of targeted industries. In its most simplistic form, a commonly held 
view of the Taiwan experience is the same as that held of the Japanese experience in 
that, 'Japan has a targeted industrial policy and Japan has a high growth rate, so 
Japanese-style targeting must work’ (Krugman 1987b:282). Sakoh's (1983:2) 
characterisation of the Japanese experience appears equally if not even more relevant to 
the Taiwan experience:
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..many observers of Japan have committed the classic fallacy of elementary logic - cum hoc 
ergo propter hoc (false association). Since Japan has something those observers choose to call 
an industrial policy, and since the country's industrial capacity has been growing dramatically, 
they conclude that there must be a causal relationship between the two. Yet other concurrent 
factors just as easily could be selected to explain Japan’s successes.
The nature of the debate of East Asian industrialisation is perhaps best characterised by 
Brander (1987:34) who states that:
[o]ne difference between mainstream economic theory and the industrial policy literature is 
that the former appears in specialised academic journals and makes extensive use of formal 
mathematical modelling, while the latter is written in popular form, is almost entirely 
descriptive, and certainly does not use formal modelling. Formal modelling has at least two 
major disadvantages. First it is inaccessible to nonspecialists; when doing research, 
economists usually communicate in a way that only other economists can fully understand. 
Second, formal modelling makes extensive use of simplifying assumptions that seem to 
distance the analysis from the complex real world. The advantage of formal modelling is that 
it requires careful definitions of terms and imposes logical consistency on the claims being 
made. If someone writes a paper claiming that subsidies might be in the national interest, the 
assumptions that lead to that conclusion must be specified explicitly. The problem with the 
popular descriptive material is that, while it can be logically rigorous, in general the standards 
of logical rigour are much lower than those used in mainstream economics.
In fact, Brander concludes that much of the industrial policy literature is logically 
flawed, making frequent use of false dichotomy, selective (biased) use of evidence, and 
outright inconsistency. Selective and biased use of evidence is probably the most 
serious methodological problem in this work. But he points out that professional 
economists are inclined to discount the popular industrial policy work simply because 
it does not meet the standards of precision and logical rigour that are normal in 
economic research. This is unfortunate because this literature does contain substantive 
ideas that should be addressed carefully (Brander 1987:36).
2.5 Conclusion
As the preceding discussion indicates, there are two diametrically opposed views on the 
role of industry policy interventions in East Asian industrialisation. The neoclassical 
explanation asserts that a relatively neutral policy regime was an important factor in 
explaining the industrial growth of Taiwan and Korea. The governed market view, on 
the other hand, asserts that interventions have made a significant contribution to 
industrial growth. In particular, the policy regime is believed to have been designed to 
promote industries with an emerging comparative advantage. Interventions, it is argued, 
have been correcting for market failures associated with externalities. Government
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initiatives are considered to have been actively involved in the technological upgrading 
of the industrial structure in the 1980s. Technological change is therefore seen as 
having been the focus of selective intervention.
As these competing explanations make opposite predictions about the structure of 
incentives and their relationship to economic performance, the propositions presented by 
these models can be transformed into testable hypotheses. The central hypotheses that 
arise from the above discussion centre on the relative neutrality of the incentive 
structure, and whether departures from neutrality are associated with industries with 
emerging comparative advantage. Answering these questions forms the bulk of the 
thesis analysis beginning in Chapter 6. As a prelude to this discussion, the industry 
policy regimes of Taiwan and Korea in the 1980s are considered in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The central question is whether the observed pattern of incentives conformed to the 
presumptions of the governed market and the new trade literature outlined in the 
following chapter. This analysis is then used to assess whether, as asserted by the 
governed market model, government became more or less interventionist over this 
period.
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- CHAPTER 3 -
EXTERNALITIES AND THE NEW TRADE CASE
FOR INTERVENTION
The difference between the external economy argument and the strategic 
argument is one o f potential importance. Even though efforts at 
quantification o f the strategic trade argument are extremely rudimentary, 
we can be fairly sure that the potential gains from  activist policy in pursuit 
o f rents are very small. No comparable effort has yet been made for  
external economies, but I would conjecture that the potential stakes are 
many times larger. In the end, then, the most important policy implication 
o f the new trade theory may be that it has freed trade theorists to take 
seriously the role o f external economies; and these external economies 
offer a reasonable justification for a neo-mercantilist view o f international 
competition (Krugman 1992:438).
3.1 Introduction
New trade theory has sought to explain how a country that systematically promotes 
industries characterised by externalities of a particular kind can help shift the pattern of 
comparative advantage, thereby raising its standard of living at the expense of other 
countries (Krugman 1992:436-7). While the existence of external economies is not 
new, the new trade theorists claim to have strengthened the case for intervention by 
focusing on externalities from the R&D activities of high-technology industries and by 
linking the analysis of externalities to the analysis of the imperfectly competitive market 
conditions characteristic of such industries. In particular, technological spillovers 
inherent in certain industries may be very important to the growth process, requiring 
intervention to ensure their capture. In these cases, assistance or subsidisation can 
expand the scale of the externality-generating activity and create social gain. The newly
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industrialising economies, it is asserted, have been accomplished practitioners of new 
trade policies.
Moreover, as Krugman (1990b: 111) notes, '[new trade theory] has provided advocates 
of protectionism with a new intellectual gloss to justify their position'. For example, 
Kuttner (1990:98) argues, there is now the view that 'the classical case for free trade as 
the optimum arrangement [has broken down] because of overwhelming evidence that 
several emerging countries have done rather well by practicing strategic trade policies 
rather than Ricardian trade objectives...' Government subsidies to high-technology 
industries with their characteristic scale and learning economies are considered to have 
influenced market outcomes. But in focusing on the special characteristics of high- 
technology industries, more traditional trade theorists contend that new trade theorists 
have merely come up with new reasons for some of the old arguments for government 
intervention. While the new trade theorists contend that externalities are likely to be 
more prominent in some industries than in others, others draw on traditional 
reservations to argue that it is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of 
externalities, it must be demonstrated that their presence is greater in some industries 
than in other activities.
This chapter reviews the externality argument for assistance, focusing on the new trade 
view that the existence of externalities in particular industries may provide a legitimate 
case for government intervention. That East Asian governments implicitly or explicitly 
recognised the importance of such externalities is thought to go some way in explaining 
their rapid and sustained industrial growth. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the 
new trade literature centred on the profit shifting and externality arguments. Section 3.3 
then reviews the externality argument for industrial policy in the presence of market 
failures associated with R&D and learning. Section 3.4 discusses the distinction 
between technological and pecuniary external economies and the new trade theorists' 
assertion that this distinction requires reassessment following developments in the 
modelling of imperfect competition. By focusing on geographical boundaries and scale 
economies in giving rise to linkage effects, they claim to have narrowed the scope to 
which externalities may justify government intervention. While new trade theorists 
acknowledge that externalities were a central theme in the postwar literature, section 3.5 
highlights traditional neoclassical concerns that this 'newer' literature has not applied the 
same rigorous principles of welfare analysis in presenting its conclusions. Section 3.6 
then undertakes an assessment of the available empirical evidence. Also, in discussing 
whether the factor endowment theory remains relevant in explaining comparative
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advantage, a review of recent modelling of technology as an endogenous phenomenon 
highlights the distortionary effects from policy interventions in high technology sectors. 
Section 3.7 then discusses the applicability of the externality argument to developing 
countries. The relevance of earlier oligopoly models in demonstrating how import 
protection can act as export promotion is also reviewed. Finally, section 3.8 draws 
attention to the fact that many of the reservations found in traditional neoclassical 
analysis of externalities remain relevant. In particular, the political economy arguments 
and the information problems of engaging in optimal intervention remain overwhelming.
3.2 New Trade Theory: An Overview
3.2.1 Profit Shifting
The new trade view of international trade holds that trade is to an important degree 
driven by economies of scale rather than comparative advantage, and that international 
markets are typically imperfectly competitive’ (Krugman 1987a: 134). As Krugman 
(1992:424-5) explains:
[n]ew trade theorists argue that countries do not necessarily specialise and trade solely in order 
to take advantage of their differences; they also trade because of increasing returns, which makes 
specialisation advantageous per se. In arguing that trade is driven to an important extent by 
increasing returns rather than comparative advantage, the new trade theorists also inevitably 
introduced some arbitrariness into the pattern of specialisation and trade: in the new view, at 
least within limits, who produces what is a result of history, accident, and —  the first hint of 
neo-mercantilism —  past government policies rather than underlying differences in national 
resources and aptitudes. Described in this way, the new trade theory does not sound particularly 
new... Yet the role of increasing returns in trade, while acknowledged in principle, never really 
made its way into the mainstream of international economics until the new trade theory came 
along.
Krugman (1987a: 134) acknowledges that while the 'new' idea is the strategic trade 
policy argument, where government policy can tilt the terms of oligopolistic competition 
to shift excess returns from foreign to domestic firms, the 'old' idea is that government 
policy should favour externalities, especially generation of knowledge that firms cannot 
fully appropriate. The two arguments are similar in offering a reason for government 
intervention. However, the externality argument is thought to differ from the strategic 
trade policy argument in one important respect — 'policies to promote sectors yielding 
external economies need not affect other countries adversely’ (Krugman 1987a: 138).
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Centred on the concept of increasing returns-based trade, 'new trade theory' was 
originally expounded in a series of papers by Dixit and Norman (1980), Lancaster 
(1980), Krugman (1979, 1980 and 1981), Helpman (1981) and Ethier (1982b).1 The 
most controversial normative result from a traditional trade perspective has undoubtedly 
been the Brander and Spencer (1983, 1985) illustration that free trade may no longer be 
the only policy to maximise domestic welfare gains, justifying the adoption in some 
cases of a 'strategic' trade policy. Brander and Spencer showed that government 
policies such as export subsidies and import restrictions can under certain circumstances 
deter foreign firms from competing for lucrative markets. Here government policies 
serve much the same role that 'strategic' moves such as investment in excess capacity or 
R&D play in domestic competition. When there is a significant domestic market for a 
good, protection of this market raises the profits of the domestic firm and lowers the 
profits of the foreign firm; this can deter foreign entry and allow the domestic firm to 
capture the excess returns. The 'strategic' trade theory thus demonstrated that under 
some circumstances a government, by supporting its firms in international competition, 
can raise national welfare at another country's expense.
But as was subsequently shown, the policy recommendations were extremely sensitive 
to the subtle aspects of competition.2 Dixit and Grossman (1986) illustrated how the 
existence of more than one oligopolistic industry competing for factors of production 
weakened the case for profit-shifting subsidies.3 Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed 
that the basically implausible assumption of Cournot competition was crucial to the 
result: if firms compete in prices instead of quantities, the optimal policy is an export 
tax. In a more fundamental critique, Horstmann and Markusen (1986) pointed out that 
any aggressive strategic trade policy may well be dissipated by entry of new firms and
1 The profit-shifting concept originated with a series of papers by Brander and Spencer (1981, 1983, 
1984, 1985) and in Krugman (1986). Other surveys covering various aspects of the subject are Dixit 
(1984); Grossman and Richardson (1985); Helpman and Krugman (1985, 1989); Caves (1987); 
Venables (1985, 1987); Deardorff and Stem (1987); and Richardson (1989).
2 The new trade theorists contend they were at first primarily positive rather than normative, and were 
motivated to fill a gap in standard trade theory rather than by the desire to find a justification for neo­
mercantilist trade policies.
3 If there was not one but several domestic firms active in the export market, then each will not take 
into account the effects of its own actions on the profits o f other domestic firms. From the point of 
view of the country as a whole, there pecuniary externalities. Grossman (1986:55-6) shows that an 
export tax is appropriate to offset the pecuniary externality. This policy would improve the terms of 
trade (through an increase in the price of exports) but could cause a loss in some sales to foreign 
competitors. However, on balance an export tax is beneficial if the number of domestic firms is large 
and the market is nearly competitive. Even if the number of firms is relatively small, and if there 
exists an imperfectly competitive market situation where the Brander-Spencer profit-shifting argument 
for export promotion would be valid in a duopoly, an export tax could be called for in an oligopolistic 
situation if the externality effect dominates.
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creation of excess capacity. This raised the general question of whether there were 
sufficient excess returns to make strategic trade policy worth considering. Dixit (1984) 
had also shown that the scope for raising national income through strategic trade 
policies was negligible. An industry in which firms earn above-normal profits will be 
attractive to new entrants. This potential competition may eliminate the above-normal 
profits.
Moreover, Dixit and Grossman (1986) illustrated that even in a highly simplified model 
of strategic policy, the case for promoting any one sector becomes uncertain once 
general equilibrium complications are taken into account. Promoting one sector crowds 
out others, raising the cost of inputs to other activities. It was necessary to ascertain 
whether the excess returns gained in the favoured sector were greater than those lost 
elsewhere. The problem of conducting successful strategic policies thus becomes one of 
government selecting the right sectors, given it is not possible to give every domestic 
firm a strategic advantage against its foreign competitors.
3.2.2 Externalities
In addition to stressing the opportunities for shifting welfare from foreign countries to 
the home economy under oligopolistic market conditions, new trade theorists point to 
the existence of external economies as a reason for government intervention —  the 
policy implications of which they assert are not so easily dismissed. However, unlike the 
analysis of the Brander-Spencer models, there has not been the same kind of systematic 
review of external economies as an argument for intervention. Nevertheless, 'ft]he 
undoubtedly shaky Brander-Spencer model no longer bears the main weight for 
interventionist arguments; instead, market-size and coordination-failure externalities 
now play the key role' (Krugman 1992:440).
Externalities can be defined as 'a situation in which the private economy lacks sufficient 
incentives to create a potential market in some goods and the non-existence of this 
market [or the existence of imperfect markets] results in losses in Pareto efficiency' 
(Heller and Starrett 1976:10).4 Most economists accept the assertion that externalities,
4 While externalities are frequently defined to occur whenever a decision variable of one economic 
agent enters into the production or utility function of some other agent, Heller and Starrett (1976:10) 
argue that this is not a very useful definition, at least until the institutional framework is given. They 
argue that their definition is general enough to include both pecuniary and nonpercuniary externalities, 
but also provides a key to determining what types of economic situations are likely to lead to 
externalities. They demonstrate that one can identify roughly that nonpercuniary externalities occur in
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if they are significant enough, call for government measures. The main point of 
departure between the different approaches concerns the existence, size, and nature of 
externalities since it is the extent and nature of market failure which justify departure 
from the free trade position and which suggest the most appropriate design for policy 
interventions. Tyson (1987:71) characterises the divergence over the relevance of 
externalities when she says: '[t]he usual tendency among economists is to treat ... 
externalities as annoying exceptions to the market, rather than as the rule in most 
markets ... Externalities ... are the centre of analysis in both the industrial policy and 
trade theory literature'.
In perfectly competitive markets, prices convey all the information necessary for 
individual agents to perform their optimal actions, thus giving rise to an efficient 
allocation for the economy. In oligopolistic markets, knowledge of prevailing prices 
may not be sufficient for individual agents to determine their optimal strategies. While 
exerting the pervasiveness of externalities, new trade theorists contend they are likely to 
be much stronger in some industries and sectors than others because of the nature of 
dynamic externalities. The prime source of real dynamic externalities is thought to lie in 
technological change and the (unpriced) ways in which this technical change is 
transmitted from one firm to another, both within and between industries (Stewart and 
Ghani 1992:144-5).
High-technology industries are believed to conflict with the assumptions of perfectly 
competitive markets in several ways: costs tend to fall and product quality tends to 
improve over time, the returns to technological advance tend to spill over into various 
other activities, and barriers to entry tend to result in imperfectly competitive industrial 
structures. Because technological elements are not perfectly tradable, and depending on 
whether externalities are 'national' or 'international', investments to acquire and to 
assimilate them can generate surpluses for those undertaking the investments or for 
other beneficiaries. The expected generation of such surpluses is central to the 
argument for establishing infant industries that lack international competitiveness at the 
outset. In such circumstances, commitments by foreign governments to subsidise their 
producers can change the underlying competitive game played by both foreign and 
domestic firms to the strategic advantage of the former (Tyson 1992:280). This 
conclusion is thought to follow, for example, from the experience of the semiconductor, 
computer, and aircraft industries. High-technology industries are also considered
situations where it is either costly or impossible to define private property, whereas pecuniary 
externalities occur when setup costs rule out the operation of competitive markets.
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strategic in the sense that they tend to yield higher returns to both capital and labour 
than they could earn elsewhere in the economy (Tyson 1987:74).5
Traditional trade theory considers dynamic comparative advantage to be a natural 
extension of static comparative advantage, offering only limited scope for government 
intervention. However, new trade theorists point to the cumulative nature of 
technological change and the potential first-mover advantage in the subsequent 
generation of innovations, which can tempt governments to promote an industry just 
enough to get it locked into the market. These strategic moves by firms, often with the 
support of their governments, seem to some observers to be placing (United States) 
firms under increasing competitive pressures. Tyson contends that:
... the characteristic features of high-technology industries — imperfect competition, strategic 
behaviour, dynamic economies of scale, and technological externalities — provide a fertile 
breeding ground for interventionist policies. Indeed, despite the recent trend toward economic 
'liberalisation' around the world, many nations remain committed to the goal of supporting 
their high-technology producers. Certainly this is the case in the European Community, in 
Japan, and in many newly industrialising countries like Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil. Most of 
the high-technology industries targeted and nurtured by these nations are ones in which the 
United States has considerable competitive strength and which are important to the US 
industrial base in a variety of ways. Understandably, these targeting strategies have sparked 
trade friction between the United States and its trading partners (1992:4) ... As a result of this 
targeting and a variety of structural and policy barriers to foreign markets, trade in high- 
technology industries is no longer free in the classical sense; it is manipulated by government 
intervention. Nor is comparative advantage in these industries inherited as it is in resource­
intensive industries — rather it is created with the help of the often heavy and visible hand of 
government action (1992:253).
This perception of the perceived success of government intervention has been used to 
justify strategic trade policies to support domestic firms. It is considered that countries 
which lack an explicit policy towards certain sectors, risk being displaced from strategic 
sectors by foreign competition.6 It is not surprising then that most research to date has 
emerged from the United States at a time of increasing fears in that country of an East 
Asian challenge in trade and technology. Bhagwati labels this tendency to attribute the 
successes of emergent trading nations to unfair trading practices the 'diminished giant'
5 Although as Tyson (1992) has acknowledged, neither the evidence she has surveyed on case studies 
of strategic industries nor the systematic evidence reported by Katz and Summers (1989) in their study 
of the United States economy, confirms the hypothesis that high technology industries generate higher 
returns to capital than those available elsewhere in the economy. Katz and Summers (1989:210) in 
their study conclude that 'whereas the recent literature on strategic trade policy has examined policy 
measures than can shift monopoly rents between nations, our estimates suggest that capital owners in 
the American economy receive few monopoly rents’.
6 Tyson (1992:28), for example, states that '[subsidies and promotional targeting by governments are 
the rule rather than the exception in high-technology industries in most countries'.
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Syndrome —  shades of Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. 'In both instances, 
the giant's diminution produced a protectionist backlash, sorely trying the pro-trade bias 
of the international regime’ (Bhagwati 1988:65). And as Soete (1991:63) argues, it is a 
view characterised by a good deal of retrospectivity:
The strategic intervention is now motivated by the allegedly foreign unruly behaviour', itself 
often the result of foreign industrial policy which was not called strategic when implemented, 
but which after the fact appeared to be 'strategically' inspired in terms of the resulting 
successful catching-up or increased world market share, this motivation is usually strongest in 
countries/sectors which have seen their world or domestic market positions come under foreign 
pressure.
3.3 The Presence of Externalities
The point of dispute centres on what sort of (industrial) policy should be used for 
market failures associated with what can be regarded as the three facets of R&D and 
leaming-by-doing. The first is the public good aspect of technology, the second is that 
of the risk that accompanies R&D, and the third is economies of scale in R&D and 
leaming-by-doing. The public good characteristics of technology occur because the 
consumption of technical knowledge may to some extent be nonexcludable and 
collective. Because of this, the technology developed by a firm can be utilised by other 
firms with minimal additional cost. Unless the property rights of the technical 
knowledge are guaranteed through patents or copyrights, the results of the development 
efforts of one firm readily spill over to other firms. Since in this sense technology is not 
readily appropriable, the incentives for firms to undertake R&D are weakened, giving 
rise to a tendency for investment in R&D to remain at a lower level than is socially 
desirable.
The second reason why R&D may be underprovided is because of risk. It may be 
impossible to know ahead of time whether a technology can be successfully developed 
or the extent to which the technology that is developed will result in profits for its 
developer. Moreover, it may be difficult to obtain private insurance for such risk. By 
subsidising R&D, the government can pool the private risk of firms so that the 
government in effect provides insurance to private firms (Itoh et al. 1988:237).7
7 But as Itoh (1988:237) also notes, for subsidies to be justified as insurance, the risk accompanying 
R&D must be individual risk. Individual risk is where the same sort of risk is independent among 
economic agents. On the other hand, where only one firm is involved in a given type of R&D, 
individual and social risk are identical, so that in terms of risk there is no gap between private and 
social profitability, and there is no need to intervene.
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The third reason for market failures of R&D and leaming-by-doing is that of economies 
of scale.8 Those that are important in relation to the issue of fostering an industry can 
be divided into three categories. First, the case of declining-cost industry, driven by 
Marshallian externalities, whereby the overall expansion of the industry brings an 
improvement in the technology and cost conditions of each firm. Second, there is the 
case which is the focus of the infant industry argument, where a dynamic process of 
leaming-by-doing and the accumulation of experience and increased production know­
how results in a decrease in costs. A temporary period of protection may give an 
industry a chance to move down the curve and become internationally competitive. The 
key is that firms are not able to fully internalise the benefits of the knowledge they 
generate through production experience. This dynamic externality is thought to have 
had a large impact in the integrated circuit, computer, and other high-technology 
industries, but in fact seems to be a common feature of all young industries (Itoh et al. 
1988:260-1).9 Third, there is the case in which, for information reasons, industries are 
not able to fully grasp the extent of demand. The industry comprises an important link 
in a hierarchy of industries, where the output of the industry is used as an input by other 
industries, or there may be many other industries which supply the industry, for example 
steel and petrochemicals which require large-scale facilities. Because of economies of 
scale such industries are by necessity oligopolistic and prices by themselves do not 
transmit the information necessary for efficient allocation of resources. It may thus be 
impossible to foresee how induced demand, or the supply of inputs, will change as the 
industry develops. In such a case industries linked to the industry tend to have set-up 
costs for the development of the industrial sector as a whole. This argument of centred 
on 'coordination' failure, introduced by Scitovsky (1954), has been re-introduced and 
extended by Pack and Westphal (1986) in their study of industrial targeting in newly 
industrialising countries.10
What the new trade theorists have explicitly focused on is the increasing returns to scale 
(or economies of scale) and the advantages associated with producing high levels of 
output. While static increasing returns normally imply that average cost falls as output
8 The following draws heavily on Itoh et al. (1988).
9 Bhagwati (1988:97) has stressed learning is a function of doing within the appropriate environment, 
rejecting the assumption that learning automatically follows from doing.
10 Grossman (1990:111) notes that the evidence of 'coordination failure' is anecdotal, and even less for 
developing countries where they may be more relevant. Given though opportunities for international 
trade are readily available to most producers of high-tech products, and that costs of transportation of 
such products are generally low in comparison to value added, then the size of the domestic market 
should not limit the possibilities for entry of potentially profitable producers. Thus there are grounds 
for scepticism about the relevance of 'coordination failure' argument to the industry policy debate.
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rises, dynamic increasing returns (or learning economies) arise when average costs falls 
as cumulative output rises. For static increasing returns, cumulative output does not 
matter —  current average cost depends on the current scale of output. With dynamic 
increasing returns, history is thought to matter —  producing a lot this year will lead to 
lower costs next year due to the value of learning and experience (Brander 1987:11). 
By incorporating increasing returns to scale into the analysis, the potential gains from 
trade are considered to be greatly expanded, although the distribution of those gains 
between countries is not so clear. As Graham (1923) suggested, the key to ensuring 
gains from one country is that those goods produced with increasing returns expand in 
that country. The policy implication is that national governments might be able to 
improve national welfare by intervening to secure a large share of increasing returns 
industries in the domestic country.
3.4 Technological and Pecuniary Externalities
The effects of dynamic economies are conventionally discussed under three categories: 
internal economies, pecuniary externalities, and non-pecuniary externalities. The 
benefits of experience that accrue to the firm undergoing the experience are 'internal 
economies', while the benefits that accrue to other agents are 'externalities'. Of the latter 
benefits, those that are transmitted through market transactions are 'pecuniary' 
externalities (where one firm's decisions affect another firm's production function), while 
those that are not transmitted through market transactions are 'technological' (non- 
pecuniary) externalities.
Technological externalities associated with diffusion in the absence of market 
transactions are particularly hard to assess but nonetheless may be important.11 These 
typically intra-industry externalities are due to the fact that one firm’s investments to 
obtain information can significantly reduce transactions costs for access by other nearby 
firm's to the same and closely related information. Because these externalities reflect the 
provision of a free good, and due to the indivisibility that characterises the investment 
that underlie them, these externalities are a source of market failure even in the presence 
of perfect capital markets (Pack and Westphal 1986:110).
Pecuniary externalities occur where the activities of one firm affect the terms of trade of 
other firms —  the price or characteristics of their inputs, or the markets for their output
11 As Viner (1953) has discussed, while technological externalities can be theoretically conceived, it is 
difficult to find convincing illustrations.
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(Stewart and Ghani 1992:132). Various forms of transactions involving the transfer of 
technology between local agents can give rise to pecuniary externalities. Explicit sales 
of technology can be conduits for inter-industry externalities as well as intra-industry 
externalities. Another channel for inter-industry externalities is the exchange of 
technological elements in transactions involving intermediate products and capital 
goods. Pecuniary externalities related to investments in technology are considered 
ubiquitous in industrialisation, and are thought to represent the most obvious 
manifestation of the initial producer’s inability to appropriate all of the surplus arising 
from its innovation. Not only does the innovator provide a free good in terms of 
information, the innovator also suffers negative consequences as imitators emerge.12
However, Okuno-Fujiwara (1988:26) notes that the modem concept of externalities (as 
introduced earlier) does, by its very definition, exclude pecuniary externalities. 
Pecuniary externalities, under which an agent's economic environment is affected by 
other agents' actions through a change in market prices, could not be categorised 
formally as externalities. It is the working of the price system in a competitive 
environment itself that is responsible for an economy to attain a Pareto efficient 
allocation. From this viewpoint, the concept of pecuniary externalities is self 
contradictory, unless one assumes the existence of other forms of market failure. To 
this effect, Heller and Starrett (1976:17) call attention to the informational problems. 
They write, '[i]f pecuniary externalities are to be salvaged as a separate concept, it is 
crucial to find an instance of market failure characterised by inadequate signalling of 
economic interdependencies by the price system, even when there is convexity in 
production and the possibility of exclusion'.
The traditional view based on competitive models is that only technological externalities 
provide a divergence between private and social costs, and hence a case for government 
intervention; interdependence between firms reflected via prices does not create such a 
divergence (Krugman 1987d:223). The reasoning on which this view is based assumes 
constant or decreasing returns at the level of the firm and perfect competition and no 
indivisibilities. However, new trade theorists argue that when indivisibilities are present,
12 As discussed in both Pack and Westphal (1986) and Corden (1974), additional issues arise when the 
total surplus that can be generated by an agent's actions depends directly upon other agent's actions, 
that is when pecuniary externalities are reciprocal, giving rise to the multiple interconnections among 
industrial activities. Scitovsky (1954) gives the classical exposition showing that reciprocal pecuniary 
externalities in the presence of increasing returns lead to market failure. The result follows because 
market information about the present does not adequately signal the interdependence that exists among 
the investment decisions in such circumstances.
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pecuniary externalities can give rise to market failures which may justify government 
interventions. With imperfect competition, the distinction between technological and 
pecuniary externalities is considered to be less clear-cut so that pecuniary externalities 
may sometimes represent real social externalities. The new trade theorists claim to have 
broken down this artificial distinction between purely technological and pecuniary 
external economies, 'which had made external economies seem empirically elusive and 
even suspect' (Krugman 1992:425), by redefining the scope of the externality argument 
in two ways.
3.4.1 Scope of Externalities: Geographical Location
The first definition of external economies centres on the unit to which external 
economies may apply. As previously noted, while the emphasis on external economies 
suggested by new trade theory is similar to the strategic (profit-shifting) trade policy 
case in offering a reason for government targeting of particular sectors, the external 
economies argument is thought to differ in that policies to promote sectors yielding 
external economies need not affect other countries adversely. Whether the effect of one 
country's targeting of high-externality sectors on other countries is positive or negative 
depends on whether the scope of the externalities is national or international.13 There 
are conflicting interests if knowledge spills over within a country but not between 
countries (Krugman 1987d). The case for concern over foreign competition in high- 
technology sectors is thus considered to depend on the geographic diffusion of 
knowledge.
The most persuasive case for considering sectors that generate external economies to be 
strategic is the argument that the externalities are not confined to the industry itself but 
also yield interindustry spillovers. Thus several different industries may use similar kinds 
of knowledge, each being able to learn from the R&D or gain from the experience of the
13 Krugman has argued that even when the externalities are nation-specific no intervention is justified 
where factor prices are unaffected and where the externalities are industry-specific (Helpman and 
Krugman 1985; Krugman 1986). However Stewart and Ghani (1992:145-6) argue that this argument is 
centred on a full employment model where real wages are determined in the constant-returns sector 
which is shared by both trading partners. Here a rise in productivity throughout the economy can 
happen only if either (i) a nation specialises entirely in external economy industries; or (ii) the external 
economies arising from one industry benefit the whole economy raising productivity everywhere. In 
contrast, developing countries which succeed in raising productivity in the externality-creating sector 
may increase the size of the modem sector (through absorbing labour surplus) and thereby raise real 
incomes for the economy as a whole. They argue the efforts of Taiwan and Korea in their post-labour 
surplus phase can be seen as a gradual effort to shift the whole economy into technological dynamic 
increasing returns sectors though the policy has to start with one industry at a time.
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other. External economies can thus be identified with incomplete appropriability of the 
results of R&D, which suggests they are most likely to be found in industries where 
R&D is an especially large part of firm costs. Alternatively there could be linkage 
externalities among a number of industries in the form of forward and backward 
linkages. Like industry-specific externalities, there are benefits associated with the 
geographical concentration of 'industrial complexes', but these benefits do not 
necessarily accrue to the country in which the complex is located. Thus there is the 
need to distinguish innovations by how they diffuse. At one extreme some innovations 
can be wholly internalised by firms, that are highly specific production knowledge. 
Examples may be details of manufacturing technology which is kept secret by a few 
people. At the other extreme are innovations which can be imitated, regardless of 
location. The obvious example is product design, which can be 'reverse engineered' from 
samples. Between these cases is knowledge that cannot be held closely by firms, but 
which diffuses in a way that limits its geographic spread. Thus the best candidates for 
nationally limited externalities are those cases where knowledge spreads largely by 
personal contact and word of mouth, that is, knowledge that diffuses only locally 
(Krugman 1987a: 138).14 New trade theorists assert that damage from foreign targeting 
is most likely to arise in this intermediate range, where technological change involves 
creation of a pool of knowledge that is not easily held within firms but tends to stay 
within national boundaries. Krugman (1987d:240) concludes then that special national 
advantage from having an externality-generating strategic sector really arises only if it 
creates technological spillovers that are broadly beneficial to the rest of the economy 
and that are somehow country-specific in character.
Although quantitative estimates are not available, new trade theorists contend several 
kinds of evidence point to significant localised externalities. The economic geography 
of the United States electronics industry is considered to provide evidence of significant 
local spillovers. This may represent a bona-fide criterion for identifying a strategic 
sector: look for a sector that appears to generate knowledge that cannot be appropriated 
by the firm but is restricted in its geographic spread' (Krugman 1987d:223).15
14 The electronics industry is considered to offer examples of all three types of knowledge. At one end 
there is the learning curve in the production of semiconductors, in which reliability increases sharply 
over the production run. The knowledge involved in this learning curve is so specific that it does not 
generalise across different plants owned by a single firm, or across firms. On the other hand, reverse 
engineering of product design is common and does not stop at national boundaries. Finally, the middle 
ground of geographically limited diffusion of knowledge is provided by the movement of personnel 
and informal communications within high-tech clusters of Silicon Valley (Krugman 1987d:222).
15 Krugman’s most recent position favours government expenditure of say $US10 billion of subsidies 
for industries for which a strong case for external economies can be made.
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Lawrence and Shultze (1990:20) note that the tendency of companies from the same 
industry to locate near one another, for example, Silicon Valley, does suggest some role 
for geographically confined spillovers. 'In principle, the existence of geographically 
confined spillovers could deprive a country of important benefits because market forces 
would not generate the appropriate amount of output from the spillover-creating 
industries. But even then it does not follow straightforwardly that government policies 
to promote these industries are called for'. And as Krugman (1989:140) in fact points 
out, even where there are external economies, 'if additional resources of labour and 
capital are supplied elastically to the industry, the external benefits of larger production 
will not be confined to the promoting country. Instead they will be passed on to the 
consumers around the world'.
To make a strong case for a special national advantage from possession of externality- 
generating sectors, interindustry spillovers must not be restricted to a narrow group of 
related sectors but must be broadly spread through the economy. One area where broad 
interindustry spillovers seem plausible is in infrastructure. Transportation and 
communications enter into production throughout the economy; are characterised by 
significant economies of scale; and at least in the telecommunications sector there may 
be substantial technological externalities (although these may be international in scope). 
In terms of international competition, however, the argument is least forceful in the area 
to which it has also been applied: that of telecommunications equipment, which is 
tradable. Thus as Krugman (1987d:228-9) also acknowledges, what is left is an 
argument for some deliberate national policy for infrastructure development, which is 
not a significant departure from conventional wisdom.
As regards the appropriate policy response, Stewart and Ghani (1992:146-7) contend 
that where the externalities are concentrated as to source, and nation-specific as to 
beneficiary, selective industrial promotion is justified. But if the source of externalities 
is spread widely within industries but not outside, then the type of intervention justified 
is non-discriminatory industrial promotion. Others, like the dynamic externalities 
associated with technical change, are likely to be focused on particular types of 
technology and industry, where the rate of frontier technology is changing fast. These 
externalities will generally be concentrated on a single industry or a few closely linked 
industries.16 The externalities must be sufficient to ensure eventual competitiveness in
16 In the case where linked industries are the main beneficiaries, care is needed to establish that the 
externalities are nation-specific and could not be equally (or better) acquired by importing. An 
example is India's protection of its capital goods industry, which has probably led to lower technology
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the industry in question or in user industries, and the eventual gains must be sufficient to 
outweigh the temporary costs (the Mill-Bastable test). Moreover, while examples of 
this form of interaction occur (semiconductors in Silicon Valley), it is difficult to 
estimate the extent to which technological change is due to the change in the linked 
industry as against innovative activity in the industry itself, which would have occurred 
anyway.
3.4.2 Linkages
New trade theorists argue that there is a second way in which special national 
advantages can be created. They assert that the pattern of industrial localisation within 
countries suggests that there are forces at work that look like localised externalities but 
cannot be attributed simply to incomplete appropriation of knowledge. This view is 
centred on past theoretical analysis that suggests a variety of ways in which effects that 
resemble externalities can arise even if true technological externalities are absent. By 
introducing interdependence of several industries and oligopolistic competition in at 
least one of these industries, problems often associated with Marshallian externalities 
can be interpreted as those of 'coordination failure'. Among recent studies concerned 
with Marshallian externalities and coordination failure, Ethier (1979, 1982b)17 and 
Helpman and Krugman (chapter 11, 1985) present a microeconomic foundation for 
these externalities. They purport to show that the domain of externality-type arguments 
may thus be considerably larger than the technological spillover case.
The case that is considered most relevant is where intermediate goods are produced 
with economies of scale internal to firms. In the international trade context this case has 
been emphasised by Ethier. In Ethier's model, a monopolistically competitive industry 
produces intermediate (differentiated) products operating with increasing returns to 
scale, while the final goods industry which uses the former industry's outputs as input is 
perfectly competitive. If the industry grows, it will typically be able to support a greater 
variety of inputs produced at larger scale; because of greater specificity and lower prices 
of these inputs, the costs of the industry will fall. Ethier points out that this fall in costs 
may come from a technological externality. The decline in costs does not reflect a loss
transfers to user industries than would have been received through imported capital goods (Stewart and 
Ghani 1992: 146).
17 Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) also shows how Marshallian externalities can be theoretically explained by 
interdependence of industries and by oligopolistic competition in one of these industries using a 
Cournot rather than a monopolistic competition model.
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to anyone but a real saving in resources; the fact that costs decline with output causes a 
true divergence between private and social marginal cost (Krugman 1987d:223-4).
Krugman (1987d:224) contends that there does not seem to be any established name for 
this phenomenon, where private increasing returns at one stage of the production 
process give rise to social increasing returns at the final stage. It is not a technological 
externality, yet unlike a conventional pecuniary externality it does not give rise to a 
divergence between market prices and social costs. Krugman refers to this as a linkage 
externality, noting that the case of intermediate goods produced with increasing returns 
is the simplest but not the only case. One example is in the context of industrial 
localisation where several firms have in common their use of some specialised factor 
such as a particular kind of skilled labour. If there is firm-specific uncertainty about 
markets or technology which makes each firm's demand for the common factor random 
ex ante, then it is mutually advantageous for the firms and the workers if the industry is 
sufficiently concentrated geographically so that workers can easily shift from one firm to 
another, without substantially increasing wages. In this example the linkage externality 
appears to be geographically restricted in extent.
In the discussion of technological externalities, the geographical extent of the externality 
is thought to assume a crucial role. The same is also considered true for linkage 
externalities. In this case, however, it is thought to be much easier to ascertain the 
forces that determine the geographic extent of externalities. The question is simply one 
of tradability of the inputs to which the linkage externalities applies. Ethier (1979) 
pointed out that if externalities arise from economies of scale in the production of 
intermediate goods, and if these intermediate goods are tradable, then economies of 
scale could be thought of as applying at the international, rather than the national 
industry. This is the case for inputs such as machine tools. But Helpman and Krugman 
(1985) then showed that these externalities would give rise to specialisation in final 
goods only if the intermediates goods were nontraded. They assert all inputs are freely 
tradable; where the linkage externality involves inputs difficult to trade because of 
natural or artificial barriers, the linkage externality is only national in scope. Linkage 
externalities are thus a national competitive concern only if some aspect of 
nontradability makes them so. In the past such industries as steel and petrochemical 
industries have been portrayed as vital industries, and more recently the semiconductor 
and machine tool industries have been described in the same way. In each case the 
linkage argument is considered to have been subject to abuse. Developing countries are 
free to buy steel and capital goods from developed countries (and vice versa); other
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Asian countries can make use of Japanese semiconductors and machine tools. Only 
where nontradability is significant does a national linkage externality arise (Krugman 
1987d:225).
Despite this caveat Krugman contends the addition of linkage externalities to strict 
technological externalities does seem to widen the scope for designating certain sectors 
as strategic. However, once international trade is introduced, the scope narrows again, 
for even if the external economy, technological or linkage, is national in scope, the 
benefits of that externality may end up being shared internationally.
3.5 The Domestic Distortions Literature and Externalities
The notion that the existence of significant externalities create a prima-facie case for 
interventionist industrial or trade policies is not new. Discussion of dynamic 
externalities in the earlier literature was in the context of leaming-by-doing, following 
Arrow's (1962) modelling, for example, of the infant-industry argument. Much of the 
trade and investment policy debate in small and/or developing countries drew on the 
same reasoning and provided the original justification for developing country trade 
preferences in the 1960s. Developing countries may have a dynamic comparative 
advantage in an industry subject to dynamic externalities, but be uncompetitive 
according to static comparative advantage. Consequently, temporary intervention may 
be justified to enable comparative advantage to be realised. Bardhan (1993:133) states 
that:
the acquired and sometimes policy-driven nature of dynamic comparative advantage, to which 
the East Asian challenge has awakened many developed-country trade theorists, has been a 
persistent theme in the trade and development literature for decades. In general, the literature 
on the microeconomics of technological progress has always emphasised the pervasiveness of 
externalities in the innovation process, in the transfer, absorption, development and adaptation 
of new technologies; and the problems posed by the catching-up process in the developing 
countries helped shape the directions of this literature.
For example, the distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities, was first 
discussed by Marshall,18 named by Viner (1932), and has been further popularised and
18 While not explicitly originating the notion of pecuniary externalities, Marshall coined the term 
'internal economies', to signify cost reductions, technical or pecuniary, which result to the firms 
comprising a single industry when the industry expands its output through an expansion of the number 
of firms within it. It has been extended to include the reductions in cost which accrue to a particular 
industry from the expansion of other industries in the same country or region —  called the economies 
of complementarity of industries (Viner 1958:56).
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developed by Meade (1952) and Scitovsky (1954). Scitovsky and others suggested that 
technological externalities are, with the exception of human skill formulation, relatively 
insignificant in developing countries. In contrast, Scitovsky, Rosenstein-Rodan, and 
others argued that pecuniary externalities are of significant magnitude, justifying 
economic planning and other interventions.
Viner (1958:56-8) referred to the 'increasingly fashionable' idea of external economies 
which could be used to 'support a broadened version of the old infant industry argument, 
as justification for protection to a whole range of new industries', but thought that it 
might 'call for major qualifications if it is presented as having much practical 
significance'. That the transmission of externalities were important in stimulating the 
growth of inter-related industries, was also not ignored in Marshallian value theory. But 
it was thought that no extra-market treatment was called for since such economies will 
be reflected in market prices (hence Viner’s term pecuniary economies) of inputs and 
will be a part of the coordinating mechanism (Bardhan 1978:459).
Other development economists of the 1940s and 1950s also made contributions in the 
analysis of 'pecuniary' external economies, particularly in the case of 'economies of 
market coordination'. The insight, originally due to Young (1928) and Rosenstein- 
Rodan (1943),19 was developed by others, particularly Nurkse (1953), Scitovsky (1954) 
and Fleming (1955). When domestic markets are small, simultaneous expansion of 
many sectors can be self-sustaining through mutual demand support, even if by itself no 
sector can break even. Bardhan goes on to argue that:
[t]he idea of how plant-level economies of scale get translated into increasing returns at the 
aggregate level through ’pecuniary' external economies, which was so central to the 
development economics of the 1950s, lost much of its intellectual force in the subsequent 
decades, not so much because it lacked, until recently, a firm anchoring in a formal model 
using tools of imperfect markets equilibrium analysis, as Krugman (1992) suggests, but more 
because at the policy level the difficulties of aggregate coordination were underestimated 
(particularly at the existing levels of administrative capacity and political coherence in 
developing countries) and the incentive and organisational issues of micro-management of 
capital were underappreciated. The resulting government failures diverted the profession's 
attention from what nevertheless remain an important source of market failure discovered by 
early development economics (Bardhan 1993:134).
19 See Arndt (1955) for a comprehensive survey and discussion of the origins of the concept of 
externalities.
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Scitovsky (1954:300-1) had earlier noted that pecuniary external economies 'clearly 
have no place in equilibrium theory, but may be meaningful elsewhere'.20 In an 
environment of imperfect knowledge, current prices are a poor signal of future 
profitability, especially in the early stages of development. Hence the need for 
centralised intervention in the decision making. Scitovsky (1954:305-6) stated:
market prices ... reflect the economic situation as it is and not as it will be. For this reason, 
they are more useful for coordinating current production decisions, which ... should be 
governed ... by what the future economic situation is expected to be. The proper coordination 
of investment decisions, therefore, would require a signalling device to transmit information 
about present plans; and the pricing system fails to provide this. Hence the belief that there is 
a need either for centralised investment planning or for some additional communication 
system to supplement the pricing system as a signalling device ... In undeveloped countries ... 
investment is likely to have a greater impact on prices, give rise to greater pecuniary external 
economies, and thus cause a greater divergence between private profit and social benefit.
The Rosenstein-Rodan view also represented one of the early examples in dealing with 
coordination failures in economics and as Krugman (1992) acknowledges, the basic idea 
had been fruitful in generating examples of multiple equilibria in international trade (with 
increasing returns in the production of nontraded intermediate goods bringing about 
external economies at the level of final goods). But, while attributed to Ethier (1982a 
and 1982b) it can be traced back to the genesis of externalities in Marshall (1898). 
Marshall takes up the matter of industrial location using externalities as an explanatory 
variable in much the same fashion as Ethier and Krugman. Krugman notes that although 
such externalities may be an important part of the production environment, to be the 
object of international competition, their benefits must be country-specific. As Marshall 
also noted, this is not often the case. Externalities can be embodied in goods and trained 
individuals that are internationally traded or otherwise migrate. Even when externalities 
do remain largely country specific, benefits may be shared through lower international 
prices (Saxonhouse 1987).
According to Bardhan (1993:133) where the earlier development literature went astray 
(and similarly more recent endogenous growth models) is in underestimating the 
difficulty of identifying the few sectors and locations where the spillover effects may be 
large and particularly difficult to internalise.21 Learning is highly localised and project-
20 Scitovsky (1954:300-1) stated that 'investment in an industry leads to an expansion of its capacity 
and may thus lower the prices of its products and raise the prices of the factors used by it. The 
lowering of product prices benefits the users of these products; the raising of factor prices benefits the 
suppliers of the factors. When these benefits accrue to firms, in the form of profits, they are pecuniary 
external economies —  Marshall would have called them consumers' and producers' surplus.'
21 Bardhan (1993:133) notes that the more recent growth literature of Römer (1986, 1990) has 
increased the consciousness of the profession about the importance of these external effects,
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specific with the extent of spillovers depending crucially on the nature of competition 
that the policy environment promotes and of the physical and social infrastructure, 
including the level of education.
3.5.1 The Postwar Theory of Commercial Policy
Mainstream neoclassical economists contend that the new trade theorists have largely 
ignored the theory of distortions and welfare developed during the 1960s and 1970s, 
which, in presenting contributions on the analysis of market failures arising from 
monopoly, factor market imperfections, increasing returns etc, dominated the postwar 
analysis of commercial policy. What emerged from this literature was an ’overriding 
pro-free-trade message: that domestic failures were best dealt with not by trade policy 
interventions, but by choosing domestic policies tailor-made to assist and countervail the 
market failure at its source' (Bhagwati 1989:27).22 The domestic distortions approach 
pointed to the fact that trade interventions are a particularly inefficient way of dealing 
with the problem. In the interpretation of 'strategic' industry policy, for example, the 
subsidy support arguments, by downgrading the role of trade policy, not only highlight 
the fact that the compensation must occur as closely as possible to the origin of the 
distortion; they also underline the real and hidden costs of the indirect income transfers 
in favour of the strategic industry. As a result, policy support for such direct income 
transfer will be less than in the case of an import restriction, where the hidden taxation is 
indirect and less obvious and can even be presented as being borne by foreign 
competitors (Caves 1987).23
In particular, the domestic distortions literature demonstrated that monopoly 
(monopsony) power24 in trade gives rise to pecuniary externalities which are best offset
(particularly those flowing from investment in human capital). However, it tends to overlook, and thus 
fails to learn from earlier development literature which abounds with many examples and sophisticated 
debates on these effects through learning, skill-formation, machine user-supplier interaction, or 
networks of technology diffusion.
22 Various theoretical grounds for government intervention were developed in the 1950s and 1960s by 
such economists as Meade (1955), Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Johnson (1965c). As these 
writers point out, there is a theoretical case for government intervention by a country when Pareto 
optimality conditions are not satisfied because of either an international or domestic economic 
distortion.
23 Sourced from Soete (1991:62).
24 Instances where a country acts as a monopolist are a standard part of traditional trade theory. The 
situation of a country raising its welfare by introducing tariffs to counter the tariffs of a foreign 
government is well known from Scitovsky (1941) and Johnson (1954). Katrak (1977) and Svedberg 
(1979) also have analysed the situation where a tariff is imposed against imports from a private foreign 
firm acting as a monopolist.
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by specific export (import) taxes. In the absence of such market power, the only 
potentially significant sources of market failure are internal economies and externalities 
associated with human capital formation. But there can be no market failure unless it is 
associated with imperfect knowledge or imperfection in the capital and labour markets. 
Neoclassicists who recognise that products and technology are not perfectly tradable 
emphasise that for small economies that lack market power, the role of the government 
is to facilitate the flow of information,25 to promote improvements in the operation of 
capital markets, and to ensure adequate investment in human capital formation. Trade 
economists (Baldwin 1969) have long warned about the likely ineffectiveness of trade 
policies as a means of dealing with these externalities.
Corden (1974) notes that the weakness in the externality argument is that all investment, 
if it is indivisible, gives rise to pecuniary external economies so that investment in 
learning is not unusual. It would have to be shown that the indivisibilities in learning are 
in some sense greater than in alternative investments, whether within the same firms or 
other firms. Hence there was no reason for investment on pecuniary externality grounds 
in preference to others. '[I]n a general equilibrium framework all externalities and 
arguments for protection needed to be seen in relative terms. If one fosters industries 
where there is learning but does this by reducing the output of, or perhaps completely 
ending, other industries where there are much greater potentialities for learning ... then 
total learning for the whole economy may actually decline as a result of protection' 
(Corden 1974:269).
Corden (1974:270-2) also discussed the situation in which various industries or 
activities may be complementary with each other, justifying temporary subsidisation. 
There may be mutual benefits, described as reciprocal pecuniary external economies, 
which operate through the price system, as distinct from ordinary externalities which by­
pass the price system. In the absence of any coordination investment, the two industries 
could coordinate their activities, or the pecuniary externalities might be internalised by a 
takeover or merger. But in the case of many firms, the solution may be to subsidise 
temporarily some or all of the activities. However, introducing trade weakened the
25 Similarly, Corden (1990) noted that the idea that an argument for intervention based on a distortion 
resulting from imperfect private information is not new. Earlier infant industry proponents cited 
similar arguments and as Corden (1974:252-3) argued, the first policy was for the state to spread more 
information with no reason existing as to why private firms would have less information regarding the 
prospects for its own cost curves than the state. In the more recent cases where the home and the 
foreign governments possibly compete in underwriting their firm's losses in the process of international 
competition, Corden considers this is a special version on the infant industry argument, namely an 
'infant exporting argument' (Corden 1990:16).
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whole argument. Where all goods are traded and world prices are given, and there are 
no nontraded goods; then the whole problem disappears. 'If we abandon the small 
country assumption world prices are no longer given ... where there is the possibility of 
trade extreme complementarities disappear. The problem only really returns when 
nontraded goods are introduced' (Corden 1974:271-2).
Mainstream neoclassicists have not been as dogmatic as their portrayal by the new trade 
theorists suggests. Bhagwati (1989:19) contends the postwar theory of commercial 
policy in fact shows that trade policy instruments may under some circumstances be in 
the national interest, that one cannot assert that free trade is 'the policy that economic 
theory tells us is always right' and 'this is surely the core contribution of the postwar 
theory of distortions and welfare'. What this literature illustrated was that 'even when 
departures from free trade are justifiable, it is necessary to distinguish between policy 
interventions that are merely beneficial and those that are maximally useful (emphasis 
added): a prescription more often ignored than respected by some of the recent 
proponents of the theory of imperfect competition in international trade'.
In fact the major postwar developments in the theory of commercial policy appeared 
principally to address the two exceptions to the case for free trade: market failure 
presented by the infant industry argument and the presence of monopoly power.26 The 
former led to the influential theory of policy intervention for an open economy in the 
presence of distortions; the latter paved the way for a systematic analysis of strategic 
trade-policy initiatives. In both cases, the developments can be argued as having 
strengthened the case for free trade, but in a subtle and sophisticated sense' (Bhagwati 
1989:26).27
Similarly, Helleiner (1992:4) argues that 'a good deal of the 'older' trade and 
investment policy debate in small and/or developing countries has ... always revolved 
around the questions of scale economies, learning, externalities, oligopoly, and the 
'shaping of comparative advantage' that are now in fashion in much of the mainstream 
literature'. In particular, the theoretical developments presented by the new trade
26 The classic analysis of strategic trade policy as a reactive 'game' between governments is Johnson's 
(1954) study of the optimum (monopoly) tariff in the presence of retaliation. In the Johnsonian 
analysis of strategic interactions of governments, firms are competitive but the two governments are in 
strategic interaction (although Johnson's analysis was entirely in terms of Coumot-Nash strategy). 
New trade theory is new in the sense of attempting to allow for oligopoly and strategic interactions 
among private firms, as distinct from governments.
27 See Bhagwati (1989:26-7).
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theorists are similar to the traditional infant industry scenario with closure of the 
domestic market the first step towards a firm participating in the international market. 
The refinement in new trade theory is the narrower range in which assistance to the 
domestic industry is seen as desirable, namely industries exhibiting characteristics 
associated with technology intensity. In contrast to earlier proponents of the infant 
industry argument is the feature that assistance be applied (implicitly or explicitly) not to 
the whole industrial sector '(except perhaps to the encouragement of investment in 
general), but rather to the selection of particular strategic industries — anticipating or 
creating the development of comparative advantage' (Snape 1993). Whatever form 
intervention takes, its potential to benefit the relevant country depends on the ability of 
government to enable domestic firms to increase market share at the expense of foreign 
rivals.
Earlier proponents of the infant industry argument such as Hamilton (1791) and List 
(1885) posited that some newly established industries have initially high costs relative 
to foreign producers with greater experience and higher skill levels, but may, in the 
long run, have a comparative advantage after a temporary period of development — 
once new producers became 'educated to the level of those with whom the processes 
are traditional' (Mill [ 1848] 1909:922). And while economists since Mill and Bastable 
([1887] 1903) have acknowledged that infant industry considerations may constitute a 
legitimate exception to the case for free trade, they have also provided various reasons 
for being sceptical of infant industry protection.
The theoretical reservations surrounding the infant industry argument have remained 
equally valid for assistance on strategic industry grounds. The dynamic externality had 
to be of sufficient size so that later gains would repay the initial 'investment', defined as 
the losses that would be incurred because of the static costs of producing when the 
protected items would be obtained more cheaply from abroad. Perhaps more 
fundamental were questions about whether and why the protection of an infant 
industry, even if undertaken by producer subsidy, would achieve the desired results. 
Baldwin (1969) in considering the same possibilities, provided a compelling statement 
of the theoretical case by demonstrating that protection was unlikely to internalise the 
spillover or overcome the source of the imperfection, and in indicating that the 
problem of infant industries are not necessarily peculiar to them alone.
Embodied within the infant industry proposition are four contentious arguments:
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(i) some newly established activities are initially high cost relative to established foreign 
enterprises and require time to become competitive; (ii) it does not pay any individual 
entrepreneur to enter an infant industry at free trade prices; but (iii) the industry, if developed, 
would be economic enough to permit a reasonable rate of return on the initial losses; and 
therefore (iv) the industry requires a temporary period o f protection or assistance during which 
its costs will fall enough to permit it to survive international competition without assistance 
(Krueger and Tuncer 1982a: 1142-3).
Reasons advanced for the first proposition as to why costs of a new activity may 
initially be high include leaming-by-doing and the existence of 'linkages' between 
industries as proposed by Hirschman (1958).28 As previously mentioned, these 
possibilities were encapsulated by Arrow (1962) in the notion that output per unit of 
input might increase as cumulative output within a given line of activity increased. 
The essential feature was that a new activity will initially be high cost, but that unit 
costs will decline over time.
According to the second proposition, while costs will decline, they will do so in a way 
that does not allow individuals initially starting the activity to reap the full rewards. If 
start up costs are high but the activity is economic, it would pay an individual 
entrepreneur to incur those costs in order to reap later benefits. For there to be a case 
for intervention, there must be positive externalities from the development of an infant 
activity which accrue to individuals other than those undertaking the activity initially. 
Thus, the presence of externalities is necessary in order to show that private activity 
will not generate the optimal level of development (Krueger and Tuncer 1982a: 1143).
The third proposition asserts that the losses associated with an initial period of high 
costs must be recovered (with interest) at a later date, although not by the individual 
entrepreneur starting up the activity. The costs of production of those benefiting from 
the development of the activity must fall enough to repay the initial losses and to 
provide a reasonable rate of return on those losses (since resources could otherwise 
have been allocated to unprotected activities with higher incremental international 
value-added) (Krueger and Tuncer 1982a: 1143). This is the Mill-Bastable criterion 
whereby the discounted present value of the social gains must exceed those of the 
social costs. Krueger and Tuncer (1982a) apply this criteria in their work on the 
Turkish manufacturing industry, showing how rates of growth of output per unit of 
input between more or less assisted industries constitutes a test for the empirical
28 In this latter case, the absence of complementary activities or small size of the industrial sector of an 
economy might, in the early stages of development, constitute a reason why all industrial activities 
would initially be high cost (Krueger and Tuncer 1982a).
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validity of the infant industry argument.29 This test is also applied to the Taiwan case 
in Chapter 9.
The fourth proposition relies on the fact that if the first three propositions are valid and 
some form of assistance to the externality-generating activity is warranted, protection 
would not be the first-best policy and might not achieve its intended purpose. In policy 
terms, the first-best intervention in the case of a perceived market failure is to direct 
policy to correct the specific failure. A second-best policy would compensate 
underprovided inputs directly. A third-best policy would subsidise the whole industry 
output, provided that the Mill-Bastable criterion is satisfied.
In also asserting the magnitude and nature of dynamic economies are far more 
significant than is recognised by this literature, the governed market literature has 
sought to castigate the neoclassical position, drawing on the work of those considered 
to possess 'impeccable neoclassical credentials' as endorsement of their view — quotes 
such as Corden (1974:255) for example, that 'in spite of many qualifications, a valid, 
practically relevant infant industry argument for subsidisation of new manufacturing 
industries resting on capital market imperfections can be made for less developed 
countries’; and Bhagwati (1965), that externalities in cultivating new foreign markets 
may justify export subsidies as first-best policy measures. Thus:
free trade guided one to the efficient outcome only if the price mechanism worked well. 
Prices had to reflect true social costs. Thus it was understood, particularly after the writings 
of List, that infant-industry protection could be justified ... if there were future returns that 
could not be captured by the infant industry but would dissipate to others in the country, this 
market failure justified protection (Bhagwati 1989:21).
But as Baldwin (1969:295) stated 'the classical infant industry argument for protection 
has long been regarded by economists as the major 'theoretically valid' exception to the 
case for worldwide free trade. What controversy there is over the concept tends to 
centre not on the analytical issues but rather on empirical matters'. The infant industry 
case rests on the notion that a freely functioning market system will, in the absence of 
protection, fail to bring about socially optimal levels of training, knowledge, and factor 
endowment in certain industries. The importance of these issues is not denied by the 
neoclassical literature. What is disputed is that protection cannot correct for these 
externalities and achieve an optimal learning level. More direct measures can be
29 That is, costs in assisted industries are required to fall over time more rapidly than costs in non- 
assisted or less-assisted industries.
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employed to correct for these disadvantages without giving rise to undesirable side 
effects. Recognition of these reservations that surround the infant industry argument 
have often been either misrepresented or afforded scant attention within the governed 
market literature.
3.6 An Assessment of the Externality Argument
The few studies of strategic behaviour in particular industries based on the profit- 
shifting literature tend to support the view that the gains from strategic trade policies are 
small.30 Based on a survey of empirical research on trade policy under imperfect 
competition, Richardson (1989) concludes that on balance, trade liberalisation has 
strong positive effects on economic welfare that are due in large part to rationalisation 
of the industrial structure and heightened market competitiveness.31 Thus empirical 
studies of imperfectly competitive markets have in some ways strengthened the case for 
liberal trade.
In the case of externalities, recent empirical evidence indicates that knowledge spillovers 
associated with research and development efforts, while elusive and difficult to 
calculate, may be more significant than most traditional trade economists thought, 
although appropriability appears to be quite variable across industries, firms and time.
30 For example, Dixit (1988) in an empirical study of competition in the United States automobile 
market between United States and Japanese producers, found the United States strategic welfare gains 
from imposing an optimal tariff to be small, once the domestic distortion associated with the domestic 
monopoly problem is corrected with a domestic production subsidy. Analysis of the semiconductor 
and aircraft industries by Baldwin and Krugman (1988a, 1988b) provided even less support for the 
desirability of engaging in strategic trade policy actions. In the 16K semiconductor case, by assuming 
free entry, the authors find closure of the Japanese market enabled the industry to develop in Japan and 
gain a foothold in export markets. However, Japan ends up with a lower welfare level with its 
protection of the industry than in the absence of any domestic production under free trade conditions. 
While protection of Japan's semiconductor chip industry helped increase its market share, the profit 
was small, and the harm to downstream users of the chips, who paid higher prices, was quite 
substantial. They conclude that the policy was not a net benefit to the Japanese economy. In 
modelling the Airbus-Boeing competition in the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft, Baldwin 
and Krugman look at the effects of the European subsidies to Airbus in a duopoly model with dynamic 
learning curve effects which are internal to the firm. They conclude that Airbus would not have 
entered without the subsidy and that prices would have been higher with a Boeing monopoly. They 
likewise conclude that Europe loses by subsidising Airbus compared with a free trade situation in 
which Boeing would be the only producer of this type of aircraft. Competition from Airbus lowers the 
price of these medium-range aircraft significantly, bringing consumer benefits to Europe, but these are 
not enough to offset the costs to taxpayers of the huge subsidy.
31 In a study of a similar vein, Gunasekera and Tyers (1989) find that industrial rationalisation to be a 
significant source of potential Korean gains from trade liberalisation.
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While it is not possible to resolve the issue of externalities by direct measurement,32 
Richardson (1990:119) notes that this research tends to show significant patterns of 
spillovers or externalities that range from moderate to important.33 For example, Jaffee 
(1986) in examining the research performance of 432 United States firms for the years 
1973 and 1979, tests the hypothesis that a firm's R&D success is positively related to the 
amount of R&D undertaken by other firms in closely related areas of research. He finds 
considerable support for the externalities hypothesis, with over one half of the new 
patents associated with a general increase in research outlays in an industry being due to 
spillovers. Berstein (1988) measures spillovers by estimating cost functions for several 
Canadian industries. In most cases significant intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers 
are found together with evidence that firms reduce their own R&D expenditures when 
the opportunity to free ride on others increases. Berstein estimates social rates of return 
to R&D roughly double that of estimated private returns, with intra-industry spillovers 
accounting for the majority. Scherer (1982) reports social returns to R&D that are 
more than double their estimates of the private returns, while Berstein and Nadiri (1989) 
provide evidence that technological spillovers extend across industry boundaries. 
Griliches and Mairesse (1983) use pooled United States and French data to estimate a 
gross excess rate of return on R&D of 25 per cent by regressing total factor productivity 
growth on the R&D/sales ratio. Baily and Chakrabarti (1988) find that a substantial gap 
exists between private and social returns to R&D, despite the availability of patents, and 
consider a conservative excess return to R&D to be between 35 to 60 per cent above 
the return to ordinary capital. Mansfield et al. (1977) estimate the private and social 
rates of return from 17 industrial innovations finding that the social rate of return 
generally exceeds the private rate of return. However, the highest discrepancy between 
social and private returns from innovation was in 'thread innovation', followed by 'stain 
removers', neither of which are high technology industries.
But as discussed earlier, the existence of externalities does not provide a prima-facie 
case for trade intervention. Baldwin (1969), in the context of the infant industry 
debate, analyses the possible underlying sources of externalities mentioned above, and 
the extent to which tariff assistance (or a production subsidy) might move resource
32 Measurement of activity-specific policies such as R&D, or environment-creating ones such as 
education, is difficult, since all the benefits are diffused through the economy. Nonetheless, 
measurement is not impossible, as studies of the social rate of return to investment in education 
indicate.
33 For example see Mansfield (1980); Mohnen, Nadiri and Prucha (1986); Levin (1988); Cockbum and 
Griliches (1988); Caballero (1989);* and Lyons (1989)*. Some of these studies evaluate a social rate 
of return on R&D without identifying the particular interindustry links o f the spillover. *Denotes those 
works not sighted by the author.
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allocation in the desired direction. Baldwin points out these policies may be totally 
ineffectual in dealing with the failure at hand. In effect, four possible sources of 
dynamic changes in cost which might generate externalities external to the firm are 
discussed within the literature: (i) new industries may acquire some knowledge and 
technical know-how, and these may not be appropriable by the firm or firms paying for 
it; (ii) new industries must bear the costs of training workers and, once trained, new 
firms can bid away the skilled workers so that the costs of training will not be 
recouped; (iii) static and continuing externalities; and (iv) market imperfections, either 
in information or in capital markets, may mean risks are overestimated and individual 
firms will not undertake socially profitable activities.
As regards the first case, whereby a firm's investment in technical know-how will 
become freely available to other firms after the initial investment, Baldwin (1969) 
pointed out that protection raises the domestic price of a product and, from the 
viewpoint of the domestic industry as a whole, makes some investments in knowledge 
more profitable.34 But the individual entrepreneur still faces the same externality 
problem as before, namely, the risk that other firms in the same industry will copy, 
without cost to themselves, any new technology discovered by the firm and will then 
drive the product's price or factor prices to levels at which the initial firm will be 
unable to recover the costs of acquiring knowledge (Baldwin 1969:298). By acting on 
the price of final output, output or export subsidies provide equal inducement to firms 
that free-ride on the R&D of others as they do to firms that engage in R&D. As such 
they do nothing to overcome the problem of appropriability35
34 Moreover, the special encouragement of an industry is not the same as an argument for protection. 
Protection is a round about way of compensating an industry for the disadvantages which have been 
suggested as reasons for its special encouragement. These disadvantages could be eliminated or 
reduced by more direct methods — by subsidising the use of labour, by providing training facilities 
and other services, by improving the institutions through which savings are channelled to industry, and 
by rewarding industry directly for any 'external' benefits which it may confer. Such policies are 
promotional, as opposed to merely protective. Their major advantage is that they are devised to 
eliminate the basic reasons for the disadvantages under which the industry may suffer, rather than 
offsetting them by measures which have undesirable side-effects such as a bias against exports (Little, 
Scitovsky and Scott 1970:14).
35 Meade (1955:256) in noting that the key argument on which the infant industry case must rest 
relates to the technological externalities associated with the learning process, notes that for many types 
of knowledge acquisition no externality problem exists, since the entrepreneurs are able to keep their 
knowledge from competitors. Similarly, in industries where there are significant economies of scale in 
relation to the size of the market and therefore a small number of firms, interfirm negotiations are 
likely to result in arrangements that offset the externality problem (Coase 1960). Meade 
acknowledges, however, that in cases when the number of firms is large, these conditions may result in 
a significant divergence between private and social benefits. Yet Baldwin's point (1969:298) still 
remains valid, protection will not guarantee that individual entrepreneurs will undertake greater 
investments in acquiring technological knowledge for the reasons already outlined.
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And as Grossman (1990:108-9) has explained, the level of inventive activity among 
existing firms may or may not increase when protection or output-based subsidies are 
provided. An exception is where subsidies or trade policies serve to encourage entry 
by firms that otherwise would be inactive, and in situations where entry necessarily 
entails the undertaking of R&D, so that a positive externality-firm-entry effect will be 
generated. Nevertheless, these policies induce a negative profit-capture effect36 and (in 
the case of subsidies to export industries) a negative terms-of-trade effect. In addition, 
Grossman (1986:57) stresses the difficulty of distinguishing between rents and quasi­
rents:
[o]ften what appears to be an especially high rate of profit is just a return to some earlier, 
riskier investment. Research and development expenses, for example, can be quite large, and 
many ventures end in failure. Firms will only undertake these large investments if they can 
reap the benefits in those instances where they succeed. Once the market is in operation, we 
will of course only observe those companies that have succeeded. We may then be tempted to 
conclude that profit rates are unusually high. But industry profits should be measured 
inclusive of the losses of those who never make it to the marketing stage.
The same sorts of considerations pertain to the other three cases. In training workers, 
protection does not provide assurance to existing firms that there will not be new 
entrants once training costs have been incurred;37 static externalities are ongoing and 
do not constitute a case for temporary protection given also that a tariff may not be an 
efficient instrument for correcting the externality; and in the case of imperfect 
information or an imperfect capital market, investment in acquiring the information 
cannot be recaptured even in the presence of a tariff if the initial entrant demonstrates 
to other firms that risks have been overestimated.
36 The profit-capture effect, as defined by Grossman (1990:92), refers to the 'private cost to a typical 
manufacturer of producing one more unit of output, or the 'private marginal cost’. It arises in 
oligopolistic environments (where prices are above marginal costs) anytime policy induces firms to 
change their levels of output. The output changes alter firms' (net-of-subsidy) profits and their total 
industry surplus.'
37 Baldwin (1969) noted that if firms must pay workers more than their marginal product during a 
training period, and if they stand to lose the skilled workers to other firms when they try to recoup their 
investment, then no amount of output subsidy will induce the firms to provide the required training. 
Even if the appropriability problem, though present, is not severe, a policy targeted to the externality- 
generating activity (one that directly supports investment in human capital) is more efficient than one 
that promotes activity in the industry more generally. More recently, Grossman (1990) in surveying 
the available literature concerning this issue, found that these studies do not explicitly reveal the 
existence of any inefficiency in the provision of on-the-job training, nor do they indicate that firms in 
new industrial activities suffer any special difficulties in appropriating the benefits from training their 
work force. In view of the paucity of evidence, the question of whether significant externalities exist 
in the process of human capital formation still remains an open one.
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Grossman and Horn (1988) raise the question of whether the existence of informational 
barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of 
'experience' goods38 and services in countries that are followers rather than leaders in 
innovative industries, a case which would seem to characterise Taiwan. In industries 
with imperfect consumer information, the lack of reputation puts latecomers at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis established firms. Incorporating both moral hazard 
in an individual firm's choice of quality and adverse selection among the potential 
entrants into the industry, the authors' conclude that infant industry protection often 
exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections (Grossman and 
Horn 1988:785). Grossman and Horn conclude that this message is reminiscent of 
Baldwin's examinations of the micro foundations of dynamic scale economies and the 
conclusion that infant industry protection often could not correct the market distortions 
that the proponents of such policy described.39
While economists agree spillovers and linkages exist, generally they consider that the 
rule is that even subtle, complex products and services can be defined well enough and 
made appropriable enough by assigning property rights, and thereby made marketable. 
True externalities are the exception; thus instances of government intervention justified 
by externalities will be exceptional.
Also pointed to is the substantial literature concerned with 'internalising' externalities. 
The process of internalising can occur by strategic vertical integration of 'upstream' and 
'downstream' firms that manufacture a product with multiple states of fabrication. If one 
industry which produces an intermediate product can be characterised as oligopolistic 
due to underlying economies of scale, is integrated with another perfectly competitive 
industry which produces a final product from the intermediate product, then externalities 
will disappear.40 Moreover, a large firm can buy into manufacturing activities to 
internally reap the benefits of the putative externalities; or can enter joint ventures with 
firms that are vitally linked to it. Thus intersectoral spillovers are increasingly 
appropriable. And as firms grow by diversifying across sectors and borders, they are 
better able to internalise externalities. Thus, as Richardson (1990:121) argues, 'however
38 'Experience' goods denote products whose qualities can be fully judged only after they have been 
consumed.
39 Their conclusions also contrast sharply with those from a study by Mayer (1984) who argues that 
export' subsidisation is warranted when actual consumption experience is required for (foreign) 
consumers to learn about the qualities of (domestic) products (Grossman and Horn 1988:770).
40 One potential danger posed by joint ventures as a response to the appropriability problem in R&D is 
that it may foster collusion on the part of firms in an industry to slow the rate of technological 
progress. The risk is usually mitigated, however by competitive pressures from abroad.
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large or small externalities 'really' are, they are arguably becoming smaller over time as 
economic environments become more 'strategic'. The externalities reason for industrial 
policy is thus growing weaker over time, however strong it is in an absolute sense. The 
distinctive role of a government as an identifier and corrector of growth and 
competitiveness externalities is being filled by large firms that are able to do so very well 
for themselves' (Richardson 1990:121).
Moreover, Baldwin and Krugman (1988a, 1988b) conclude from their empirical case 
studies, that what is often neglected is that such policies cannot give any concrete 
introduction on 'how to manufacture' a specific product at factory level, such as dynamic 
random access memory chips (DRAMS), which is a matter of leaming-by-doing and 
experimenting with details over time. This factory level leaming-by-doing cannot be 
enhanced simply by attempts to create comparative advantage through government 
intervention. Thus just as high savings and investment and R&D are the key to the 
dynamic evolution of comparative advantage at the macroeconomic level, the key to 
such an evolution at the microeconomic level is competition among private enterprises 
to sort out extremely risky undertakings in new technologies.
While almost all products face downward-sloped learning curves at some point of their 
life cycle, Richard Baldwin (1992:240) also highlights that very few industries have 
learning curves for which strategic infant industry arguments apply. For example, when 
a factory is first built, some trial-and-error learning is usually necessary to get the kinks 
out of the production process. As production experience accumulates, the leaming-by- 
doing advances and marginal costs fall. In most industries, this learning relatively 
quickly irons out the kinks so that the marginal cost curve is flat beyond a certain 
cumulative experience level. That is, further experience does not reduce marginal costs. 
In a few highly unusual industries, such as semiconductors and aircraft, the learning 
curve is downward-sloped even at the end of the product life. In the case of aircraft this 
is due to the enormous complexity of the product together with the fact that even the 
most successful planes involve the production of only a few hundred units. 
Semiconductors are complex and have product life cycles of only a few years.
Strategic reasoning about imperfect competition may also have weakened the relevance 
of another strand of the traditional externalities case for industrial policy. The 
traditional case concludes that risk and appropriability problem cause markets to 
undersupply infrastructure and research and development. But some economic models 
of strategic behaviour predict the opposite —  an oversupply. An irreversible
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commitment to a capital project on the scale of infrastructure or a large-scale research 
and product development can serve as a credible deterrent against market entry by rival 
firms because of its obvious irreversibility. The competitive-deterrent value of such 
projects encourages more of them to be undertaken than mere (nonstrategic) market 
considerations would warrant, leading to 'strategic' excess capacity and excessive 
research and development. If these predictions could be shown to be consistent with 
most industry experience, they would cast doubt on whether infrastructure and 
technology really are undersupplied in imperfectly competitive environments, whatever 
their risk and appropriability problems (Richardson 1990:122-3).
Soete (1991:54-5) expresses the more fundamental doubt that it is not obvious why 
high-tech products would fall under the category of strategic products, particularly 
when compared to some scarce natural resource, such as oil, of which world supply is 
concentrated in a single or small number of countries. To the extent that high-tech 
products are continuously subject to 'creative destruction' through the entry onto the 
market of new inventions and innovations, and that knowledge is difficult to contain 
within firms let alone countries, new scientific and technological breakthroughs and the 
international diffusion of technology are likely to be major factors in rendering such 
strategic high-tech products quickly obsolete. Given the costs in developing strategic 
capabilities the continuous improvements in performance by the technologically leading 
firms might quickly render the costs of strategic support policies in this area prohibitive. 
Even the most successful strategic cases of technological 'leap frogging' all seem to 
reflect more good fortune than a careful strategic consideration of costs and benefits. 
For example, Korea, which succeeded in developing a technological capability in the 
production of VLSI (very large-scale integration) chips over a very short period, had the 
fortune to come onto the market at a moment when Japanese firms were forced to raise 
chip prices following American anti-dumping suits and import tariff measures.
Nor does it follow that all technology necessarily yields spillover benefits. While it is 
hard to document, it is fairly evident that product cycles are becoming increasingly 
shorter for many high-tech products. Going alone is likely to be exceptionally 
expensive. For example, as Pack (1992a: 112) notes, the new x-ray lithography method 
being explored for the production of the 64 megabyte chip is totally different from that 
employed for the 256K and one megabyte chip. The losses incurred by latecomers to 
the latter market, particularly by Korean firms, cannot be viewed as an investment for 
the next stage. Their knowledge simply does not confer any advantage.
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3.6.1 Is the Factor Endowment Theory Obsolete?
Based on the assumption of perfect competition in atomistic markets and constant 
returns to scale, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory of comparative advantage, 
being static in nature, sees no role for differences in technology across countries and 
thus no role for government in the ’creation’ of comparative advantage via R&D and 
leaming-by-doing.41 By contrast, competition in high-tech sectors is dynamic, 
characterised by rivalry among large firms which bring out new or improved products or 
cut production costs. The notion that Schumpeterian, not Ricardian efficiency 
determined economic policy-making in Japan and other East Asia economies has been 
emphasised by a number of authors. Amsden (1989), Dosi, Tyson and Zysman (1989), 
and Tyson (1990), have all discussed the distinction between Ricardian or allocative 
efficiency on the one hand and Schumpeterian efficiency on the other, asserting there is 
a conflict between short-term Ricardian efficiency and long-term dynamic efficiency.
The concept of Schumpeterian efficiency is based on Schumpeter's insight that the dynamism 
of capitalism depends largely on competition in new products and process rather than on price 
competition —  an allocation of resources on the basis of current price signals, while Ricardian 
efficient, may not be an allocation that encourages the most beneficial pace and direction of 
technological change over time (Tyson 1990:158).
The fundamental question raised by Yoshitomi (1991), is whether there is conflict 
between, on the one hand, static efficiency of resource allocation based on comparative 
advantage which would require elimination of monopoly profits, and on the other, a 
Schumpeterian innovation and the resultant dynamic evolution of comparative 
advantage.
According to Schumpeterian innovation, technical change is not an accidental by­
product or 'residual' of economic activities, but the result of deliberate efforts on the part 
of firms through R&D competition and organisation reforms. Within the basic 
Schumpeterian framework, such innovation or new technical and organisational 
knowledge is at least temporarily appropriable by allowing innovative firms to establish 
monopoly positions. Over time, however, new technologies become public goods 
through imitation by rivals. Thus, the incentive for innovation depends on the 
expectation of the innovator being rewarded with temporary extra profits. The 
Schumpeterian world is thus a competitive one, allowing no firms to reap any permanent
41 However, Ohlin (1933) pointed out that economies of scale in production provide an incentive for 
international specialisation and trade that can supplement the incentives created by cross-country 
differences in factor endowments and give rise to trade even in the absence of such differences.
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monopoly profits on the basis of innovations. The result of such dynamic competition is 
the equally dynamic development of national resource endowments themselves in terms 
of increasing abundance of R&D and skilled labour inputs per unit of output, relative to 
other national resources. For this reason, the Schumpeterian dynamic evolution of 
comparative advantage is not inconsistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, once 
the dynamic and endogenised creation of national resource endowments through 
deliberate policies at the enterprise and government levels are acknowledged (Yoshitomi 
1991:23-4).
Thus, growth and Schumpeterian efficiency cannot be obtained by ignoring Ricardian 
comparative advantage. Comparative advantages will evolve naturally as an economy 
accumulates capital and skills. Economic determinants of a nation's comparative 
advantage evolve as the relative abundance or scarcity among endowed production 
resources dynamically changes through its economic development. As econometrically 
demonstrated (Balassa and Noland 1989:174-88; Grossman 1989), Japan has exhibited 
the dynamic changes in comparative advantage from unskilled labour-intensive to 
capital-intensive and to R&D-intensive manufactured products over the past two 
decades. Chapter 7 shows the existence of a similar trend in the cases of Korea and 
Taiwan. The result is that differences in relative factor endowments, in forming part of 
the explanation of the pattem of trade, remains robust.42
Saxonhouse (1987) for one rejects the view that new trade policy essentially makes old 
arguments for free trade either incorrect or irrelevant43 There is still a great deal of 
trade that is motivated by factor endowment differences, and because some markets are 
imperfect this does not imply the lessons from neoclassical general equilibrium theory 
are invalid. Krueger (1990c: 191-2) argues that the principle of comparative advantage 
remains valid regardless of what determines comparative advantage.44 She stresses that 
the gains from trade result from differences in comparative costs, and these gains are 
present even where comparative advantage is not based on resource endowments.45
42 Learner (1985) for example finds considerable support for the standard theory.
43 While advocates differ in the degree to which this holds, new trade theorists claim that their theory 
does not reject comparative advantage, but rather supplements it. While tire pattern of trade is 
determined by countries' tastes, technologies and resources, the complete pattern of trade also reflects 
specialisation due to economies of scale, which includes an historical or arbitrary element.
44 See also Bhagwati (1964).
45 Krueger (1990c) notes that the recent developments in economic theory calling free trade into 
question is not the comparative advantage proposition: it is the assertion of tire possibility that cost 
differences can be created by government policy. But traditional concerns still remain relevant in the 
more recent case of the high technology items. Krueger (1990c:70-l) argues that '[i]t is not sufficient 
that there be new lines in which comparative advantage may be developed; for protection to be an
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Similarly, Warr (1992a:5) notes that while government intervention will affect resource 
allocation, and may or may not induce resource movements which are consistent with 
the exploitation of underlying comparative advantage, they do not alter that underlying 
comparative advantage, either by improving it or harming it. Comparative advantage 
depends on the underlying social opportunity costs of factors of production and on 
international prices; neither is affected by the kinds of policies associated within 
creating comparative advantage.46
Both cross-sectional and time-series approaches have demonstrated that R&D 
expenditures and other strategic variables in trading countries are determinants of trade 
shares in industries.47 Moreover, the fundamental rationale for foreign direct investment 
lies in the transfer of firm and industry-specific intangible assets, such as knowledge 
embodied in both new products and new production processes and managerial skills. 
This kind of dynamic evolution of comparative advantage differs in economic efficiency 
from the artificial creation of comparative advantage. The former is economically 
efficient, since allocative efficiency is secured via the allocation of production resources 
along the lines of endogenised changes in the relative proportions of production factors. 
In contrast, the artificial creation of comparative advantage is apt to be economically 
inefficient, because the actual development of domestic production factors such as 
capital and skilled labour may not be able to catch up with and merge into the artificially 
created comparative advantage (Yoshitomi 1991:25).
economically defensible policy, the development of this comparative advantage must be privately 
unprofitable (because otherwise individual firms would in any event undertake it and reap the rewards) 
but nonetheless publicly profitable ... However, the bureaucratic complexities of so doing make that an 
impossible task, so from the potential gains — if any — from protecting a particular industry should be 
subtracted the potential losses to using industries — an impossible task.
46 Warr's (1992a) discussion is in the context of Porter's (1990) argument that the concept of 
comparative advantage is overly limited in scope and that it fails to capture the determinants of 
exporting success in the modem international economy. Porter (1990:12) stresses that government 
policies such as 'reductions in interest rates, efforts to hold down wages, devaluation that seeks to 
effect comparative prices, subsidies..' etc can help 'improve comparative advantage in factor costs'.
47 See for example Yamawaki and Audretsch 1988 for the United States and Japan; and Owen and van 
der Loeff (1989*) for the United States, Japan and France, at the three digit level. Owen and van der 
Leoff find that, not only do the R&D intensities of individual sectors relative to other industries 
diverge within a country; they also evolve differently over time. They conclude that Japanese R&D 
plays a more critical role than American technological investment; this accounts for Japan's relatively 
better trade performance, especially with respect to its market share in world trade rather than in 
bilateral trade with the United States. This finding is consistent with the outcome of other empirical 
studies, that Japanese R&D expenditures have concentrated on process innovation of product-quality 
improvement and cost reduction (Yoshitomi 1991:24). *This reference has not been sighted by the 
author and is taken from OECD (1991).
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While a fundamental tenet of the industrial policy literature is that many industries have 
no natural homes as indicated by comparative advantage based on factor endowments, 
an issue raised by this debate is how much a country's comparative advantage continues 
to depend in the modem world on the quantity and quality of human capital. As Lipsey 
(1987:142) notes 'to the extent that acquired human capital remains a major determinant 
of the types of comparative advantage that still influence trade, a climate-style industrial 
policy has great potential. It seems quite possible that changes in the stock of human 
capital over several decades could be more important than anything that is done directly 
to favour or retard particular firms or industries'.
3.6.2 Endogenous Growth Theory
The inefficiency of the market provision of new technology has been established in many 
theoretical contexts.48 Endogenous growth theory, in which technical progress is 
explicitly modelled as an endogenous phenomenon (as distinct from the traditional 
treatment of technological change as exogenous) has become fashionable following 
recent contributions by Römer (1986, 1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
Grossman and Helpman in particular develop a model of endogenous innovation, 
growth, and trade, which features a 'Schumpeterian' process that is alleged to undermine 
more traditional policy perspectives based on assumptions of perfect competition.49 
They establish that, when spillovers from R&D are present, changes in the incentive 
structure provided by the policy environment will affect not only the static level of 
economic well-being but also the rate of economic growth. From this structure comes 
an ordered cornucopia of scenarios in which trade and industrial and technological 
policies matter —  sometimes along traditional free trade lines and sometimes along the 
lines of the industrial activist school of strategic government promotion of selected 
activities.
In seeking to determine the characteristics of a country that contribute to the 
development of a long-run comparative advantage in high technology, Grossman and 
Helpman find that when spillovers of technical knowledge are assumed to be 
international in reach, the answer is traditional: a country creates comparative advantage 
in high technology if it has a relative abundance of human capital that can be used in 
(skill-intensive) R&D activities. But if technological spillovers are geographically
48 See Griliches (1979) and Spence (1984)
49 The following draws on Richardson's (1991:14-6) concise summary of the models presented by 
Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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concentrated, a country's size and prior research experience also have a role in 
determining its trade pattern. What then follows is an investigation of the growth effects 
of various government policies — trade policies, technology policies, and industrial 
policies (targeted production subsidies) —  which emphasises how policies in one 
country may influence the growth process of its trade partner.
They further show how R&D (with large pro-growth spillovers) and high-technology 
manufacturing (with smaller pro-growth spillovers) often 'compete' with each other for 
the same human capital, so that a country that favours the latter over the former will 
often be inhibiting its growth; how the case for trade policy intervention becomes 
weaker as spillovers become more and more internationally diffused and less and less 
nationally self-contained; and how policy promotion of R&D in countries without 
comparative advantage in it can slow down growth world-wide, and therefore how 
much stronger is the case for policy promotion of R&D in locations where it is done 
most efficiently.
3.7 How Relevant is the Externality Argument for Developing Countries?
This question has been addressed in Srinivasan (1989), Krugman (1986, 1989), Stewart 
and Ghani (1992), and Rodrik (1988), who contend that the new trade theories may be 
more relevant to developing countries than developed countries, for two reasons.50 
Firstly, it is argued that the smaller the market the greater the likelihood of such 
externalities, because the size of the indivisibilities necessary to create such externalities 
is relative to the size of the market. Pecuniary externalities, therefore, may be 
particularly relevant to developing economies with small and imperfect markets. 
Secondly, as argued by Stewart and Ghani (1992:133), since pecuniary externalities 
occur when firms' activities affect the relevant prices of inputs or output, they can only 
occur if local prices (and/or product characteristics) are affected by local activities and 
would not exist if world prices ruled locally. In practice, barriers to trade, both natural 
(transaction costs) and artificial (trade restrictions) lead to divergences between local 
and world prices. The high level of such barriers in developing countries creates the 
potential for pecuniary externalities. As these barriers are reduced, pecuniary 
externalities will diminish in importance, implying pecuniary externalities will be greater 
in developing countries than at a later stage of development
50 Corden (1990:28) has also argued that Brander-Spencer profit-shifting and all the complications 
which have to do specifically with governments influencing the strategic behaviour of private 
oligopolies competing in world markets, have little relevance for developing countries.
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However, developing countries typically have a lower comparative advantage in high 
technology industries. As Leipziger and Petri (1993) point out, in the early stages of 
industrialisation, a new firm will probably create externalities simply by importing a 
foreign technology and proving to other firms that foreign techniques can be 
successfully adapted to local conditions. In more advanced economies, the externalities 
of the type specified by the new trade literature are likely to be limited to newer, 
technology-intensive industries.
3.7.1 Import Protection as Export Promotion
Several papers have been published in recent years that in effect offer a refurbished 
version of the infant-industry argument. The traditional version of this argument relied 
on imperfect capital markets or external economies to explain why temporary protection 
was needed to establish an industry, provided the higher earnings of the factors of that 
industry compensate for distortions. In the new version, advanced in Krugman (1984a), 
Venables (1985), and Dixit and Kyle (1985), the emphasis is instead on increasing 
returns internal to the firm. A protected home market allows firms to move down their 
marginal cost curves (or down their learning curves in a dynamic model), lowering costs 
and raising market shares in all markets. The conclusion from the literature is that a 
protected domestic market may actually serve as a springboard for exports. Recent 
simulation studies by Baldwin and Krugman (1988a, 1988b) have sought to confirm the 
importance of this effect for several actual industries.
The problem with applying the new infant industry argument (described as import 
protection as export promotion) to developing countries is that again it largely depends 
on the domestic market being fairly large. The privileged access of domestic firms to 
the home market can only be a significant strategic asset if the home market is large 
enough to matter.51 On the other hand, the concern over the role of protection in 
creating excessive market power for and/or entry by domestic firms is considered 
especially valid for developing countries. Not only are their markets small, but the 
history of import substitution has led to a characteristic pattern of quantitative
51 Krugman says that this can hardly be the case for developing countries none of which account for 
more than 2 or 3 per cent of the world demand for any manufactured good. Helleiner (1989:370) 
however contends this is incorrect, theoretically because of the high potential for product 
differentiation (the conventional argument for small country specialisation) and the potentially large 
relative role of domestic sales for individual risk-averse firms; and empirically, because Korea has 
evidently successfully been doing it.
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restrictions rather than tariffs, with rates of effective protection much higher than 
advanced countries. In this sense then ’there is nothing new in the theory that would 
restore intellectual respectability to the strategy of import substitution' (Krugman 
1989:358-9). While acknowledging the theoretical relevance of new trade theory, 
because of the effect of protection in increasing domestic market power in a small 
economy, Krugman concludes that 'it could all so easily be used as a cloak for crude 
protectionism' ... 'Import substituting industrialisation looks even worse in the new 
theory than in standard theory' (1989:359-64).
Nonetheless, Krugman's illustration of the effects of trade policy in competitive 
environments made imperfect by static and dynamic scale economies (whereby 
protection of domestic markets and promotion of export markets can reduce unit costs) 
has been asserted to offer an insight into explaining what East Asian governments 
actually did in promoting industrialisation. Baldwin and Krugman (1988a) note that this 
policy may have been adopted by Japan as a means of overcoming the 'early start' 
advantage of the United States semiconductor industry and enabling Japan's industry to 
become a significant exporter of the 16K random access memory chip.52 Other East 
Asian economies are purported to have pursued these kinds of policies to establish 
export industries. For example, reference is also often made to Yamamura (1986) on 
Japanese televisions, and Amsden (1989:85-8) and Wade (1990a, 1990b) respectively, 
on a variety of Korean and Taiwan exports. None of these studies has established a 
convincing causal relationship between trade policy and establishment of the industry, 
and none measures the welfare effect of such policies.
In Krugman's model, two firms compete in various markets, including the home market. 
Their method of competition is Cournot and both are subject to economies of scale 
which may take several forms. Cost curves may decline as output increases, or may be 
flat but nevertheless shift down when larger outputs justify larger R&D spending, or 
when larger cumulative output imparts improvements in productivity through leaming- 
by-doing. The conclusions are the same irrespective of the source of scale economies. 
In the following example, each firm is supposed to have constant marginal costs, the 
level being chosen equal to the actual marginal cost at the equilibrium output. Figure 
3.1, adapted from Dixit (1993:181), shows the initial equilibrium E in two such markets 
as the intersection of solid reaction curves. If the home country then imposes an import 
tariff, this raises the delivered cost in the home market for the foreign firm, and shifts its
52 However see footnote 30 for the welfare effects of this policy.
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reaction curve downward as shown by the dotted line; the intersection point shifts to E l. 
Since the home firm’s output rises, its marginal cost falls and the foreign firm's marginal 
cost rises. By protecting one market the government gives the domestic firm greater 
economies of scale, while reducing those of its foreign competitor. The home firm's 
reaction function shifts to the right, and that of the foreign firm downward. These shifts 
in turn increase the home firm's sales and decrease the foreign firm's sales in both 
markets, further lowering the home firm's marginal cost and raising the foreign firm's, 
causing further output changes. Since all these changes work in the same direction, the 
qualitative prediction for the final outcome is unambiguous. The reaction functions after 
the changes have been worked out are shown by dashed lines, and the resulting 
equilibrium is at E*.
Figure 3.1: Import Protection as Export Promotion
Foreign
firm's
sales
Home firm's 
reaction curves
Foreign
firm's
sales
' \E 1
' Foreign 
firm's 
reaction 
curves
Home firm’s sales
Home market
Home firm's
reaction curves
■Foreign
firm's
reaction
curves
Home firm's sales
Export market
The empirical appeal of the protection as promotion argument is thought to lie in the 
more subtle forms of decreasing costs, that is the dynamic economies of scale involved 
in the learning curve and in R&D. Protection, by increasing the home firm's sales and 
reducing those of its foreign competitor, increases the incentive for domestic R&D at 
foreign expense. This is turn translates into a shift in relative production costs which 
leads to increased domestic sales even in unprotected markets. The home firm has not 
only reinforced its advantage in the home market, but also gained in the export market. 
Thus defence has proved the best form of attack (Dixit 1993:180-1).
In a similar model, Krugman (1987c) argues that if production of new export goods 
involves leaming-by-doing, then temporary support for an industry can be sufficient to 
achieve permanent competitiveness. Krugman seeks to encapsulate empirically what
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Givens (1982) has referred to as the Japanese 'narrow moving band’ whereby the 
government allegedly targets a series of new industries in succession, leaving subsidies 
in place just long enough for long-run competitiveness to be assured. In this way, 
industries are ’sliced o ff one after another. Krugman (1987c)53 shows that closing the 
home market to imports of a good can accelerate the pace of productivity change in 
this sector in the home relative to the foreign country. If continued long enough, the 
change in relative productivity growth may be enough to give the home country a cost 
advantage. Trade policy can thus be used to achieve a permanent shift in comparative 
advantage whereby a government protecting a series of sectors in succession can 
steadily increase its market share. This use of temporary protection to engineer 
permanent shifts in comparative advantage is considered to be most effective in the 
case of a country with a large labour force but low wages.54
The former of these two models has been subject to the obvious criticism of its 
acknowledged lack of welfare implications. In particular, the model ignores the fact that 
when one firm or industry in the country is protected, it draws resources from others, 
which must therefore contract. In an economy-wide sense then, import protection does 
hurt exports by discriminating against those industries or firms that may have excellent 
export prospects. Some of those industries might also be oligopolistic, and then- 
strategic position will be worsened.55
Grossman and Richardson (1985:19) note the existence of scale economies and 
opportunities for learning provides only a potential for policy, not a case for it. The 
scale economies described by Krugman are internal to the firm, so its own incentive for 
wanting to exploit them corresponds perfectly with the government’s reason for wanting 
to have it do so. When information is reasonably complete, and when insurance and 
financial markets work reasonably well, there will be no scope for policy. The most
53 Itoh and Kiyono (1987) provide an argument for subsidies to emerging export industries within the 
orthodox model. They show subsidies to ’marginal’ industries that are ’almost’ competitive on world 
markets without government support can improve a country's terms o f trade.
54 There is, o f course, a limit to this process. As a country acquires more industries, its relative wage 
will rise, so that the next sector will require higher relative productivity and thus a period of protection 
to become established. Moreover, small countries will find that the domestic market is not large 
enough for protection to yield much in the way of accelerated productivity growth; high wage 
countries will find that the extra productivity is not enough to provide a cost advantage (Krugman 
1987:48-9).
55 Dick (1991) quoted in Richardson (1991:17) tests directly the Krugman result that import protection 
can at times serve as export promotion. He is unable to find the hypothesised correlation, controlling 
for a number of determinants of comparative advantage. But cross-industry regressions have little 
power against alternative hypotheses.
93
competitive firm will become a 'natural monopolist' in its market. Markets will have 
made sure that all scale economies are captured, leaving none for trade policy to seize.56
Further, Corden (1990:20) questions whether this conclusion really depends on the 
Coumot-oligopoly assumption. The idea that a tariff can promote exports is familiar 
from the theory of dumping. With regard to policy implications, Pursell and Snape 
(1973), also assumed economies of scale in dealing with the same issue. In their small 
country model where a single domestic firm faces given world import and export prices, 
Pursell and Snape show how a tariff may make discriminating monopoly possible, 
allowing prices at home to be raised, enabling exports to be started for the first time. 
But it is not necessary to assume oligopoly to get this result. Pursell and Snape 
(1973:90) show that a tariff will never be optimal in their case but 'there may be a case 
for a subsidy to enable the firm to get set up (and export)...'. Under the Pursell and 
Snape model, it is not necessary to allow for either a foreign firm's or a foreign 
government's reaction, whether Cournot or strategic, which appears more realistic. In 
Krugman (1984) there is the familiar myopic Cournot behaviour of the two firms, but 
also the passivity of the foreign government
3.8 Policy Implications
As previously discussed, there is now an increasing trend among countries to share the 
burden of R&D costs or gain access to foreign markets via joint ventures, strategic 
alliances etc, complicating any definition of national economic interest. Many firms in 
such industries are global players, with extensive sales, production, and research 
operations in other countries. As Bhagwati describes (1991:16), expanding trade and 
investment are turning the 'globalised world economy into a veritable spider's web, 
where everyone is now in everyone else's backyard, making import competition in one's 
own market and export competition in the other's market and in third markets ever more 
fierce'. That the role of government is weakened by the extent to which firms are
56 Although as Richardson (1991:27-8) points out 'it is not widely appreciated that the fundamental 
mechanism here is that trade policy itself serves as a barrier to entry. The problem is that the higher- 
profile results from new trade analysis subtly promote support of one's own incumbents and 
suppression of foreign entrants, thereby undermining the general understanding of how important entry 
is in general for markets to work well, for avoiding oligopolistic rigidity and turgidity, and for 
achieving workably competitive outcomes even with imperfect competition. New view analysis with 
free entry has a number of policy implications. One of the most important is the entry-facilitating 
value of minimal, transparent barriers to cross-border merger and acquisition, which is often a means 
by which new entry takes place (or by which exit is avoided). The co-ownership of McDonnell- 
Douglas' commercial division by Taiwan Aerospace and other Asian investors is a good example.’
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increasingly entering such alliances, implies that examples of externalities centred around 
questions of national geography and linkages would appear to be extremely limited. If 
externalities are intemational/national in scope and flow across national borders through 
trade in goods and technological information, each nation can benefit whether it has 
domestic producers or not. It is thus becoming more and more impractical to promote 
only domestically owned firms and exclude foreign-owned companies, even if the latter 
make substantial intangible investments domestically.
Given this, does a national trade and policy agenda for such industries make sense? 
Should a country use trade policy to open foreign markets to companies if those 
companies supply those markets from their offshore production facilities? Should 
policies to promote a domestic high-technology production base be limited to domestic 
companies, or should they include the domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies? 
Should extensive outlays on R&D programs be used when the knowledge they create 
will be channelled to foreign companies, through joint ventures? Governments often 
follow a 'hunch' to support a particular technology, without clear evidence of market 
failure. Hence as Richardson (1990:122) suggests, ’[i]f the typical economist is correct, 
then the benefits of this alleged externality are diffused worldwide, and no country can 
bottle it up for itself. Indeed it is better to import it than to expend policy resources 
trying to stake exclusive national claims, only to find the benefits sold by firms at 
implicitly subsidised license fees to nontaxpaying foreigners'.
While studies do indicate the existence of spillovers, most of the empirical research of 
government subsidies justified on these grounds concludes that subsidies were 
counterproductive.57 And if many spillovers and linkages are detectable, if not precisely 
measurable, they would appear to be more accurately detected by information gathered 
efficiently by private sector agents such as stock analysts, commercial and investment 
bankers, and strategic planning groups of firms contemplating merger etc. Therefore 
'they are more and more 'internalisable', and ... less and less a valid grounds for 
government intervention aimed at capturing their benefits (Richardson 1991:30). As 
Richardson (1991:30-1) also points out that:
57 The literature has shown how fairly minor modifications in various elements of the problem can 
radically alter the nature of the optimal policy, for example, from subsidising trade to taxing trade. 
Dixit's (1988) study of the United States automobile industry concludes the optimal policy for the 
United States was a tariff on imports and a subsidy to domestic production. However, Krishna, Hogan, 
and Swagel (1989) demonstrate that with relatively minor changes in specifying the industry demand 
curve, the optimal policy changed to a subsidy on both imports and domestic production.
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[bjanks, brokers, analysts, accounting firms, venture capitalists, shareholders, and potential 
joint-venture partners all produce information for the market. The market for information 
works about as well as any other, and has been the beneficiary of impressive technological 
innovation in informatics and telecommunications. The rule is that even subtle, complex 
products and services can be defined well enough, made appropriable enough by assigning 
property rights, and thereby more marketable. True externalities are then the exception. They 
are spillovers and linkages that cannot be appropriated, priced, and marketed. Thus instances 
of government intervention justified by externalities will be exceptional. They will have to rely 
on the government's information being better than that of banks, brokers, analysts, accountants 
and so on. Otherwise the rule will be that there is very little that deters any firm from joint 
ventures with firms in sectors that are somehow vitally linked to it. In an era of growing 
alliances many more intersectoral spillovers are appropriable. They are not externalities and 
provide no suggestion of the need for policy. The distinctive role of a government as an 
identifier and corrector of growth and competitiveness externalities is being filled by firm 
banks that are able to do so very well themselves.
There is thus the potential of hidden costs in government barriers in the form of the 
inefficiency introduced into information markets and to the constriction of markets that 
would otherwise work to internalise spillovers and linkages among sectors. In addition, 
compared to small, perfectly competitive firms, strategically large firms are rarely 
rationed in globally integrated insurance and financial markets and are frequently able to 
self-insure and self-finance. The case for government intervention to supplement 
inadequate insurance provision or to subsidise commercial risk taking is becoming less 
and less applicable (Richardson 1990:122). Large firms may themselves be the owners 
of insurers, financial intermediaries, and small, innovative research subsidiaries, as the 
Japanese and Korean industrial structure illustrates.
However Richardson (1991:32) says that the ’new view is not dogmatic on the issues of 
externalities. Detection of technological externalities and linkages is incomplete; their 
appropriability, and therefore marketability, is only partial’.58 Krugman (1984b: 105) for 
instance, acknowledges that to justify intervention by externalities would appear more 
difficult than ever in strategic environments with imperfectly competitive firms. He 
notes that 'strategic industrial policies are unlikely to be successful unless governments 
are actually trying to play the game; but in practice governments are not so clear headed. 
European support for Airbus is based on a mixture of motives, including prestige,
58 Tyson (1990:150) acknowledges that such arrangements should not substitute for other policy 
measures to build a strong national base in high-technology industries. For example, if the goal of 
policy is to promote more R&D spending in such industries, then some form of R&D subsidy is the 
most effective policy. More generally, the well known prescription of traditional trade theory 
continues to apply: if the rationale for policy is the presence of external benefits, such as those that 
characterise high-technology industries, then trade policy is at most a second-best policy response, 
whose adverse effects, such as higher import prices, may more than offset anticipated benefits.
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employment, presumed externalities, and so on ... These mixed motives mean that the 
policy deftness envisioned in the theory has not actually been visible'.59
Moreover, retaliation is more likely in precisely the knowledge-intensive high-tech 
industries where economies of scale relative to world markets are assumed by 
proponents to be significant, for these industries are widely regarded as important in 
themselves. As with the earlier retaliation analysis of the optimal tariff for exploiting 
monopoly power, the competitive retaliatory policies provoked by attempts at profit- 
shifting are likely to leave each country worse off. Because of the transparency of 
subsidy claims for support for particular strategic industries, governments will have an 
even stronger preference to go for the more hidden import restriction apparently borne 
by the foreign competitors. As Stegemann (as quoted in Soete (1991:63)) puts it, ”[t]he 
deficit of political support for an open domestic income transfer as compared to import 
restrictions is even larger if the motive for intervening with free trade could have been 
fudged by accusing foreigners of selling at 'unfairly low prices.”
This political pressure has been typical in the case of US-Japan 1986 semiconductor trade 
agreement ... where, rather than granting the US semiconductor industry R&D and production 
subsidies, US policy focused on attacking Japanese predatory pricing with the aim of freeing 
trade, particularly in Japan. Strategic industrial policies thus contain a number of protectionist 
pressures, mainly because of the temptation to go for bilateral retaliatory trade action which lead 
to traditional domino protectionist effects (Soete 1991:63).
The broader question is how different the political economy of the new view is from the 
political economy of the old? Krueger (1990c, 1990e) in applying the 'regulatory 
capture' tradition in industrial organisation to new trade policy, stresses the parallels 
between postwar infant-industry arguments for developing country protection and more 
recent 'technological infant' arguments for industrial-country protection. She highlights 
the information requirements that confront any government attempting to pick 
promising infants; the rent seeking opportunities that often proliferate as a result; the 
informational advantages that industry has over government; the consequent inability to 
conduct any form of realistic cost-benefit evaluation; and the inherent irreversibilities
59 Richardson (1990, 1991) acknowledges that most contributors are sceptical that a government 
knows enough to carry these out efficiently, noting that the preference ranking for types of government 
microeconomic policies is virtually the same between the activists Cohen and Zysman (1987) and 
among the economists contributing to Krugman (1986): first, market-perfecting policies that encourage 
provision of public goods such as economic infrastructure, second, general factor-market policies such 
as government promotion of saving, education, and R&D; third, trade and industrial policies toward 
whole sectors, which are endorsed with considerable caution and only if they are market conforming or 
outward oriented, fourth, firm-focused policies, if at all. Not at all favoured are policies aimed at 
promoting specific firms, as distinct from industries.
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whereby legislative promises of temporary protection, until the industry matures, are 
often inconsistent with both government and industry incentives when the time actually 
comes to remove protection.60 Moreover, Krueger (1990e:23) notes an additional 
consideration is that:
the new industries normally referred to by the advocates of 'strategic protection' are the high- 
technology industries where investment in new product lines and in new technologies is 
essential. The fact that firms must invest in new technology in order to develop many of the 
new product lines suggests that problems of forecasting what a successful technology will be 
like may be even more difficult than they would be in the case of infant industries where, at 
least, the industry is already in existence somewhere else (Krueger 1990e:23-4).
Interventionist policies to promote particular sectors, must draw resources from other 
areas. Many high-technology industries draw on a common pool of resources, and one 
which may be in relatively inelastic supply in the short to medium run. The supply of 
scientists, engineers and other skilled workers, necessary as inputs to production in the 
high-technology sectors, might not be able to respond quickly if an industrial targeting 
effort were undertaken. The expansion in one or several of these sectors could only 
occur at the expense of others. This highlights the substantial knowledge that a 
government must have to formulate interventions that do more harm than good. 'As in 
the Brander-Spencer analysis, there is a Prisoners' Dilemma: if two countries both try to 
protect a sector subject to external economies, they will fragment the market, possibly 
leaving both worse off. As in strategic trade discussion, the problem of making the 
theory operational is severe —  and it is easy to see how the argument could be abused 
to justify catering to special interests' (Krugman 1992:437-8).
The argument for trade policy in the presence of externalities would appear strongest 
when national markets are not well integrated. But the increasingly complex structure 
of industry would seem in fact to strengthen the need for liberal trade policies. As 
Richardson (1991:20-1) concludes:
If the new view concludes anything, it is the case for targeting is complex and necessarily 
pragmatic. Indeed, since the new view always carries along at least one distortion to the 
perfectly competitive norm (either imperfect competitive market structure or production 
externalities or both), its assessments necessarily imply a second-best situation, in which 
information and pragmatic judgment are necessary to draw any normative assessment about 
trade policy. The new view has hardly killed the case for free trade; if anything, it has 
probably strengthened it.
60 Cohen and Noll (eds 1991) (quoted in Tyson 1992) demonstrate how in the case of the United States 
political rather than technological concerns have wasted public funds on technological programs with 
dubious commercial merit.
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Nonetheless, the externality argument for research and factor subsidies in high- 
technology sectors has become more appealing to policymakers than the strategic trade 
policy arguments. As there are no obvious unfair income-distribution effects from such 
assistance, the case can be made that national welfare is enhanced without adversely 
affecting other countries. The danger with these arguments, given the difficulty of 
empirically determining their validity, is that they can be misused to promote inefficient 
economic activities. As political economy models stress, rent-seeking activities are 
especially strong in oligopolistic market. But in acknowledging that they have opened 
up trade policy analysis to a market-structure framework that fits modem industrial 
conditions much better than the old competitive paradigm, Baldwin (1992:827) 
considers that in interpreting the basis of the traditional support for free trade in this 
manner, the new trade theorists have been led by their understandable enthusiasm for 
their new analytical approach into misrepresenting why trade economists, certainly those 
commenting on trade policy since the 1950s, have supported free trade. While Krugman 
(1992:436) asserts that 'ultimately, the most important policy implication of the new 
trade theory is probably that it makes external economies legitimate, and lets us see the 
obvious', Baldwin argues instead that:
[t]he new trade theorists sometimes write as if they are unaware of the extensive trade 
literature on domestic distortions that has developed since the 1960s. This literature 
emphasises the existence in the real world of all sorts of economic distortions preventing the 
attainment of Pareto optimality conditions. Consequently, there are many theoretical grounds 
for government intervention. However, the developers of this framework go further than just 
pointing out that government intervention might be justified; they rank the welfare effects of 
alternative forms of intervention ... I would predict that, while the recent theorising will be 
credited with improving traditional trade-policy, it will be integrated into this framework 
rather than replacing it (Baldwin 1992:828).
3.9 Conclusion
New trade theory has raised the possibility that governments can help shift the pattern 
of comparative advantage by promoting industries characterised by external 
economies. By leading to reduced costs, protection of domestic markets and 
promotion of export markets are claimed to offer an insight into what East Asian 
governments actually did in promoting industrial growth. Krugman has shown, for 
example, how a country may gain by protecting its home market if this enables a 
domestic industry to move down the 'learning curve' more rapidly relative to foreign 
rivals. This analysis comes close to the familiar infant industry argument. By giving 
its domestic producer a privileged position in the home market, a country gives it an 
advantage in scale production over a foreign rival. East Asian economies are purported
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to have pursued these kinds of policies to establish export industries, thereby 
engineering shifts in comparative advantage.
However, much of the informal discussion of new trade theory has increasingly 
emphasised the external benefits of generating knowledge as the reason for protecting 
or promoting strategic sectors. And while the 'best bet for finding strategic sectors may 
be to focus on external benefits' (Krugman 1987d:221), proponents then proceed to 
show why only a subset of knowledge generating industries might justify intervention 
to establish a domestic presence in those industries. In particular, a special national 
advantage from an externality-generating sector is likely to arise only if the sector 
generates broad spillovers to the rest of the economy, and these are country-specific. 
However, in many cases they are not. Knowledge diffuses across international 
boundaries; intermediate goods can be traded. Whenever the external economies are 
international in scope, special concerns about sustaining sectors in international 
competition are misplaced. Even when the external economies from a sector are nation- 
specific, the benefits will often be shared internationally through lower prices. The 
governed market model, unlike the new trade model, makes no distinction as to the 
scope of externalities, but cites East Asian governments as effectively intervening to 
ensure their capture. The discussion in this chapter suggests that the governed market 
model's emphasis on the externality argument has been misleading. While externalities 
were a central theme in postwar commercial policy literature, concern has been 
expressed that the new trade literature and the governed market literature, have not 
applied the same rigorous principles of welfare analysis in presenting their conclusions.
By highlighting the limited circumstances in which externalities may warrant 
intervention to ensure their capture, this raises the question of whether the policy 
regimes in both Taiwan and Korea necessarily conformed to the characterisation of 
both the governed market model and new trade model. That is, to what extent was 
technological upgrading in the 1980s the result of economic forces or the result of 
industry policy initiatives? These questions are taken up in the following two chapters 
in a discussion of the policy regimes of Taiwan and Korea.
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- CHAPTER 4 -
TAIWAN’S INDUSTRY POLICY IN THE 1980s
4.1 Introduction
According to both the new trade and governed market models, the role of the state in 
Taiwan during the 1980s was one of orchestrating the technological upgrading of the 
economy. To evaluate this proposition, Chapter 4 focuses on the Taiwan government's 
adoption in the early 1980s of a 'strategic industrial policy' designed to provide 
preferential finance to high technology industries. This is used to assess whether the 
structure of incentives displayed the characteristics asserted by the new trade and 
governed market models; that is, was the incentive structure specifically designed to 
promote strategic industries thereby ensuring the capture of externalities thought to be 
most prevalent in high-technology industries? Was the allocation of resources to the 
'strategic' industries important in influencing this sectors development? Answering 
these questions can in turn provide an insight into whether the government became 
more or less dirigiste over the 1980s.
Section 4.2 examines the various changes in the domestic and international economic 
environment that influenced government industrial policy formulation over the 1980s. 
The Taiwan government's policy response to changing economic circumstances was 
quite different from that of past decades as it came under increased external pressure 
to liberalise, and was faced with the domestic problem of declining industries. While 
addressing these concerns via a program of trade liberalisation, the government also 
sought to foster specific industries to shift the economy away from a reliance on 
labour-intensive industries towards the development of technology-intensive
101
industries. This progress in trade reform and the structure of incentives to industry is 
discussed in section 4.3. This is followed in section 4.4 by an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of preferential fiscal and financial measures directed to industry during 
the 1980s and whether the incentive structure discriminated amongst traded goods 
industries. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 then evaluate the government's implementation of a 
strategic industrial policy. The problems associated with identifying what constitutes a 
high technology and strategic industry are considered, as are the criteria used by the 
government to select strategic industries. This discussion informs the question of 
whether the government's policy possessed a forward looking rational view on how the 
industrial structure should evolve. In other words, did the bureaucracy conform to the 
governed market view by acting as an effective 'filtering mechanism' to focus the 
attention of policy makers on sectors crucial to future industrial growth (Wade 1990a).
4.2 Changes in the Environment for Industrial Development
Despite rapid export expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, by the early 1980s, the Taiwan 
economy was facing a number of structural pressures. Persistent trade surpluses were 
placing heavy upward pressure on the exchange value of the New Taiwan (NT) dollar 
and were intensifying trade friction with the United States.
Taiwan began to record exceptionally large current account surpluses from 1982. 
Between 1984-87, the current account surplus averaged around 15 per cent of GDP, 
peaking at over 19 per cent in 1986, and then declining to 2.3 per cent by 1992 (Tsai 
1993). These persistent surpluses, especially with the United States, resulted in 
political friction and led to the United States pressuring Taiwan to dismantle residual 
protection and to permit further appreciation of its currency. The rapid growth in the 
trade surplus can be attributed to a decline in the rate of private investment beginning 
in 1979, while private savings continued to grow.
In response to United States pressure and several other factors, such as the government 
noting the United States retaliatory actions against Japan, the passage of the United 
States Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act in 1988, and withdrawal of Generalised 
System of Preference (GSP) trade concessions treatment, Taiwan announced in 1989 
the adoption of an official policy of diversifying its export trade away from the United 
States. While still seeking to improve trade relations with the United States, Taiwan's 
overall objective has been to reduce its trade surplus with the United States (by 10 per 
cent a year), through procurement, import liberalisation, liberalising the service sector,
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encouraging domestic demand, and stronger enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. The net effect of United States pressure has probably been a positive one in 
leading to further opening of the Taiwan economy. It has also led the Taiwan 
government to adopt a policy of export market diversification.
However, Taiwan's trade surpluses have created pressures to liberalise quite separately 
from United States pressure. Haggard (1988a) notes that the surpluses gave new 
impetus to trade liberalisation on purely economic grounds and that Taiwan became a 
target of United States attention precisely as a result of domestic policies that 
contributed to external imbalance. Hence the adjustment process demanded went 
beyond exchange rate adjustments to encompass broader domestic reforms.
In recognising that structural adjustment of the economy required a more liberal 
environment, the government in 1984 announced its intention to promote a strategy of 
economic liberalisation and internationalisation of the economy. A trade surplus 
reduction program, which included the relaxation of foreign exchange and interest rate 
controls, the lifting of foreign investment restrictions and tariff reductions was 
announced. These measures were aimed at ensuring that domestic demand, rather than 
foreign demand, became the driving force behind future industrial development. The 
effect of the policy is that imports have become more attractive and have grown and 
export growth has continued, although at a somewhat less rapid rate (Wu 1991).1
4.2.1 Changes in the Internal Environment
By the 1980s the industrial sector was subject to a number of domestic pressures. A 
labour shortage had been gradually apparent in the manufacturing sector since the late 
1970s, and more so after the mid-1980s, resulting in firms relocating industrial 
activities offshore to mainland China and Southeast Asia. Labour costs rose as a result 
of this labour shortage and following the introduction in 1984 of the Labour Standard 
Laws, designed to improve working conditions. The average monthly wage which 
increased in real annual terms by 6.5 per cent during 1981-86, increased by 11.4 per 
cent between 1986-90.
1 Financial liberalisation was also accelerated, whereby interest rates were decontrolled and a new 
Banking Law enacted in 1989-90 removed all interest rate restrictions. Foreign exchange controls 
were lifted on trade-related transactions and residents were allowed to hold and use foreign currencies 
after July 1987 (although remittances of foreign exchange were still subject to quantitative 
limitations).
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Rising living standards led to a greater community awareness of environmental 
concerns with the government imposing increasingly stringent pollution control 
standards. Requirements on firms in polluting industries to meet these standards also 
contributed to cost pressures.
4.2.2 Changes in the External Environment
In addition to domestic pressures, a number of external factors were affecting the 
industrial sector. Developing countries in Southeast Asia and mainland China began 
to move into producing light industrial products, placing pressure on Taiwan to 
upgrade its export composition. In the early 1980s, rising protectionism in United 
States markets for Taiwan exports of textiles and consumer goods led Taiwan to move 
towards changing the composition of its exports and diversify its markets by seeking 
other trading partners. This, in turn, required Taiwan's export industries to increase 
competitiveness without the burden of protection and subsidies to inefficient 
industries. Also, the introduction of the 'Super 301' clause in the United States Trade 
Act in 1988 placed pressure on the government to liberalise and on firms to diversify 
into new markets.2
As previously discussed, the United States was placing pressure on Taiwan to reduce 
its trade surplus. The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves increased from less 
than US$11 billion in 1981 to over US$73 billion in 1990.3 Appreciation of the US 
dollar in the first half of the 1980s made the United States market relatively attractive 
to Taiwan exports. From 1980 to 1986 the percentage of exports to the United States 
rose from 34 to 48 per cent. Since 1985, the United States dollar has fallen against the 
NT dollar, the yen, and other major currencies. The United States share in Taiwan's 
exports has declined throughout this period following the appreciation of the NT dollar 
by 40 per cent against the US dollar between 1986-88.4 Throughout this period,
2 Up until 1992, Taiwan had been named in 7 cases for investigation under section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 (as amended). Four of these cases have been in manufacturing, 2 in agriculture and 1 
covering intellectual property rights. Three of the 7 cases have led to explicit threats of retaliatory 
measures by the United States. Friction has centred on mostly market access for major agricultural 
and food products, including wine and cigarettes, and intellectual property rights (Bayard and Elliott 
1992).
3 In addition to provoking trade friction with the United States, the rapid growth of Taiwan's foreign 
exchange reserves also led to excessive expansion of the money supply and the inflation of both real 
and financial asset prices.
4 As Riedel (1992:254-69) has shown, the nearly 60 per cent share of exports in GNP by 1986 may 
only be exceptional because of a large but temporary deviation of the real exchange rate from its long- 
run equilibrium. Since Taiwan is a net importer from Japan and a heavy net exporter to the United
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however, the Taiwan authorities held the NT dollar steady against the yen (Riedel 
1992).* 5
The rapid development of science-based technology in developed countries meant 
industrial upgrading required a more liberal policy with regard to direct foreign 
investment. As an increasing number of domestic producers became foreign 
subsidiaries, the rationale in protecting domestic producers no longer held. Policies to 
support domestic producers could end up supporting foreign subsidiaries, and was 
contrary to the government's desire to increase technology transfer as a means of 
enhancing indigenous technological capabilities.
Table 4.1 illustrates the significant structural changes that took place within the 
manufacturing sector during the 1980s. Manufacturing industries are classified into 
three categories: traditional industries, basic industries, and technology-intensive 
industries.6 The table shows that the share of net value added of basic industries rose 
from 20 per cent in 1981 to around 36 per cent by 1989; traditional industries 
continually lost share from 54 per cent in 1981 to around 35 per cent by 1989; and 
technology-intensive industries slightly gained share from 26 per cent to 28 per cent 
over the same period. Table 4.2 shows the pattern of export share is slightly different. 
The export share of traditional industries declined from 50 per cent to 36 per cent 
between 1981 to 1990; basic industries maintained a constant share of around 20 per 
cent; however technology-intensive industries increased their share from 29 per cent to 
43 per cent over the same period. The most obvious changes are in the apparel
States, a realignment of the real US dollar-yen exchange rate can impact significantly on Taiwan's
terms of trade. A real depreciation (appreciation) of the dollar against the yen lowers (raises) the price
Taiwan receives for its exports relative to the price it pays for imports, when both prices are expressed
in a common currency. Over the period 1978 to 1985, the US dollar rose against the yen. This shift 
undoubtedly benefited Taiwan, whose net barter terms of trade rose 20 per cent from 1980 to 1986.
5 In both popular and academic discussions it is often claimed that the exchange rate has been used 
successfully as an implied instrument of industry policy in seeking to affect relative prices. However 
Liang (1992) contends that Taiwan's real exchange rate, prior to the mid-1980s, has been relatively 
undistorted. Appendix Table 4.1 in showing Liang's series of the purchasing-power-parity effective 
exchange rate for exports, indicates that the real exchange rate was also fairly stable over the period 
1973-85 and was particularly favourable for exporters during the period 1958-60 and 1969-73. The 
stable purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rate helped induce producers to prefer export over 
domestic markets and accelerate export expansion despite a continually expanding base.
6 The following classification and analysis draws on the work of Hsueh (1992). Traditional industries 
include: food, beverage and tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather, lumber and furniture, paper 
and printing, non-metallic mineral products, and miscellaneous industries. Basic industries include: 
chemical materials, chemical products, petroleum and coal products, rubber and plastic products, and 
basic metals and metal products. Technology-intensive industries include: machinery, electrical 
machinery and appliances, transportation equipment, and precision instruments.
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industry and electrical machinery and appliances industry. While the share of the 
former decreased from 15 per cent to 7 per cent, the share of the latter rose from 19 
per cent to over 28 per cent. During the 1980s, technology-intensive industries have 
gradually replaced traditional industries in exports, this trend accelerating after 1986.7
4.3 Trade Policy Measures
Although a policy of economic liberalisation was announced in 1984, actual 
implementation took several years to gain momentum. Under the pressure of excess 
foreign exchange reserves and the threat of United States 301 retaliatory action, the 
process of trade reform speeded up after 1986. The reduction of tariffs and removal of 
remaining import restrictions was considered necessary to smooth trading 
relationships, to foster the upgrading of the industrial structure, and to strengthen 
international competitiveness. On the other hand, the tariff structure has at times been 
adjusted fragmentarily in response to foreign pressure with little attempt to revise and 
simplify the entire tariff structure based on a clear conception of its economic rationale 
in view (Lee et al. 1975). Trade liberalisation measures have also met with resistance 
from various interest groups, particularly from within the agricultural sector and 
sectors within manufacturing, such as the automobile industry (Tu and Wang 1988).
4.3.1 Tariffs
Table 4.3 indicates that the average nominal tariff rate remained above 40  per cent 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Despite gradual liberalisation, tariff rates in 
fact still remained relatively high until the mid-1980s. The average nominal tariff rate 
for all importables was 55.7 per cent in 1974. The pace of liberalisation accelerated 
after 1984 with the nominal rate falling from 30.8 per cent to 8.9 per cent between 
1985-1990 for Column II countries.8 The average tariff burden (total tariff revenue as 
a percentage of the total value of imports)9 fell from 7.9 per cent to 5.9 per cent
7 The National Science Council (1989) reports that the export value of technology-intensive products 
as a percentage of total exports increased from 23.6 per cent in 1984 to 29.5 per cent by 1989. 
Differences reflect classification procedures.
8 From 1980, Taiwan adopted a two column tariff schedule. Column I countries refer to those 
countries that do not grant preferential tariffs to Taiwan, while Column II countries do grant 
preferential tariffs to Taiwan. Column II preferential rates apply to goods imported from most 
countries with 119 countries or areas eligible for applying the Column II preferential rates.
9 As is well known, averaging tariffs by means of import values introduces a downward bias since 
high tariffs are given a small weight and low tariffs given a large weight. The simple average of tariffs 
will also be overstated because of the various tax exemptions and the tax rebate system, with the same 
true of the frequency distribution o f actual tariffs.
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TABLE 4.3: List of Tariff Changes, Taiwan
_____________________________________________________________ _____ (per cent)
Year Average Nominal Tariff Amended Items Average
Rate ( % )  
Column I 
Countries
Column II 
Countries
Reduction Free Increase Tariff Burden
1955 .. .. .. .. .. 38.2
1965 .. • • .. . . . . .. 16.5
1970 . . .. . . . . .. 16.1
1971 .. . . .. 242 39 171 14.1
1972 .. • • 415 0 53 12.1
1973 . . . . 94 4 16 12.6
1974 .. 55.65 .. 202 2 7 11.7
1975 52.69 .. 71 0 13 9.9
1976 .. 49.13 .. 44 11 19 11.4
1977 . . 46.17 .. 159 4 14 10.4
1978 .. 43.58 .. 996 16 119 11.3
1979 .. 39.14 . . 432 21 16 11.6
1980 35.96 n.a. 31.17 1604 23 10 9.0
1981 35.96 n.a. 31.17 0 0 0 7.5
1982 35.95 n.a. 31.04 106 5 124 7.6
1983 35.95 n.a. 31.04 0 0 0 7.6
1984 35.95 n.a. 30.81 281 2 23 7.7
1985 32.79 n.a. 26.46 1058 35 1 7.9
1986 31.77 n.a. 22.83 111 25 11 7.7
1987 .. n.a. 19.37 1599 15 6 7.5
1988 .. n.a. 12.57 3377 142 .. 6.2
1989 .. n.a. 9.73 4738 • . .. 5.1
1990 .. n.a. 8.90 . . .. .. 5.9
Notes: 1) Average tariff burden is defined as the collected tariff revenue weighted by total
import value.
2) Column I countries refer to those countries that do not grant preferential tariffs 
to Taiwan, while Column II countries do grant preferential tariffs to Taiwan.
3 )  .. not available.
4) n.a. - not applicable.
Sources: 1) Table 4, Kuo (1991:135). Derived from Customs Import Tariff Table, The Inspectorate
General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, Republic of China.
2) Table 2, Tu and Wang (1988:67).
3) Figures for 1990 are from Hsueh (1992:9).
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over the same period (Hsueh 1992:9). As a result, 96 per cent of tariff rates on 
industrial items were lower than 15 per cent by 1990 compared with 34 per cent in 
1986. Moreover, 58 per cent of the rates were lower than 5 per cent. Under the 
government's announced 'Four-year (1989-1992) Tariff Reduction Plan', the effective 
real tariff rate was further reduced to 4.2 per cent in 1993, which is the average of the 
OECD countries.
Table 4.4 shows the ratios of customs revenues to imports. Column (1) lists the ratios 
of net customs revenue (import duty, defence tax and harbour dues), to total imports 
while column (2) lists the ratio of gross customs revenue which are the sum total of net 
customs revenue and those rebated to exporters, to total imports. The gross ratio is 
probably a better measure of the average degree of protection since it is not affected 
by the increasing importance of processed exports and assembly operations based on 
imported inputs which were exempt from taxes (Scott 1979:334-5). Both ratios show 
a declining trend in the average level of protection, even though these measures are 
affected by the changing composition of imports. The higher ratio on gross revenues 
than that on net revenues suggests also that tariffs on intermediate products were often 
quite high. Unless these taxes were rebated, the competitiveness of processed exports 
would be adversely affected. This suggests that under a dualistic trade regime, import 
liberalisation was mainly limited to imported inputs for export processing (Liang 
1992:24).
4.3.2 Import Controls
Nontariff barriers began to be lowered from the early 1970s. The percentage of 
permitted import items, or the import liberalisation ratio, rose from 57.1 per cent in 
1970 to 97.0 per cent by the late 1980s (Table 4.5). However Table 4.6 shows that, in 
the early 1980s, of the permissible imports, only 11 per cent were free from import 
licenses with many other items subject to other forms of import restriction.10 After 
1985 the percentage of items free from import licenses was raised to 31.4 per cent 
reaching 65.7 per cent by 1991. Also, the number of items restricting applicants who 
could qualify, and the origin of the imported products criteria, were sharply reduced 
over the period. While nontariff barriers are no longer used as instruments to protect
10 Imported commodities are classified into three groups: (i) commodities that may be imported but 
under strict controls; (ii) commodities that may be imported but only with the consent of certain 
branches of government or with restrictions imposed on the qualifications of importers or country of 
origin and; (iii) commodities that cannot be imported at all by private importers.
TABLE 4.4: Ratio of Customs Revenue to Imports, Taiwan:
1960-92
(per cent)
Fiscal Year Net Revenues Gross Revenue
(Column 1) (Column 2)
1960 28.21 31.72
1965 22.01 31.81
1970 18.00 26.13
1975 9.80 15.15
1980 8.97 12.96
1981 7.46 10.39
1982 7.61 10.54
1983 7.60 9.89
1984 7.72 9.88
1985 7.89 10.47
1986 7.67 9.56
1987 7.46 9.17
1988 6.10 7.36
1989 6.30 6.98
1990 5.87 6.29
1991 4.96 5.23
1992 5.12 5.35
Sources: Appendix Table 4, Liang (1993:41). Derived from Department of Statistics,
Ministry of Finance, Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, The 
Republic of China (Taiwan District), Taipei, (various years); Department 
of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Yearbook of Financial Statistics of 
the Republic of China, Taipei, (various years).
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TABLE 4.5: Import Controls in Taiwan
Y ear and 
month
Permissible
Im ports
Controlled
Im ports
Prohibited
Im ports
Total
No. o f 
items
% o f total No o f 
items
% o f total No. o f  
items
% o f total No. of. 
items
% o f total
1953 280 55.2 185 36.5 28 5.50 507 100
1956 252 48.1 241 46.0 25 4.80 524 100
1960 506 53.7 381 40.5 33 3.50 942 100
1966 493 52.3 395 41.9 36 3.50 942 100
1968, 12 5451 57.9 3770 40.1 191 2.30 9412 100
1970, 7 5612 57.1 4030 41.0 190 1.90 9832 100
1972, 7 10860 82.1 2365 17.9 5 0.04 13236 100
1974 ,2 12645 97.7 293 2.3 4 0.03 12942 100
1975, 1 12688 97.5 318 2.4 4 0.03 13010 100
1976, 6 12846 97.2 362 2.7 13 0.10 13211 100
1978 ,7 15773 97.6 375 2.3 17 0.10 16165 100
1979, 12 15836 97.6 380 2.3 17 0.10 13233 100
1980, 12 15818 97.4 410 2.5 21 0.10 16249 100
1981 ,12 25681 96.8 833 3.1 17 0.10 26531 100
1982, 12 25657 96.5 904 3.4 17 0.10 26566 100
1983, 8 25640 97.4 921 3.5 17 0.06 26602 100
1983, 12 25827 97.1 749 2.8 14 0.05 26610 100
1984 ,12 25968 97.1 744 2.8 14 0.05 26746 100
1985, 12 26065 97.4 662 2.5 14 0.05 26760 100
1986, 12 26270 98.1 470 1.8 9 0.03 26768 100
1987, 12 26426 98.3 421 1.6 8 0.03 26874 100
1988, 12 26472 98.5 391 1.5 8 0.03 26889 100
1989, 1 8519 97.0 242 2.8 2 0.02 8783 100
1989,3 8610 97.3 229 2.6 2 0.02 8848 100
1989 ,10 8711 97.2 247 2.8 0 0.00 8958 100
1989, 12 8715 97.2 247 2.8 0 0.00 8962 100
1991,1 8758 97.3 246 2.7 0 0.00 9004 100
Notes: 1) Controlled items are those required to obtain approval from various government agencies
before importers apply for import licenses from the Board of Foreign Trade.
2) There were several reclassifications of commodities during 1989 such that the number 
of items changed dramatically.
Sources: 1) Table 5, Kuo (1991:137). Derived from Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
2) Table 1, Tu and Wang (1988:66).
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TABLE 4.6: Type of Permissible Imports, Taiwan
Y ear T o ta l
Perm issible
Im p o rts
Free o f  
Im p o rt 
L icenses
R estric ting
A pplican ts '
Q ualifications
R estric ting  
O rigins 
o f  Im p o rted  
P ro d u c ts
N o . o f  
item s
%  o f  to ta l N o. o f  
item s
%  o f  to ta l N o . o f  
item s
%  o f  to ta l N o. o f  
item s
% o f  to ta l
1 9 8 3 ,8 2 5 640 96.4 2805 10.5 628 2.4 1610 6.1
1 9 8 3 ,1 2 25827 97.1 2986 11.2 372 1.4 124 0.5
1 9 8 4 ,1 2 25968 97.1 2937 11.0 339 1.3 125 0.5
1 9 8 5 ,1 2 26065 97 .4 8412 31 .4 330 1.2 99 0 .4
1986, 12 2 6 270 98.1 11477 42 .9 271 1.0 64 0 .2
1 9 8 7 ,1 2 26426 98.3 11457 4 2 .6 226 0.8 58 0.2
1 9 8 8 ,1 2 2 6 472 98.5 11454 4 2 .6 165 0 .6 58 0 .2
1 9 8 9 ,1 8519 97 .0 5849 66 .6 93 1.1 41 0.5
1989, 3 8610 97.3 5887 66.5 86 1.0 42 0.5
1 9 8 9 ,1 2 8715 97 .2 5928 66 .2 43 0.5 51 0.6
1991, 1 8758 97.3 5918 65.7 43 0.5 46 0.5
Notes: 1) There was a change of classifications in January 1989.
2) Since January 1990, import licenses have been abolished.
Sources: 1) Table 6, Kuo (1991:138). Derived from the Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Republic of China; and Tu (1990) in Kuo (1991).
2) Table 1, Tu and Wang (1988:66).
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domestic industries, some restrictions still apply to particular sources of origin, and the 
status of applicants.
Import liberalisation has generally not been associated with an increase in import 
ratios. Table 4.7 shows some increase in the ratios of finished and semifinished 
manufactured exports to nominal GNP since 1985. However, the import ratios of all 
other categories of commodities have declined (Liang 1992:21).
In the past Taiwan has also imposed local content requirements which have affected 
parts of such industries as machinery (tractors), electrical equipment (colour 
televisions, video recorders and refrigerators), and transport equipment (motorcycles, 
bicycles and heavy sedans). These restrictions were designed to foster linked parts and 
components industries but have also resulted in the maintenance of higher prices and 
lower quality relative to imports (Wu 1991). As of 1989, local content requirements 
applied only to the automobile industry.
4.4 Evaluation of Fiscal and Financial Incentives and Measures 
4.4.1 Fiscal Incentives
The most influential fiscal incentive scheme for investment was the Statute for the 
Encouragement of Investment (SEI). Available to both domestic and foreign firms, 
the SEI was in force between 1961 and 1990 and was revised several times. The 
primary purpose of this statute was to encourage and channel investment into areas 
considered important for economic development. The emphasis of the statute in the 
1960s was to encourage the establishment and enlargement of exporting industries; in 
the 1970s to encourage capital-intensive industries; and in the 1980s to encourage 
technology-intensive industries. Over time, however, the objectives and incentive 
measures available under the SEI became more complex, with the statute serving as a 
policy instrument guiding enterprise economic behaviour in such areas as export, 
pollution abatement, R&D and energy conservation. As a result of these additions, the 
targets for encouragement were continuously increased and the number of items 
receiving encouragement enlarged, resulting in a complicated tax reduction system.
Under the statute, a 'productive enterprise' conforming to certain categories of and 
criteria for encouragement were eligible for several major fiscal incentives during the 
1980s. 'Newly established' and 'newly expanded' productive enterprise could choose
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from either a tax exemption of 4 or 5 years respectively, or accelerated depreciation on 
machinery and equipment. Under the accelerated depreciation option offered, an 
enterprise could reduce the service life of machinery and equipment to 5 years for 
machines whose service life was more than 10 years, or by half for those whose 
service life was less than 10, and by one third for buildings, construction, 
communications and transportation facilities.
The accelerated depreciation option served as an alternative to tax exemption, but very 
few enterprises chose to take it up. Prior to 1987, only 21 enterprises applied for 
accelerated depreciation, while thousands of enterprises applied for tax exemption 
(Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), 1987). While the accelerated 
depreciation option was expected to become more popular as the economy underwent 
industrial restructuring and more capital and technology-intensive production 
techniques were adopted, the number of applicants did not increase significantly. This 
option was obviously beneficial for a firm engaged in capital-intensive production 
with heavy investment in long service-life machinery or equipment. However, most 
enterprises in Taiwan are small and medium-sized enterprises, operating under labour- 
intensive production technology.
The income tax rate for 'ordinary' productive enterprises was reduced in 1977 from 30 
per cent to 25 per cent, with 'important productive enterprises' being eligible for an 
income tax ceiling of 20 per cent since 1987.11 A productive enterprise could also 
apply for a tax credit for the purchase of machinery and equipment ranging from 5 per 
cent to 20 per cent. The tax credit was introduced in 1981 and discontinued between 
1984 and the first half of 1985. The effectiveness of the tax credit was somewhat 
controversial and the measure was discontinued in 1990.
In addition, a productive enterprise could be exempt from import duties or had the 
option to use an instalment plan for paying duties on machinery purchased from 
abroad.12 This helped enterprises to lower capital costs to some extent when import
11 The income tax rate for all 'other' enterprises was reduced to 35 per cent in 1975, to 30 per cent in 
1985, and then to 25 per cent in 1986.
12 The amount of rebates expanded as the items covered expanded and exports grew. Rebates have 
applied to customs duties, the defence surtax on customs duties, harbour construction dues, 
commodity taxes, and the salt tax. These rebates composed 1.2 per cent of total relevant tax receipts 
in 1955, 30 per cent in 1964, and 62 per cent in 1972. In 1983, as part of the trade liberalisation 
strategy, the government announced a five-year program to abolish tax rebates. By 1986, their level 
had fallen to 21 per cent (Wu 1991:319).
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duties were high, but the importance of the measures diminished as tariff rates and 
other surcharges were progressively lowered (Chou and Wu 1991:13).
Other tax benefits included incentives for research and development; for promoting the 
rationalisation of enterprises through merger and consolidation; for acquisition of land 
for industrial use; and for the purchase of machinery and equipment for energy 
conservation.
In 1987 the Taiwan government initiated a long term research project to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SEI.13 Research institutions were contracted to conduct a series of 
studies on Taiwan's industrial organisation, to evaluate industrial policy measures and 
to review government incentive schemes. The study concluded that, while extensive 
tax relief may have been useful in speeding up economic development in the past, it 
was no longer suitable for a maturing economy. The intervention was seen as 
resulting in distorted resource allocation, and it was considered highly questionable 
whether the results of government intervention justified the costs in lost taxes. The 
report concluded:
• Excessive tax exemptions and deductions were causing an unfair distribution of 
the tax burden;
• Complications of the law were creating insurmountable difficulties in tax 
administration;
• The incentives had created entrenched interest groups that were hampering the 
establishment of a fair tax system; and
• The correlation between favoured enterprises and their productivity and 
profitability was low (CIER 1987).
The following table shows that the majority of the tax revenue losses due to the 
enforcement of the SEI occurred over the 1980s. This tax revenue loss of NT$290.5 
billion was equivalent to 6.8 per cent of the total tax revenue collected over the period 
1981-1990.14
13 This study was undertaken by the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) and Chung-Hua Institution 
for Economic Research. The IDB of the Ministry of Economic Affairs is the major governmental 
agency dealing with industrial development The IDB is responsible for initiating industrial policies 
and strategies for overall industrial development as well as for specific industries such as electronics, 
information, aviation and automotive.
14 Tax revenue includes taxes collected at all levels o f government, but excludes monopoly revenue.
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TABLE 4.8: Tax Revenue Losses Due to Enforcement of the SEI
(Billion NT$)
Total
Amount %
Income Tax 
Amount %
Business Tax 
Amount %
Land Tax 
Amount %
Others 
Amount %
1961-1990 372.9 100 225.7 60.5 82.9 22.2 4.5 1.2 59.7 16.0
1961-1970 6.7 100 2.7 40.3 1.4 20.9 0.0 0.0 2.6 38.8
1971-1980 75.7 100 27.5 36.3 29.6 39.1 0.3 0.4 18.2 24.1
1981-1990 290.5 100 195.5 67.3 51.9 17.9 4.2 1.4 8.9 13.4
Source: Table 5, Pai (1991:9).
More specifically, the report noted that in the initial stages of industrial development 
the statute was quite effective in encouraging an increase in investment, but that the 
effectiveness of tax reductions had lessened overtime.15 While the five-year tax 
exemption was estimated to have reduced the investment costs for firms by some 20 
per cent, and the number of firms benefiting from tax exemptions or reductions had 
increased, the growth rate of total investment had not been obviously enhanced. 
Moreover, measures used to accelerate depreciation were found not to be as effective 
as tax exemptions and reductions, while measures to encourage business mergers, 
R&D and environmental protection were also all thought to have had limited 
effectiveness for the following reasons:
• The motivation behind encouraging R&D was based on the potential of expected 
development and the pursuit of profit-making, such that preferential tax 
reductions and exemptions had not been a major element in investment decisions.
• The motivation behind merging of enterprises, in seeking to reduce expenses, 
coordinate manpower and technology and control access to marketing, had little 
to do with tax reductions and tax exemptions;
• The effect of encouraging the prevention of industrial pollution had not been 
significant, given that the equipment for curbing pollution was not capital that 
generated profits;
• Measures for encouraging energy saving were considered insignificant since the 
price of energy still did not reflect real cost; and
15 These findings are taken from Yu (1988), which in turn have been taken from the Summary Report: 
Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis Evaluation of Regulations to Encourage Investment, Chung-Hua 
Institution for Economic Research, August 1987. (in Chinese)
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• Investment credits while stimulating investment, particularly during a period of 
recession, could not be employed as a long-term instrument (Yu 1988).
At the time of promulgation the basic philosophy underlying the SEI was that an 
economy will undergo certain stages of development, and at each stage there are 
certain key industries which through various linkages will bring about development of 
the entire economy. This strategy assumed government officials knew what those key 
industries were and what policy measures should be adopted to develop those 
industries (Hou 1988:48). In recent years though there has been an increasing 
awareness among government officials that it is difficult to pick the right industries or 
winners, if indeed such winners can be identified in advance; and that selective 
protective measures may not be effective. This view has been reinforced by several 
other studies into government incentives to industry. One study, for example, based 
on input/output tables for the 1970s and 1980s found no significant relationship 
between tariff protection and the growth rates of industries when industries are 
classified according to market orientation (for export or for the domestic market) or 
according to value added (Hou 1988:49).16 Another study suggested that government 
measures designed to encourage investment in certain selected industries had little 
effect. Rather it was found that investment decisions were primarily determined by 
persistent increases in sales which government officials were not in a position to 
determine beforehand. Interest burden and tax deductions were found to be 
insignificant in influencing investment decisions (Sun 1985).
The consensus was reached in 1990 that the encouragement of targeted products and 
industries should be discontinued. A substantial modification was made to the system 
of fiscal incentives and the more function-oriented Statute for the Upgrading of 
Industry (SUI) was adopted in 1990 to replace the specific industry-oriented SEI. The 
SUI does not single out any specific industry for special tax treatment, but provides 
tax benefits to all industries for certain generic types of investment, such as R&D, 
manpower training, and anti-pollution measures. Hence it is not a targeting measure, 
since all benefits are available to all industries. The following incentives are available 
under the SUI: industries using selective technologies are eligible for accelerated 
depreciation and tax credits of 5 to 20 per cent relating to R&D, manpower training, 
pollution control, industrial equipment, energy conservation and international 
marketing; in the case of merger or consolidation, a company is exempted from stamp
16 Based on Hou's study on the problem of Taiwan s trade surplus by a research team at Chung-Hua 
Institution for Economic Research.
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tax and deed tax; tax benefits for acquisition of land for industrial use; exemption from 
personal income tax for royalties derived from patents or computer software; 
companies which invest overseas may set aside a tax free reserve of up to 20 per cent 
of their total outward investment to cover investment losses; and tax incentives for the 
encouragement of purchase of machinery and equipment for energy conservation.17
4.4.2 Financial Incentives
The Taiwan government also at various times selectively allocated credit at favourable 
terms to accommodate the financing needs of some specific industries, economic 
activities or borrower groups, in order to promote economic growth or to equalise to 
some extent the availability of bank loans among borrower groups (Yang 1990:19). 
The most important of these policies have been the export financing policy18 and 
strategic industry financing policy. Export financing policy is discussed briefly below 
while the strategic industry policy is discussed in greater detail in section 4.5.
Since the 1960s, export activities have been granted special low interest loans to 
provide pre-shipment finance and for the importation of raw materials.19 The 
difference between the export loan rate and the minimum interest rate for secured 
loans is illustrated in Table 4.9. With continuous trade surpluses and accumulated 
foreign exchange reserves, the interest rate differential narrowed in the 1980s and the 
margin of preference for exports diminished. Other forms of finance available to 
exporters have also been wound back considerably since the mid-1980s.
17 More specifically, when a company uses its undistributed earnings through an increase in capital, 
the newly issued stock dividends to its shareholders are not subject to personal income tax if the 
shareholder is an individual, or to business income tax if the shareholder is an enterprise if these 
earnings are to be used for the following: to expand machinery, invest in R&D, quality control, 
pollution prevention, conservation of energy; to make loan repayments on machinery or equipment; 
and/or to invest in high-tech enterprises, an investment company or a venture capital firm (Pai 
1991:12).
18 As McKinnon (1991:37) notes, although some financial repression existed in the form of 
preferential interest rates for exporters these rates were generally kept positive and substantial in real 
terms; nor was this commitment to finance exporters sufficient to undermine the central bank's control 
over the monetary base, unlike the Korean experience.
19 Wu (1991:319) in quoting Lin (1973) notes that credit has generally been of the revolving, short­
term type; for example, for three months covering the period between receipt of a letter of credit and 
shipping. The letter of credits were discounted by the central bank at a lower rate than a commercial 
bank would charge, if a bank would advance money at all. This provided firms, especially small and 
medium size ones, needed working capital to fill orders without resorting to the high-cost black- 
market, and thus promoted smaller enterprises as well as exports.
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But while the financial system in Taiwan is considered to have effectively mobilised 
domestic savings, its performance in allocating funds during the 1980s has been 
subject to criticism. These criticisms include that collateral was emphasised rather 
than profitability of the firm in determining allocation of funds; public enterprises and 
large firms were favoured, while private enterprises and medium and small enterprises 
were discriminated against; and exporting industries enjoyed privileged access to bank 
loans and preferential loans, compared to import competing industries and the 
nontradables sector (Shea and Yang 1990:13).
In testing these criticisms, and in determining which industries have been favoured, 
Shea and Yang (1990), estimate a 'bank finance equation' by applying pooling data of 
12 manufacturing industries over the period 1974-87.20 Their results provide support 
for the criticism that larger firms have found it easier to obtain financing from 
financial institutions, while the smaller the asset scale of a firm, the greater was the 
dependence on curb market finance. To the extent that export finance has been 
regarded as stimulating exports and economic growth, the authors conclude it has also 
distorted the fund allocation among exporting, import competing, and the nontradables 
sectors, and contributed to the problem of large trade surpluses in recent years.
The study found also that the food and beverage, paper, printing and publishing, 
chemicals, basic metals, and transport equipment industries have been favoured in 
applying for loans, while wood and bamboo, non-metallic mineral, fabricated metal, 
electrical and electronic machinery and equipment, and miscellaneous industries have 
been discriminated against. The preference order of bank financing was found not to 
be associated with the order of production growth rates of manufacturing industries, 
suggesting that the financial institutions have not allocated loans according to the 
growth potential of industries.
4.4.3 Informal Credit Markets
The curb market (informal financial system) is composed of all markets where 
borrowing and lending activities occur without being subjected to the supervision and
20 In their equation the proportion of financing demand of industry i met by loans from financial 
institutions is used as the dependent variable. The following explanatory variables are used —  total 
loans from financial institutions of the entire private manufacturing sector in year t/total domestic 
borrowings of the private manufacturing sector in year t (to denote the general market condition of the 
availability of bank loans in year t); fixed assets/total domestic borrowings of industry i and capital 
income/total assets (to represent collateral factor and profitability respectively); a dummy variable for 
industry i; export ratio variable; and a previous bank financing ratio variable for year t-1.
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regulation of financial authorities. It is generally believed that the active curb market, 
which the government has never tried to suppress vigorously, has played an important 
role in Taiwan by attracting household saving and financing the investment needs of 
private enterprises.
Cole and Patrick (1986:58) note that if the credit of regulated institutions is initially 
channelled to certain uses, largely in the presence of below-equilibrium interest rates, 
and those uses are less profitable than other opportunities currently available, parallel 
financial markets are likely to assist with the reallocation of credit from the less to the 
more profitable uses at market-clearing prices. And while private and social benefits 
and costs may differ significantly, the unregulated sector in most cases is a more 
effective, efficient and equitable mobiliser and allocator of funds than a highly 
repressed regulated sector. Market determination of interest rates provides appropriate 
signals and incentives. Entry is relatively easy and case studies suggest that 
competition is substantial. Further, the unregulated sector may play a key role in 
making effective the subsidies implicit in the low-interest-rate loan of the regulated 
sector. At least this is the case if the allocators of the low-interest loans do not extract 
all the economic rents from the original borrowers. The export-credit subsidies in 
Korea in the latter half of the 1960s provide an example of how this system works 
(Cole and Patrick 1986:60).
Table 4.10 shows that curb market finance (enterprises and households) grew from 20 
per cent of total domestic financial assets in 1965 to more than 30 per cent in 1980, 
then fell to around 17 per cent by the end of the 1980s. At its peak in 1980, curb 
market finance was roughly equal to that of all regulated financial institutions taken 
together, indicating a very large diversion of savings from the regulated financial 
institutions to the unregulated curb market.
During the period 1964-87, financial institutions provided the business sector with 58 
per cent of total financings from the financial system, while the informal curb market, 
capital market and money market accounted for 25 per cent, 14 per cent and 7 per cent 
respectively. Between 1981-87, financial institutions provided 51 per cent of 
financing, while the curb, capital and money market contributed 26 per cent, 14 per 
cent and 9 per cent respectively (Shea and Yang 1990:30). Further decomposing the 
business sector into public and private enterprises, Table 4.11 shows that over the 
period 1964-87, public enterprises borrowed 95 per cent of their borrowings from
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TABLE 4.10: Composition of Domestic Financial Assets, Taiwan: 1965-89
(per cent)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
Loans bv:
Financial Institutions 31.1 28.5 36.8 33.0 32.7 43.0
Enterprises and Households 19.6 29.0 28.6 32.2 26.8 16.6
Government Agencies 9.7 4.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.9
Securities:
Government 2.6 2.7 0.8 0.6 1.2 2.2
Enterprises
Long-term 35.4 32.3 28.6 26.1 28.0 29.8
Short-term 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.5 1.9
Other domestic assets (net) 1.5 2.9 3.5 4.3 6.1 5.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Loans made by enterprises and households include suppliers' credits as well as direct borrowing
from households through various informal financial channels.
Source: Derived from Table 1, The Central Bank of China, Flow of Funds in Taiwan District,
December (1990:115, 125, 135, 145, 155, 163).
financial institutions and 2.1 per cent of their borrowings from the curb market. This 
compares with the private sector shares of 60 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. 
Over the sub-period 1981-87, public enterprises share of borrowings from financial 
institutions was 88.7 per cent, compared with 3.7 per cent from the curb market. 
Private enterprises share was 53.5 per cent and 35.2 per cent respectively (Shea and 
Yang 1990). Table 4.12 shows also that the larger the firms, the easier it is to get 
financing from both financial institutions and money and bond markets; and the 
smaller the asset scale, the greater the dependence on curb market financing.
Table 4.13 compares various types of bank interest rates with a curb market interest 
rate and consumer price inflation rate. In real terms, the bank deposit rate yielded a 
fairly consistent and positive rate of return (except for high inflation years). However, 
compared to the returns that seem to have been available in the curb market — the 
loan rate minus an undetermined, presumably high, profit margin — the bank deposit 
rate was probably not very attractive for many savers (Cheng 1986).
Export loans were extended by banks at interest rates lower than the savings deposit 
rate. A special rediscount facility at the central bank made this possible and 
effectively meant that the central bank financed exports while commercial banks
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TABLE 4.13 Interest Rates and Inflation Rates in Taiwan: 1956-89
(per cent)
Year
(end)
Bank Rates Curb Market 
Unsecured Loans
Consumer Price 
InflationSavings Deposits* Unsecured Loans Export Loans
1956-62 17.00 20.90 11.20 41.10 8.35
1963-73 10.10 14.10 7.70 25.40 3.40
1974 13.50 15.50 9.00 29.30 47.47
1975 12.00 14.00 7.00 26.40 5.24
1976 10.75 12.75 7.00 27.60 2.50
1977 9.50 11.50 6.50 25.60 7.04
1978 9.50 11.50 6.50 27.20 5.77
1979 12.50 15.25 10.50 30.10 9.75
1980 12.50 16.20 10.50 31.30 19.01
1981 13.00 15.25 11.00 30.10 16.34
1982 9.00 10.75 8.25 27.70 2.96
1983 8.50 10.25 8.00 26.80 1.35
1984 8.00 10.00 7.75 25.90 -0.02
1985 6.25 9.50 6.25 24.48 -0.07
1986 6.25 9.00 5.50 21.96 0.70
1987 6.25 9.00 5.50 21.60 0.52
1988 6.25 9.00 5.50 21.00 1.28
1989 6.25 12.00 6.50 21.96 4.41
Note: * One-year savings deposits
Sources: 1) Data from 1956-84 is from Table (11-6) in Cheng (1986:151). Data from 1985-89 is from Table 5,
Tsai (1993:56).
2) Derived from the Central Bank of China, Financial Statistics Monthly,(various issues); and Council for 
Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1990.
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collected a fee for initiating and servicing the loans and bearing the credit risk. Cheng 
(1986:151) notes that these separate arrangements created a three-tiered credit market.
Exporters enjoyed a heavily subsidised loan rate, other privileged borrowers (mostly 
large enterprises) paid the bank loan rates, and the rest sought high-cost finance in the 
curb market. Given the significant size of the curb market, the average cost of capital 
in Taiwan, was probably much higher than indicated by the bank loan rates. Thus as 
Cheng (1986:152) notes:
the interest rate policy administered by the central bank resulted in a diversion of domestic 
savings from regulated financial institutions to the unregulated curb market. If the intent of 
policy was to stimulate investment by containing business interest cost, it has succeeded in 
doing so only for those who have access to bank credit. It is doubtful then that the policy had a 
positive overall effect on the aggregate domestic savings or investment rate.
4.4.4 Technology Policy
While over the course of the 1980s Taiwan continued to maintain competitiveness in 
some of the labour-intensive industrial sectors, the government recognised the need for 
industrial restructuring in 1979 with the announcement of a Science and Technology 
Development Program. The program, which was later integrated into the Eighth Four 
-Year Economic Plan (1982-85), was aimed at raising R&D expenditure and focusing 
on private sector technology development. A further subplan in 1982 called attention 
to the development of the following eight strategic areas: information, automation, 
material science, energy, optoelectronics, food processing technology, biotechnology 
and hepatitis prevention. This was followed in 1984 by the formulation of the Ten- 
Year National Science and Technology Development Plan (1986-95), a major goal of 
which was the improvement of the general environment for science and 
development.21 The government's aim is to raise R&D expenditure to 2 per cent of 
GNP — 40 per cent from government (including public enterprises) and 60 per cent 
from private enterprises — by 1995. In addition, the government also established the 
Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park in 1980 to attract high-technology industries 
with high R&D content.
21 As part of the plan, the government in 1984 revised laws to provide tax incentives for 
manufacturers who allocate a percentage of their revenues to research and development This was 
revised in 1990 to make preferential treatment dependent on a firm meeting conditions related not 
only to R&D spending but also to manpower training and environmental protection standards.
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The heavy dependence on the government to finance R&D activities is due to the lack 
of research capabilities of the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). But 
investment in private domestic R&D has become essential for the maintenance of 
future competitiveness. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP rose from 0.7 per 
cent in 1978 to 1.4 per cent by 1989 (compared with 1.9 per cent for Korea and 2.7 per 
cent for Japan). Between 1978 and 1989, the government accounted for between 50 
and 65 per cent of total R&D spending (35 to 47 percent by government agencies, 10 
to 25 per cent by public enterprises). By 1989, nearly 50 per cent of R&D spending 
was being undertaken by private enterprise indicating that the government was 
achieving its aim of increasing private sector R&D (Table 4.14). However, private 
sector spending on R&D as a percentage of sales was only 0.1 per cent in 1978, 
compared to 2 per cent and 3 per cent in the United States and Japan respectively. By 
1989 this had risen to 0.7 per cent, but was still much lower than that of Korea (1.9 per 
cent) and Japan (2.7 per cent). Throughout the 1980s, R&D spending by the foreign 
sector largely remained under 1 per cent.
TABLE 4.14: R&D Expenditure by Types of R&D Organisation: 1978-89
(per cent)
Period Total 
Expend­
itures 
(NTS m)
R&D Exp/ 
GNP (%)
Govern­
ment
(%)
Public Private Non-profit Foreign 
Enter- Enter- Enter- Enter­
prises prises prises prises
{ % )  (%) (%) (%)
1978 6407 0.66 44.2 24.3 21.8 4.9 4.8
1979 9908 0.84 45.5 19.3 26.5 5.2 3.5
1980 10563 0.75 35.7 24.7 34.4 5.1 0.1
1981 16414 0.94 35.4 17.3 41.9 5.2 0.2
1982 16864 0.91 43.5 14.7 38.4 3.0 0.4
1983 19200 0.94 45.5 15.8 36.9 1.7 0.1
1984 22444 0.99 45.7 16.5 35.6 1.3 0.9
1985 25397 1.06 46.3 14.0 36.7 1.9 1.1
1986 28702 1.04 45.6 14.5 38.7 0.7 0.5
1987 36780 1.16 38.3 12.6 47.6 0.9 0.6
1988 43839 1.22 47.1 9.5 43.4 , # ,,
1989 54789 1.38 35.8 11.9 49.8 2.0 0.5
Notes: .. not available
Source: 1) National Science Council, 1989. Science and Technology Yearbook, Republic of China.
2) National Science-Council, 1991. Indicators of Science and Technology, Republic of China.
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4.5 Strategic Industry Financing Policy
In 1982, in order to promote industrial development and restructure industry, the 
Taiwan government adopted a policy of identifying 'strategic' industries and products 
for promotion. Apart from factors already mentioned, the policy was largely adopted 
as a means of addressing the structural imbalance apparent in the manufacturing sector 
since the early 1980s, and the associated reliance of Taiwan for imported intermediate 
goods of machinery and equipment from Japan.22
Selection of strategic industries was based on the following six criteria, identified by 
the government (Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 1981): 
high technology intensity, high market potential, high rate of value added, low energy 
intensity, low pollution and large linkage effect. The selected products were drawn 
from the mechanical, information and electronics industries in the original 
promulgation. The list has been revised four times during the 1980s with additional 
products added after 1986 to include biotechnology and material technology 
industries.
The government offers two measures to subsidise strategic industries — preferential 
medium and long-term low interest loans, and technology and management guidance. 
The interest rate difference between the strategic loans and the prime rate is around 
1.75-2.75 per cent. The loans are managed by the government's development bank, 
and were disbursed in five phases from 1982 to 1991. The actual amounts extended 
are listed in Table 4.15. Table 4.16 shows that by end 1988, of the total preferential 
loans, 32 per cent were directed to the strategic industries. In addition to financing 
strategic industries, preferential loans have been expanded to finance the purchase of 
automated equipment, domestically produced machines and pollution-prevention 
equipment, the production of exports and the development of new products (Yang 
1990:2). Under the technology and management guidance incentives, the government 
subsidises 60 per cent of total consulting expenses of firms, up to one million New 
Taiwan dollars. Strategic industries were also eligible for the incentives contained 
under the SEI.
Since implementation, the strategic loan policy has been subject to two major 
criticisms. The first relates to its distortionary effects. The second, that the various
22 Taiwan's bilateral trade deficit with Japan has grown rapidly since the early 1980s from US$3.1 
billion in 1980 to US$14.2 billion by 1993.
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TABLE 4.16: Preferential Medium and Long-Term Loans, Taiwan: end Dec, 1988
Total
(% )
Thousands 
o f NTS
Share in 
T otal Industrial 
Credit (% )**
(1) Investm ent Projects for Strategic Industries 32.14 34, 104, 828 85.7
(2) Investm ent Projects for Autom ated Equipment 31.69 33, 621, 179 79.0
(3) Investm ent Projects for Domestic 
Produced Machines
28.54 30, 285, 539 71.3
(4) Investm ent Projects for Environment 
P rotection and Pollution-prevention
3.91 4, 146,611 100.0
(5) GM P* Projects 0.04 4 1 ,9 3 0 100.0
(6) C ooperational Export and 
New P roduct Development
3.19 3, 3 8 5 ,2 1 5 0.0
(7) Projects Supported by CEPD* 0.49 5 2 1 ,7 6 4 100.0
Total 100 106, 107, 066
Notes: 1) CEPD* represents Council for Economic Planning and Development
2) GMP* represents Good Manufacturing Product
3) **Loans provided by the Medium Business Bank of Taiwan constitute the remaining 
shares of industrial credit.
Source: 1) Bank of Communications Annual Report, 1988.
2) Table 21, Shea and Yang (1990:48).
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criteria used by government to determine what constitutes a strategic product are 
inconsistent with each other and lack a clear rationale.
A recent study by Yang, Jen and Chou (1990) is the only research to date which has 
sought to review the effectiveness of the policy. Based on questionnaire data to some 
3000 firms, of which 357 responded, the authors attempt to answer the following 
questions:
• To what extent has government intervention changed the pattern of investment
from what free market prices would have generated, so as to carry out a planned 
pattern of sectoral growth?
• To what extent has government intervention made for faster economic growth?
• To what extent have the processes of and measures for executing policy been 
effective in improving the investment position and performance of firms?
The authors’ sample included firms which had acquired strategic preferential loans, 
those firms which acquired technical and management assistance, and those firms in 
the mechanical, information and electronic industries which did not receive 
preferential loans.
The authors then apply principal component analysis to test the following hypotheses:
• The characteristics of the firms influence the probability of their receiving the 
loans;
• Strategic loans cause a greater level of fixed asset accumulation in subsidised 
firms than in non-subsidised firms;
• Strategic loans help decrease the interest burden of firms;
• Strategic loans increase the operational performance of subsidised firms 
compared to that of non-subsidised firms.
Five OLS regression equations are estimated based on the following dependent 
variables representing the various hypotheses — subsidise or not, interest burden, 
growth of fixed capital, operational efficiency and productive efficiency. Included in
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the explanatory variables are the aforementioned plus technology level, scale of firm, 
sufficiency of funds, investment mood, and credibility.23
Their results indicated that the most significant item influencing the availability of 
preferential loans was the firms investment mood evaluated on the basis of the 
following categories — frequency of firm investment, the depth of the evaluation 
employed in the investment decision making process and the importance of investment 
in the firm's growth. Other factors, such as technology level, scale, sufficiency of 
funds and credibility (evaluated by the availability of short-term, medium and long­
term credit to the firm) were shown not to be important factors in the issuance of 
loans. The effect of preferential loans on the electronic, information and mechanical 
products industry were also found not to significantly influence interest burdens, 
stimulate fixed capital formation or operational performance (Yang, Jen and Chou 
1990).
The effects of technological and management guidance on the firm's operational 
performance were also evaluated. Higher technology firms were found to rely more 
heavily on non-government support than on government assistance. It was shown also 
that government did aid in the dissemination of technology, but not in the upgrading of
23 Principal component analysis involves combining several variables that represent each 
characteristic of the firms to form a representative variable. For example, the growth of sales and 
profitability are combined to form a term to represent operational performance and the variables of 
productivity of labour and capital are combined to represent productivity performance. In this study 
the following factors have been quantified:
(I) Characteristics of firms:
(i) Scale of firms: the paid-in capital of firms at the end of 1988.
(ii) Technology level: the ratio of engineers and technical persons to total employees.
(iii) Financial status: the financial status required for manufacturing the firm's current capacity level 
and for enlarging their capacity is evaluated.
(iv) Investment mood: this factor is evaluated using the following categories: the frequency of a firm's 
investments, the depth of the evaluation employed in the investment decision-making process, the 
importance of the investment to the firm's growth, and the understanding of the technology by the 
employees who are responsible for the firms' investment activities.
(v) Credibility: This factor is evaluated using the availability of short term credit to the firm and the 
availability of medium and long-term credit to the firms.
(II) The decision of the firms to acquire preferential loans or not: The to-acquire case is represented by 
the dummy variable 1, and not-to-acquire case is represented by the dummy variable 0.
(III) Interest burden: the ratio of the average interest cost to the total expenses of the firm in the years 
1985 to 1988.
(IV) Fixed asset formation: The average growth of fixed capital from 1985 to 1988.
(V) Performance of firms: four variables are used for the years from 1985 to 1988:
(i) Growth of sales
(ii) Profitability: the ratio of profit to revenues
(iii) Productivity of capital: the ratio of average sales to capital
(iv) Productivity of labour: the ratio of average sales to the number of employees
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technology. Thus whether a firm obtained assistance through government or other 
institutions was not a key factor influencing the production performance of firms. The 
study also found that the majority of subsidised firms would have continued with then- 
investment projects and would have still sought funds from other institutions even if 
they had not obtained preferential support from the government. It appears then that 
government measures to promote the development of strategic sectors were not 
important in influencing the development of this sector.
4.6 Policy Lessons from the Taiwan Experience
4.6.1 The Identification Problem: Defining a 'High-Technology' and
'Strategic' Industry
A high technology industry usually refers to those technologies at the cutting edge of 
science which have a great potential for commercial use or are already in commercial 
production. A comparison of country classifications reveals that there is neither a 
uniform standard or formula for identifying what constitutes a high technology 
industry. Some classifications relate to standard industry codes. Other high
technology industries, particularly in OECD classifications, cover many standardised 
products. Japan, for example, lists the following nine high-tech industries: industrial 
robots, integrated circuits, office automation, new industrial materials, biotechnology, 
computers, information, optoelectronics and aerospace. It is unclear though how these 
industries were chosen.24 Some industries, such as new industrial materials and 
biotechnology, are still at the development stage without mass production, yet the 
technological and market potential are thought to have been thoroughly analysed. 
There are also 'strategic-transformative' technologies or industrial technologies which 
are not necessarily bonded to any specific product. Thus there is the problem of how 
to distinguish among the many high-technology industries and their sub industries.
In popular discussions, the delineating aspects of a strategic industry are rarely 
identified. The attitude of many observers is that they know one when they see one 
(OECD 1991:36). Strategic industries are considered 'good' industries for a nation to 
have or in a sense are industries a country feels 'it has to have'. Within the literature 
there would appear to be at least some consensus that it should involve major positive
24 Accordingly MITI used the following criteria in determining key industries for promotion in the 
1960s and early 1970s: productivity growth, income elasticity, and employment relatedness (Okuno- 
Fujiwara 1992).
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externalities and large economies of scale based on leaming-by-doing. But some 
industries are regarded as strategic by all governments, not only in static sense of 
oligopolistic games as suggested by new trade theory, but also in terms of their 
potential for future growth. The problem thus remains of how to identify the 
industries in which opportunities for dynamic gain might exist. The examples are 
largely based on ex post identification, and the theoretical models do not suggest a 
strong definition of the characteristics of such industries.
4.6.2 The Information Problem
It seems doubtful that in designing policy bureaucrats are particularly conscious of the 
mechanism behind the criteria. The Taiwan government, for example, identifies 
strategic industries as 'industries that have to grow at an accelerated pace in order to 
promote improvements or breakthroughs in the present industrial structure', while key 
industries are identified as being 'indispensable to continued economic growth' (CEPD 
1981:8). Thus when the policy was first announced the information industry was 
considered a strategic industry, whilst its software component was not. Basic metals 
and metal products on the other hand are considered key industries but not strategic 
industries.
As mentioned previously government selection of a strategic industry was judged 
according to the following criteria — market potential and linkages, high technology 
intensity and value added ratio, a low level of energy consumption and low pollution. 
While each criterion may have some economic justification, together they appear to 
exhibit little consistency.
As the priority accorded to each criteria has not been explicitly spelt out, it is difficult 
to identify which industries meet all the criteria, given that any industry may exhibit 
one or more of the characteristics. In practice though there would appear to be few 
oligopolistic firms which readily conform to all the characteristics required by the 
theory. Schive and Hsueh (1987:150-1) in assessing the criteria applied by the 
government in Taiwan point out that to encourage investments with great market 
potential is redundant if the market signal is clear. A similar argument can be applied 
to the low energy requirement. A high value added ratio reveals nothing about the 
efficient use of resources, as is true of the rule for high technology intensity. As far as 
linkages are concerned, though more investment can be induced by the initial 
investment if there are linkages, there is no guarantee of success of such an
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investment. Moreover, the failure of the investment of great linkages implies that the 
negative impact upon other industries will be greater. There are also great difficulties 
in determining the positive spillovers that may accrue to end users, and related 
industries.
4.6.3 Implementation
By the end of March 1987, of the 199 strategic products defined and eligible for 
preferential loans, only 72 items had asked for technological assistance in production, 
and 46 items for management consulting. The number of items that applied for 
preferential loans was 82, less than half of the total items. Two important results 
concerning the distribution of preferential loans are worth mentioning. First, the ratio 
of transmitted loans for the strategic industries — machinery and information — over 
total funds at end March 1987 was around 21 per cent. Adding the electrical and 
automobiles and parts industries, the ratio rises to only 31 per cent. Second, the 
highest ratio of funds went to the textiles industry, which received 28.6 per cent of 
total loans transmitted. Based on this information it is somewhat difficult to determine 
the theoretical rationale behind the strategic industry policy with the textile industry 
enjoying the largest share of preferential loans originally designed for high technology 
industries. Though a comprehensive empirical study is necessary for a thorough 
evaluation of the policy, preliminary findings show that implementation of the policy 
is far from satisfactory (Schive and Hsueh 1987:131). In particular, it appears that 
changes in the incentive structure during this period were not concerned with directing 
resources towards the development of high technology ’strategic' industries.
4.6.4 Was It Necessary?
It could be argued that the size of preferential loans is too small to have a significant 
impact, and incentives should be directed to R&D activities, instead of production, as 
far as the externalities are concerned. This then begs the question of whether the 
policy was necessary at all.
It is generally believed that the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been 
the backbone in the economic development of Taiwan. These SMEs have made a 
greater contribution to the development of foreign trade than have the larger 
enterprises, and on the whole, have not been major recipients of government
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protection and incentives,25 compared with the larger firms. Almost 99 per cent of 
total manufacturing enterprises are SMEs (Table 4.17); employing in 1986 around 68 
per cent of the manufacturing workforce (compared to 43 per cent in 1966); and 
contributing almost 45 per cent of manufacturing output in 1989 (compared to 27 per 
cent in 1971). Table 4.18 shows that in 1987, SMEs contributed almost 47 per cent of 
total sales. Except for the food, beverages and tobacco, chemical materials, petroleum 
and coal, and transportation equipment industries, sales from SMEs constitute a 
significant proportion of total sales in various manufacturing industries. Table 4.19 
shows that economy-wide, large enterprises on average exported 37 per cent of their 
production between 1976 and 1988. SMEs exported more than 64 per cent during the 
same period.
The contributions of SMEs to Taiwan's economic development can also be illustrated 
by the export shares of SMEs in manufacturing. As shown in Table 4.20, the share of 
SME exports in manufacturing ranged from 62.5 per cent to 73.5 per cent between 
1981 and 1988, with precision instruments, textiles, plastic products, leather, and 
electrical machinery and appliances the major export industries (Table 4.21). Since 
1982, SMEs have experienced a decline in their export contributions, indicating that 
they have been under fairly strong competitive pressures.
Small and medium-sized enterprises are by and large price takers, being heavily 
influenced by, and adapting to, the overall environment rather than by their individual 
strategies or efforts. In the past, SMEs have shown considerable flexibility and 
adaptability in response to changing market conditions. This challenge has become 
more difficult since the early 1980s as product cycles have shortened. But the 
predominantly labour-intensive SMEs have gradually been losing their international 
competitiveness as a result of increases in production and marketing costs. Moreover, 
traditional practices of operating on small profit margins with attention to costs and 
cost adjustment have become more difficult to continue as capital deepening and 
technology become more important in maintaining niche markets and market shares 
both domestically and abroad.
In responding to this challenge, SMEs have either changed their traditional lines of 
business or invested abroad. While flexible in meeting market demand, the SMEs are
25 Yen (1984) has calculated the percentages of loanable funds of the whole banking system extended 
to SMEs between 1977-81. While SMEs accounted for 95 per cent of all firms in the economy, they 
received around 32.5 per cent of preferential total loans in 1981 (and 28 per cent in 1977).
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TABLE 4.17: Number and Distribution of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in 
Manufacturing, Taiwan
(Number; per cent)
1983 1985 1988
Industry Number % Number % Number %
Food 10096 99.2 9247 98.6 19602 99.1
Beverage and Tobacco 162 97.0 124 94.7 142 92.8
Textile 6783 97.4 6582 95.9 7909 96.2
Wearing Apparel 7140 99.6 6942 99.3 5924 99.2
Leather 1241 99.5 1275 98.8 1614 98.4
Paper & Printing 9474 99.6 9619 99.4 11519 99.3
Chemical Materials 1847 96.3 1698 95.1 1495 93.6
Chemical Products 2129 98.2 1911 96.7 2026 95.5
Petroleum & Coal Products 81 96.4 52 92.9 52 94.6
Rubber Products 1239 99.3 1295 98.3 2163 98.4
Plastic Products 9857 99.7 9950 99.4 14433 99.1
Basic Metals 5856 98.8 5803 97.9 6696 97.5
Metal Products 26690 99.8 26244 99.7 33614 99.6
Machinery 7177 99.7 7220 99.2 9489 98.9
Electrical Machinery & 5857 97.9 6013 96.5 8812 96.0
Appliances
Transportation Equipment 2657 98.3 2699 97.3 4196 97.7
Precision Instruments 834 99.3 884 98.7 1244 98.0
Lumber & Furniture 10302 99.7 9481 99.5 9269 99.3
Non-Metallic Mineral 4433 98.9 4203 98.5 4438 97.7
Products
Miscellaneous Industries 6980 99.8 7831 99.6 8234 99.3
Total 120844 99.3 119073 98.8 152871 98.6
Sources: 1) Data for 1983 is from Table 5, Wu and Chou (1988:29). Data for 1985 and 1988 is 
from Table 6, CJ. Lee (1992:43).
2) Derived from Small and Medium Enterprises Overview in Taiwan, (various issues).
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TABLE 4.18: Sales Shares of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
in Manufacturing Industries, Taiwan: 1987
(per cent)
Industry SME
Enterprises
Food 27.5
Beverage & Tobacco 7.0
Textile 35.8
Wearing Apparel 71.4
Leather 80.9
Lumber & Furniture 79.0
Paper & Printing 55.1
Chemical Materials 18.3
Chemical Products 49.7
Petroleum & Coal Products 0.3
Rubber Products 62.7
Plastic Products 76.2
Non-Metallic Minerals 44.8
Basic Metal 41.7
Metal Products 81.1
Machinery 56.7
Electrical Machinery & Appliances 35.6
Transportation Equipment 31.9
Precision Instrument 64.1
Miscellaneous Industry 76.8
Total 46.9
Sources: Table 9, C. J. Lee (1992:46). Derived from Small and Medium Enterprises
Statistics, 1988.
TABLE 4:19: Export Ratios of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(Economy-Wide), Taiwan
(per cent)
Year Large
Enterprises
Small and Medium 
Enterprises
1976 39.1 56.8
1977 36.8 53.5
1978 40.9 56.7
1979 40.2 59.0
1980 40.1 66.7
1981 41.9 74.8
1982 39.3 75.9
1983 35.0 73.3
1984 36.6 71.8
1985 34.2 70.0
1986 32.4 66.5
1987 32.3 61.9
1988 32.5 47.0
Annual average
1976-88 37.0 64.2
1981-88 35.5 67.7
Sources: Table 10, C. J. Lee (1992:47). Derived from Industrial Financial Situation
Survey, (various issues).
TABLE 4.20: Export Shares of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
in Manufacturing, Taiwan
(Billion US$; per cent)
Year Exports o f  
SMEs
Share o f  SMEs 
(%)
1981 105.6 71.8
1982 106.1 73.5
1983 109.3 66.9
1984 123.8 62.5
1985 129.0 64.6
1986 181.2 70.1
1987 246.3 70.8
1988 249.4 63.6
Sources: Table 12, C. J. Lee (1992:49). Derived from Small and Medium Enterprises Overview
in Taiwan, (various issues).
TABLE 4.21: Export Ratios of Small & Medium Enterprises by Manufacturing 
Sector, Taiwan
(per cent)
Industries 1984 1986 1988
Food & Beverage 63.2 60.6 49.0
Textile 85.3 81.0 67.9
Lumber & Furniture 75.1 69.0 55.0
Paper & Printing 15.8 14.3 8.0
Leather 89.5 75.9 58.9
Rubber Products 79.7 62.5 53.0
Chemical Products 15.0 13.7 17.2
Plastic Products 83.7 83.8 66.5
Non-Metallic Minerals 35.5 29.0 20.5
Basic Metal 53.2 31.9 26.8
Machinery 47.1 45.6 39.0
Electrical Machinery 78.3 74.4 64.7
& Appliances
Transportation Equipment 87.3 79.7 38.4
Precision Instruments 95.5 85.0 67.3
Miscellaneous industries 87.8 74.9 61.8
Sources: Table 11, C. J. Lee (1992:48). Derived from Industrial Financial Situation Survey,
Economic Research Department, Bank of Taiwan, (various issues).
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still characterised as having labour-intensive technologies and thus largely incapable 
of conducting intensive R&D other than basic research, have lower capabilities in 
marketing, after sales service and have few brand name products (Kuo: 1992). How 
these firms undertake restructuring in response to both domestic and global pressures 
is seen as crucial to Taiwan's future industrial development. The bottleneck to further 
industrial upgrading though is not seen as being one of capital per se but acquisition of 
design and processing technology. Over the 1980s the SMEs adopted the following 
strategies in seeking to overcome these limitations: overseas mergers, outward 
investment, joint efforts for the upgrading of technology, technology alliances in 
acquiring design and processing technology, and a mixture of economy of scale and 
economy of scope approaches.26
A question not sufficiently dealt with in the new trade literature then is whether the 
anticipated benefits of high technology can be realised through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) rather than via strategic policies.27 The fundamental rationale for 
FDI lies in the transfer of firm and industry-specific intangible assets, such as the 
knowledge embodied in both new products and new processes and managerial skills. 
A related question concerns the strategic benefits of foreign direct investment by 
domestically owned producers. Often the presumption is that domestically owned 
firms are necessary to obtain the national strategic benefits of high-technology 
production. Yet Taiwan has always had an open door policy toward foreign 
investment.28 This has been particularly fruitful for the electronics industry where
26 Most SMEs have approached structural change by subcontracting between final assemblers and 
independent supplies of intermediate inputs, or merging with a foreign company to enhance marketing 
channels. An example has been the Acer groups merger with DYNA, the third largest computer 
dealer in the United States. The competitive strategy adopted by most Taiwan firms follows a highly 
flexible, niche producer pattern. Such a strategy concentrates on short product cycles, quick product 
delivery schedules, and mixes of products aimed at particular market niches. This highlights that 
firms do not compete just by altering prices and quantities. Strategic competition in oligopolistic 
industries often includes product quality, after sales service, and advertising. New trade theory does 
not provide answers to the effect of export subsidies on these alternative instruments of corporate 
strategy (OECD 1991:28).
27 An exception is Tyson (1990).
28 Foreign direct investment began to increase from the mid-1960s and 1970s, as did the number of 
formal technical cooperation agreements. The government has encouraged foreign investment in 
areas that enhance the skill and technology-intensity of production. Foreign investment that supports 
this objective (such as investment in high technology and capital-intensive industries) is encouraged 
with incentives such as tax holidays, tariff exemptions, accelerated depreciation, preferential 
financing, and other incentives. During the 1980s foreign investment continued to remain prohibited 
in such areas as acquisition of most types of agricultural land; refining of gasoline and diesel fuel; 
electric power and other utilities; most forms of transportation; real estate brokerage; 
telecommunications; and radio and TV broadcasting. Investment in a number of other industries is 
subject to government approval.
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local electronic firms are becoming more international in design, production and 
marketing. Between 1952 and 1988, of the US$8.5 billion total realised FDI by 
foreign nationals and overseas Chinese, 28 per cent of this went into the electronics 
industry — the majority in the latter half of the 1980s.29 This foreign investment has 
been an important channel for the rapid diffusion of technology into these export 
industries as well as for industrial upgrading.
The Taiwan government has also played a major supportive role in developing high 
technology industries through the provision of training, equity loans, research support 
and science parks, and in providing the institutional structures for technical support. 
Such policies are not concerned with picking winners, but have created support by 
offering better information conditions, reducing uncertainties and sustaining 
organisational change and skill formation. It is thus difficult to see how strategic 
policies have been the main force behind this sector's rapid growth.
The Taiwan case thus reveals a significant paradox in the actual emergence and 
growth of domestic strategic industrial policies and their theoretical foundations given 
that the 'domestic' firms at which such policies are aimed are becoming increasingly 
global, are themselves involved in so-called 'strategic alliances', and are increasingly 
sourcing on an international scale 'strategic' science and technology inputs.
A major constraint on the effectiveness of strategic industry policies then is the 
increasing tendency of firms to enter into strategic alliances where governments 
cannot be sure of the domestic competitive effects. National technology policy to 
support specific firms or activities may thus become increasingly meaningless given 
the leakages, in terms of both financial advantages and research results, to foreign 
enterprises (OECD 1991:100). Industrial policy measures to support domestic 
production may end up supporting foreign production facilities and subsidising foreign 
subsidiaries while programs to increase domestic production may subsidise goods that 
have largely been produced abroad through offsets and subcontracting arrangements. 
Investment incentives and domestic policies may thus in fact transfer income to 
trading partners and help strengthen rival industries.
29 As of 1989, the overall dollar value approved United States investment (US$2.4 billion) has been 
greater than that of Japan (US$2.2 billion). Japanese companies however have had almost twice as 
many cases of foreign investment (1407 versus 695) (Simon 1992:106).
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4.7 Conclusion
In focusing on Taiwan's industry policy in the 1980s, this chapter has highlighted the 
special form of liberalisation that took place, whereby general trade liberalisation, 
including the winding back of export incentives, occurred in conjunction with an 
industrial policy of identifying and favouring certain industries over others. This latter 
policy was gradually abandoned in response to various studies showing the policies to 
be inefficient and difficult to implement successfully. In fact, the considerable 
progress in trade liberalisation that took place after 1985 suggests that industrial 
upgrading appeared to be driven largely by economic forces (both internal and 
external) rather than by industry policy initiatives. This suggests that the government 
became less rather than more dirigiste over the period.
A survey of the available evidence does not support the view that strategic policies 
were a major factor in furthering Taiwan's industrialisation during the 1980s. Most of 
the changes in the incentive structure over this period were not concerned with the 
promotion of strategic industries. It is important to distinguish the economic impact 
from changes in the internal economic environment in the 1980s — such as the 
exchange rate appreciation and the policy of economic liberalisation including 
reductions in tariffs and import controls — from the impacts due to the selective fiscal 
and financial incentives and measures. The former provided the opportunity for the 
mechanism of comparative advantage to operate and is the crucial factor explaining 
the industrialisation and structural change during the past four decades of Taiwan's 
development. The latter, in discriminating between traded goods industries, led to the 
distortion of resource allocation. In fact, the policy to allocate funds to strategic 
industries in order to stimulate economic growth contradicts the objective to equalise 
the availability of bank loans among borrower groups based on equity considerations. 
It is also contrary to the liberalisation program announced in 1984 and to Taiwan's 
progress in trade liberalisation as a prelude to admission to GATT.
This chapter has also sought to highlight that the circumstances under which strategic 
policies might pay off are difficult to detect in practice. Given Taiwan's industrial 
structure, composed predominantly of small and medium-sized enterprises with their 
reliance on informal channels of financing, it is doubtful that the policy was significant 
in furthering industrial growth over the period. Moreover, it was difficult to determine 
the economic rationale behind the implementation of the policy given that the high 
technology ’strategic’ industries did not appear to be the major recipients of
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preferential finance. In implementing the policy, it is not apparent that the 
government had a clear perception on how the industrial structure should be evolving. 
It is thus difficult to determine what the rationale was behind the government's 
designing of the policy. A preliminary discussion of the policy suggests that, contrary 
to the assertions of the new trade and government market hypothesis, the incentive 
structure was not designed to overcome market failures associated with externalities. 
An assessment of the extent to which the government appeared to directing resources 
to 'strategic' industries finds that incentives were not important in this sectors 
development and in fact it appears the government did not really possess a 'strategic' 
view on how this sector should be evolving.
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- CHAPTER 5 -
KOREA’S INDUSTRY POLICY IN THE 1980s
The two NICs appear to be breaking their respective orthodoxies ... 
Policymakers and technocrats in South Korea and Taiwan, for their parts, 
are now emulating each other, with South Korea experimenting with 
economic stabilisation, revitalising small enterprises, and trimming policy 
loans to chaebols while Taiwan is inducing business mergers, favouring 
existing rather than new enterprises, designating strategic industries and, 
for the first time in the postwar period, tolerating deficit financing to stem 
its sagging investment (Haggard and Cheng 1987a, Cheng 1990:172).
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 suggested that contrary to the predictions of the new trade and governed 
market models, industry policy interventions did not play a major role in the 
technological upgrading of Taiwan's industrial sector in the 1980s. This chapter 
undertakes a similar analysis of Korea's industry policy in the 1980s to gauge the 
significance of such interventions. The Korean economy, with a history of greater 
state involvement in resource allocation and oligopolistic market structure resulting in 
a high concentration of industrial power, would appear on the surface to adhere more 
closely to the propositions raised by both the new trade and governed market models.
Section 5.2 begins by noting the change in policy direction in the early 1980s and the 
factors behind this change. Section 5.3 discusses progress in trade liberalisation during 
the 1980s, while section 5.4 outlines major reforms in the fiscal and financial incentive 
structure to industry. Section 5.5 then draws some brief comparisons with Taiwan's 
industry policy in the 1980s.
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5.2 Background to Liberalisation
The underlying motive for the shift in Korean industrial policy in the 1980s towards a 
greater role for the market mechanism lay in the desire by the Korean government to 
correct the structural imbalances apparent in the manufacturing sector by the late 
1970s. In addition, since the mid-1980s, increasing foreign government pressure to 
eliminate unfair trade practices has played an important part in continuing to bring 
about significant changes in Korean industrial policy.
In the early 1980s the Korean economy was experiencing severe structural difficulties. 
The massive investment in heavy and chemical industries ended at the outset of the 
global and domestic economic downturn, leaving many of these industries with severe 
overcapacity problems. The international competitiveness of Korean exports was also 
weakened as a result of high wage increases in the late 1970s, overvaluation of the 
Korean currency and underinvestment for the development of technology and training 
of skilled manpower by both the government and private sector (Koo 1986:19). 
Adverse external conditions combined with these structural problems to produce a 
worsening balance of payments. These circumstances led the Korean government to 
examine critically its role in the nation’s overall economic development.
Several institutional reforms towards the end of the 1970s, and during the 1980s, were 
significant in reducing government industry policy interventions:
(i) The Comprehensive Stabilisation Program announced by the Korean government in 
1979 focused economic policy in a new direction. This direction was described at the 
time as the pursuit of a 'private-sector-led economy' as opposed to a 'government-led 
economy' (Yoo 1990:106). The Program's basic tenets consisted of attaining price 
stability, establishing an unbiased incentive structure, and promoting competition 
within the domestic market and from abroad. More specifically, the exchange rate was 
substantially devalued in early 1980 and adjusted in line with fluctuations in the value 
of currencies of major trading partners. Liberalisation measures on imports and direct 
foreign investment were announced to promote more efficient allocation of resources, 
preferences for specific industries were to be reduced, and financial reforms carried 
out. Emphasis thus shifted from intervention at the industry and firm level to a greater 
reliance on the market.
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(ii) A Tariff Reform Committee was established early in 1983 and a program of import 
liberalisation formulated. The main feature of the package was the establishment of a 
time-phased plan for import liberalisation. Priority was directed to liberalising overly 
protected commodities first and items which enjoyed a monopolistic market structure 
(Young 1986:67-8).1
(iii) In order to further streamline the industrial incentive system, the Industrial 
Development Law was introduced in July 1986. This Law replaced existing individual 
promotion laws which previously covered the following industries: machinery, 
electronics, textiles, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, petrochemical and shipbuilding.
An additional impetus came from a recognition that the existence of industry-specific 
laws was likely to invite retaliatory actions from foreign governments (the United 
States in particular) on account of their providing implicit production and export 
subsidies (Young 1988:26-7). In fact, many of the trade policy reform measures 
adopted during the 1980s have been made largely in response to United States pressure. 
Bilateral disputes have centred on Korean macroeconomic policies, especially 
regarding the won-dollar exchange rate and the bilateral current account balance. 
Korea's growing bilateral trade deficit prompted the United States in the mid-1980s to 
examine Korea's exchange rate policy, with Korea subsequently accused of 
manipulating its exchange rate for balance of payments adjustment purposes or to gain 
an unfair advantage in international trade.2
1 The Committee put forth a 5-year import liberalisation program consisting of import decontrol and 
tariff reform. The plan, largely developed by Soogil Young of the Korea Development Institute, was 
significant in that its proposals led to a nation-wide debate on trade liberalisation. The program 
embodied the following elements: import liberalisation would be pursued as a 5-year program; in the 
first year of the program, all quantitative restrictions should be eliminated in principle; tariffs would be 
levied on all import-decontrolled items in equal amounts of the existing nominal rates of protection; all 
tariffs would be reduced by uniform percentages each year during the subsequent four years; the 
highest tariff rate at the end should not be high, possibly not exceeding 30 per cent; and infant industry 
protection while allowed, should be strictly limited in scope and phased out according to a 
preannounced schedule. The program was motivated by the following considerations. Elimination of 
quantitative restrictions would improve the transparency of protection, allowing the public to see the 
costs of protection, making it easier to manage. Reducing protection levels would lower import 
substitution biases and improve the international competitiveness of exports. Uniform effective 
protection would remove distortions in the allocation of resources.
2 Noland (1992:18) argues that the United States Treasury position is flawed in that it does not 
discriminate between nominal and real exchange rates (nor between bilateral and effective exchange 
rates), and confuses the means of exchange rate determination with the goal of maintaining the correct 
exchange rate for macroeconomic balance. He argues that it is unclear how one distinguishes in 
practice between exchange rate management (what the United States Treasury and the Group of seven 
countries do) and the exchange rate manipulation (what the Treasury accused Korea of doing). 
Noland's view is even more prevalent when one considers that compared to Taiwan, Korea has not had
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The US dollar began depreciating in world markets in 1985 and the Korean won also 
depreciated vis-a-vis the yen and other major currencies due to its close link to the 
dollar. Korea's increased competitiveness relative to other exporters and the 
persistence of the United States savings/investment imbalance saw Korea's bilateral 
trade surplus with the United States rise dramatically after 1985, reaching US$14.2 
billion in 1988. With the further rise in the trade deficit despite the depreciation of the 
US dollar, a major part of the United States policy response was to insist that countries 
with current account surpluses adopt measures to reduce those surpluses. Throughout 
the late 1980s, United States officials threatened their Korean counterparts with actions 
if they did not let the nominal exchange rate of the won appreciate and open Korean 
markets to imports.
Policymakers thus faced two opposing influences during the 1980s — United States 
pressure for opening of domestic markets and appreciation of the Korean won, and the 
domestic sectoral interests opposed to further market opening. Moves toward 
democratisation in 1987 also complicated the policy making process with the 
government having to formulate a policy which attracted the support of its 
constituency. Moreover, United States pressure tended to foster an impression among 
the Korean electorate that trade liberalisation was largely a 'concession' to trading 
partners. As a result, trade liberalisation measures are often interpreted as a sign of 
weakness on the part of the government and provoked a negative reaction from the 
general public, bringing into question the credibility of the government as a protector 
of national interests. Such public reaction tended to strengthen sectoral interests and 
pose a major political impediment to ongoing trade liberalisation.
5.3 Trade Liberalisation
Up until the early 1980s trade policy formation was characterised by two features. 
Firstly, there has only ever existed a weak constituency for trade liberalisation. While 
trade liberalisation improves external competitiveness by reducing input costs of export 
industries or forces domestic producers to be more efficient, liberalisation in Korea has 
been typically regarded as necessary to appease trade partners and ensure that export 
markets remain open to Korean products. Resistance to trade reform has been
a 'chronic' surplus problem with the United States. Up until the mid-1970s Korea had maintained trade 
deficits with the United States. Since then, with the exception of the years 1979-81, Korea has 
maintained trade surpluses with the United States.
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strongest when the balance of payments is deteriorating. It was not until after 1983, 
when the balance of payments became more favourable, that an extensive trade 
liberalisation program could be implemented, over the period 1984-88.
Secondly, decision-making over trade reform is essentially, a political process. Import 
liberalisation is undertaken usually on a micro basis with each commodity considered 
in isolation and with little regard for the macro-level optimality governing the inter­
sectoral allocation of resources (Young 1988:21). Often there is little public debate 
about the costs and benefits of a trade policy measure to the national economy. No 
institutional forum exists for taking account of wider public interests. Those sectors 
which bear the costs of protection are generally left uninformed and excluded in the 
decision making process (Young 1986:23). Much of the country's trade policy 
continues to be formulated in an ad hoc manner with no central authority within the 
government formulating and articulating government trade policies. As described by 
Bartlett (1992:205), the perception is one of a 'lurch-halt' approach to economic policy 
whereby the government apparatus alternates between taking bold steps towards 
liberalisation and backsliding into more protectionist policies:
Korea announces and partially implements trade-reform measures; discomfort among Korean 
interest groups affected by the reforms leads to sporadic backsliding, although the 
government's official role is never clear; foreign trading partners, particularly the United 
States, responds to the developments with displeasure and vague threats of retaliation; finally, 
Seoul provides increased foreign (mostly U.S.) access to Korean markets in selected areas and 
announces new trade reforms and partially implements them.
5.3.1 Tariffs
Prior to 1984 progress in tariff reform was slow.3 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that since 
then progress speeded up with the announcement of the tariff reform program covering 
the period 1984-88. Over this period the average nominal tariff rate was lowered from 
23.7 per cent in 1983 to 18.1 per cent by 1988 (Jung-ho Yoo 1991:2-7); falling to 12.7 
per cent by 1989. In 1988 Korea announced an incremental 5-year tariff reduction 
program over the period 1989 to 1993. Under this program, the average tariff rate is 
scheduled to fall to 7.9 per cent by early 1994. Table 5.3 presents estimates of nominal 
(implicit) rates of assistance and effective rates of assistance by industry group, as 
calculated by Hong (1992) for the period 1970- 1990. The results indicate that by
3 Major tariff reductions were achieved in 1979 with the nominal rate being reduced from 35.7 per cent 
to 24.9 per cent.
TABLE 5.1: Import Liberalisation, Korea
(per cent)
Year Items Liberalised
All
Tariff Rates 
Manuf. Agric.
1968 (61.7) .. .. ..
1975 (49.5) .. ..
1976 (50.5) .. ..
1977 (51.0) 35.7
1978 (53.9) .. 35.7 ..
1979 (68.2) .. 24.9 ..
1980 (69.1) .. 24.9
1981 (68.6) 74.7 24.9 ..
1982 .. 76.6 23.7 ..
1983 .. 80.4 23.7 22.6 31.4
1984 84.8 21.9 20.6 29.6
1985 87.7 21.3 20.3 28.8
1986 .. 91.6 19.9 18.7 27.1
1987 93.6 19.3 18.2 26.4
1988 94.7 18.1 16.9 25.2
1989 .. 95.5 12.7 11.2 20.6
1990 96.3 11.4 9.7 19.9
Notes: 1) 'Items liberalised' shows the percentage in total of the import
items that do not require import permission.
2) The percentage shown in the parentheses are based on 4-digit 
classification; others, on 8-digit CCCN.
3 )  .. not available.
Sources: 1) Data for years 1968-87 are from Table 8, Yoo (1989). Derived from
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea 
2) Data for years 1988-90 are from Table 4 and Table 5A, Jisoon Lee 
(1992:334).
TABLE 5.2: Tariff Rates by Product Types, Korea
(per cent)
1980 1983 1984 1988 1989
Raw Materials 19.4 11.9 10.6 9.5 3.9
Intermediate Products 28.5 21.5 18.7 17.1 11.7
Finished Products 35.4 26.4 24.7 18.9 13.3
Source: Table 5B, Jisoon Lee (1992:344).
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TABLE 5.3: Nominal and Effective Rates of Assistance for Domestic Sales by Industry 
Groups, Korea
(per cent)
Nominal Rate o f  Protection* Effective Rate o f  Protection**
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Agric. & Fishery .. 30.1 81.6 85.6 143.1 36.6 96.4 104.1 197.1
Mining & Energy .. 2.2 6.4 38.6 47.5 4.0 1.6 40.8 55.0
Primary Sector 26.5 27.9 70.9 80.3 130.2 33.6 80.4 95.9 174.5
Processed Food 37.3 19.4 69.0 64.4 69.4 16.5 -25.9 -45.7 -37.5
Beverages & Tobacco -1.7 -12.2 13.5 -1.5 -15.6 -24.8 -4.2 -16.2 -30.2
Construction Materials 22.3 5.6 43.5 34.1 34.5 -5.4 44.4 30.7 33.9
Intermediate Goods 1.4 15.2 40.8 27.5 9.2 -22.3 -13.3 -34.1 -46.4
Processed Interm. Goods 33.0 16.8 36.1 23.4 18.0 14.8 29.3 18.4 22.3
Nondur. Consum. Goods 26.8 -0.5 36.4 25.5 15.5 -27.5 34.3 30.5 10.0
Consumer Durables 60.3 39.2 55.5 21.2 16.3 52.4 60.6 15.7 22.5
Machinery 52.1 12.5 52.0 23.9 28.8 -0.3 65.2 24.5 37.4
Transport Equipment 70.4 35.8 63.3 48.5 39.0 25.4 95.9 77.9 54.1
Manufacturing 24.8 12.2 43.5 30.1 21.9 -4.6 21.9 10.7 5.8
All Industry 24.8 16.1 47.5 36.6 30.7 9.5 36.1 26.5 22.9
Notes:
Source:
1) * (Domestic price - World Price)/World Price.
2) ** Based on Corden Method.
3) .. not available.
Table 12, Hong (1992:27).
TABLE 5.4(a): Nominal Rates of Assistance by Trade Category, Korea
____________________________ (per cent)
1975 1980 1985 1990
Export 8.1 32.2 21.7 18.6
Export and Import Competing 30.3 68.9 39.0 21.2
Import Competing 19.3 64.4 41.2 38.5
Non-Import Competing 9.4 40.6 29.3 19.7
Source: Table 6, Hong (1992:16).
TABLE 5.4(b): Effective Rates of Assistance by Trade Category, Korea
(per cent)
1975 1980 1985 1990
Export -16.8 22.1 24.9 14.6
Export and Import Competing 22.1 112.2 57.9 33.7
Import Competing 39.9 97.8 30.0 23.4
Non-Import Competing -10.4 -16.6 -25.7 -19.5
Note: Based on Corden method
Source: Table 14, Hong (1992:29).
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1990 the structure of tariff assistance still remained heavily biased towards the 
agricultural sector. Within the manufacturing sector, the following industry groups 
were the recipients of above average assistance: processed foods, construction 
materials, machinery, transport equipment, and beverages and tobacco, the latter sector 
being subject to government price controls. Table 5.3 also shows that while the 
average effective rate of assistance has fallen in the case of the manufacturing sector, it 
remains high for the agricultural sector. Within the manufacturing sector, the effective 
rate of assistance to value added over the 1980s has tended to discriminate in favour of 
the following industry groups: processed food, beverages and tobacco, intermediate 
goods, and transport equipment.
Table 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) present estimates of nominal and effective rates of assistance 
by trade category.4 Table 5.4(a) indicates that by 1990, the import competing sector 
and export and import competing sectors5 were the major recipients of nominal 
assistance whereas the export sector and non-import competing sectors received the 
lowest rates of nominal assistance over the past two decades or so. In the case of 
effective assistance, Table 5.4(b) shows that over the 1980s export and import 
competing goods were the major recipients of incentives, followed in turn by import 
competing goods, export goods, and finally by non-import competing goods.
In 1984 tariff exemptions were also abolished for strategic industries in order to 
minimise tariff preferences that tended to promote specific industries. Prior to 1984, 
the chemical, steel, electrical machinery, transportation equipment and precision 
machinery industries had been eligible for tariff exemptions. In addition to tariff 
incentives, various other tariff systems were in operation. These included an anti­
dumping tariff, a retaliatory tariff, a countervailing tariff, an emergency tariff, an 
adjustment tariff, tariff quotas and a price equalisation tariff. These tariff measures 
have rarely been invoked.
4 Industries have been classified into four categories: exporting (X), where more than 20 per cent of 
domestic output is exported; import competing (IC), where more than 20 per cent of domestic supply is 
imported; (XIC) export and import competing, where both shares exceed 20 per cent; and non-import 
competing (NIC), where neither the export not import share exceeds 15 per cent.
5 It is important to note that negative effective rates of assistance can be misleading, whereby an 
industry which may be so highly assisted that value added at world prices is negative indicating little 
assistance, when in fact assistance may be so high as to indicate an absolute wastage of resources.
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5.3.2 Nontariff Barriers
Korea has traditionally relied on quantitative restrictions rather than tariffs to protect 
import competing industries, and since export industries have generally been exempt 
either directly or via a rebate system, tariffs have fallen, mostly on final consumption 
goods.6
Prior to 1978 progress in import liberalisation had been slow. This was in large part 
due to strong nationalist prejudices against imports long cultivated by the government. 
Significant import liberalisation began in 1979 when the import liberalisation ratio was 
raised from 53.9 per cent to 68.6 per cent (Young 1988:22). The process halted during 
1980 and 1981 following balance of payments difficulties, after which the import 
liberalisation ratio subsequently rose from 80 per cent in 1983 to over 95 per cent in 
1988.7 In 1991 a new 3 year import liberalisation program for 1992-94 was announced 
to cover the remaining restricted items, the majority of which are agricultural products. 
In 1992 Korea's overall import liberalisation ratio was 97.7 per cent (99.9 per cent for 
manufactured goods). The overall import liberalisation ratio is scheduled to increase to 
98.5 per cent by 1994.
Liberalisation of restrictive licensing has been the principal component of Korea's trade 
liberalisation since 1978. Import restrictions even in the early 1980s had a substantial 
product coverage and served as the most important import barrier. In 1983 import 
restrictions covered 19.6 per cent of all product categories. This has since fallen to 5.3 
per cent by 1989. Nearly all remaining import restrictions are on primary products 
(Table 5.5). By 1989 only 46 industrial products or 0.6 per cent of all industrial 
product classes were under restrictive import licensing compared with 28 per cent of all 
primary products.
6 Prior to 1984, tariff rebates on machines and equipment imported were offered to strategic, resource 
based, defence and ’special' industries. Strategic industries included, inter alia, chemicals, cement, 
basic metals, machine parts, general and electrical machinery, transport machinery, trains, and 
scientific primary and power industries. Special industries included shipbuilding (engines) and aircraft 
(parts) as well as the animal feed and agricultural chemical industries. In 1984, however, tariff rebates 
for the promotion of specific industries were considerably reduced. 'Strategic' industries entitled to 
tariff rebates were replaced by 'new technology industries’ —  the machine parts, general machinery, 
electrical machinery and electronic materials industries. Producers of animal feeds and agricultural 
chemicals are no longer eligible for tariff rebates.
7 However this ratio should only be seen as a general yardstick for openness of the economy given that 
there were various quantitative import restrictions in operation.
TABLE 5.5: Import Licensing Liberalisation Program, Korea
N u m b er 
o f  item s*
P ro p o rtio n  o f  item s subject 
to  au tom atic  im port ap p ro v a l, 
u n d e r the  reg u la r  tra d e  n o tic e  (% )
N u m b er o f  
res tric ted  
item s
1983 1987 1988 1988
Prim ary  P ro d u c ts , 1 386 7 3 .2 80.1 80.5 27 4
F o o d  and B everages 
C hem ical P ro d u c ts , 2  182 94 .4 99.1 99 .6 8
P ap er and  C eram ics 
S tee l and  M eta l 802 90.9 100.0 100.0 0
P ro d u c ts
G eneral M ach inery 1414 68.7 93.3 100.0 0
E lectrica l and 495 53 .6 95.5 100.0 0
E lectro n ic  M ach inery  
T ex tile  P ro d u c ts , 
includ ing  L ea th e r 1089 80 .4 96.9 97.8 23
G arm en ts
O thers 547 81.2 88 .2 88 .2 65
T o ta l 7915 80.4 93 .6 95 .4 370
Notes: 1) The program for 1986-88 is an announced plan.
2) * At the eight-digit level of CCCN as of 1984.
Source: Table 8, Young (1988:27). Derived from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Republic 
of Korea.
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Import licensing is automatic or restrictive, depending on the commodity. There exist 
four restrictive import licensing systems — regular import notice, the import-source 
diversification program, the import surveillance program and special laws. The 
government annually publishes a list of commodities that are subject to restrictive 
import licenses with imports of these commodities permitted only if there are no 
domestic substitutes (Young 1988:44). In all, there are some 39 special laws, serving 
various public interest objectives, under which relevant ministries can designate 
commodities requiring import approval. An import surveillance system is in operation 
to prevent import surges of commodities from Japan. Under this system, the 
government designates commodities with high import dependence for restrictive 
licensing as a means of controlling its bilateral trade deficit with Japan (Nam 1992). 
Furthermore, an import-source diversification program is in effect which, banning 
some 200 Japanese products, operates with the aim of easing excessive bilateral trade 
imbalances by providing infant industry protection.
Import liberalisation generally has not resulted in major industrial dislocations. This 
may be explained by the government's policy of providing advance notice and 
liberalising first those items in which Korea has a competitive edge. Implementation 
of both the import liberalisation program and the structure and schedule of tariff 
reform were criticised by the original architects of the program in that they were not 
based on an explicitly stated target structure of protection. A target level for the import 
liberalisation ratio was chosen arbitrarily, with import decontrol undertaken in terms of 
individual commodities and with little coordination with tariff reform measures 
(Young 1986:22). This micro orientation in the approach to import decontrol has 
tended to lend an overprotective bias to Korea's trade policy.
While considerable progress has been made, a number of formal trade barriers remain 
in operation. The Korean government has largely exempted agriculture from 
liberalisation of import restrictions, and remains under pressure from the United States 
to reduce tariffs on specific items such as wine, motor vehicles, electronics and 
communications equipment. The volume of consumer-goods imports remains low, and 
the prices of imported goods, especially high quality goods, are high in comparison to 
other markets. Moreover, as previously noted, the ban on selected Japanese imports 
remains in an attempt to protect domestic industries and to reduce import dependence 
on Japan. There are also programs that provides low interest loans to reduce imports.
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5.4 Incentives to Industry
It is often perceived that the Korean government continues to subsidise exports heavily, 
but this is largely no longer the case. Export incentives, while generously provided 
during the 1960s and until the early 1970s, have since been continuously reduced. Five 
export incentives remained as of 1989. First, a tariff drawback system exempts 
imports of raw materials used in export production from tariffs and import restrictions. 
Second, export products are exempt from the collection of the special consumption tax 
and the value added tax. Third, long-term preferential credit is offered to finance 
exports of ships, industrial plants and heavy machinery. Fourth, a preferential credit 
allocation scheme entitles exporters to automatic allocation of short-term bank credit 
for the financing of export production up to a certain proportion of exports. Finally, 
allowances for tax-free reserves for export loss, overseas market development or price 
fluctuations are available. Of these remaining export incentives, the first three are not 
genuine subsidies in that they allow exporters to operate under free trade conditions. 
The government during the 1980s has been phasing out the fourth incentive of 
preferential credit. In 1988 large firms were disqualified as beneficiaries of this 
scheme. Only the final incentive remained by 1989, although it is gradually being 
reduced due to its inconsistency with the GATT Subsidy Code (Young 1989:36-7).
In the early 1980s the promotion of 'strategic' industries with preferential credit and tax 
treatment gave way to more indirect and functional support of such industries. In this 
period, the number of industries classified as 'strategic' decreased, and measures 
adopted for preferential tax treatment moved from direct forms such as tax deductions 
or tax holidays to indirect forms such as the allowance of tax-free reserves for expenses 
in technology development (Rhee 1987:31).
5.4.1 Fiscal Incentives
Preferential tax treatment to encourage investment in industrial activities comprises 
two incentive schemes. The first is preferential tax treatment to encourage investment 
in strategic industries. The second is to investments in R&D activities determined by 
the type of business activity.
Substantial modifications were made to the tax system in a 1981 tax reform. Effective 
as of June 1982, the list of strategic industries for tax preferences was reduced from 14 
to 6. Incentives currently remain for the naphtha cracking, steel, industrial machinery,
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electronics, shipbuilding, and aviation industries. The nature of tax incentives to these 
industries was scaled down from a previous choice of the following tax incentives:
• Exemption from corporate taxes for the first three years after establishment of the 
plant and a 50 per cent reduction of corporate taxes for the following two years;
• Tax credits of 8-10 per cent of the investment amount or;
• Accelerated depreciation of up to 100 per cent of the normal depreciation 
allowances.
Currently, the only tax incentive available to strategic industries is an indirect 
preference in the form of accelerated depreciation. The machinery and electronics 
industries are still provided with a choice between tax credits of 3-5 per cent of the 
investment amount or accelerated depreciation.
Industries undertaking R&D expenditure are currently eligible for three tax incentives. 
A 10 per cent tax credit is available for current R&D expenditures. Either special 
accelerated depreciation or tax credits are allowed at a rate of 50 per cent for R&D 
capital expenditure. Firms can also set aside reserves for future R&D expenditure. In 
general, reserves may not exceed 1 per cent of sales (1.5 per cent for technology­
intensive industries) or 20 per cent of profits (30 per cent for technology-intensive 
industries).
The last two of these three tax incentives have been estimated to have the effect of 
reducing R&D costs before tax by about 30 per cent, while the first of these three tax 
incentives was estimated to reduce R&D costs by around 14 per cent. Besides these 
incentives through the corporate taxation system, there is also a number of measures to 
promote private R&D. These benefits are not realised by all firms engaged in R&D for 
the following reasons. Firstly, if a firm is not profitable or if its profit is not sufficient 
for tax preference, these incentives are of little benefit. Secondly, there is a maximum 
applied to the technology reserve fund. Thirdly, there is also a ceiling on the tax 
credit. Fourthly, R&D expenditures are narrowly defined for tax purposes (Yoo 
1988:25).
5.4.2 Financial Incentives
Preferential interest rates which were formerly applicable to strategic industries or 
exports were 'officially' abolished in June 1982. No interest rate subsidy exists in
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explicit form for any major loans and the size of policy loans has been reduced since 
1980. However, given that financial markets are generally considered to be imperfect 
in the sense that credit rationing is the prime form of allocating financial resources, 
access to bank loans still carries inherent preferential benefits (Nam 1991:4).8 Thus the 
benefits to receiving industries can still be measured as the differential between the 
interest rate for bank loans and the curb market rate. However, Tables 5.6 and 5.7 
show that the average borrowing cost of the manufacturing industry has fallen over the 
1980s. During 1975-80, the average borrowing cost for manufacturing firms was 4-5 
percentage points lower than the general bank loan rate. Between 1982-84, the average 
borrowing cost of manufacturing firms was 3-4 percentage points higher than the 
general bank loan rate and 1-2 percentage points higher during the latter half of the 
1980s. This has resulted mainly from the elimination of preferential interest rates 
given to policy loans and rapid growth of nonbank financial institutions whose interest 
rates are generally higher than bank rates and the time lags between bank rate charges 
and the adjustment of other rates, applied to existing as well as new liabilities of firms 
(Nam 1992:17).
The major source of long-term financing for strategic industries is the National 
Investment Fund (NIF), established in 1974. The size of the fund was substantially 
increased up until 1982 but has since been reduced in line with government policy. 
The share of the use of NIF loans in heavy and chemical industries has continued to 
rise since 1977. Other forms of long-term loans are provided by the Korea 
Development Bank. Since 1976 the Korea Eximbank (Export-Import Bank) has 
provided low-cost financing to exporters of ships and industrial plant and to firms 
investing abroad. These loans, while considered to be the only true remaining form of 
preferential financing, have declined in recent years. But while the financial system 
underwent significant liberalisation during the 1980s, it remains credit-based and 
subject to government influence. The Korean government's aggressive industrial 
policy in the 1970s has also tended to retard the development of private institutions that 
share in industrial decision-making and risk bearing. Equity markets remain small and 
the financial decision-making experience of commercial banks remains thin. As 
previously mentioned, the government has remained closely involved in credit policy. 
In particular, the government's basic role in rationing credit has in turn forced it to 
become involved in many additional ad hoc regulations. In 1989, for example, the 
government's concern over the chaebol using bank credit to speculate in real estate
According to Nam, almost 80 per cent of all fixed investment in the manufacturing sector during the 
late 1970s is estimated to have been directed towards the heavy and chemical sector.
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rather than invest in manufacturing led it to bring in a new decree requiring 
conglomerates to divest 'excess land holdings', which it eventually bought from the 
companies at handsome prices (Leipziger and Petri 1993:14). Efforts to limit the 
chaebols' share of 65 per cent of new low cost bank loans created similar unintended 
interventions. Faced with deteriorating export performance of several major 
companies, the government sought means to make additional funds available for 
productive investment. To justify the credit, the chaebol were told to select three core 
operations for specialisation, which would be exempted from credit limits. Many 
chose their capital-intensive operations, especially petrochemicals — not those 
industries that Korea needed to foster for the future. Leipziger and Petri (1993:14-5) 
conclude that 'it is not clear whether or not the government simply aimed to make 
available more credit to the chaebol and used the specialisation directive merely to 
make policy more palatable. What is clear is that access to credit remains rationed and 
politically determined, and it repeatedly involves the government in questionable new 
pronouncements and regulations'.
5.4.3 Other Industrial Initiatives
(i) Declining industries policy: An intractable problem in industrial policy making in 
Korea since the late 1970s has been dealing with financially distressed firms and the 
large amount of non-performing debts that have accumulated in the banking system. 
The majority of these firms commenced operation at the height of the heavy 
industrialisation drive in the 1970s. In particular, industries such as shipping and 
foreign construction industries which had been selected and fostered by the 
government as 'strategic' industries in the 1970s faced severe structural depression in 
the early 1980s.
Under the Industrial Development Law effective in 1986, these industries, along with 
textiles, ferro-alloys, dyes and fertilisers were designated for rationalisation. The 
rationalisation packages available to these industries included subsidised credit for 
upgrading capital equipment, mergers, restrictions on entry, and long-term supply 
contracts. At the end of March 1988 commercial bank loans to firms designated for 
rationalisation amounted to 11 per cent of their total loans. During December 1985 
and May 1987, the Bank of Korea provided 1.7 trillion won of special credit to banks 
in order to alleviate their financial burden due to corporate restructuring. These loans 
carried a low interest rate of 3 per cent per annum; other central bank loans to banks 
for industrial rationalisation have usually carried an interest rate of 6 per cent. By the
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end of 1987 the total central bank credit to commercial banks related to industry 
rationalisation programs reached 3.0 trillion won.
A criticism of the government-imposed industry restructuring in Korea is that the 
major emphasis has been on mergers rather than industrial exit or conversion, and this 
has tended to delay needed adjustments and entailed inefficient resource allocation. 
Furthermore, the firms undergoing restructuring were mostly taken over by large 
business groups, contributing to the concentration of economic power.
Leipziger and Petri (1993:14) ask whether an independent banking sector would have 
been willing to finance this restructuring, and if not, was some fundamental market 
failure involved? They note that it is difficult to find the externalities that would 
justify industrial policy. With the possible exception of dyeing, none of the industries 
was pursuing activities where learning or dynamic economies of scale might have been 
important. Rather these interventions probably reflect political considerations and 
fears of the effects of large corporate failures on the banking system — hence the 
government's continued involvement in keeping a badly damaged financial sector 
solvent. They conclude that the government has been more successful in disengaging 
itself from sunrise industries than from sunset industries.
(ii) Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs): It has been a clear priority of the 
Korean government in the latter half of the 1980s to provide credit preferences for 
SMEs. To this end the government has reserved a share of domestic credit for SMEs. 
This policy largely represents a program to offset the discriminatory access to credit in 
the 1970s and to prevent credit market domination by large firms. The number of 
subsidised SMEs accounted for less than 5 per cent of all SMEs in the manufacturing 
sector in 1986 (Lee 1988:11). These measures to overcome distortions in the credit 
market are in the nature of second best interventions and interim measures until capital 
market biases are eliminated.
5.5 Some Comparisons with Taiwan's Industry Policy
Korea's industry policy of the 1980s represents a response to excessive government 
intervention and the associated distortionary effects of policy in the 1970s. These 
distortions, created by overinvestment in the heavy and chemical industries, led the
166
government to reevaluate its ability to choose industries for promotion.9 Moves to 
redirect industrial incentives away from large firms towards the SMEs also represented 
a more balanced approach to industrial development than in the past. Importantly, 
during the latter half of the 1980s, the Korean government continued to pursue trade 
liberalisation in the face of a deteriorating external environment.
A brief comparison of Korea's industry policy of the 1980s with that of Taiwan's 
industrial strategy reveals some interesting features:
Firstly, a feature common to both economies in the 1980s was the pressure to upgrade 
and restructure industry from labour-intensive to technology and capital-intensive 
industries, thereby reducing the dependency on Japan for intermediate goods. To this 
end both governments appear to have adopted a mild import substitution policy. 
Relative to Korea, however, Taiwan appears to have adopted a more activist approach 
in addressing this problem by directing incentives towards technology-intensive 
industries.10 Two factors may be important in explaining this: the absence in Taiwan 
of a heavy and chemical industrial legacy of the 1970s and associated structural 
imbalances; and the continued domination of Taiwan's industrial structure by SMEs 
which lack the capacity to undertake intensive R&D. The SMEs have, however, 
successfully adopted a number of strategies in order to help overcome these limitations 
without explicit support from government.
Secondly, the Korean government, on the other hand, tended to adopt a less activist 
policy towards the high technology sector, with high-tech industries being eligible for 
more functional or indirect incentives. Tax incentives in the form of tax credits for
9 Moreover, it is difficult to conclude that the rapid export growth in the 1980s of products of 'heavy' 
industries promoted by the Korean government during the 1970s was the result of successful 
government intervention. Various reasons for this rapid export expansion and economic growth need 
to be considered. Yoo (1990:111) notes for example that the rapid increase in exports during the 1980s 
was mostly due to exports to the United States. This increase represented a response to the surge in 
United States imports, which in turn was primarily the result of the Reagan administration's fiscal 
policy. On the price side, Korean exports were boosted from the depreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate, due to an 8 per cent depreciation of the won in 1985 against the US$ and the 
appreciation of the yen and deutschmark after 1985. United States restrictions on imports form Japan, 
by diverting some United States imports from Japan was particularly favourable to exports of industries 
targeted by the Korean government during the 1970s. These external developments contributed to a 
rapid increase in Korean exports to the United States and the rest o f the world in the 1980s, although 
there is little reason to believe that the Korean government foresaw this in the early 1970s.
10 It is important to note, however, that Taiwan's policy of providing preferential finance to 'strategic' 
industries was not conducted on the same scale as the Korean government industrialisation drive of the 
1970s. The amount in subsidy terms was quite small, with about a third o f preferential finance being 
directed to the high-technology 'strategic' industries.
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technological development are available to all industries, and are not aimed at 
promoting the development of specific industries. Similarly, loans aimed at supporting 
technological development are provided at the same interest rate as those provided by 
commercial banks, although the terms are longer than ordinary loans (Koo 1986:29).
Thirdly, while arguments for a more activist policy are based on the presence of inter­
firm externalities, this would appear to have limited applicability in Korea, where 
industry is highly concentrated. To a significant extent, large firms have financed their 
own large-scale investment, including technology-related and R&D expenditure, 
without public guidance or explicit support. Unlike Taiwan, where foreign investment 
has been important in overcoming the problem of acquiring design and process 
technology, particularly with regard to the electronics industry, the bulk of investment 
in high technology industries in Korea has been privately funded. This is particularly 
so for the Korean electronics industry.
TABLE 5.8: R&D Expenditure by Types of R&D Organisation, Korea: 1978-89
(per cent)
Year Total
Expend­
iture
(Billion Won)
R&D Exp/ 
GNP 
( % )
Govern­
ment
(%)
Private
Enter­
prises
( % )
Foreign
Enter­
prises
( % )
1978 152 0.64 48.5 51.2 0.4
1979 174 0.57 52.5 45.5 2.0
1980 211 0.58 49.8 48.4 1.8
1981 293 0.64 41.5 56.4 2.1
1982 457 0.88 41.1 58.7 0.2
1983 621 1.01 27.3 72.5 0.2
1984 833 1.19 20.6 78.6 0.8
1985 1155 1.48 19.3 80.5 0.2
1986 1523 1.68 19.0 80.9 0.1
1987 1877 1.77 20.3 79.6 0.1
1988 2347 1.86 17.7 82.3 0.1
1989 2705 1.92 17.1 82.9 0.1
Notes: Figures for Private Enterprises include research institutions and universities which comprise
around 25 per cent o f the total.
Source: Korean Industrial Technology Association, 1991. Major Indicators of Industrial Technology.
Fourthly, the term 'strategic' industries appears to be more loosely defined in the case 
of Korea, (in the sense that the Taiwan government during the 1980s explicitly 
identified characteristics for industries for promotion). Industries considered 'strategic'
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by the government have typically been capital-intensive rather than technology­
intensive and have tended to conform more closely to the characteristics of the infant 
industry case for assistance rather than the strategic case argument as in Taiwan. 
While the infant industry argument holds that the protection of an infant industry 
should be temporary, protection of Korean industries in general, dates back to the 
1960s when investments were first undertaken in individual industries, and has 
continued indefinitely. This can be related back to the fact that, historically, national 
autonomy in the pursuit of industry policy was an important government objective, 
with infant industry protection an essential ingredient in the pursuit of this.
Finally, a feature that appeared to be common to both governments in their 
implementation of industry policy was that a substantial share of resources designed for 
emerging industries (or strategic industries in the case of Taiwan) were directed to the 
restructuring or support of declining industries. Whether there is empirical support for 
this proposition in the case of Taiwan is a question that will be addressed more fully in 
Chapter 6.
5.6 Conclusion
Despite past occasional backsliding, Korean progress on trade liberalisation, 
particularly since the mid-1980s, has been both consistent and significant. The 
government has considerably reduced border protection, wound back its use of direct 
production subsidies and no longer employs extensive export subsidies. While several 
significant formal trade barriers still remain, industry promotion policies, particularly 
with respect to the high technology sector, are being tailored to avoid trade friction.
During the 1980s Korean industrial policy underwent a fundamental reorientation. The 
shift to technology-intensive industries was designed around functional policies 
supportive of industrial upgrading. This contrasted with the industry-specific 
interventions during the last major shift in industrial structure — the heavy and 
chemical industry push of the 1970s. This highly politicised heavy industry drive of 
the 1970s left a legacy of distorted credit markets, overly-indebted firms, and a high 
concentration of industrial power. As a result, the industrial policy strategy of the 
1980s was based on the premise that direct intervention was no longer feasible or 
desirable in light of the economy's changing industrial structure and greater reliance on 
private sector decision-making.
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The assertions of the new trade and governed market model would appear to have little 
applicability in explaining the role of the Korean government in technological 
upgrading in the 1980s, as with Taiwan. Technological upgrading has largely been 
driven by the private sector's push into high technology industries through R&D 
investment. Rather than directing resources to industries considered 'strategic', the 
government's industrial initiatives have instead focused on the restructuring of 
declining industries and measures to promote a greater role for small-scale enterprises. 
This reduced role of the Korean government and the greater reliance on private sector 
investment decisions suggests that the government became less, not more, dirigiste 
over the 1980s. This tendency for government to become less interventionist in 
response to changing economic circumstances has largely gone unacknowledged within 
the governed market and new trade literature.
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- CHAPTER 6 -
MEASURING THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE
6.1 Introduction
Both the new trade and governed market models assert that Taiwan has been effective 
in shifting its pattern of comparative advantage by promoting industries thought to be 
associated with external economies. However, an initial assessment of Taiwan's 
adoption of a strategic industry policy in Chapter 4, suggests the incentive structure in 
the 1980s did not possess those characteristics believed to be associated with 
supporting industries with emerging comparative advantage. In this chapter we begin 
formally to test this proposition by examining systematically the relationship between 
the incentive structure and comparative advantage. This is undertaken to provide an 
insight into the questions raised by the discussion of governed market and new trade 
literature. Was the policy regime non-neutral in the sense that it discriminated amongst 
industries? And if so, were these departures from neutrality associated with industries 
characterised by an emerging comparative advantage?
The first question is assessed by measuring the interindustry distribution of assistance. 
The second question is approached by focusing on Taiwan's pattern of export 
specialisation during the 1980s. Using value added per worker as a measure of labour 
intensity it is possible to determine whether the incentive structure was designed to 
shift the economy away from a reliance on labour-intensive industries (as indicated by 
low value added per worker) towards the development of technology-intensive 
industries (as indicated by high value added per worker). If the incentive structure is in 
fact found to be associated with industries characterised by an emerging comparative 
advantage (high value added per worker), then this would suggest that the government
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had an economic rationale in designing the incentive structure. If, on the other hand, 
the incentive structure was biased towards industries with a declining comparative 
advantage (low value added per worker) this would appear to suggest that the industrial 
structure was unrelated to objectives of promoting economic growth.
Section 6.2 discusses the methodology and data sources used to estimate the incentive 
structure to Taiwan’s manufacturing sector for the years 1981 and 1989. This is 
followed in section 6.3 by a review of past studies of Taiwan's incentive structure and 
the methodologies employed. Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 then detail the methodology 
and data sources used to measure, respectively, the nominal rate of assistance, effective 
rate of assistance and effective rate of subsidy to Taiwan's manufacturing industries. A 
discussion of the results follows in section 6.7. Section 6.8 then seeks to determine 
whether assistance was being directed to sectors exhibiting an emerging comparative 
advantage. Finally, section 6.9 provides a summary of the major findings.
6.2 Methodology1
Evaluating a system of incentives involves two tasks — estimating the incidence on 
product prices of the incentive measures applied, and evaluating their economic effect. 
The former involves determining whether and to what extent the incentives applied 
favour (or disfavour) a particular activity relative to other activities, and whether an 
activity receives net incentives (disincentives) compared with a neutral state of affairs. 
The latter involves analysing the effects of government incentives on the allocation of 
resources and other economic variables (Balassa et al. 1982:9). Incentives are defined 
to include government measures that affect the allocation of resources among 
industries. Their application thus entails a departure from a neutral state of affairs in 
which there is no discrimination among economic activities. Government incentives 
may directly affect the prices of outputs and inputs, while others may take the form of 
direct and indirect subsidies. Incentives to be quantified in this study are defined to 
include those which bear directly upon imports and exports in the form of tariff and 
tariff-type measures, and explicit subsidies in the form of credit and tax preferences.
1 The following draws on the methodology employed by Balassa (1971) and Balassa et al. (1982).
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6.2.1 Nominal Rate of Assistance
The nominal rate assistance (NRA) of a particular commodity is defined as the 
percentage excess of the domestic price over the world price, resulting from the 
application of protective measures.2 This may be represented as:
Pi - Pi*
(6.1) NRA(j) = ________
Pi*
where pj is the domestic price of commodity i under existing government policy and 
p*j is the free trade price in the absence of government intervention.
For commodities not subject to quantitative restrictions or prohibitive tariffs on 
imports, the nominal rate of assistance may be taken to equal the rate of import tariff or 
the ad valorem equivalent of tariff-type measures. The nominal rate of assistance will 
thus indicate the extent to which tariffs and tariff-type measures raise the domestic 
price above the c.i.f import price by an amount given by:
(6.2) Pi = Pi* (1 +tj)
In the case where imports are subject to quantitative restrictions, the nominal rate of 
assistance can be estimated as the percentage difference between the domestic producer 
price and the c.i.f import price of equivalent commodities (implicit rate). The same 
procedure applies where tariffs appear to be prohibitive. The prices received for 
exports may be raised by export subsidies or reduced by export taxes. Generally, the 
nominal rate of assistance for export commodities is taken to equal the ad valorem rate 
of these subsidies or taxes, as the case may be.
6.2.2 Effective Rate of Assistance
While the NRA measures the incidence of assistance provided to industry output, the 
effective rate of assistance (ERA) is used in estimating the joint incidence of output 
and input assistance on the processing activity and to examine the effects on the
2 In the framework of a simple partial equilibrium model, it is assumed that the elasticity of 
substitution among inputs is zero, production takes place under constant returns to scale, factor prices 
are unchanged, there is pure competition, transport costs are nil, and both the foreign demand elasticity 
for the country's exports and the foreign supply elasticity of its imports are infinite.
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allocation of resources (Balassa 1965a; Corden 1966). Thus whereby tariffs on the 
product itself provide protection to the firm or industry by allowing domestic prices to 
rise above import prices, tariffs on material inputs reduce the extent of protection by 
raising the costs of material inputs and can be regarded as a tax on the processing of 
such inputs (Balassa 1971:4). The effective rate of assistance is defined as the 
percentage excess of domestic over world-price value added, where the latter equals 
the difference between the world price of the product and the cost of its inputs at world 
prices. Assuming then that all goods are traded, the ERA for an industry i can be 
written as:
(6.3) Zi =
Wj- vJ
V
(6.4)
pi-^Tajipi
a = - ™ - i  = ________ £ ______
V*.  P1 P‘
- 1
-la,-
1 + Ti j 1 + Tj
where:
Zj = effective rate of protection of value added 
W[ = value added in domestic prices 
V*j = value added in world market prices
Pi = domestic price
i = output
j = input
aji = input-output coefficient for intermediate products in domestic prices 
Tj = nominal rate of assistance on output
Tj = nominal rate of assistance on inputs
The numerator of the expression is obtained from domestic input-output statistics; the 
denominator is derived by deflating domestic values by the nominal rate of assistance 
for the output and tradeable inputs. As Wj is always positive, the ERA in equation 
(6.4) is negative, when either V j is positive and greater than Wj, or when V [ is 
negative. The first case occurs when the protection structure is biased against an 
industry. In the second case, misleading results will be obtained when an industry 
which may be so highly assisted that value added at world prices is negative, indicating 
little protection. To avoid problems of interpretation, an alternative measure of ERA
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has been used in this study and is defined as the ratio of the difference between 
domestic and world market value added to domestic value added. This measure reports 
negative values only in the event of genuine negative protection, having a value greater 
than one if world market value added is negative (Balassa 1971:318).
Wi - V*i
(6.5) Zi = _______
Wi
Under the assumption of constant input coefficients, calculation of effective rates of 
assistance is straightforward whenever all immediate inputs are tradable goods whose 
domestic prices are affected by assistance (Balassa et al. 1982:14). Two methods are 
commonly employed for treating nontraded inputs. In the Corden method, value added 
in the production of nontraded inputs is combined with value added in the processing 
activity so that the extent of assistance is calculated with respect to the sum of the two. 
Deriving the Corden measure then entails dividing the value of nontraded inputs into 
direct and indirect material inputs, which are combined with the value of material 
inputs used in the production process and; direct and indirect value added, which are 
combined with value added in processing. Tariffs on material inputs used in producing 
nontraded goods are thus assumed to increase the costs of these inputs to the producer. 
This approach thus provides a useful indicator of the direction of resource pulls 
between industries resulting from the protective structure.
In contrast, under the Balassa method, the effective rate of assistance is estimated for 
the processing activity alone under the assumption that nontraded inputs are supplied at 
constant costs, where the cost of nontraded inputs is affected by assistance-induced 
changes in the prices of the tradeable inputs used in the production of nontradable 
goods. Since this term is always positive, the Corden formula will give a smaller or 
greater result depending on whether the effective rate of assistance is positive or 
negative.
6.2.3 Effective Rate of Subsidy
Whereas the ERA indicates the joint effects of output and input assistance, the effective 
rate of subsidy (ERS) expresses the combined effects of protective measures and credit 
and tax preferences. The value of these preferences to a particular activity can be 
estimated as the absolute difference between the hypothetical interest charges and taxes
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payable at average rates and the amounts actually paid. The value of credit and tax 
preferences for a particular activity is added to domestic value added in estimating the 
effective subsidy measure, which is designed to indicate the combined incidence of 
protective measures and credit and tax preferences. The ERS is thus defined as the 
percentage excess of adjusted domestic value added over world market value added.
The weighted average of the ERS for all sectors equals that of effective assistance 
rates, the weights being value added in domestic prices. This conclusion follows since 
the average rates of credit and tax preferences have been chosen as the norms from 
which deviations have been calculated for estimating effective subsidy rates for 
individual activities.
In the numerator of equation (6.6), the second term refers to the value of tax 
preferences (differential rates of corporate income tax) and the third to that of interest 
preferences (differential interest rates).
V*i + (Tcn - Tc)Qi + (in - i)Bj
(6.6) Si = ______________________________ - 1
W;
where:
V i = value added in world market prices 
Wj = value added in domestic prices 
Tc = rate of corporate income tax 
i = interest rate 
i (subscript) = output 
Q = gross profit in domestic prices 
B = value of borrowed capital in domestic prices 
n = weighted average of relevant variable 
S = effective rate of subsidy to value added
6.3 Review of Past Studies on Taiwan
There have been two previous studies which to varying degrees have measured 
incentives afforded to Taiwan's manufacturing sector. Lee and Liang (in Balassa et al.
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1982), estimate the incentive structure for 46 two digit manufacturing industries for the 
year 1969.3 This represents the only detailed study to measure Taiwan's incentive 
structure.4 The second study by Chang (1987), estimates nominal rates of assistance 
for the years 1981 and 1985.5
The Lee and Liang study employed a substantially different methodology from that 
outlined below, but some general conclusions from this research should be noted for 
comparative reasons. Lee and Liang demonstrated that the industry policy of Taiwan 
had sought to fulfil two objectives: exports had been promoted by policies largely 
thought to be neutral, exhibiting an absence of differential effects on the allocation of 
resources among activities relative to free trade. Non-neutral policies on the other 
hand, had focused on promoting infant industries. Their results, as summarised in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2, show the main features which characterised the structure of 
assistance to Taiwan's manufacturing industry in the late 1960s.
(i) Industries which were assisted appeared to be those in which the country had a 
comparative advantage, with tariff and nontariff protection becoming largely redundant 
due to improved efficiency in the process of import substitution and export expansion. 
Tariff and nontariff protective measures were thus found to be redundant for many of 
the commodities classified as belonging to either export industries or export and import 
competing industries.
(ii) Government incentive measures were in certain cases adopted in an ad hoc manner 
with little perceived economic rationale. In dividing intermediate products into two 
subgroups, with intermediate products I used as inputs of intermediate products II, it 
was found that nominal and effective rates of assistance and subsidy tended to be 
higher on intermediate products I than on higher order intermediate products II, 
indicating that the structure of assistance did not 'escalate' with the degree of
3 The results of this study have also been published in greater detail in Lee et al. (1975).
4 Another is Lui's (1970) study of incentive rates for 1966. Lui estimates show higher effective rates of 
assistance for consumption as opposed to capital and intermediate goods. This trend was reversed in 
the 1969 estimates. Alam (1989) interprets this as the Taiwan government switching to promote infant 
industries and intermediate goods sectors. Schive (1987a, published in Chinese) has measured the 
nominal, effective rate of assistance and effective rate of subsidy for selected industrial products for 
the year 1974. Tu and Wang (1988), estimate simple average tariff rates by 4-digit SIC code for 1986, 
1987 and 1988.
5 Chang measures nominal rates of assistance for 2-digit (representing 99 sectors) and 4-digit 
(representing 424 sectors) based on the 1981 input-output table. This study is not explicitly concerned 
with the structure of protection, but in testing for the determinants of both nontariff and tariff 
protection during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
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TABLE 6.1: Nominal Assistance, Effective Assistance, and Effective Subsidy 
by Industry, Taiwan: 1969
(per cent)
Industry Adjusted
Tariff
Rate
NRA ERA ERS
Processed Foods 78.8 7.8 6.2 11.9
Beverages & Tobacco 166.6 48.2 -369.7 271.1
C onstruction Materials 34.3 0.0 -8.3 -7.3
Interm ediate Products I 54.8 17.0 18.2 21.9
Interm ediate Products II 76.8 11.6 4.0 14.0
Nondurable Consum er Goods 71.7 10.9 7.3 10.1
Consum er Durables 54.5 12.9 14.3 21.5
Machinery 34.9 8.9 0.4 2.6
Transport Equipment 58.6 26.5 27.5 29.1
M anufacturing 63.2 12.1 8.2 13.3
less Beverges & Tobacco
M anufacturing 66.1 12.9 10.2 15.2
Notes 1) ERA and ERS are derived by Corden method.
Source: 2) Table 7, Lee et al. (1975:75-6).
TABLE 6.2: Nominal Assistance, Effective Assistance, and Effective Subsidy by 
Major Sectors, Taiwan: 1969
(per cent)
Industry Adjusted
Tariff
Rate
NRA ERA ERS
Export Industries 78.9 9.0 7.6 13.1
Import Com peting Industries 75.7 22.9 22.7 23.6
Export and Im port Competing Industries 57.1 13.3 11.4 18.3
Non-import Com peting Industries 66.6 9.3 2.0 2.8
All M anufacturing 66.1 12.9 10.2 15.2
Notes Figures are average rates for total (domestic and export) sales.
Source: Table 8, Lee et al. (1975:79-80).
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processing.6 Moreover, the incentive structure for intermediate products I was biased 
against exports, whereas that for intermediate products II was biased in favour of 
exports.
(iii) Tariff and nontariff assistance on nondurable consumer goods was found to be 
redundant to a large extent, and the nominal (implicit) rate of assistance considerably 
lower than adjusted tariff rates. The weighted average adjusted tariff rate and weighted 
average nominal rate of assistance for all industries was 60 per cent and 12 per cent 
respectively. Apart from beverages and tobacco, transport equipment was the most 
highly assisted. This latter sector, followed by intermediate products I and consumer 
durables enjoyed the highest effective rate of assistance for total sales. The effective 
rate of subsidy indicated a slight export bias in most of the established industries, 
whereas the more capital-intensive industries, including intermediate products, 
consumer durables and transport equipment, were characterised by import substitution 
biases.
(iv) When classified by trade category, export industries generally had higher adjusted 
tariff rates, but lower implicit rates, than other trade categories, indicating that tariff 
protection was largely redundant as productivity improved in the process of successful 
export expansion. The nominal and effective rates of assistance were lower for export 
industries than for export and import competing industries. While import competing 
industries exhibited a higher adjusted tariff rate than export and import competing 
industries, their average implicit NRA, ERA and ERS were much lower, again 
implying that the tariff and nontariff protection accorded to them was also substantially 
redundant. Nevertheless, import competing manufacturing was more highly protected, 
resulting in a bias against exports.
(v) The weighted average effective rate of assistance to the manufacturing sector by the 
Corden measure was 11 per cent.7 In taking imputed export subsidies into account, the 
weighted average effective rate of subsidy for the manufactured sector was 15.2 per 
cent. Protection and subsidy did not in general favour manufactured exports over 
domestic sales. While export subsidies were found not to be excessive, notable
6 The average adjusted nominal rate did, however, appear to be reasonably 'escalated' with the degree 
of processing.
7 Since adjustment for exchange rate overvaluation is not undertaken in this study, average results are 
discussed. However, when adjusted for overvaluation of 4.9 per cent, the average net effective 
assistance and subsidy for the manufacturing sector was -2 per cent under both the Balassa and Corden
measures.
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exceptions were exports of cotton fabrics and woollen and worsted fabrics of 87.6 and 
91.2 per cent respectively (Lee et al. 1975:85).
(vi) Finally, an interesting result that emerges from the study concerned the degree of 
assistance afforded to the machinery industry. By the late 1960s, the Taiwan 
government was stressing import substitution in machinery to establish a self- 
supporting domestic industry. However, the authors find that the average nominal and 
effective rates of assistance offered to machinery were the second lowest among the 
manufacturing industries. Contrary to the government's stated objective, the structure 
of incentives was not designed to promote this industry.
As outlined in Chapter 2, the low average rates of assistance for manufacturing in 
Taiwan at the end of the 1960s is generally interpreted as low intervention in trade 
relative to other developing countries. Similarly, the relatively low manufacturing 
difference in effective subsidy for export sales versus domestic sales is interpreted as a 
low 'trade bias'. The governed market model (Wade 1990a, Alam 1989) argues that the 
average dispersion of effective rates of subsidy for manufacturing in Taiwan is not far 
from the average of other developing countries such as Argentina and Israel (Table 
6.3). In particular, a standard deviation of 23 per cent is thought to imply large 
intersectoral differences in effective subsidy rates. Table 6.4 shows the relative 
strength of resource pulls towards export versus domestic sale for each subsector. 
These figures are thought to indicate that, for Taiwan, resource pulls created by 
government policies have the net effect of favouring export sale in export industries, 
while they have had the net effect of favouring domestic market sale in import 
competing industries. Biggs and Levy (1988:22-23) conclude that the dualistic nature 
of the trade regime reflects the government's approach of creating different incentives 
for different industries.8
This is in direct contrast to the neoclassical view that the structure of incentives was 
unrelated to industrial objectives. Westphal (1978:21-22) for example in the case of 
Taiwan stated that 'there is little, if any, economic rationale underlying the tariff 
structure; that is, effective tariffs rates are highly diverse and bear no systematic 
relationship to the type of product or level of processing. It is probably impossible to 
relate a highly differentiated tariff structure such as Taiwan's to industrial development
8 Similarly Wade (1990a: 136), in drawing on Chang's (1987) study of the determinants of tariff and 
nontariff protection, concludes that 'those who assert the absence of an economic rationale are wrong'.
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TABLE 63: Incentives in Taiwan's Trade Regime Compared to Five Other Countries: 
about 1969
(per cent)
Taiwan Korea Singapore Israel Columbia Argentina
(1) Manufacturing 14 13 4 76 35 112
(2) Agriculture -4 18 - 48 -14 -13
(3) Effective Subsidy to 9 -14 -7 -17 7 -46
Manufactured Exports
(4) Inter-sectoral Dispersion 8 36 2 25 71 38
(5) Effective Subsidy to 10 14 1 16 28 45
Manufactures for
Domestic Sale
(6) Inter-sectoral Dispersion 23 47 7 32 56 35
Notes: 1) The data are for 1969 except for Korea (1968), Singapore (1967), and Israel (1968).
2) The dispersion index refers to the standard deviation from the unweighted manufacturing mean 
of seven manufacturing sectors (construction materials, intermediate products I, intermediate 
products II, consumer nondurables, consumer durables, machinery, and transport and equip).
3) The averages in rows 1 and 2 are weighted, and come from Table 2.3 Balassa et al. (1982:28-9); 
those in rows 3 and 5 are unweighted and come from Biggs and Levy (1988:24).
4) Results are average rates for total (domestic and expert) sales.
5) Differences between rows land 2 and that of Table 6.1 reflect results using the Balassa method 
reported here and by Corden method in the case of Table 6.1
6) Results for rows 3-6 are net results in that they have been derived by adjusting the effective 
subsidy rates calculated at the existing exchange rate for the extent of overvaluation.
Source: 1) Rows 1 and 2 from Table 2.3, Balassa et al. (1982:28-9); the rest are derived from Table 2.6, p.36.
2) Dispersion index derived from Table 2, Biggs and Levy (1988:24).
TABLE 6.4: Differences Between Effective Subsidy for Export Sale and that for 
Domestic Sale, Taiwan Compared to Five Other Countries: about 1969
(per cent)
Taiwan Korea Singapore Israel Columbia Argentina
(1) All Manufacturing 4 7 -5 -44 -22 -145
Industries by Trade Orientation;
(2) Export 12 31 0 -130 10 -91
(3) Import Competing -46 -61 -3 -88 -76 -190
(3) Export and Import Competing -4 -46 -7 -65 -15 -164
(4) Non-import Competing 21 16 3 -5 -4 -153
Source: Table 2.5, Balassa et al. (1982:34-5).
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objectives, which to be meaningful must be stated in broader terms'. Similarly Lee et 
al. (1975:98) noted that the 'existing tariff structure has no contemporary logic'. In also 
referring to the 1969 study of Taiwan's incentive structure, Biggs and Levy (1988:22- 
23) note that the resource-pull effect (or industry bias) of a given standard deviation 
will probably be greater the lower the average. When the dispersion is around a low 
average, it is likely to result from 'intended' differences in industrial policy between 
sectors. However, when it is around a high average, it is more likely to result from 
unintended, even quite accidental, causes.9
6.4 Estimating Nominal Rates of Assistance
When estimating nominal rates of assistance, the average nominal rate afforded to each 
sector depends crucially on the weighting procedure used. Of the two previous studies 
measuring nominal rates of assistance, Liang and Lee estimate industry average 
nominal rates using a weighted average of production values at world prices. This is 
undertaken at a somewhat aggregated level. Chang (1987) adopts a weighting 
procedure of weighting simple average tariffs by import value. Averaging tariffs by 
import value will introduce a downward bias in the calculations since high tariffs are 
given an artificially small weight, and low tariffs an artificially large weight. 
Moreover, in the case of Taiwan, a simple average of tariffs will overstate the degree 
of protection due to the various tax exemptions and the existence of a tax rebate 
system. For this study, we have instead chosen to estimate nominal rates of assistance 
using industry gross output at unassisted prices as weights.
The procedures used to estimate the nominal rate of assistance are as follows:
(i) Taiwan's tariff schedule classifies import commodities in much greater detail than 
industry data, presenting the obvious time consuming task of aggregating many tariff 
items to obtain an average rate for each input-output sector. Commodities produced in 
each input-output sector were identified and their value of output at domestic prices for 
significant commodity outputs were estimated for each sector based on the 424 sector 
input-output table for 1981. Production data in Taiwan is classified by 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) o f the Republic of China. According to this 
system, all outputs of a particular firm are allocated to the industry which covers a 
firm's major commodity outputs. While manufacturing census data provides a detailed
9 This is because all numbers are large and the dispersion is calculated as the difference between large 
numbers.
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breakdown on a commodity basis of a firm's products, this data was not available for 
1989. We have instead relied on the Industrial Production Statistics Monthly 
(February 1990, March 1991) for a more disaggregated break up of production data to 
industry subgroup and individual commodity level.
(ii) Under the SIC system, production data can be linked to the input-output table, 
which in turn can be linked to the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature 
(CCCN), based on information provided by the Inspectorate General of Customs and 
Board of Foreign Trade, Classification o f Import and Export Commodities of the 
Republic of China (June 1980, August 1989). This classification is carried up to seven 
digits. The concordance provided between the CCCN system and CTRN system was 
then checked, the latter system being used to classify tariff rates in the Inspectorate 
General of Customs, Customs Import Tariff o f the Republic of China (September 1980, 
August 1989). A similar procedure was followed for 1989.10 As noted in Chapter 4, 
since 1980, Taiwan has operated a two columned tariff schedule whereby countries are 
classified according to one of two tariff schedules. For the first column, general duty 
rates apply to goods imported from countries and areas in general; the second column, 
reciprocal duty rates apply to goods imported from countries and areas that have 
reciprocal treatment with Taiwan (Ministry of Finance 1991b).* 11 In estimating 
nominal rates of assistance, this study has adopted the procedures under the R.O.C. 
Nomenclature whereby the column II tariff rate was taken as the tariff rate of a 
commodity. Where there were no tariff rate for column II, the tariff rate in column I 
has been taken as the tariff rate for that commodity.
(iii) The unassisted production weights were then estimated by deflating the production 
values by their nominal protection coefficient to obtain output in unassisted prices for 
each commodity. These values were then divided by the total value of output in 
unassisted prices for each sector.
In determining the nominal rate of assistance, the authors of the 1969 study chose the 
implicit tariff rate as the NRA over the adjusted tariff rates on the basis that adjusted 
tariffs rate were not a good indicator of nominal assistance in the late 1960s, given that 
many imports were exempt from duties and a number of commodities subject to
10 Beginning in 1989, Taiwan moved to the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 
(HS) of trade classification. This classification is carried up to ten digits, of which the first seven digits 
relate to the CTRN system.
11 The majority of Taiwan's trade partners (113 countries in 1980 and 127 countries in 1989) are 
classified as belonging to column II of the tariff schedule.
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prohibitive tariffs. Nontariff restrictions of varying intensities also played an important 
role in the assistance of import substitution industries. The survey of price 
comparisons undertaken by the authors showed domestic prices below world prices for 
a number of commodities, yielding negative implicit tariffs. A zero nominal rate was 
thus assumed on the basis of quality differences between domestic and foreign 
products. However Nam (1981:203) noted in a similar study of the Korean incentive 
structure that including such a large portion of the sample at a zero nominal rate 
ignores the existence of price controls, and the fact that a substantial portion of key 
industries such as iron and steel, fertiliser and oil refining etc were under government 
ownership, whereby prices of those industrial products may have been set artificially 
low or have increased more slowly than costs of production. The official prices set by 
the government at lower than world prices would tend to generate implicit premiums in 
the actual markets, underestimating the rate of assistance.
While acknowledging the desirability of undertaking price comparison in the presence 
of nontariff barriers being applied to commodities, the necessary data required to 
undertake this analysis for the 1980s was considered confidential and could not be 
obtained from the Taiwan government. Given that significant trade reform has taken 
place over the period between 1969 and 1981, with import restrictions remaining 
primarily on agricultural commodities and a few selected industrial products, this is not 
believed to alter significantly our overall conclusions.
It is important to note that throughout the 1980s nontariff barriers existed for the 
importation of some goods. For example, sugar imports were banned; the application 
of imports of alcohol and beverages and tobacco was limited to publicly operated 
trading organisations; and the importation of agricultural products, processed food, 
telephone products and equipment, and printing and publishing required that the 
attached documents be approved by other organisations (Tu and Wang 1988:57). In 
estimating nominal rates of assistance, select items within the following sectors were 
found to be subject to import controls in both 1981 and 1989: sugar, frozen foods, 
miscellaneous food products, petroleum refining, selected industrial chemicals and 
fertilisers. Select products within the following industries were also subject to export 
controls: slaughtering, rice, sugar, grain milling, printing, petroleum, metal and 
metallic products and jewellery products. A number of other products were not 
completely liberalised in the sense that their importation still required the permission of 
relevant industry associations. In general though, raw materials, most intermediate
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inputs and machinery and equipment and final products were characterised by low 
nontariff barriers due to Taiwan's lack of natural resources and higher level technology.
Nominal rates of assistance have been estimated for 61 manufacturing sectors for the 
years 1981 and 1989.12 Due to lack of weighting data, the NRA for input-output sector 
68 (machinery parts, repair and maintenance) has been assumed to be the same as the 
NRA on input-output sector 66 (machinery). Four commodities excluded from the 
analysis are pumps and compressors, mining machinery, aircraft and fur products. For 
these industries there was insufficient information available to estimate the NRA.
Where tariffs have been set at a specific rate (for example, NT$/kg) the nominal rate 
has been taken to be the ad valorem equivalent of the specific rate. The ad valorem 
equivalent of specific duties has been estimated by relating the amount of duties paid to 
the unit value of imports for the years 1981 and 1989 respectively. Selective duties 
also applied whereby the tariff rate was determined by the higher of the specific or ad 
valorem duty. For example, the tariff on mixed metal scrap was NT$1500 or 10 per 
cent of its transaction value, which ever was higher (Ministry of Finance 1991a: 117). 
Also, tariffs on selected items could temporarily be lowered for a period of time over 
the course of a year, after which the tariff was then raised to its original level. In 1981 
some 466 items were temporarily adjusted and some 709 items in 1989.13 The 
temporary adjusted nominal rate of assistance to these items has been determined for 
1981, but information in order to estimate this for 1989 was unavailable. In 1981, 
temporarily adjusted items were those belonging primarily to the machinery and 
electronics industry, and ranged from 1-3 per cent below the original tariff rate for a 
period ranging from 3-6 months. The number of items receiving a temporary reduction 
varied significantly from year to year during the 1980s, and was possibly in response to 
externally applied pressure to lower trade barriers on specific products.
12 Nominal rates of assistance have been estimated for the year 1980 due to customs import tariff data 
being unavailable for 1981. There was little, if any, revision to the tariff schedule between 1980 and 
1981.
13 Known as the 'dynamically adjusted duty' the duty was designed in response to changes in the 
domestic and international environment and to regulate the material supply of industries. The 
government could reduce or increase the tariff rate on selected imported goods within a 50 per cent 
range under the Customs Import Tariff (Ministry of Finance 1991a).
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6.5 Estimating Effective Rates of Assistance
Effective rates of assistance have been measured using the Corden method for the years 
1981 and 1989 using input-output tables of these years. Initially, it was proposed to 
follow closely the procedures adopted by Liang and Lee in their estimates of effective 
rates of assistance. However, in estimating ERA by the Corden method, their study 
included three nontraded sectors but excluded the service industries. By excluding the 
service sector their results may have underestimated the extent of assistance afforded to 
inputs. Similarly, in replicating their methodology for both 1981 and 1989, we found 
effective rates of assistance to be very low and in line with what would seem to be a 
realistic result when compared with the 1969 results.14 In fact, the results obtained 
were found to be highly sensitive to the treatment of the sector due to the magnitude of 
this sectors inputs relative to manufactured value added. This, along with the 
adjustment for depreciation and indirect taxes being excluded from this study, may 
account for the high nature of the results obtained.
Using matrix estimation (Warr 1992b) effective rates of assistance have been estimated 
for 98 sectors, 72 traded and 26 nontraded industries. Industries included in the 
nontraded sectors are sugarcane, crude oil and natural gas, and dying of textiles.15 
Results are presented for the 60 manufacturing sectors. In the presentation of results, 
effective rates of assistance have been weighted using value added in domestic prices, 
in keeping with the proportional measure of the ERA outlined previously.
6.6 Estimating Effective Rates of Subsidy
By the early 1980s, many of the export incentives available throughout the 1960s and 
1970s had either been withdrawn or wound back considerably. As a result, the amount
14 The average unweighted effective rate of assistance using Lee and Liang's methodology was 22 per 
cent in 1981 and 20 per cent in 1989. These results were heavily biased by very high effective rates of 
assistance to the petroleum refining, sugar and textiles industries.
15 Nontraded goods (or services) are those goods (and services) that do not enter into international 
trade. The treatment of nontraded inputs depends on assumptions made in regard to the responsiveness 
of their supply to changes in domestic prices. In this study it is assumed that the same primary factors 
are used in producing nontraded inputs as in producing traded goods, so that the available amounts of 
these factors limit both kinds of activities. This method (Corden 1966) entails including value added 
in the production of nontraded inputs with value added in processing in the industry in question. When 
estimating the ERA, the nontraded inputs may be included by tracing down the input-output structure 
and decomposing the nontradable inputs used by an industry into two categories: their traded inputs 
used directly and indirectly, and their primary factor inputs, used directly and indirectly. The value of 
the former is included in the value of all the intermediate inputs subtracted from the value of output in 
calculating value added (Warr 1992b).
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of subsidy in dollar terms was small, and in the case of the preferential financing 
policy, represented around 3 per cent of GDP in both 1981 and 1989. The two export 
incentives that were directed to exporters during the 1980s have been quantified in this 
study.
6.6.1 Financial Incentives
First, exporters received low interest loans to help finance imports of raw materials and 
to provide pre-shipment financing. The interest subsidy accruing to individual 
industries from preferential export loans was calculated by multiplying the interest rate 
differential by outstanding export loans to individual industries. The Central Bank of 
China's Financial Statistics Monthly (January 1982:77-78) publishes details of loans 
provided by domestic banks to major industry recipients. For the category of 'other' 
industries (see Table 6.5), the remaining outstandings of export loans in 1981 have 
been apportioned on the basis of each non-specified industry's share of total exports. 
By 1989, the interest rate subsidy afforded to exporters had been eliminated. Table 6.5 
shows that in 1981 (and in fact throughout the 1980s) both the textile industry and food 
processing industry were the major beneficiaries of these loans.
TABLE 6.5: Export Loans by Industry, Taiwan: 1981
________________________________________ (Million NT)
Textiles, Cotton & Fiber 4663
Textiles, Wool 212
Cement 156
Plywood 383
Plastics 893
Rubber Products 446
Iron, Steel & Machinery 953
Glass & Glass Products 21
Chemicals 442
Canned Food Products 2765
Fruits, Chilled & Frozen 44
Seafoods, Chilled & Frozen 335
Electronics 940
Wires & Cables 222
'Other' 2991
Total 15 337
Source: Appendix, Central Bank of China, Financial Statistics Monthly,
January (1982:77-8).
Second, as outlined in Chapter 4, loans were provided to strategic industries at a rate of 
1.75-2.75 percentage points below the market rate. In order to determine the implicit
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subsidy afforded to industry, the average of this interest rate differential has been 
multiplied by outstandings to individual industries in determining the subsidy amount. 
Besides strategic industries, other industries were also recipients of preferential loans. 
The rate of subsidy to these 'other' industries has also been apportioned on the basis on 
their share of total exports in 1989. Those industries classified as being strategic 
industries have been determined by information provided by the Industrial 
Development and Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Since the government's strategic industry policy was promulgated in July 1982, the 
preferential financing subsidy to strategic industries has been estimated for 1989 only. 
Data detailing the amount of outstanding loans provided by the preferential financing 
policy were obtained from various annual reports of the government's development 
bank, the Chiao Tung Bank (formerly, Bank of Communications). Information 
regarding industry allocation was obtained after being collated on request from the
author by the Loan Department of the Chiao Tung Bank. Tables 6.6(a) and (b) and 
Figures 6.1(a) and (b) indicate the amount and distribution by industry of total 
outstanding loans to strategic and other industries in 1982 and 1989. As mentioned 
previously, a large percentage of loans originally designed for high technology 
industries was directed towards industries other than the high technology industries. 
Table 6.6 shows that, by end 1982, apart from the amount of loans available to public 
utilities, the major recipients of preferential loans were the petrochemical and chemical 
industries, followed by the transport, metal and shipbuilding industries. Similarly, 
Table 6.6(b) shows that, in 1989, the chemical and chemical products industry received 
the largest share of the loans, followed by the electronics industry and textile 
processing industry. Interestingly, the large portion of loans directed towards 'other' 
industries indicates that these loans were in fact more widely and evenly dispersed than 
was indicated by government pronouncements. The high technology industries 
originally earmarked for the majority of loans were not in fact the major recipients of 
preferential finance in the form of either export loans or strategic industry loans.
A productive enterprise was also able to set aside a reserve fund for export loss up to 1 
per cent of export exchange settlement from the previous year. This has not been 
quantified on the assumption that no firm experienced an actual export loss.
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TABLE 6.6(a): Preferential Loans to Strategic Industries, Taiwan: 
1982
(Billion NT; percent)
Electric, Electronic & Information Industries 1.1 1.8
Machinery Industry 2.6 4.2
Shipbuilding 3.8 6.2
Transport & Ware housing 5.0 8.0
Petrochemical & Chemical Product Industries 8.9 14.3
Metal Industry 4.4 7.0
Textile & Textile Processing Industry 3.3 5.3
Tourism 1.4 2.3
Public Utilities 21.8 35
Other Industries 9.9 15.9
Total 62.5 100.0
Source: Loan Department, Bank of Communications Annual Report (1982:14).
TABLE 6.6(b): Preferential Loans to Strategic Industries, Taiwan: 
1989
(Billion NT; percent)
Electric, Electronic and Information Industries 15.3 13.2
Machinery Industry 10.7 9.2
Communications, Transport & Warehousing Industries 7.0 6.0
Petrochemical 2.4 2.0
Chemical & Chemical Product Industries 16.2 13.9
Metal Industry 3.8 3.3
Textile & Textile Processing Industry 13.8 11.8
Tourism 2.2 1.9
Public Utilities 26.4 22.7
Other Industries 18.7 16.0
Total 116.5 100.0
Source: Compiled on request of author by the Loan Department, Bank of
Communications (ChiaoTung Bank).
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FIGURE 6.1(a): Medium and Long-Term Development Credits by Category, 
Taiwan: 1982
Other Industries
Machinery Industry 4.20%
Metal Industry 7.04% 
Tourism 2.27%
Electrical, Electronics 
1.79% & ^formation 
Industries
6 .20%
Shipbuilding Industry
5.34%
Textile and Other 
Processing Industries
Petrochemical
14 29% and Chemical Products
Transport and
8.00% Warel» usi"S
Public Utilities 35.01%
Source: Table 6.6(a).
FIGURE 6.1(b): Medium and Long-Term Development Credits bv Category, 
Taiwan: 1989
Other Industries
Public Utilities 22.68%
Tourism
9.22% Mechanical Industry
16.03%
Electric, Electronic & 
13.18% Information Industries
1.87%
Communications, 
6.02% Transportation &
Warehousing industries
2 .02%
Petrochemical Industr y
13.89% Chemical & Chemical 
Products Industry
Textile & Textile Processing Industry 11.81% 3.28% Metal Industry
Source: Table 6.6(b).
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6.6.2 Fiscal Incentives
According to the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (SEI) (1961-1990), the 
major fiscal incentives available to all productive enterprises (including strategic 
industries) were in the form of preferential tax rates, a choice between tax holidays or 
accelerated depreciation in the case of a new or expanding enterprise, and tax credits. 
Total tax reductions due to the Statute for Encouragement of Investment during the 
1980s are shown in Table 6.7, while Table 6.8 indicates the total amount of major 
business income tax reductions available. As was noted in Chapter 4, while thousands 
of enterprises opted to receive tax holidays, few chose the accelerated depreciation 
option. Tax credits for fixed investment were introduced into the SEI in 1980. A 
productive enterprise meeting the required criteria was eligible for a tax credit ranging 
from 5 per cent to 20 per cent. The period for which the tax credit was allowed and the 
rate of the investment tax credit are prescribed by the government (Chou and De-Min 
1991:12).16 Table 6.8 also shows both the amount and number of applicants who 
sought this incentive during its period of operation.
According to the SEI, enterprises were subject to different corporate tax rates. Tax 
preferences to industries have been determined from information provided by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, who provide details on those industries classified as 
either 'important' or as 'productive enterprises', eligible for encouragement. According 
to the Government's Categories and Criteria for Special Encouragement of Important 
Productive Enterprises (1986), 'important enterprises' included those in the iron and 
steel industry, aluminium industry, copper industry, machinery and equipment 
industry, heavy electrical machinery industry, electronics industry, shipbuilding 
industry, precision instruments and apparatus industries. While according to the 
government's Categories and Criteria for Productive Enterprises Eligible for 
Encouragement (1990), 'productive enterprises' were those in the food processing 
industry, pulp and paper industry, rubber industry, chemical industry, non-metallic 
mineral processing industry, basic metallic manufacturing, machinery industry, 
electronic industry, electrical equipment, transport equipment industry, ceramic 
industry, textile industry and other miscellaneous manufacturing industries.17
16 During 1982-83, the statutory rates for the investment tax credit were 15 per cent for domestic 
equipment and 10 per cent for foreign equipment During 1985-87, these rates were 15 per cent and 5 
per cent respectively (Chou and De-Min 1991:14-15).
17 In the case of an industry belonging to both categories, the tax incentive has been estimated on the 
basis that the industry was considered an 'important' industry.
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An 'important' industry was subject to corporate income tax at the rate of 22 per cent in 
1981, this rate later falling to 20 per cent by 1989. 'Productive' enterprises on the other 
hand were subject to a corporate tax rate of 25 per cent in 1981 and 1989. All 
remaining industries (those not classified according to either category) were subject to 
the tax rate of 35 per cent in 1981; this rate falling to 25 per cent by 1989. Deviations 
from this tax rate have been taken as the norm from which tax preferences for 
individual industries have been estimated.
6.7 Interpretation of Results
A summary of the estimation of nominal rates of assistance, effective rates of 
assistance and effective rates of subsidy are presented in Table 6.9. These results show 
that in 1981 nominal rates of assistance were highest on beverages and tobacco (71 per 
cent), fabrics (41 percent), garments and accessories (57 per cent), rubber products (42 
per cent), leather products (56 per cent) and artificial fibres and plastics products (53 
per cent). Table 6.10 shows that within these sectors, industries receiving above 
average assistance were sugar (68 per cent), canned foods (68 per cent), and non- 
metallic furniture (99 per cent). The machinery industry had the lowest rate of 
assistance on output in 1981, reflecting this industry's role as a major source of inputs 
into other industries and Taiwan's dependence on machinery and equipment imports for 
industrial restructuring during the 1980s.
By 1989, the structure of nominal assistance reflects the considerable rationalisation of 
the tariff structure which took place after the mid-1980s, with the average NRA falling 
from around 35 per cent in 1981 to around 10 per cent by 1989.18 At the industry 
level, assistance still remained relatively high on beverages and tobacco (36 per cent) 
and on transport equipment (24 per cent). The manufacture of tobacco and alcoholic 
beverages was, until early 1993, a government monopoly with the tariff protection on 
this industry group thus being prohibitive in nature. Individual industries within the 
processed foods sector also exhibited higher than average nominal rates of assistance. 
These included sugar, canned foods, slaughtering and by-products, frozen foods and 
miscellaneous food products; industries in which nontariff barriers were placed on 
selected items. The motor vehicle industry also exhibited an above average rate of 
nominal assistance (27 per cent). Taiwan's input-output classification includes within 
the motor vehicle sector other modes of transportation and parts. Thus the NRA for
18 Presentation of average rates vary due to the weighting procedure adopted and because of the 
various classification procedures adopted.
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TABLE 6.9: Nominal Rate of Assistance, Effective Rate of Assistance and Effective Rate of 
Subsidy by Sector, Taiwan: 1981,1989
(per cent)
1981
NRA
1981
ADJUST.
NRA
1981
ERA
1981
ERS
1989
NRA
1989
ERA
1989
ERS
Processed Foods 30.6 101.1 101.6 16.8 77.0 77.3
Beverages & Tobacco 70.9 99.7 100.3 36.8 27.2 27.3
Fabrics 41.3 133.1 133.7 6.3 235.2 235.3
Garments & Accessories 57.4 130.1 131.5 11.6 325.3 325.4
Leather & Leather Products 56.0 85.0 86.0 5.0 46.0 47.0
Wood & Wooden Products 42.6 115.3 115.6 9.5 82.2 82.8
Paper & Products, 40.1 46.6 46.9 10.0 198.9 199.9
Printing & Publishing
Rubber & Rubber Products 42.0 107.0 107.0 10.0 117.0 117.0
Chemical Materials 18.0 75.3 28.0 2.2 -2.9 -3.9
Artificial Fibres, 44.8 86.9 87.7 3.9 38.7 38.8
Plastic and Plastic Products
Miscellaneous Chemical Products 28.0 122.3 122.5 7.9 22.5 22.9
Petroleum Refining Products 25.0 236.0 236.0 7.0 218.0 218.0
Non-Metallic Minerals 23.6 116.6 117.1 9.7 -247.0 -248.0
Steel & Iron 22.1 114.7 115.1 9.9 138.2 138.9
Misc Metals & Metallic Products 28.8 124.4 124.7 5.1 156.3 157.2
Machinery 14.0 11.8 107.6 107.9 7.3 62.1 62.1
Household Electrical Appliances 29.0 26.0 110.0 110.0 9.0 96.0 96.0
Electronic Products 27.0 26.0 114.0 114.0 7.0 31.0 31.0
Electrical Machinery & Apparatus 22.0 21.0 105.0 105.0 8.0 50.0 50.0
Transport Equipment 37.2 112.7 113.5 23.6 29.2 28.8
Miscellaneous Products 40.3 130.2 131.2 6.0 -430.0 -438.5
Average 35.3 113.0 111.2 •- 10.1 60.5 60.3
Note: 'Average' is the unweighted manufacturing mean
Source: Table 6.10.
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this sector represents an average which includes other forms of vehicle equipment. 
The weighted NRA on motor vehicles was in fact considerably higher in 1989 at 37 per 
cent. Table 6.9, in also showing adjusted nominal rates of assistance, verifies that 
tariffs of electronics and machinery industries were around 2-3 per cent below the rate 
indicated by the tariff schedule.
In order to determine the degree to which assistance may have 'escalated' with the level 
of development, industries have been classified into 9 major commodity groups. As 
shown in Table 6.11, in both 1981 and 1989, nominal rates of assistance on 
intermediate products II were slightly higher than that on intermediate products I; this 
feature being more pronounced by 1989. Assuming these were used as inputs into 
higher processed intermediate goods, value added to these industries was in fact 
taxed.19 Nondurable consumer goods are typical candidates for an initial phase of 
import substitution. However, by the 1980s, these industries had become well- 
established and with the exception of medicines and printing (whose very high 
effective rates of assistance biased the overall results) had become export and import 
competing industries. Excluding beverages and tobacco, nondurable consumer goods 
exhibited the highest NRA in both 1981 and 1989.
There was a low degree of correlation between the ranking of industries by nominal 
and effective assistance. The Spearman rank correlation between the two series was 
0.19 in 1981 and 0.07 in 1989 indicating a very weak relationship between the two. 
Similarly, the rank correlation between both series in Lee and Liang (1982) was also 
weak for 1969 at 0.15. Conversely, there was a high degree of correlation between the 
ranking of industries by effective assistance and effective rates of subsidy. The 
Spearman rank correlation between the two series was 0.89 for 1981 and 0.99 for 1989.
19 Those sectors classified as intermediate products I include leather and leather products, lumber, 
plywood, synthetic fibres, petroleum refining products, glass and glass products, pig iron and crude 
steel, aluminium, miscellaneous metals, plastics, artificial fabrics, other artificial fibres, other fabrics 
and fabric products. Those sectors classified as intermediate products II include cotton and cotton 
fabrics, wool and worsted fabrics, dyeing of textiles, wood, bamboo and rattan products, non-metallic 
furniture, pulp and paper, paper products, rubber and rubber products, petrochemical raw materials, 
other industrial chemicals, chemical fertilisers, plastic products, primary iron and steel, aluminium 
products, and miscellaneous metallic products.
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TABLE 6.11: Nominal Rate of Assistance, Effective Rate of Assistance and Effective 
Rate of Subsidy by Commodity Group, Taiwan: 1981, 1989
1981 
NR A
1981
ERA
1981
ERS
1989
NRA
1989
ERA
1989
ERS
Processed Foods 30.6 101.1 101.6 16.8 77.0 77.3
Beverages & Tobacco 70.8 99.7 100.3 36.8 27.2 27.3
Construction 22.6 118.3 118.8 9.5 -9.2 -9.4
Intermediate Products I 31.5 100.0 100.5 5.0 99.2 100.0
Intermediate Products II 33.7 96.6 96.8 6.1 65.5 65.7
Nondurable Consumer Goods 49.5 129.3 129.8 26.6 -129.3 -131.8
Consumer Goods 29.7 111.8 112.2 8.4 42.4 42.7
Machinery 16.1 106.1 106.5 7.2 56.2 56.1
Transport 37.2 112.7 113.5 23.6 29.2 28.8
Average 35.7 108.4 108.9 15.6 28.7 28.5
Note: 1) 'Average' is the unweighted manufacturing mean.
2) See footnote 19 for sectors classified as Intermediate products I and II. 
Source: Table 6.10.
TABLE 6.12(a): Nominal Rate of Assistance, Effective Rate of Assistance and 
Effective Rate of Subsidy by Trade Category, Taiwan: 1981
(per cent)
1981
NRA
1981
ERA
1981
ERS
Export 48.8 123.5 124.0
Export and Import Competing 28.7 110.1 110.8
Import Competing 27.4 98.8 108.6
Non-Import Competing 24.4 66.5 69.0
Source; Table 6.10.
TABLE 6.12(b): Nominal Rate of Assistance, Effective Rate of Assistance and 
Effective Rate of Subsidy by Trade Category, Taiwan: 1989
(per cent)
1989
NRA
1989
ERA
1989
ERS
Export 7.7 40.8 40.9
Export and Import Competing 8.8 29.4 29.0
Import Competing 12.0 115.8 116.3
Non-Import Competing 12.4 15.9 16.3
Source: Table 6.10.
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The average effective rate of assistance to value added in both 1981 and 1989 is 
considerably higher than that of the structure of assistance to output. Table 6.9 shows 
that the average ERA in 1981 was 113 per cent, falling by 1989 to 60 per cent. Apart 
from escalation in the assistance structure, Table 6.10 shows that by 1989 there was 
considerable variability in rates of effective protection for individual industries, 
indicating inefficiency in resource allocation. Such high variability thus cannot be 
attributed to the result of deliberate decisions, but rather may reflect the results of 
actions taken at different times in response to the prevailing situation and pressures 
exerted by special interest groups.
Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 show that the ERA in 1981, in being all high, did exhibit 
neutrality in the sense that most manufacturing industries received very high rates of 
effective assistance. While the equal treatment of industries is desirable, the question 
remains though what are 'reasonable' rates of tariffs and subsidies and whether all 
manufactured goods should receive equal treatment. According to Balassa:
Assuming that particular measures are used to correct 'special disabilities' (emphasis 
added) and that employment objectives are served by a direct or indirect subsidy to the 
use of labour, as a first approximation, one may suggest providing effective protection at 
equal rates to all manufacturing activities that have passed the infant industry stage. In 
this way, one would apply the 'market principle' in the sense that firms would be 
established that are profitable under such conditions and existing firms would have to 
improve their operations, change their product composition, or disappear (Balassa 
1971:96-7).
But as Corden (chapter 9, 1974) stressed, these 'special disabilities' that are usually 
associated with calls for infant industry assistance should, in principle, be dealt 
with directly through some form of direct subsidisation.
By 1989, the average rate of assistance had halved but as previously noted had become 
more variable. In 1989, assistance was particularly high for textiles, printing and 
petroleum industries. Table 6.10 indicates that the following industries were so highly 
assisted in 1989 that their value added, measured at world prices was negative: 
miscellaneous food products, non-alcoholic beverages, wool and worsted fabrics, 
cement products, industrial chemicals, fertilisers, other artificial fibres, medicines and 
motor vehicles. While this may be due to errors of observation, cases of negative value 
added at world market prices generally indicate an absolute wastage of resources. Such 
cases are representative of extreme inefficiency since it would appear cheaper to import 
the finished product than to import its material inputs. Several factors explain why this 
may occur — the existence of a monopolistic seller; the country's resource endowment
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may not be suitable to the production of a commodity whose manufacturing is made 
profitable only by protection (Guisinger 1969:415-33);20 or nontraded inputs, such as 
electricity, may cost more at home than abroad. Negative value added may also result 
when the ratio of value added to gross output is low, as was the case for some of these 
industries.
In other cases, those industries exhibiting large negative effective rates were state 
enterprises involved in producing products comparatively disadvantageous to produce 
domestically. The structure of assistance was thus heavily biased in favour of these 
sectors. It could be expected that eliminating this assistance would entail a transfer of 
resources to industries where their contribution to foreign exchange earnings and to 
national income was larger.
It is somewhat difficult to interpret the high negative rates of assistance to ’other' 
manufactures and to the precision instruments and apparatus industry. As an export 
and import competing industry, the former is composed of goods in which Taiwan, by 
the end of the 1980s, was losing competitiveness to Southeast Asian countries. The 
high ERS to this industry may indicate that incentives were in fact being directed to 
this industry by 1989 for this reason. The precision instruments and apparatus industry 
in being treated as a strategic industry also exhibited a much higher ERA and ERS than 
in 1981, suggesting that government incentives were by 1989 being directed towards 
this sector. However in the case of both industries their share of value added at 
assisted prices was low. This is a familiar result in ERA studies that a very high ERA 
can occur if the share of value added is small.
Overall, the general pattern of ERA indicated lower rates of effective assistance for 
machinery and finished goods, with higher rates for intermediate inputs and the textile 
and textile processing industries. Transport and equipment and consumer durables 
were industry groups for which parts can be imported at lower tariffs than tariffs on 
final goods. This is reflected in lower rates of effective assistance to these industries in 
1989. The high negative rate of effective assistance to the non-metallic minerals sector
20 Another reason why value added may be negative at world market prices is that parts and 
components may be more costly to transport than the product itself, raising the c.i.f. price of imported 
inputs to a greater extent than that of the final product. Negative value added at world market prices - 
may also be due to the waste of materials, or to the substitution of materials with higher world market 
prices for those with lower prices. Such substitution can occur since differences in tariffs among inputs 
may make it profitable for the entrepreneur to utilise materials that would not be used under free trade 
conditions (Balassa 1971:74).
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is heavily biased by the cement industry. Excluding cement, the ERA to this sector 
was 28.3 per cent.
Due to the high dispersion of measures of ERA and ERS for 1989, outliers which 
biased the results because of the weighting procedures employed, have been removed 
in the results presented in Table 6.11. Those individual industries excluded are, within 
processed foods — sugar; construction — cement; intermediate products I — artificial 
fibres; intermediate products II — pulp and paper; and within nondurable consumer 
goods — knitted garments and printing.
Estimates of the ERS to industry during the 1980s show subsidies to the manufacturing 
sector to be, on the whole, quite small and uniform in impact. There was, however, 
important exceptions to this pattern. The structure of subsidy was most heavily biased 
towards the chemical fertiliser industry in 1981 and towards the chemical fertiliser, 
industrial chemical, artificial fibre and medicine industries by 1989. Both the artificial 
fibres industry and select products from within the medicine industry were regarded as 
strategic industries.21 While some strategic industries received a small subsidy, other 
strategic industries were in fact discriminated against during the 1980s. Individual 
industries within the food processing and intermediate products and metals industries 
received a small export subsidy.
Tables 6.12(a) and (b) present estimates of the incentive structure by trade category. In 
adopting the convention employed in Balassa et al. (1982), industries have been 
classified into four categories: exporting (X) if more than 10 per cent of domestic 
output is exported, while imports account for less than 10 per cent of domestic 
consumption; import competing (IC) where less than 10 per cent of production is 
exported while more than 10 per cent of domestic supply is imported; export and 
import competing (XIC), where both shares exceed 10 per cent; and non-import 
competing (NIC) where neither the export nor the import share exceed 10 per cent.
In 1981, one-third of all manufacturing industries were classified as export and import 
competing. However, by 1989, more than one-half of all manufacturing industries 
were in the export and import competing category, reflecting an export pattern in
21 Those industries displaying a high ERS were predominantly industries within the chemicals sector, 
namely fertilisers, chemicals, petrochemicals and petroleum refining products. While this sector is 
classified according to the SITC system as technology-intensive, they are not classified as being 
'strategic' industries by the Taiwan government.
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Taiwan characterised by the exportation of assembled or processed imported inputs. 
Those industries the government was seeking to promote (at least as indicated by 
government plans) in the high technology sector — namely electronics, information, 
machinery etc — were all classified as belonging to the export and import competing 
category in both 1981 and 1989.
It is interesting to note that those industries classified as export and import competing 
industries accounted for 45.7 per cent of manufactured exports in 1981, while those 
industries categorised as export industries made up 28.5 per cent of such exports. By 
1989, the share of export and import competing industries in manufactured exports had 
risen to 79 per cent, while that of export industries had fallen to 12 per cent. This 
pattern of exports reflects the industrial upgrading that took place during the 1980s, 
with the government attempting to encourage domestic production instead of relying 
on processed exports or assembly operations with imported parts and materials. Most 
export and import competing industries remained in this transition phase over the 
1980s with considerable diversification in products and quality such that it was 
common to have some commodities being exported and imported at the same time. 
Direct foreign investment has also played an important role in these industries where 
foreign factors of production and intermediate inputs are combined with host country 
inputs. Industries characterised by a higher level of value added, such as the 
machinery and electronics industries, were by 1989 all indicative of this pattern. For 
example, the export and import share of the precision instrument and apparatus 
industry amounted to 75 per cent and 79 per cent respectively, and that of the general 
industrial machinery export and import share amounted to 61 and 69 per cent 
respectively.
Table 6.12(a)22 also indicates that in 1981 the government appeared to be assisting 
those sectors with comparative advantage with the export sector being the most highly 
assisted.23 However, this assistance was largely redundant due to improved production
22 In Table 6.12(a) and (b), the ERA and ERS for 1981 and 1989 have also been adjusted by excluding 
outliers that severely biased the results obtained. In 1981 outliers are: for export industries —  sugar; 
and for non-import competing industries —  slaughtering and by-products. For 1989 these are: for 
export industries —  cotton fabrics; export and import competing industries —  artificial fibres; import 
competing industries —  pulp and paper; and non-import competing industries —  sugar and printing.
23 The relatively high nominal rates on export industries may also be due to the tariff structure of 
export industries not being revised so as to make it more in line with the realised protection. Another 
reason may be that the nominal rate was left unchanged to discourage imports of finished goods such 
as processed foods and nondurable consumer goods.
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TABLE 6.13: Amount of Duty Free and Duty Paid 
in Instalments on Imports of Machinery, Taiwan
(Billion NT)
Fiscal
Year
Duty
Free
Duty Paid in 
Instalments
1980 2.6 4.7
1981 5.7 4.0
1982 4.1 4.1
1983 2.4 4.0
1984 1.6 3.7
1985 2.1 4.6
1986 2.7 3.0
1987 5.2 3.4
1988 3.3 4.6
1989 1.7 2.9
1990 1.7 3.0
Total 33.1 42.1
Source: Table 74, Yearbook of Financial Statistics of the
Republic of China, Ministry of Finance (1991:288).
efficiency in the process of export expansion. Also, the various rebates available on 
inputs into export industries in the early 1980s, plus the tariff drawback system in 
operation, ensured that exporters in fact operated under free trade conditions. 
According to the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment, exporters were eligible 
for duty reductions, duty exemptions, duties payable in instalments, and duties 
recorded on account for a period of 5 years on imported machinery used in 
manufacturing businesses. However, these rebates were wound back gradually during
the 1980s in line with the overall rationalisation of trade policy (Table 6.13 and Table 
6.14). This is reflected in 1989 by a reversal of the pattern of NRA displayed in 1981. 
Table 6.12(b) shows that by 1989, nominal rates of assistance were highest within the 
import competing (12.0 per cent) and non-import competing (12.4 per cent) sectors. 
This was followed by export (7.7 per cent) and export and import competing (8.8 per 
cent) sectors, whose assistance had been considerably reduced; and in fact was being 
taxed as a consequence.
As would be expected, the effective rate of subsidy in most cases was only slightly 
higher than the effective rate of assistance (Tables 6.9-6.12). Whereas in 1981 the 
government appeared to be subsidising those industries in which Taiwan did not have a 
comparative advantage, by 1989 the structure of subsidies had become more uniform.
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However, Table 6.12(b) indicates that by 1989, the import competing sector still 
exhibited the highest ERA (115.8 per cent) and ERS (116.3 per cent). As previously 
indicated, chemicals and fertilisers, as inputs into other industries, received the largest 
subsidy. The export sector — ERA (40.8 per cent) and ERS (40.9 per cent) — was the 
second most favoured category, followed by export and import competing sector — 
ERA (29.4 per cent) and ERS (29.0 per cent) — and the non-import competing sector 
— ERA (15.9 per cent) and ERS (16.3 per cent).
It is worth noting, though, that including the outliers of sugar and printing within the 
non-import competing category raised the ERA and ERS to -58.7 per cent and -58.4 
per cent respectively, completely reversing the pattern of 1981, and indicating that this 
sector was the least efficient with the structure of incentives biased towards the 
production of these goods.
Finally, it should be noted that the measurements of incentives estimated in the study 
are gross estimates in the sense that no adjustment has been made for the overvaluation 
on the Taiwan currency. Thus, to the extent that the Taiwan NT$ has been overvalued 
due to various policy measures, the estimates of effective incentives presented will 
overstate the true effective incentive rates.
6.8 Pattern of Export Specialisation
This section seeks to determine whether Taiwan's changing pattern of export 
specialisation in response to changes in relative resource endowments during the 1980s 
has occurred as predicted by dynamic comparative cost theory. This issue will be 
taken up in more detail in Chapter 7. Here attention is confined to the question of 
whether Taiwan's comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities was 
declining over the 1980s; and to determining the extent to which government assistance 
was being directed towards these commodities.
According to the simplest Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, patterns of 
international trade can be explained by international differences in countries' relative 
endowments of capital and labour. While the obviously restrictive nature of the 
various assumptions underlying the model has long been recognised,24 Harry Johnson
24 Criticisms of the model have generally been twofold. The first concerns the 'static' framework of 
analysis employed in the theory. In focusing on national differences in countries' relative endowments 
of capital and labour as the primary explanation of international trade, the theory ignored the influence
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in the Wickseil Lecture (1968) suggests that this essentially static model can be 
'dynamised' through the adoption of a capital-theoretic view of economic growth and 
thus still provide a useful insight into predicting a country's pattern of trade as reflected 
by its comparative advantage. Johnson (1968:25) argues that:
The capital-theoretic approach to economic growth suggests that, as a starting point for the 
explanation of international trade at a given point of time, this is indeed a fundamental 
differentiating characteristic, provided that 'capital' is conceived of in the broad sense as 
comprising natural resources, social capital, human skills, and technological and 
organisational knowledge, as well as material capital equipment, while 'labour' is conceived 
of in the analytically relevant sense of human time availability only, instead of being 
identified broadly with all the services to production rendered through human beings.
By redefining the concept of capital to be a highly aggregated one, and labour in a 
more narrow sense, the production process of a country can then be reflected fairly 
reliably in the statistic — value added per time unit of human input. Ruling out the 
possibility of reversals in factor intensity in response to differences in relative factor 
prices, this reformulation of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem suggests that within its 
manufacturing sector, a country will specialise in the production and export of products 
characterised by higher value added per worker in production, the higher its 
endowment of broadly defined capital per worker.
The process of growth is a generalised one of capital accumulation through the 
investment in the acquisition of larger stocks of various forms of capital. The 
condition of being 'developed' then consists of having accumulated and established 
efficient social and economic mechanisms for maintaining and increasing large stocks 
of capital per worker in the various forms. The accumulation process itself requires the 
application of capital towards the invention of new production and consumption 
technology, the demand for which derives from the rising opportunity cost of human 
time relative to the cost of capital. As explained by Gamaut and Anderson (1980:376):
These improvements yield an initial comparative advantage to these countries, which is lost 
by the standardisation and diffusion of technology involved through the world economy in 
response to economic incentives provided by differences in relative costs of human labour 
time. Production of commodities with mature technology requires fewer inputs of human
of natural resources in explaining trade patterns. The second criticism focused on the validity of the 
assumptions on which the theory was built: assumed identity of factor qualities and production 
functions among countries; constant returns to scale in production; tastes were assumed not to differ 
significantly between countries; and the assumption revealed as necessary by controversy over the 
factor-price-equalisation theorem that the relative factor-intensities of industries do not reverse within 
the relevant range of international factor price variations (Johnson 1968).
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capital and the production location of such goods is distributed amongst countries not on the 
technological frontier according to the familiar considerations of relative factor intensity and 
relative factor endowments. In the process of economic development, all countries gradually 
shed comparative advantage in more labour-intensive commodities and establish new 
comparative advantage in more sophisticated and capital-intensive commodities.
This approach, as recognised by Johnson, derives its simplicity from, and maintains 
analytical continuity with the Heckscher-Ohlin model at the expense of leaving 
unexplained the more detailed composition of comparative advantage. It does this by 
abstracting, for example, from differences in social preferences and political processes 
that affect a country's labour supply and may cause a country to invest more or less 
heavily in the accumulation of particular forms of capital; from the effects of 
commercial policy, informational and spatial barriers to trade; and from differences in 
resource endowments (Gamaut and Anderson 1980:376). Johnson argues that a 
capital-theoretic approach to comparative advantage provides a useful simplification of 
comparative advantage theory for purposes of empirical application and policy 
prescription. Lary (1970), for example, by defining capital intensity in terms of value 
added per worker, found that developing countries tend to export labour-intensive 
manufactures and developed the implications of this fact for policies designed to 
increase export earnings and promote growth of developing countries.
Following the work of Gamaut and Anderson (1980) in applying this approach in 
explaining patterns of ASEAN trade within the Pacific Basin, manufactured 
commodities have been ranked by value added per worker in the industries producing 
them. Similarly we have used United States data on this statistic as reported by Balassa 
(1977a), and divided the ranked commodities into 4 categories.25
25 Balassa (1977a:7-10) notes that as a measure of capital-intensity of manufacturing production 
(whereby nonwage value added per worker is taken to represent physical intensity and wage value 
added per worker human represents capital-intensity) this statistic is subject to a number of 
limitations. As regards physical capital intensity, focusing on one particular year will not represent an 
equilibrium position, and this, combined with imperfections in product, capital, and labour markets, 
will contribute to interindusty variations in profits. Moreover, nonwage value added may included 
items other than capital's remuneration such as advertising. In relation to human capital intensity, 
including the entire wage value added will tend to overestimate human capital-intensity by the amount 
of the unskilled wage. While this does not give rise to problems if the unskilled wages were the same 
in every industry, unskilled wages may differ among industries due to factors such as disutility of work 
and the power of unions. Interindustry differences in risk, market imperfections, inclusion of items 
other than capital's remuneration in non-wage value added, and the inclusion of unskilled wages in 
wage value added also represent deficiencies. And as Branson and Monoyios (1977) note, the 
aggregation of various forms of capital assumes that they are perfect complements or perfect 
substitutes in production.
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Table 6.15 shows that category 1, composed of the most labour-intensive goods, 
comprised over 6 per cent of world trade in manufactures in the early 1980s, rising 
slightly to 7 per cent by the late 1980s. The next most labour-intensive commodities 
(category 2), accounted for around 12 per cent of world trade in manufactures 
throughout the 1980s. Reflecting Taiwan's relative comparative advantage in these 
categories, the share of these commodities in total trade was considerably larger with 
categories 1 and 2 contributing over 56 per cent of total exports in the early 1980s. 
Although compared to the rest of the trading world, Taiwan was relatively labour 
abundant in the early 1980s, it had become increasingly less so by the 1980s as Taiwan 
became increasingly more capital abundant.
This is suggested by the fall by 1989 in Taiwan's export share of category 1 
commodities, and to a lesser extent in category 2, such that these groups by the late 
1980s contributed to around 42 per cent of total exports. Taiwan's share of exports of 
category 3 rose from 36 per cent in 1981 to 43 per cent by 1989, while the share of 
exports in category 4 rose from 8 per cent to 15 per cent over the same period. This 
compares with categories 3 and 4 accounting for around 50 per cent and 30 per cent, 
respectively, of world exports in manufactures by the end of the 1980s.
TABLE 6.15: Shares of Manufactured Exports by Category of Labour-Intensity 
of Production and Nominal Rates of Assistance for Taiwan
(per cent)
1981 1989
Category Export
Shares
Nominal 
Rates of 
Assistance
Export
Shares
Nominal 
Rates of 
Assistance
Taiwan 1 28.1 64 17.0 11
2 27.9 36 24.8 7
3 36.0 32 43.3 9
4 7.9 22 15.0 7
World 1 6.6 7.5
2 12.5 11.6
3 51.0 50.0
4 30.0 30.9
Source: 1) International Economic Data Bank (IEDB), The Australian National University, based 
on United Nations Trade Statistics 
2) Nominal rates o f assistance from Table 6.10.
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Next the relationship across industries between value added per worker and levels of 
assistance is examined in order to determine the extent to which the structure of 
incentives may have been biased towards industries characterised by declining 
comparative advantage (and lower value added per worker). Using Balassa's 
classification, industries have been ranked according to US$ average value added per 
worker and also by NT$ average value added pier worker for the years 1981 and 1986. 
These are compared with industry averages of nominal rates of assistance for 1981 and 
1989, which have been weighted using industry gross output at unassisted prices. 
Estimates of nominal rates of assistance are used rather than measures of effective rates 
of assistance and subsidy given that Taiwan's input-output tables from which effective 
rates of assistance and subsidy have been classified are too aggregated to apply 
Balassa's criteria.26 In the case of nominal rates of assistance, while a concordance was 
developied between Taiwan's industrial product classification (SIC) and the ISIC 
system and then for the SITC system employed by Balassa, there are obvious 
aggregation and reconciliation problems associated with this process.
Despite these limitations, the results obtained do piermit some general conclusions to be 
drawn regarding Taiwan's pattern of export specialisation during the 1980s. Table 6.16 
indicates that when ranked by Balassa's measure of value added per worker, the most 
labour-intensive industries (category 1) were the major recipients of nominal assistance 
in 1981 and to a lesser degree by 1989, indicating support for the proposition that tariff 
assistance was being directed to those sectors characterised by low value added per 
worker and high labour-intensity. It appears that the Taiwan government was assisting 
traditional (exporting) labour-intensive industries (textile, clothing and footwear 
industries), characterised by a declining comparative advantage during the 1980s. It 
can also be seen that in 1981, industries characterised by high value added per worker 
(and greater capital intensity) received lower rates of assistance, this feature being less 
pronounced by 1989 in the wake of the significant tariff reform that took place over the 
p>eriod. Table 6.17 shows that this trend holds when Taiwan value added per worker is 
used.
26 However, it should be noted that the variable value added p>er worker is employed in Chapter 7 to 
test for the relationship between effective rates of assistance and subsidy to industry and various other 
industry structural characteristics. As Taiwan's input-output tables closely concord with its industrial 
product classification system, of which many of the proxy variables representing various industrial 
structural characteristics are classified, this is thought to more accurately reflect the proposition that 
assistance was being directed to industries producing commodities thought to be comparatively 
disadvantageous to produce.
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It is somewhat difficult, though, to determine here the extent to which assistance was 
being directed to products with declining comparative advantage in the 1980s.27 This is 
because these industries were not, on the whole, major recipients of tariff assistance but 
were characterised by high effective rates of assistance and subsidy by 1989. This 
question will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
6.9 Conclusion
Considerable rationalisation of the tariff structure took place over the 1980s, as 
indicated by the reduction in the nominal rate of assistance from an average of around 
35 per cent to around 10 per cent by 1989. The effective rate of assistance was 
uniformly high in 1981, averaging over 100 per cent. While the average ERA was 
substantially reduced by 1989, the assistance afforded to value added was considerably 
more variable and lacking in economic rationale. The overall high rates of ERA may 
have been the result of methodological problems and/or may reflect that the tariff 
structure had not yet been revised to be more in line with realised assistance. 
Successful export expansion and the various rebates available to exporters meant that 
assistance to many industries was substantially redundant.28
In terms of the ERA and ERS, the incentive structure to manufacturing in 1981 was 
high and uniform with incentives found not to be biased towards specific industries. 
However, this neutrality did not hold for 1989, when the incentive structure was 
characterised by an import substitution bias, resulting in resources being directed 
towards import competing sectors. Those industries regarded as strategic (high 
technology) industries exhibited low nominal and effective rates of assistance and
27 Multivariate regression analysis was also undertaken to test for the determinants of comparative 
advantage as measured by Export Specialisation Indices (see Chapter 7). Three regression equations 
were tested using Balassa's classification. In this case, categories 1 and 2 were combined (that is, the 
lowest and second lowest value added per worker). The explanatory variables used were Taiwan value 
added per worker to represent skill intensity (FT), nominal rate of assistance (INC), and a dummy 
variable (DTEXT) which takes on the value of 1 for textiles in order to test whether the Multi Fibre 
Agreement affected Taiwan's export response. While the adjusted R squares were low, and 
multicollinearity was a problem, the results for 1981 indicated that the best explanator of comparative 
advantage in the case of the combined groups 1 and 2 (that is, low value added per worker) was the 
nominal rate of assistance. But while positive, and providing some support that assistance was being 
directed to labour-intensive sectors characterised by low value added, this variable was significant only 
at the 20 per cent confidence level. However, for exports characterised by higher value added per 
worker (categories 3 and 4), none of the explanators were significant. The variable FT was negative 
and insignificant, while that of DTEXT was positive but insignificant. In the case of 1989, none of the 
explanatory variables in the regression equations were significant.
28 Although it needs to be noted that because a product is exported does not imply that protection 
against imports is redundant when there is less than perfect competition.
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effective rates of subsidy. This was particularly the case in 1989 where the machinery, 
information and electronics industries exhibited low rates of incentives relative to other 
industries. An exception to this pattern was the precision instrument and apparatus 
industry. The incentive structure, while seemingly biased towards this sector, was also 
characterised as favouring industries having a low ratio of domestic value added to 
gross output.
While the subsidy amounts were small, the major recipients appeared to be those 
industries with declining comparative advantage (such as the textile and textile 
processing industries) and industries in which Taiwan did not have an established 
comparative advantage. Industries exhibiting higher effective rates of subsidy by 1989 
were typically heavy and chemical industries (fertilisers, chemicals and petrochemicals 
and petroleum refining products etc) characterised by a high degree of state ownership.
By the late 1980s, the incentive structure was discriminating against those industries 
with comparative advantage. The structure of assistance was biased against export 
industries and export and import competing industries and in favour of import 
competing and non-import competing industries, indicating that resources were being 
encouraged to move from exportables to import substitution.
According to the governed market model, different industries were given different 
incentives, implying that the government had an economic rationale in designing the 
incentive structure. However, the high standard deviations for effective rates of 
assistance and subsidy for the 1980s indicate that the structure of incentives was 
unrelated to industrial objectives.
There does not appear strong evidence to support the view that the departure from 
neutrality evident in 1989 was associated either with industries known to have 
exhibited superior growth performance or with industries identified by government as 
having a perceived emerging comparative advantage. An examination of the pattern of 
export specialisation indicated that, at least as far as tariff assistance is concerned, 
incentives were directed to industries with a declining comparative advantage (as 
indicated by low value added per worker).
217
- CHAPTER 7 -
THE PATTERN OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
IN TAIWAN AND KOREA
7.1 Introduction
Neoclassical trade theory states that as a country develops, the commodity composition 
of its exports will, in the absence of policy distortions, change according to its 
comparative advantage. Hence the pattern of trade and the resultant division of labour 
will be subject to dynamic change in a rapidly growing economy. Both the new trade 
model and governed market model, on the other hand, contend that interventions were 
important in influencing the evolution of the industrial and trade structure in East Asian 
economies. Governments are thought to have systematically promoted industries in the 
sense that these industries have become internationally competitive. The result, they 
argue, is an export structure different from that based on complementary differences in 
technology and factor-endowments. This chapter tests this proposition by focusing on 
the question of whether the industrial structure evolved in line with a shifting (factor- 
based) comparative advantage and changing factor endowment
This chapter extends the analysis in Chapter 6 which found that strategic industries did 
not appear to be the major recipients of government assistance. By examining the 
export performance of strategic industries it addresses the question of whether there was 
a distinct tendency for strategic industries to display an increasing comparative 
advantage following the introduction of new policy measures?
Chapter 7 focuses its analysis on Taiwan, and compares the results obtained with Korea, 
the economy which most closely resembles Taiwan in product composition of exports. 
An examination of the changing export share and trends in export specialisation in 
Taiwan and Korea over the 1980s is used to determine whether a given level of exports
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indicates a strong or weak comparative advantage or disadvantage, and the extent to 
which government incentives were focused on industries in which comparative 
advantage was emerging. Section 7.2 of the chapter briefly reviews the methodological 
issues involved in measuring the relative export performance of industries. This is 
followed in section 7.3 by a brief review of Taiwan and Korean export performance in 
the 1980s. Section 7.4 examines the factor composition and emerging export 
specialisation of Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s. Section 7.5 then examines both 
the export share and trends in export specialisation of the strategic products identified 
by the Taiwan government for preferential encouragement as well as for technology­
intensive commodities.
7.2 Methodological Issues
Since the 1960s the theory of comparative advantage has progressed considerably 
beyond the framework of the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models. The 
shortcomings of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model have long been recognised as 
stemming in part from the aggregation of factors of production.1 Various attempts have 
been made to expand beyond capital and labour factors to include the natural-resource 
content of trade and to separate human capital (as distinct from physical capital) in an 
attempt to explain, for example, the Leontief paradox (Kenen 1965; Keesing 1966; 
Learner 1980). While the majority of literature has concentrated on determining the 
significance of human capital in United States trade, this work has been extended by 
Balassa (1977a) to cover developing countries. Other developments within the literature 
have found support for further disaggregation of capital to separate out technology.2 
Contributions to this literature by explicitly focusing on technological factors, 
emphasised the research and development component of value added as a measure of 
technology-intensity (Gruber, Mehta and Vernon 1967; Hufbauer 1970; Baldwin 1971; 
Branson and Junz 1971; and Goodman-Ceyhum 1976). As noted in Phillips (1984:11), 
the incorporation of the role of technology as a factor of production has contributed to 
dynamic extensions based on product life-cycle theory (Vernon 1966; Wells 1968).
Further developments within the literature have emphasised the role of natural resources 
as a factor of production. Jones's (1971) work in extending the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
to incorporate natural resources, was subsequently generalised by Krueger (1977) and
lrThe Leontief paradox, for example, asserted that this model could not accurately predict the pattern of 
exports of the United States. Dixit (1981) noted also that it could only be said that 'on average' 
countries will have lower autarky prices for goods intensive in the factors with which they are well 
endowed and that lower autarky prices would lead to exports under free trade. However, as noted by 
Phillips (1984:12), while disaggregation of factors of production weakens the most general form of the 
theorem, the generalisations that remain possible still justify empirical testing.
2 For a comprehensive survey of this literature see Balassa (1977a) and Stern in Kenen (1975).
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applied in explaining the pattern of ASEAN and Western Pacific trade by Gamaut and 
Anderson (1980) and Anderson and Smith (1981). In defining three factors (capital, 
labour and natural resources) and two classes of goods (natural-resource-based goods 
and manufactures), these authors find this extension to the theory explains well the 
changes in the pattern of export specialisation in natural-resource-rich Pacific countries 
like Australia and Canada, relative to natural-resource poor countries, such as Japan and 
the Asian NICs (Phillips 1984:11).
Krause (1982) goes further to disaggregate the factors of production considered 
important in United States exports to ASEAN countries, namely natural resources, 
labour, technology, and human capital. Phillips (1984) in extending this approach 
further, divides natural resources into agricultural-resource-intensive and mineral- 
resource-intensive. Here the authors find the changing comparative advantage of 
ASEAN trade within the Pacific Basin to be consistent with that predicted by the 
traditional trade theories. These studies have shown that in most transitional economies, 
considerable change in the composition of exports according to factor intensities has 
followed a general pattern from natural-resource-intensive exports to unskilled-labour­
intensive to physical and human-capital-intensive exports.
The present analysis follows that of Phillips (1984) and Krause (1982), in which 
merchandise trade is considered to be the result of production processes involving 
multiple factors, and each item is classified according to its dominant factor —  that used 
most intensively and/or that which determines the location of production (Phillips 
1984:12). In applying this to Taiwan and Korea during the 1980s the factor intensity 
approach used by Phillips (1984) is adopted in which commodities (as shown in 
Appendix Table 7.1) are classified at the 3-digit SITC level, and are divided into five 
groups according to their intensities in the five factors —  agricultural resources, mineral 
resources, labour, human capital and technology. This study concentrates specifically on 
trade in manufactures as is reflected in Taiwan and Korean factor endowments, though 
the influence of natural resource considerations still remains important in evaluating 
comparative advantage.
Following this, the shares of commodities in total trade are examined and trends in 
export specialisation analysed. Given the difficulties in the direct measurement of a 
country's comparative advantage,3 it is often assumed that a country’s commodity
3 There exist obvious limitations to this method. The index itself is an ex post indicator of comparative 
advantage. Since comparative advantage is related to pre-trade relative prices, or relative unit costs in 
autarkic conditions which are not directly observable, it is necessary to rely upon post-trade data of 
various kinds in empirical research (Warr and Zhang 1990:3). As discussed by Donges and Riedel 
(1976:69), while useful in describing the trade patterns that have taken place, these indices cannot
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pattem of trade can reflect interindustry (intercountry) differences in relative costs 
(price) as well as non-price factors. Data on a country's export pattern is thus assumed 
to say something of the comparative advantage of an industry (country). This study 
examines the pattem of export specialisation to the neglect of the commodity 
composition of imports. This is the usual focus of studies of links between resource 
endowments and foreign trade specialisation (Balassa 1965b, 1977b; Anderson and 
Gamaut 1980) given that the import pattern is commonly distorted more severely by 
trade policies than the export pattern.
The export performance of a particular commodity can be evaluated by comparing the 
relative shares of a country in the world exports of individual commodities and 
indicating changes in relative shares over time (Balassa 1965b: 105). In doing so we 
adopt Balassa's measure of export specialisation given by,
(7.1) ESI(ij) =
(Xij/Xi)
(Xwj/Xw)
where:
ESI : Export Specialisation Index 
Xjj : exports of industry j of country i 
Xwj : total exports of industry j world-wide 
X[  : total exports of country i 
Xw : total exports world-wide
According to the formula, a coefficient greater than one indicates the global market 
share of industry j of country i is greater than the global market share of all industries of 
country i, indicating the commodity has a comparative advantage. For values less than 
one the opposite holds. This situation can be interpreted as industry j of country i is at a 
comparative disadvantage relative to other industries in country i.
Most analyses have incorporated disaggregation to the 3-digit (and in some cases 4- 
digit) level using the United Nations Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). 
In analysing export performance of strategic industries, industries have been classified by
determine whether these patterns are optimum ones. It is possible to infer what developing countries 
can do in the field of industrial expansion, but not what they should do on theoretical grounds. This 
latter prescription can only be made, if at all on the basis of individual country studies in which 
particular factor endowments can be taken into account. In addition, the indices themselves are highly 
sensitive to the choice of years and level of aggregation, although this latter problem is considered to 
have been reasonably overcome here.
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both the SITC and International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC), given this latter 
system concords more closely to Taiwan's industrial product classification.4 Unless 
otherwise specified results are reported for 1981 and 1989 in the case of Taiwan, and 
for 1982 and 1988 in the case of Korea.
7.3 Recent Export Performance
Both Taiwan and Korea are typically cited as examples of highly successful export-led 
industrialisation in which the composition of exports has adapted in response to 
changing factor endowments and the international market environment The pattern of 
their exports is considered consistent with that of the dynamic comparative advantage 
theory. The expansion of manufactured exports, Liang (1992:25) notes, contributed to 
efficient industrialisation by permitting specialisation according to comparative 
advantage, encouraging capital accumulation and financial deepening, and stimulated 
technological improvement Their pattern of trade conforms to these expectations, as 
Taiwan's and Korea's factor endowments place them in an intermediate position between 
industrial and developing countries.5
For both economies, the share of most labour-intensive categories in total exports has 
been declining, albeit slowly, over the 1980s. Declining export specialisation in labour- 
intensive industries has been especially evident in the textiles, apparel, leather, lumber 
and furniture industries. Structural changes in the pattern of exports over the period 
also indicate a growing importance of higher value added products. In the case of 
Taiwan, export growth over the 1980s was strong in electronics products, machinery, 
basic metals and metal products, information and communications equipment, and 
electrical machinery and appliances. In the case of Korea, exports of electrical products 
and textiles grew rapidly, along with exports of non-metallic mineral products, primary 
iron and steel, metals and metal products, transport industries and machinery and 
equipment.
Consistent with trends in comparative cost theory, it would also be expected that the 
export structure of Taiwan and Korea would increasingly come to comprise more
4 It should be noted that the analysis employing the methodology of Phillips uses the human-capital- 
intensity measure, whereas analysis using the United Nation's SITC intensity measure does not attempt 
to separate human capital and physical capital. While useful to separate human capital and physical 
capital, in the case of Taiwan selected data within SITC category 74-79 was not available and this 
exercise could not be undertaken.
5 Between 1970 and 1988, Korea’s share of world exports increased from 0.3 per cent to 2.1 per cent, 
while Taiwan's share of world exports increased from 0.5 per cent to 2.4 per cent over the same period. 
Accompanying this growth has been a dramatic change in the trade composition, with the share of 
manufactures in Taiwan's exports increasing from around 30 per cent in the 1960s to around 95 per 
cent by the late 1980s. A similar pattern can be found in the case of Korea.
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technology and human-capital intensive commodities by the late 1980s. This movement 
can largely be considered the result of both internal developments and external 
pressures. Taiwan by the mid-1980s was facing severe labour shortages, experiencing 
rapid real wage increases, sharp appreciation of the currency and increased pressure 
from mainland China and ASEAN countries characterised by abundant labour supplies.6 
In the case of Korea, the fall in unskilled labour-intensive exports to around 40 per cent 
of total exports by 1987 can also be attributed to rising real wages which by the early 
1980s was eroding Korea's comparative advantage in these commodities. This shift 
away from exports of unskilled labour-intensive goods ran parallel with the increase in 
importance in exports of human-capital and technology-intensive commodities. The 
increase in human-capital-intensive exports was most pronounced over the 1970s, 
corresponding with the Korean government's heavy and chemical industry push 
(Willmott and Thorpe 1992:9-10).
In order to illustrate the changes in the structure of Taiwan and Korean comparative 
advantage during the 1980s, Table 7.1 provides some broad insights into the relative 
export specialisation of both economies. Throughout the 1980s, both economies 
displayed a comparative advantage in traditional labour-intensive commodities with an 
increasing share in capital and technology-intensive commodities. In 1981, textiles and 
clothing exports accounted for 21.5 per cent of total exports in Taiwan. However by 
1989, this share had fallen to 15.4 per cent. In Korea's case this trend has been less 
pronounced, with exports of textiles and clothing falling from 19.5 per cent in 1982 to 
15.9 per cent by 1988. By the late 1980s, electrical machinery had become the largest 
export industry in both Taiwan and Korea, comprising 17.4 per cent and 18.0 per cent 
of their total exports respectively. Korean exports of transportation equipment also 
emerged as a leading export category by the late 1980s, whereas for Taiwan machinery 
was emerging as a major export sector.
Table 7.2 presents export specialisation indices for the top 30 export commodities at the 
three digit SITC level for Taiwan in 1981 and 1989, ranked from highest to lowest 
indices for each of the years. This also indicates that in the early 1980s, Taiwan 
displayed a strong comparative advantage in traditional unskilled labour-intensive goods 
(travel goods and handbags, toys and sporting goods, footwear etc). Whilst still strong, 
this comparative advantage was declining as human-capital-intensive and technology
6 As previously noted, Taiwan's merchandise trade surplus with the United States has also been a 
source of trade tension between the two countries. Rising costs, in addition to United States 
protectionism in these commodities, has led both Taiwan and Korea to change the composition o f their 
exports and diversify their markets by seeking out other trading partners.
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TABLE 7.1: Export Specialisation Indices and Export Performance, by Major Trade 
Category
TAIWAN KOREA
SITC
Code
ESI
Index
1981
Export
Share
1981
ESI
Index
1989
Export
Share
1989
ESI
Index
1982
Export
Share
1982
ESI
Index
1988
Export
Share
1988
51 Chemical elements, components 0.19 (0.54) 0.20 (0.66) 0.31 (0.90) 0.29 (0.97)
52 Coal, petroleum etc 0.37 (0.02) 0.19 (0.01) 0.53 (0.11) 0.76 (0.04)
53 Dyes, tanning, colour products 0.30 (0.13) 0.52 (0.30) 0.24 (0.10) 0.34 (0.20)
54 Medicinal etc products 0.21 (0.17) 0.07 (0.07) 0.14 (0.12) 0.13 (0.14)
55 Perfume, cleaning etc 0.36 (0.15) 0.41 (0.23) 0.26 (0.11) 0.15 (0.08)
56 Fertilizers manufactured 0.01 (0.00) 0.05 (0.02) 2.17 (0.95) 0.82 (0.38)
57 Explosives, protech products 0.97 (0.05) 0.33 (0.02) 2.34* (0.13) 0.18 (0.01)
58 Plastic materials 0.83 (1.17) 1.00 (2.06) 0.62 (0.91) 0.55 (1.20)
59 Chemicals nes 0.27 (0.22) 0.24 (0.23) 0.06 (2.74) 0.16 (2.64)
61 Fur and leather 1.53 (0.47) 1.91 (1.35) 0.57 (0.18) 0.92 (0.40)
62 Rubber manufactuers 1.19 (0.77) 0.81 (0.60) 2.29 (1.40) 1.85 (1.50)
63 Wood and cork manufactuers 6.92 (3.46) 2.59 (1.49) 2.35 (1.12) 0.27 (0.15)
64 Paper & paperboard manuf 0.36 (0.51) 0.30 (0.57) 0.36 (0.51) 0.32 (0.63)
65 Textile yam & fabric 3.22 (8.92) 2.68 (8.30) 3.38 (2.27) 1.77 (1.37)
66 Non-metallic minerals 1.11 (2.01) 0.80 (1.82) 1.44 (2.59) 0.54 (1.21)
67 Iron and steel 0.52 (1.96) 0.46 (1.66) 2.35 (8.73) 1.51 (5.44)
68 Non ferrous metals 0.08 (0.17) 0.36 (0.92) 0.29 (0.54) 0.28 (0.68)
69 Metal manufacturers 2.16 (4.38) 2.52 (5.03) 2.42 (5.06) 1.53 (3.04)
71 Machinery, non-electric 0.50 (5.28) 1.02 (14.00) 0.21 (2.23) 0.51 (6.95)
72 Electrical machinery 2.56 (15.92) 1.95 (17.42) 1.58 (10.01) 1.99 (17.97)
73 Transport equipment 0.37 (3.62) 0.35 (4.20) 1.49 (15.40) 0.87 (10.58)
81 Plumbing, heating, lighting equip 1.72 (0.34) 3.66 (1.04) 0.32 (0.06) 0.60 (0.17)
82 Furniture 3.08 (1.80) 2.90 (2.48) 0.38 (0.23) 0.49 (0.43)
83 Travel goods, handbags 20.14 (3.19) 5.32 (1.46) 9.30 (1.57) 6.81 (1.79)
84 Clothing 5.98 (12.59) 2.14 (7.10) 7.87 (17.28) 4.58 (14.56)
85 Footwear 10.23 (6.38) 5.87 (4.86) 7.70 (5.28) 7.22 (6.11)
86 Instruments, watches & clocks 1.11 (2.09) 0.79 (2.20) 0.66 (1.24) 0.50 (1.35)
89 Misc manufactures 4.38 (12.52) 2.89 (13.14) 1.53 (4.62) 2.14 (9.45)
Notes: The figure denoted by * appears unusually large when compared with data from other years during the
1980s and has thus been treated as an error.
Source: International Economic Data Bank (IEDB), The Australian National University, based on United Nations 
Trade Statistics.
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-intensive commodities became increasingly more important in the composition of 
exports.7 By the late 1980s, Taiwan had developed a comparative advantage in a 
number of human-capital and technology-intensive products.8 These included developed 
cinema film (SITC 863); iron and steel castings (SITC 679); office machinery (SITC 
714); domestic electrical equipment (SITC 725); railway equipment (SITC 731); and 
electric distributing machinery (SITC 723). Further, there was a pronounced increase in 
the indices of human-capital-intensive commodities of hand tools (SITC 695); steel and 
copper nails and nuts (SITC 694); metal manufactures (SITC 698) and sanitary, 
plumbing and heating (SITC 812), with a corresponding increase in their ranking.
Similarly Korea, (Table 7.3) in the early 1980s exhibited a strong comparative advantage 
in unskilled-labour-intensive commodities, which by the late 1980s was still being 
maintained in most of these commodities. A notable exception is the case of ships and 
boats (SITC 735) which ranked number one in 1982, but by 1988 had fallen to be 
ranked tenth. Korea had also developed an above average export specialisation in a 
number of human-capital and technology-intensive commodities between 1982 and 
1988. These included base metal household equipment (SITC 697); sound recorders 
(SITC 891); domestic electrical equipment (SITC 725); iron and steel castings (SITC 
679) and electrical machinery (SITC 729). There was a pronounced increase in the 
ranking of the following commodities: railway equipment (SITC 731); developed cinema 
film (SITC 863) and telecommunications equipment (SITC 724).9 Interestingly, 
Taiwan's comparative advantage in this latter commodity was falling the 1980s.
7.4 Factor Composition and Export Performance
Numerous studies show that the export industries in both countries in the 1960s were 
labour-intensive (Balassa 1985; Kuo and Fei 1985; Schive 1987b). However prolonged 
export-led industrialisation will eventually exhaust surplus labour more rapidly if the 
economy follows its comparative advantages in expanding its trade. This is precisely the 
experience of Korea and Taiwan during the 1960s. Fei (1979) points out that Taiwan's 
era of labour surplus came to an end around 1968-70 followed by a movement into
7 Although during this process of development in Korea and Taiwan it would be expected that within 
these 3-digit categories there was considerable capital-intensification.
8 Whilst not shown for reasons of conciseness, several other human-capital and technology-intensive 
products had began to exhibit a comparative advantage by the late 1980s.
9 Willmott and Thorpe (1992:15) in measuring the revealed comparative advantage in a number of 
human-capital and technology-intensive commodities between 1976 and 1987 find Korea had 
developed a comparative advantage in the following commodities: structures and parts not elsewhere 
specified (SITC 691); auto data processing equipment (SITC 752, 753); household type equipment 
(SITC 786); passenger motor vehicles (SITC 781); trailers non-motor (SITC 786). They also found a 
pronounced increase in the indices for the human-capital-intensive commodities of television receivers 
(SITC 761) and radio broadcasting receivers (SITC 726).
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TABLE 7.3: Top 30 Commodities by Export Specialisation Indices, Korea: 1982, 1988
Rank
SITC Code
Index
1982
Rank
SITC Code
Index
1988
1 735 Ships and boats 10.67 UL 1 851 Footwear 7.22 UL
2 842 Fur clothing 9.59 UL 2 831 Travel goods and handbags 6.81 UL
3 831 Travel goods and handbags 9.30 UL 3 731 Railway equipment 6.77 HK
4 841 Clothing 7.82 UL 4 842 Fur clothing 5.49 UL
5 851 Footwear 7.71 UL 5 696 Cutlery 5.25 HK
6 672 Iron, steel primary forms 6.75 HK 6 841 Clothing 4.56 UL
7 654 Tulle, lace, embroidery 6.25 UL 7 653 Woven textiles 4.44 UL
8 653 Woven textiles 6.23 UL 8 697 Base metal household equip 4.09 HK
9 731 Railway equipment 6.07 HK 9 891 Sound recorders 4.03 HK
10 696 Cutlery 5.35 HK 10 735 Ships and boats 3.75 UL
11 693 Wire products non-electrical 5.23 HK 11 894 Toys, sporting goods 3.61 UL
12 697 Base metal household equip 4.01 HK 12 693 Wire products non-electrical 3.32 HK
13 894 Toys,sporting goods 3.69 UL 13 725 Domestic electrical equipment 3.30 HK
14 656 Textile products 3.46 UL 14 672 Iron, steel primary forms 3.02 HK
15 631 Veneers, plywood 3.45 AR 15 724 Telecommunications equip 2.90 HK
16 651 Textile yarn and thread 3.38 UL 16 654 Tulle, lace, embroidery 2.87 UL
17 666 Pottery 2.86 MR 17 863 Developed cinema film 2.81 TI
18 674 Iron & steel universal plate, sheet 2.84 MR 18 679 Iron and steel castings 2.50 HK
19 561 Fertilisers, manufactures 2.71 TI 19 656 Textile products 2.25 TI
20 695 Hand tools 2.68 HK 20 655 Special textile fabrics 2.15 UL
21 724 Telecommunications equipment 2.65 HK 21 612 Man ufactures of leather 2.09 AR
22 612 Man ufactures of leather 2.54 AR 22 729 Electrical machinery 2.07 TI
23 694 Steel, copper nails and nuts 2.48 HK 23 899 Other manufactures 1.95 UL
24 571 Explosives 2.34 TI 24 695 Hand tools 1.89 HK
25 899 Other man ufactures 2.25 UL 25 677 Iron and steel wire 1.86 HK
26 673 Iron and steel shapes 2.01 HK 26 651 Textile yarn and thread 1.77 UL
27 655 Special textile fabrics 2.00 UL 27 666 Pottery 1.66 UL
28 652 Cotton fabrics, woven 1.91 UL 28 694 Steel, copper nails and nuts 1.56 HK
29 864 Watches an d clocks 1.90 HK 29 678 Tubes, pipes and fittings 1.48 HK
30 863 Developed cinema film 1.74 TI 30 676 Railway construction material 1.40 HK
Note: AR = agricultural-resource-intensive commodities; MR = mineral-rcsourcc-intcnsive commodities;
HK - human-capital-in tensive commodities; UL = unskilled-labour-intensive commodities and 
and TI = technology-intensive commodities.
Source: IEDB.
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heavy and chemical industries in response to changes in comparative advantage, and in 
response to the onset of labour shortage and rising real wages (Ho 1981; Galenson 
1982). From the 1970s, both economies were focusing on the development of domestic 
materials and equipment industries to replace imports (Ranis 1979). Schive (1990) 
notes that Taiwan moved into this 'secondary import substitution phase' during the 
second half of the 1970s, while simultaneously expanding exports, and that this phase 
had largely finished by the early 1980s as trade liberalisation gathered momentum. 
Liang (1992:27) has also shown that in the case of Taiwan the emphasis on intra­
industry trade through increased import liberalisation and sectoral diversification of 
exports on a broad front was to some degree an important means of overcoming 
emerging trade tensions and in leading to a more balanced industrial structure. In 
measuring intra-industry trade levels from 1965 to 1991, Liang finds that by the early 
1990s, labour-intensive products other than miscellaneous manufactures were 
characterised by low intra-industry trade levels or high degrees of specialisation, while 
the intra-industry levels of transport equipment and machinery were high.
Both Riedel (1992:285) and Yeats (1989)10 find that despite rising real wages and a 
rapidly expanding stock of physical and human capital, Taiwan’s relative share of labour- 
intensive exports did not decline significandy over the 1980s. Riedel notes that this 
relative factor intensity of Taiwan's exports presents a paradox akin to that presented by 
Leontief. While Taiwan has increased substantially its relative endowment of physical 
and human capital, its exports remain concentrated in relatively labour-intensive product 
categories. But he notes that this paradox may be more apparent than real; the result of 
aggregation through the lumping together of similar products of different quality. As 
Riedel (1992:287) explains:
If higher quality products require more physical and human capital per worker than lower 
quality products, a change in the relative endowment of capital and skills would lead to both 
intra- and inter-sectoral shifts in the composition of exports. The standard analysis of the 
factor content of trade captures only the inter-sectoral shifts. However, intra-sectoral shifts 
may well be more important if there are substantial fixed start-up costs to getting established in 
a new industry. In these circumstances, firms would normally exploit the advantage of a 
greater relative abundance of capital and skills by upgrading to higher quality products within 
an industry before shifting to a different industry in which they lack experience and the know­
how that comes from experience.
In fact Riedel (1992:287) provides evidence that quality upgrading took place in 
response to changing factor endowments in the case of machinery and electrical 
equipment, and their major sub-categories. He also cites the work of Aw and Roberts 
(1988) in finding similar evidence of product upgrading for Taiwan's footwear exports.
to Not sighted by the author. This reference is taken from Riedel (1992:285).
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In applying the previously outlined approach of Phillips, Table 7.4 shows that in the 
early 1980s, the share of unskilled-labour-intensive commodities in Taiwan's exports 
was 46.4 per cent, similar to the 46.9 per cent share of such exports in Korea. By the 
end of the 1980s, Taiwan's export share of these commodities (37.3 per cent) had also 
fallen to be a similar share to that of Korea (38.6 per cent).
TABLE 7.4: Taiwan and Korean Export Composition by Factor Intensity
(per cent)
1981
Taiwan
1989
Korea
1981 1989
Agricultural-resource-intensive goods 12.9 8.6 10.1 5.6
Mineral-resource-intensive goods 3.0 2.7 3.9 3.0
Unskilled-labour-intensive goods 46.4 37.3 46.9 38.6
Human-capital-intensive goods 23.2 22.8 27.8 31.0
Technology-intensive goods 14.4 27.9 10.9 21.9
Note: The commodity groups on which the analysis is based are detailed in Appendix Table 7.1.
Source: International Economic Data Bank (IEDB), The Australian National University, based on 
United Nations Trade Statistics.
Table 7.4 also shows that by the early 1980s, the export share of technology-intensive 
commodities in Taiwan was 14.1 per cent, larger than that of Korea with 10.9 per cent. 
By 1989, both had doubled their respective shares in these commodities to 27.9 per cent 
in the case of Taiwan, and 21.9 per cent in the case of Korea. Human-capital and 
technology-intensive commodity exports together contributed to over 50 per cent of 
total exports in both countries, indicating a considerable shift in specialisation away from 
labour-intensive sectors which in the 1960s had accounted for around 50 per cent of 
exports. Largely as a result of the strong growth in technology-intensive exports, 
Korea's exports of human capital-intensive commodities increased marginally from 27.8 
per cent in 1981 to 31.0 per cent by 1989.11 Taiwan's share of human-capital-intensive 
exports fell slightly from 23.2 per cent in 1981 to 22.8 per cent by 1989.12
However, within these sectors there were variations in performance. Table 7.5 indicates 
for example that the value of production of heavy, chemical and technology-intensive
11 Chowdhury and Islam (1993) find that the export specialisation index in human-capital-intensive 
products rose in all the NIEs (newly industrialising economies) during 1970-85, except for Taiwan. By 
1985 though, only Korea displayed a comparative advantage in human-capital-intensive products (1.84 
compared to 0.78 in the case of Taiwan). Korea's comparative advantage in technology-intensive 
products declined during the first half of the 1980s (1.16 compared to Taiwan, 1.44), as did Korea's 
export specialisation index in physical capital-intensive products (0.53, compared to that of Taiwan, 
0.48).
12 This classification may be somewhat misleading given that a number of capital-intensive 
commodities are also classified as belonging to the mincral-resource-intensive category.
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products by 1990 represented 64.5 per cent of total manufacturing, with 42.3 per cent 
coming from the electronics, information and machinery industries. The chemical 
industry however, while increasing up until 1981, remained constant until 1986 
thereafter declining.
TABLE 7.5: Manufacturing Industrial Structure (Production Value), Taiwan
(US$ million)
Heavy. Chemical & Technology - Inteasive
Period Chemical Electrical Machinery, Vehicle Subtotal Consumer Total Prod'n Average
& Electronic & Metal Commod. Value Growth
& Others US$m Rate
1951 .. n.a. ,. n.a. n.a. n.a. 460 n.a.
1961 .. .. .. 800 11.7
1966 10.1 5.4 9.5 25.0 75.0 100 2064
1971 24.0 11.0 13.0 48.0 52.0 100 6076 16.4
1976 24.9 9.6 16.6 51.1 48.9 100 24580
1981 30.2 11.6 19.3 61.1 38.9 100 66550 14.1
1986 30.0 15.7 19.5 65.2 34.8 100 98760
1990 22.2 18.4 23.9 64.5 35.5 100 155000 6.8
Notes: .. not available; n.a. - not applicable. 
Source: Table 2, Wang (1991:362).
7.5 Export Performance of Strategic/Technology-Intensive Commodities
In this section we attempt to draw some conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
Taiwan government's strategic industry policy and the role that both the Korean and 
Taiwan governments have played in the transition of the export structure towards 
technology-intensive commodities. From Chapter 6 it was found that in the case of 
Taiwan, assistance to technology-intensive industries was low compared to other 
manufacturing sectors, indicating that a 'strategic trade policy' was not in fact being 
implemented. The structure of subsidy to industry was found to be relatively uniformly 
dispersed throughout the manufacturing sector. Exceptions to this were those industries 
within the chemical and textile sectors. Yet few commodities within the chemicals 
sector exhibited an export specialisation over the 1980s, indicating that resources were 
not being directed towards industries with an emerging comparative advantage. This 
appears as somewhat contrary to other views regarding the importance of government 
industrial policy intervention in Taiwan's technological advancement. Simon (1992:100) 
for example notes that of the many components of Taiwan's strategy for technological 
advance, 'most critical have been the financial and tax policies designed to encourage
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firms to adopt new ideas and innovation. Wade (1990a:364-7) notes that the role of 
banks and state-led financial institutions has been highly important'.
Wade (1990b:232-3) states that:
East Asian governments (minus Hong Kong) are active players in the market, able to influence 
the use of public and private resources in line with a vision of how the industrial structure of 
the country should be evolving. They can be seen as both the rule maker and the first player in 
a multistage game, whose moves influence the credible options of other players ... Government 
interventions of this type have in fact been able to improve upon the results of self-adjusting 
markets. So, not only have the macroeconomic policies of East Asian governments been 
important, but so have interventions at the sectoral, product and even firm level.
By the 1980s it appears Taiwan's export share of technology-intensive commodities was 
larger than that of Korea's. Table 7.6 provides measures of export specialisation and 
export shares of technology-intensive industries. In the case of Taiwan, the table 
indicates that, by 1989, out of a total of 37 commodities, 14 of these commodities 
displayed an export specialisation. Of these 14 commodities, 8 had exhibited a strong 
export specialisation in 1981, 6 products increased their export specialisation over the 
1980s, while the export specialisation of 4 products fell over the period. It is interesting 
to note that no commodities within the chemicals sector (SITC 51-59) with the 
exception of plastic materials (SITC 58), had an export specialisation over the 1980s. A 
similar trend can be seen for export shares. However, Wade (1990b) notes that this is 
an industry successfully promoted by the Taiwan government. His analysis is based on 
examining the growth of this industry at the aggregate ISIC level. Disaggregation of the 
chemicals industry according to the measures employed here, shows that industrial 
chemicals (ISIC 351), other chemical products (ISIC 352), petroleum refining (ISIC 
353) and miscellaneous petroleum products (ISIC 354) did not exhibit export 
specialisation over the 1980s. Interestingly, the export specialisation index of the two 
remaining commodities, rubber products (ISIC 355) and plastic products (ISIC 356), 
fell over the period of the 1980s.13 Table 7.6 also shows that relative to Taiwan, Korea 
had developed export specialisation in fewer technology-intensive commodities by the 
end of the 1980s. Of the 7 commodities exhibiting export specialisation in 1981, 4 of 
these products were characterised by declining export specialisation and export share. 
Three commodities exhibited export specialisation by 1988. These were office machines 
(SITC 714), domestic appliances (SITC 719.4) and batteries and accumulators (SITC
13 The following reports RCA indices of these commodities for 1981 and 1989, with export shares 
given in parentheses: industrial chemicals: 1981 —  0.32 (2.61), 1989 —  0.48 (4.03); other chemical 
products; 1981 —  0.14 (0.38), 1989 —  0.16 (0.46); petroleum refining; 1981 —  0.32 (2.03), 1989 —  
0.21 (0.61); miscellaneous petroleum products; 1981 —  0.13 (0.05), 1989 —  0.14 (0.04); rubber 
products: 1981 —  2.05 (2.06), 1989 —  1.54 (1.54) and plastic products; 1981 —  7.01 (5.67), 1989 —  
4.38 (5.78).
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TABLE 7.6: Export Specialisation Indices and Export Shares of Technology-Intensive 
Industries
TAIWAN _______KOREA
SITC
ESI
Index
1981
Export
Share
1981
ESI
Index
1989
Export
Share
1989
ESI
Index
1982
Export
Share
1982
ESI
Index
1988
Export
Share
1988
51 Chemical elements, components 0.19 (0.54) 0.20 (0.66) 0.31 (0.90) 0.29 (0.97)
52 Coal, petroleum etc 0.37 (0.02) 0.19 (0.01) 0.53 (0.11) 0.76 (0.04)
54 Medicinal products etc 0.21 (0.17) 0.07 (0.07) 0.14 (0.12) 0.13 (0.14)
56 Fertilisers manufactured 0.01 (0.00) 0.05 (0.02) 2.17 (1.00) 0.82 (0.30)
57 Explosives, protech products 0.97 (0.05) 0.33 (0.08) 2.34 (0.13) 0.18 (0.00)
58 Plastic materials 0.83 (1.17) 1.00 (2.06) 0.62 (0.91) 0.55 (1.20)
59 Chemicals nes 0.27 (0.22) 0.24 (0.23) 0.06 (2.74) 0.16 (2.64)
711 Power machinery non electrical 0.11 (0.16) 0.04 (0.08) 0.24 (0.40) 0.25 (0.50)
712 Agricultural machinery 0.07 (0.05) 0.20 (0.09) 0.03 (0.02) 0.10 (0.05)
714 Office machines 0.86 (1.21) 2.22 (8.06) 0.34 (1.60) 1.13 (1.86)
715 Metalworking machinery 1.42 (0.97) 1.54 (1.04) 0.30 (0.18) 0.18 (0.12)
716 Mi sc machinery .. .. .. .. - .. - ..
717 Textile, leather machinery 2.05 (1.07) 1.84 (1.23) 0.31 (0.16) 0.34 (0.23)
718 Machines for special industries 0.13 (0.20) 0.25 (0.34) 0.07 (0.11) 0.13 (0.17)
7191 Healing, cooling equipment 0.06 (0.03) 0.43 (0.27) 0.30 (0.18) 0.55 (0.34)
7192 Pumps, centrifuges 0.27 (0.21) 0.34 (0.32) 0.08 (0.06) 0.17 (0.15)
7193 Mechanical handling equipment 0.56 (0.34) 0.36 (0.25) 0.26 (0.16) 0.80 (0.51)
7194 Domestic appl. non-electrical 0.49 (0.00) 1.74 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00) 0.60(1.08)* (0.00)
7195 Power tools 0.73 (0.22) 1.89 (0.70) 0.42 (0.12) 0.11 (0.04)
7196 Non-electrical machines 0.25 (0.08) 0.52 (0.22) 0.11 (0.04) 0.22 (0.10)
7197 Ball, roller, bearings etc 0.16 (0.03) 0.41 (0.10) 0.08 (0.01) 0.08 (0.02)
7198 Other machines non-electrical 0.53 (0.28) 0.78 (0.64) 0.09 (0.05) 0.32 (0.26)
722 Elec power machine, switchgear 1.24 (1.70) 1.71 (2.97) 0.58 (0.80) 0.61 (1.01)
723 Electric distributing machinery 1.26 (0.40) 1.97 (0.80) 1.67 (0.80) 0.97 (1.06)
7249 Telecommunications equipment 3.86 (4.02) 2.35 (3.79) 1.22 (1.29) 1.46 (2.34)
726 Electro Medical, xray equipment 0.01 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.08 (0.02)
7291 Batteries, accumulators 1.11 (0.15) 0.85 (0.14) 0.72 (0.97) 1.44 (0.24)
7292 Electric lamps, bulb 2.01 (0.19) 2.02 (0.25) 1.59 (0.15) 1.27 (0.17)
7293 Transistors, valves 3.06 (2.30) 1.73 (3.32) 3.52 (2.98) 3.45 (6.36)
7295 Elec measuring, control equip 0.13 (0.07) 0.34 (0.10) 0.33 (0.19) 0.29 (0.12)
7296 Electro-mechanical hand tools 0.41 (0.03) 1.10 (0.10) 0.04 (0.00) 0.16 (0.02)
7297 Particle accelerator 0.03 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00) 0.33 (0.00) - (0.00)
7299 Other electrical machinery 1.36 (0.62) 1.95 (1.34) 0.65 (0.30) 0.54 (0.38)
734 Aircraft 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.17 (0.25) 0.12 (0.19)
861 Instruments, apparatus 0.92 (1.05) 0.82 (1.62) 0.44 (0.52) 0.43 (0.80)
862 Photo, dnema supplies 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.11 (0.04)
863 Developed dnema fil m 0.30 (0.00) 2.99 (0.03) 1.74 (0.03) 2.81(3.49)* (0.03)
Note: 1) * Denotes figures for 1989; Power tools (SITC 7195) had acomparative advantageof 1.10 by 1982.
2).. not available. 
Source: IEDB.
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729.1). Korea in fact moved from having a strong export specialisation to no longer 
having export specialisation by 1989 in fertilisers (SITC 56) and explosives (SITC 57).
As discussed in previous chapters a number of products were promoted by the Taiwan 
government on the basis that these industries were important for the future industrial 
development of Taiwan and were thus eligible for various preferential financial and fiscal 
incentives. As the strategic industry policy was introduced in 1982, an examination of 
the changing export specialisation in these commodities in Taiwan for the years 1981 
and 1989 provide a basis from which to determine the success of the policy as measured 
by changing export share. Appendix Table 7.2 provides a list of the strategic industries 
as identified by the Industrial Development and Investment Centre (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs), Applicable Scope o f a Strategic Industry, 1989. Table 7.7 lists the 
61 strategic commodities that have been classified according to the SITC system. In 
1981, Taiwan had an export specialisation in 27 of the 61 products identified as strategic 
products. By 1989, this had increased only slightly to 28 products, representing 45 per 
cent of the sample. Of these 28 products, 22 or 79 pert cent of these commodities 
already possessed an export specialisation by 1981. The export specialisation indices of 
16 products actually fell, with the export specialisation indices of 6 products increasing 
over the period. These commodities were iron and steel hoops and strips (SITC 675), 
office machinery (SITC 714), statistical machines (SITC 714.3), leather working 
machinery (SITC 717.2), switchgear (SITC 722.2), and electro-mechanical hand tools 
(SITC 729.6).
In order to compare the above results for Taiwan with that of the Korean experience, 
export specialisation indices and export shares of the same commodities have been 
measured for 1982 and 1988. The results presented in Table 7.7 indicate that in 1982, 
Korea exhibited export specialisation in 21 of the products considered 'strategic' by the 
Taiwan government, falling slightly to be 20 commodities by 1989. Of these 20 
products, 15 already exhibited export specialisation in 1982, the export specialisation 
indices of 14 commodities fell, and 5 commodities increased their export specialisation 
over the period. These products included office machinery (SITC 714), statistical 
machines (SITC 714.3), electric power machinery (722.1), batteries (SITC 729.1) and 
passenger motor cars (SITC 732.1). Due to the possible aggregation problems inherent 
when attempting to classifying commodities, Table 7.8 provides measures of export 
specialisation and export share by ISIC classification. This table also provides support 
for the results presented in Table 7.7. By 1989, of the total 20 commodities identified as 
'strategic', 12 of these commodities were found to exhibit an export specialisation. Of 
these 12 commodities, 9 commodities already exhibited export specialisation in 1981, 
with 3 commodities increasing their export specialisation over the 1980s: metal and
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TABLE 7.8: Export Specialisation Indices and Export Shares of Strategic Industries 
(ISIC Code)
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ISIC TA IW A N KOREA
1981 1989 1982 1988
3610 Pottery, china & earthenw are 3.19 2.96 1.57 0.69
(1.09) (1.00) (0.43) (0.37)
381 Prefab m etal products excl m achinery 1.43 2.26 1.3 0.95
(4.94) (6.68) (4.50) (3.08)
3811 Cutlery, hand tools & hardw are 2.63 2.59 0.82 0.65
(2.09) (2.00) (0.55) (0.54)
3813 Structural m etal products 0.12 0.13 2.32 2.16
(0.12) (0.07) (2.46) (1.03)
382 M achinery, except electrical 0.43 0.95 0.14 0.53
(6.06) (14.66) (2.46) (8.08)
3821 Engines & turbines 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00)
3822 Agricultural m achinery & equip 0.06 0.20 0.07 0.05
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
3823 M etal & woodworking m achinery 0.87 1.26 0.17 0.2
(1.30) (1.90) (0.33) (0.25)
3824 Special industrial m achinery 0.17 0.48 0.08 0.18
(0.69) 0 -7 0 ) (0.51) (0.57)
3825 Office & com puting m achinery 0.62 1.90 0.22 1.04
(1.27) (8.30) (0.57) (4.35)
3829 M achinery except electrical 0.51 0.52 0.17 0.52
(2.72) (2.63) (0.98) (2.87)
383 Electrical machnery &  apparatus 2.05 1.77 1.30 2.00
(17.04) (18.85) (10.76) (20.89)
3831 Electrical industrial m achinery 1.06 1.50 0.11 0.17
(1.87) (2.84) (0-19) (0.28)
3832 Radio, TV & com m unication equip 2.70 1.86 1.97 2.89
(13.02) (12.64) (9.53) (18.85)
3833 Household appliances 2.98 3.13 0.48 1.75
(0.96) (1.12) (0.14) (0.72)
3839 Electrical appliances nes 0.85 1.42 0.64 0.69
(1.18) (2.22) (0.89) (1.03)
385 Professional goods 0.75 0.70 0.61 0.41
(2.29) (2.31) (1.47) (1.40)
3851 Scientific, m easur. & control, equip 0.18 0.27 0.17 0.18
(0.29) (0.47) (0.35) (0.28)
3852 Photographic & optical goods 1.08 1.24 0.58 0.63
(0.96) (1-31) (0.43) (0.65)
3853 W atches & clocks 1.88 1.08 1.92 0.77
0 -0 4 ) (0.53) (0.69) (0.47)
Note: nes - not elsewhere specified.
Source: IEDB.
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woodwork machinery (ISIC 3823), office and computing machinery (ISIC 3825) and 
electrical appliances (ISIC 3839).
Additional evidence is provided by Pack (1992a) who also addresses the view of those 
who assert the Taiwan government created comparative advantage in new sectors. In 
focusing on the sectoral evolution of employment and value added in 1986 relative to 
that in 1971, Pack finds there is little significant correlation between sector expansion 
and various sectoral characteristics, namely, the ratio of fixed capital to labour (at 
historical cost) in 1986, the average wage in 1986, and the ratio of value added to total 
employment in the sector.
In particular, those sectors that exhibited a large expansion in employment (or value 
added) — clothing and footwear, plastics, electrical equipment, and metal products — 
are all characterised by below average wages and value added per worker. Below 
average wages even at the end of the period in rapidly expanding sectors tends to 
confirm the standard view of the determinants of sectoral evolution, while lower than 
average value added per worker suggests no rents are being earned by owners or capital 
or those who possess unusual skills. While it is possible that some of the development, 
for example in electronics would not have come about without specific efforts by the 
government to establish research institutes and industrial estates, the main burden of 
evidence is that even in the period of economic growth which saw the introduction of 
new technology-based products, the sectoral pattern of expansion is not consistent with 
assigning a major role to industrial policy (Pack 1992a:97-8). In fact, Pack concludes 
that the picture that emerges for Taiwan is a very neoclassical one. The cross-sector 
dispersion of wages is small compared to other developing countries, comparable to 
that of OECD countries, and is consistent with the hypothesis that labour markets are 
very competitive, with skill differentials likely to account for the intersector variation 
that exists.14
14 Pack also compares the evolution of Taiwan's industrial structure to that o f  other developing 
countries of similar income undergoing growth in income per capita, by employing the normal patterns 
calculated by Chenery and Syrquin (1986) and Kubo et al. (1986). While the analysis o f both studies 
ends in 1971, this was presumably the period in which the greatest quantitative impact of government 
policy would have been experienced given government enterprises were more important, savings rates 
were not as high, and the role of import restrictions still remained in the recently liberalised economy. 
Pack’s conclusion is that the evolution of the sectoral structure of Taiwan manufacturing, at least at the 
two digit level, looks similar to that in other countries contained in the study. Sectors promoted by the 
government such as metals and chemicals, did not growth more rapidly than would have been expected 
from a typical country achieving Taiwan's level of income in successive years. In order to provide an 
insight as to whether the industrial structure of Taiwan deepened more than other countries o f similar 
income (and size), Pack (1992a:96) also compares international calculations of forward and backward 
linkages for aggregated manufacturing groups. He finds that while backward and forward linkages in 
Taiwan exceed those in other countries in an international sample, in most cases the differences were 
not statistically significant. While a more detailed sectoral breakdown would reveal differences from 
international patterns and despite the limitations associated with both tests, Pack asserts that for the
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7.6 Conclusion
Both Wade (1990a, 1990b) and Amsden (1989) maintain that the industrial success of 
Taiwan, was to an important degree, attributable to government effort to direct the 
economy's sectoral evolution. Neoclassical trade theory, on the other hand, asserts that 
Taiwan's industrial success was fuelled by a reliance on a specialisation in labour- 
intensive products, following a (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) factor endowment-based 
comparative advantage. From the analysis undertaken here, strong support is found for 
the dominance of a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 'comparative advantage' based 
explanation over industry policy intervention in determining Taiwan's export 
specialisation. Consistent with that predicted by traditional trade theories, as the 
competitive edge of Korea and Taiwan based on a labour cost advantage began to 
dissipate over the 1980s, both economies increasingly moved to specialise in more 
capital and technology-intensive commodities.
The results from Chapter 6 suggested that the strategic/technology sector was not the 
major recipient of preferential subsidies and, with a few exceptions, government 
incentive measures appeared to be distributed relatively uniformly. However, those 
sectors identified from Chapter 6 as being more heavily assisted by the late 1980s did 
not, according to the evidence presented here, exhibit an emerging export specialisation 
over the course of the decade. Rather, the export specialisation index of many of these 
commodities fell over the period.
An analysis of the share of commodities in total trade and trends in export specialisation 
of strategic industries indicate that there did not exist a distinct tendency for strategic or 
technology-intensive industries, to display an increasing export specialisation following 
the introduction of the government's strategic industry policy. Many of these 'strategic' 
industries exhibited an export specialisation prior to the introduction of the policy. The 
export specialisation index of other strategic products actually fell over the period. The 
share of technology-intensive exports in both economies' increased by around 50 per 
cent over the 1980s. Despite not receiving preferential treatment, Korea's high 
technology sector performed as well as that of Taiwan’s.
There is insufficient evidence to support either the governed market view or new trade 
view that government intervention was important in furthering the industrial 
development of Taiwan during the 1980s. Instead, it appears that the government’s 
preferential financing policy was not significant in furthering the export performance of
entire manufacturing sector, government intervention did not have a decisive effect on the economic 
structure.
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strategic and technology-intensive industries. While policies of the 1970s may have 
contributed to the export growth during the 1980s, at the very least it could still be said 
that the implementation of the preferential financing policy in the early 1980s was not 
significant. Moreover, government incentives have been uniformly available to most 
manufacturing sectors since the early 1960s.
Finally, support for the 'governed market model' in the case of Taiwan is often based on 
government announced plans in which specific industry initiatives are detailed. The 
Taiwan government's strategic industry policy of the 1980s provides some support for a 
view, often difficult to substantiate in practice, that details of government plans can 
differ from implementation of policy or can be ineffectual. This factor has been largely 
ignored within the literature.
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Appendix TABLE 7.1: Commodity Classifications
Commodity SITC
Agricultural-resource-intensive goods 
Food and live animals 0
Beverages and tobacco 1
Hides, skins, furs undressed 21
Oil seeds, nuts, kernels 22
Crude and synthetic rubber 23
Wood, lumber and cork 24
Pulp and waste paper 25
Textile fibres 26
Crude animal & vegetable matter nes 29 
Animal, vegetable oil, fat 4
Leather, dressed fur etc 61
Wood, cork manufactures nes 63
Mineral-resource-intensive goods 
Crude fertiliser, minerals nes 27
Metalliferous ores, scrap 28
Minerals, fuels etc 3
Non-metal mineral manufactures 661-663 
Pearls, prec. & semi-prec. stones 667
Pig iron etc 671
Non-ferrous metals 68
Unskilled-labour-intensive goods 
Textile yarn, fabric etc 65
Glass 664-666
Ships and boats 735
Plumbing, heating, lighting equipment 81 
Furniture 82
Travel goods, handbags 83
Clothing 84
Footwear 85
Articles of plastic nes 893
Toys, sporting goods etc 894
Office supplies nes 895
Other manufactured goods 899
War, firearms, ammunition 951
Commodity SITC
Technology-intensive goods 
Chemical elements, comp. 51
Coal, petroleum etc 52
Medicinal products etc 54
Fertilisers, manufactured 56
Explosives, pyrotechnical prod 57
Plastic materials etc 58
Chemicals nes 59
Machinery, non-electric 71
Electric pwr mach, switchgear 722
Electric distrib. mach 723
Electro-medical, x-ray equip 726
Electrical machinery nes 729
Aircraft 734
Instruments, apparatus 861
Photo, cinema supplies 862
Developed cinema film 863
Human-capital-intensive goods 
Dyes, tanning, colour prod 53
Perfume, cleaning prod, etc 55
Rubber manufactures nes 62
Paper, paperboard manuf 64
Steel 672-679
Metal manufactures nes 69
Telecommunications equip 724
Domestic electric equipment 725
Railway vehicles 731
Road motor vehicles 732
Road vehicles - non-motor 733
Watches and clocks 864
Sound recorders, producers 891
Printed matter 892
Works of art etc 896
Gold, silverware, jewellery 897
Notes: nes - not elsewhere specified 
Source: Appendix Table A l, Phillips (1984)
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Appendix TABLE 7.2: Applicable Scope of the Strategic Industry15
The scope of the strategic industry is confined to those 'productive enterprises' which
are capable of producing or manufacturing any one or more of the following products.
I. Machinery Manufacturing Industry
Machinery
• Steel moulds (dies) manufacturing: such as die-casting moulds; press moulds; 
forging moulds; plastic moulds; drawing dies etc.
• High strength power metallurgy products
• Castings: precision castings; high tension castings; globular cast iron; alloy steel 
castings
• Precision forging, pressing and stamping; cold forging after hot forging; closed hot 
forging; warm forging; cold forging and precision pressing and stamping
• Heat treatment and metal surface treatment
• Combined harvest machine
• Engines (excluding automobile diesel engines)
• Tractor
• Screw type air compressor
• Refrigerant compressor
• Anti-pollution equipment: bag filter, electrostatic precipator, incinerator; waste 
water treatment equipment; garbage or industrial waste water treatment equipment
• Pumps
• Large size high pressure value
• Vacuum equipment
• Chemical engineering equipment: heat exchanger; reactor; and pressure or vacuum
type mixer
• Electrical welding machine: automatic D.C. CO2 welding machine; A.C. electric 
pulsed alternating current arc welder; portable type arc welder; shock protecting 
device of A.C. electric welder
• Automatic casting machine: fully automatic high speed/high pressure moulding 
machine of green sand; fully automatic moulding equipment under static pressure; 
automatic moulding equipment with vacuum sealed process (full automatic 
moulding equipment with vacuum sealed process (V-process)); full automatic 
mould permanent casting equipment, core shooter moulding machine
15 As published by the Industrial Development and Investment Centre, Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Republic Of China.
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• Automatic vending machine; money exchange machine
• Automatic forging machine, pressing machine
• Fully automatic packaging machine
• Automatic injection moulding machine
• Industrial and computer controlled sewing machine, and its parts and components
• Solar energy equipment and components
• High-efficiency, high-pressure boiler: industrial furnaces and burners
• Optical instrument: scientific microscope
• Robot
• Numerical control machine tools
• Automatic manufacturing system: transferable manufacturing line; manufacturing 
line by applying robot; flexible manufacturing system; computer integrated 
manufacturing system (such as computer aided manufacturing system (CAM); 
computer aided test system (CAT); computer aided design system (CAD); 
management information system (MIS), etc)
• Precision machine tool: combined machine tool; high precision grinder; super­
speed high-precision lathe; jig grinder and borer
• Dry type copy machine
• Textile machines (spinning and shutteless weaving; dyeing and finishing etc.; such 
as ring spinning frame, shutteless loom & high temperature-pressure dyeing)
• Precision measurement instrument and gauges
• Heavy duty construction equipment
• Fork lifts
• Ball screw
• Movement of quartz watches and clocks
• Precision mechanical parts for electric and electronic products (such as DC motor; 
video tape recorder, disk driver, printer etc.)
• Bearing and its parts and components
• Precision gears
• Non-lubricating sliding rail
• Automatic-compensation tool system for machine tools
• High-efficiency transmitting belt, timing belt; multi-vee belt
• Industrial clutch, brake and shaft coupling: electro-magnetic clutch and brake; 
mechanical clutch and brake; pneumatic clutch and brake; coupling
• Precision fixtures
• Hydraulic and pneumatic components: hydraulic pump; hydraulic motor, hydraulic 
and pneumatic control valve; proportion type control valve
• Ultra-high speed tools: carbide and coating tool; ceramic tool; cubic boron 
nitrizing sand wheel; hob; broach.
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• Seamless steel tubes
• Non-traditional manufacturing equipment: such as linear cutting and electrical 
discharge machine; plasma cutting machine; high pressure water cutting machine; 
laser cutting machine etc.
• Automatic producing equipment and components thereof
• Wind-energy equipment and components
• Oil seals and mechanical seals
Automobile parts
• Components and parts for engine (such as, carburettors; crank shaft; cam shaft; 
connecting rods; cylinder head; cylinder block, etc.)
• Transmission system (such as front axle and its suspension; rear axle and its 
suspension; differential gear assembly; propeller gear assembly; clutch, propeller 
shaft; variable speed system assembly, etc.)
• Steering mechanism (such as main pole; steering gear, connector, connecting rod 
etc.)
• Main electric components and parts (such as ignition coil; spark plug; motor 
starter: distributor, generator electric igniter; head light etc.)
• Brake system (such as brake master cylinder vacuum booster; disc type braker; 
drum type braker for heavy duty trucks etc.)
• Meters and instruments (such as speedometer, fuel gauge; engine tachometer; 
digital meter and instrument, etc.)
• Chassis frame
• Main vehicular body (pressed and stamped pieces or engineering plastic products)
• New model fuel-saving and low-pollution engines and their related parts and 
components (including electronic-control led fuel injection systems for automobiles 
and motorcycles, catalytic converters)
• Domestic designed automobile body, chassis and engine
• Domestic designed motorcycle body and engine
• Aluminium alloy rim
Electric machinery
Generators
• Diesel electric generators
• Hydro-electric generators
• Turbo electric generator assembly and parts and components thereof
• Automatic transfer switch
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Electric motors
• Explosion-proof electric motors
• DC motors (excluding those used for toys)
• Servo motor; steping motor
• Synchronous motor
• High voltage induction
• Commutator
Power or distribution transformers
• Cast-resin transformer
• Power transformers
• Underground transformer
Transmission and distribution equipment
• Potential transformer
• Current transformer
• Breakers or its important parts and components thereof
• High voltage power safety fuse
• High voltage connector, high voltage switch for power distribution use
• High-voltage lightning arresters
• Protective relays
• Electromagnetic switch or contactors
• High voltage distribution panel
• Automation system for distribution feeder
• Explosion-proof distribution apparatus
Air-conditioning and refrigerating equipment use
• Elevators
• Automatic elevators
• Automatic escalators
Lighting materials
• Fluorescent mercury lamps
• Sodium mercury lamps
• High efficiency fluorescent tubes
Electric wires and cable
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Electric insulating materials; high voltage insulators 
Electric contacting point or its materials 
Electrically operated hand tools with double insulation 
Any-type lasting cell
II. Information and Electronic Industry
Computer system products 
Computer and its components:
• Personal computer (16 bits or above)
• Small business computer
• OEM board module
• Chinese data processing equipment
• Computer aided instruction system (CAI)
• Point of sales or electronic cash register
• Word processor
• Translator
Terminal Equipment:
• Terminal
• Work station
• Audio controlled system
Peripheral equipment or its components:
• Disk drive and its components, ferrite head; thin-film head, disks and substrates; 
carriage actuator, filter
• Reel-type tape device
• Optical reader
• Printers/printer head
• Plotters
Consumer products
• Digital colour television set, large screen colour television set (30 inch or above); 
projective colour television sets and LCD television sets
• Video cassette recorder (VCR)
• Digital audio player, video disc player
• Electronic musical instruments, electronic piano (excluding those used for toys)
• Cable TV system or its components
• Micro wave oven
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Electronic components/parts (including those for the use of electro-optics industry)
• Semiconductor devices including integrated circuits, transistors, diodes, including 
(LCD LED)
• Cathode-ray tubes and components
• Lead frame for integrated circuits
• Multilayer and flexible printed circuit board
• Flyback transformer and its ferrite cores
• Deflection yokes and its ferrite cores
• Precision switches or sockets or connectors for computers instruments
• Flat panel display
• Transducer
• Sensors
• Key-board (excluding mechanic type)
• Switching power supply
• Chip resistors; monolithic ceramic chip capacitors and its chips
• Tuner for TV sets
• Mechanism for cassette tape recorder (direct driven and electronic controlled)
• Original magnetic tapes for video cassette recorder (excluding those cut and 
parcelled from the original tapes)
• Optical disc; magnetic head; read/write head (optical type or magnetic type)
• Optical components (those especially designated by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs)
• Electronic ballast for discharge lamp
• Ceramic substrate for semiconductor
• Thick or thin films electronic network
• Quartz ware for semiconductor manufacture use
• Resistors, condensers coils, transformers for SMD (Surface mounting device)
Electronic Communication Products
• Radars
• Optical fibre communication system or its components
• Multi-function electronic telephones, or mobile phone
• Digital EPABX
• Digital telephone switching system for central station
• Time division multiplex equipment-digital
• Frequency division multiplex equipment - analog
• PCM carrier equipment (excluding D-l, D-2 an D-3 types)
• Facsimile
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• Data transmission equipment (including MODEM)
• Digital microwave radio
• Teleprinter
• Satellite broadcast communication equipment or its components
• Citizen-Band or UHF/VHF Band Walkie-talkie
Electronic Industrial System
• Motor controller
• Numerical controller
• Process control system
• Energy management system
• Robots (controllers)
• Vision system
• Automatic control system
• Electronic equipment for vehicles use
• Monitors (CRT Display)
• Electronic equipment for ships
• Non-interruptable power system
• Electronic medical equipment
• Electronic fire fighting or anti-burglary equipment
• Electronic instruments (including the measuring, inspecting and controlling systems 
for the photoelectric industry)
• Laser equipment or its components
• Optical information storage system (including optical disk driver)
Computer Software
• Application software package
• Systems software
• Compiler and interpreter
• Computer aided design software
• Diagnostic & debug tools
• Software development tools
• Computer graphic processing system
• File system
• Data base management system
• Computer network, including local area network
• Artificial intelligence system or expert system
• Those items which specially designated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs
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III. BioTechnological Industry
Vaccine: such as hepatitis B vaccine; poliomyelitis vaccine; mumps vaccine; cholera 
vaccine; typhus vaccine, vaccines for animals, etc.
Diagnostic kits for such as hepatitis, AIDS; pregnancy; alpha-feto protein; venereal 
diseases; tumour markers; hormones, etc.
Hormones
• Insulin
• Growth hormones for animals
• Insect sex pheromone
Antibiotics (include 7-aminocephalosporanic acid; 6-aminopenicillanic acid) and amino 
acids (include iysiric, tryptophan, phenylalanine, threonine) which are produced by 
fermentation or biocatalytical process.
Enzymes
• Alkaline protease
• Pectinase
• Urokinase by genetic engineering or tissue culture process only
• Glucose isomerase
• Enzymes for diagnostic reagents
• Restriction enzymes and ligases for genetic engineering purpose
Biological reagents for waste water and waste material treatment 
Bio-pesticides for agriculture purposes, for example bacillus thuringiensis etc.
Blood fractionation products
Monoclinal antibodies and products, containing monoclinal antibodies
IV. Material Technology Industry 
Industrial Metallic Materials
• High class metal refinery: standard alloy steels; tool steels; silicon steel sheet; 
special steels; and high class non-ferrous metals, etc.
• Amorphous metallic alloy
• Shape memory alloys
Electronic Materials
• Semiconductor materials: single crystal silicon ingot; silicon wafers; gap wafers etc.
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• Etched aluminium foil or metallised insulating film; electronic class plastic film
• Printed circuit board materials: laminates; copper foil; glass fibre;, filament cloth, 
etc.
Optical fibre and its protective materials
Engineering plastics: such as nylon; polyester (PET, PBT); polyacetal; poly-carbonate; 
modified polyphenylene oxide or modified polyphenylene ether etc.
Industrial precision ceramics 
Composite materials; carbon fibre/resin 
Polarising sheets
Magnetic materials (except for alnico series magnets)
Industrial artificial diamonds
251
- CHAPTER 8 -
TESTING FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF 
INDUSTRY INCENTIVES
The government has adopted over a long period of time a much more 
aggressive set of industrial policies than free trading principles would 
justify. It has been anticipating, rather then simply reacting to, changes in 
Taiwans international competitive position. And it has been selecting 
between industries and specific products in giving substantial incentives 
(Wade 1984:65).
8.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the extent to which Taiwan's government was directing 
assistance to industries with emerging comparative advantage. A central interest in the 
thesis is to explore the relationship between government sectoral interventions, on the 
one hand, and industry expansion of output and the achievement of international 
competitiveness, on the other, as put forth by the new trade/govemed market model. 
Beyond this interest there is the further question: was this policy regime causally 
significant in the sense of resulting in sustained industrial and export growth?
As discussed in Chapter 1, the new trade/govemed market model asserts that 
government intervention was a necessary component of Taiwan's postwar growth. In 
contrast, the neoclassical model contends that industry policy interventions were not of 
overriding importance in the success of Taiwan's industrial development. The new 
trade model contends that industrial policy interventions by promoting the movement 
of resources into high technology industries can help shift the pattern of comparative 
advantage and thereby raise national welfare. Similarly, the governed market model
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contends that the Taiwan government has successfully determined industries for 
assistance based on a perceived future comparative advantage. This model asserts that 
there is likely to exist a systematic relationship between state structure and economic 
performance, and predicts a positive relationship between government industry policy 
incentives and industry structural characteristics thought to be associated with 
comparative advantage. The new trade model asserts that East Asian governments 
successfully promoted industries possessing characteristics associated with high 
technology intensity. The result was that such policies improved their industrial 
performance and hence raised national welfare.
In attempting to test the validity of these contrasting propositions, Chapter 8 employs 
cross-sectional regression analysis to determine the relationship between government 
industrial incentives and industry structural characteristics as represented by various 
proxy variables. These are employed to determine which (or if either) of the 
competing interpretations and the associated hypotheses are causally significant. Were 
incentives designed primarily to redistribute income, as indicated by past studies of this 
nature, or were they part of a forward looking, strategic, national welfare maximising 
industrial policy? Have incentives been designed for infant/strategic industries with a 
perceived potential and future comparative advantage?
Chapter 8 is structured as follows. Section 8.2 briefly discusses the role of interest 
groups in the policy-making process. Section 8.3 outlines the various criteria used in 
determining industries to be targeted and extends the discussion in Chapter 4 of the 
various shortcomings of the criteria. Section 8.4 identifies the proxy variables which 
are thought representative of the new trade model and governed market model as well 
as proxy variables thought to reflect the 'interest' group model of protection. Section 
8.5 discusses the hypotheses raised by the competing models concerning the role of 
interventions in Taiwan's industrialisation. Section 8.6 estimates rank correlation 
coefficients to determine whether the structure of incentives is positively (negatively) 
correlated with the industry structural characteristics. Those variables found to be 
individually statistically significant are then used in multivariate regression analysis to 
determine the relationship between industrial policy incentives and industry 
comparative advantage. The chapter concludes with a discussion of which of the two 
competing models best explains the relationship between government incentives and 
industry comparative advantage.
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8.2 The Role of Interest Groups in Policy Making
Reservations within neoclassical economics about the ability of governments to 
successfully identify industries which may become internationally competitive in the 
future derive their legitimacy from a well-developed theory of government failure. 
This theory has challenged traditional economic analysis based on the Pigovian 
assumption about the state acting exogenously as a benevolent dictator, thus allowing 
for a separation of economics and politics. The neoclassical account of the process of 
development incorporates a model of the state which draws on a subset of public 
choice theory, namely rent seeking behaviour. Interventionist states are subject to 
government failure because sector-specific interventions create 'rents’. Societal groups 
in turn divert scarce resources in order to capture these rents. The normative 
implications of this line of theorising is that the incidence of rent-seeking can be 
reduced if the state reduces its interventionist stance and exposes domestic industries to 
international competition (Islam 1992:70).1
Colander (1984:2) calls this area of research 'neoclassical political economy', 
distinguishing it from neoclassical economics by its assumption that the state, far from 
being 'an exogenous force, trying to do good ... is as least partially endogenous and the 
policies it institutes will reflect vested interests in society'. Srinivasan (1985) classifies 
the development of this literature under three major headings: Mancur Olson's 
collective action framework; the public choice school of Buchanan, Tollison and 
Tullock (1980); and the international trade and development school of Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1969, 1980), Bhagwati (1982a), Brock and Magee (1978), Findlay and 
Wellisz (1982) and Krueger (1974b).
Since the early 1970s, a large number of studies have been undertaken which, by 
incorporating all three strands of literature, have sought to analyse in quantitative terms 
the relationship between the level of protection (or a change in the level) afforded 
different industries and various political and economic characteristics of sectors or 
groups that appear to influence the level of protection. This literature has emphasised 
the notion that the state is seen to be pushed and pulled by lobbies and interest groups 
that are interested in redistribution rather than growth and development. "State 
interventions intended at best to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and 
channel it in socially desirable directions and at worst creating fairly small deadweight
1 Although the existence of ’government failure’ can also be assessed in other ways independently of 
the approach adopted here.
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losses due to distortions may instead end up diverting resources to a significant extent 
from production to 'rent seeking" (Srinivasan 1985:45).
The public choice school contends also that the emergence of monopoly and other 
distortions from public policy imposes more than a deadweight loss on the economy 
implied from comparative statics. The competition for rents which accrue to the 
winners of government largesse results in ’directly unproductive profit seeking' 
(Bhagwati 1982a). The rational rent seeking by individuals, by overriding normal 
market activity, can produce extreme suboptimality for the economy as a whole 
(Shapiro and Taylor 1990). Krueger (1974b) in applying this idea to import- 
substitution industrialisation policies in developing countries, showed that quantitative 
restrictions placed on imports led firms to compete for import licenses and their 
associated rents. Thus to the extent that rent seeking is competitive, the welfare cost of 
import restrictions was equal to the welfare cost of the tariff equivalent plus the 
additional cost of rent-seeking activities (Krueger 1974b:291-331).
In surveying the literature regarding the political economy of tariff protection, Baldwin 
(1984) notes at least seven distinct (though not necessarily incompatible) models or 
hypotheses of political behaviour can be discerned from within this literature. All 
receive some empirical support, although there is no general agreement on just which 
model performs best. These seven models and the key political-economic 
characteristics of an industry that each one stresses as being the main determinant of 
the industry's ability to secure protection are as follows.
• The common-interest model or pressure group model —  the ability of an industry to 
organise as a political pressure group;
• The adding-machine model —  the voting strength of an industry;
•  The adjustment assistance model —  the ability of workers to adjust to greater import 
competition;
• The equity-concern model —  the income and skill levels o f workers;
• The comparative-costs model —  the international competitive strength of an industry;
• The international-bargaining model —  the bargaining ability and political importance of 
the countries from which competing imports are supplied;
• The status-quo (or historical influences model) —  the historical level o f an industry's 
protection (Baldwin 1984:574).
Despite the extensive literature on the subject, there is still widespread disagreement as 
to which of the various competing hypothesis best explains the structure of protection 
within industrial democracies. As Baldwin (1984:573) notes, disagreement exists at 
three different levels.
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First there existed a lack of consensus concerning the nature of the political decision-making 
process. Secondly, authors differ widely with respect to what they believe are the key 
political-economic characteristics that enable an industry to increase its chances of obtaining 
greater protection or resisting tariff cuts. Thirdly, there is a significant divergence of views 
over which economic variables are the best proxies for a particular political-economic 
characteristic.
For these reasons the 'political economy of protection' literature has by no means swept 
the discipline. Its narrowly self-interested motivational assumptions are too simplistic 
to explain much government behaviour, with an observed pattern of trade restraints 
being compatible with any number of hypotheses concerning the nature of the political 
process. Nevertheless, this work has produced some useful insights, and has had some 
influence on the economics profession as a whole.
8.2.1 Interest Group Model
As the most commonly employed model in quantitative studies, the interest group 
model assumes that in a democratic economy, the political system is competitive to the 
extent that various different interest groups work in the mechanism and then reach an 
equilibrium state in much the same way as the forces of demand and supply work in 
the market. In this scenario, political decisions depend on the preferences of voters and 
interest groups, with the state having little independent influence. This view is 
exemplified in Olson (1965) and Brock and Magee (1978). Empirical studies confirm 
the public choice theory of political groups, which suggests that large numbers in a 
beneficiary group will reduce the group's capacity for collective action, due to the 
incentive for each actor to 'free-ride' on the efforts of others (Olson 1965).2 Such 
coalitions of self-interested persons are likely to attempt to redistribute income towards 
themselves instead of working to raise efficiency and national income. Efficient 
resource allocation will be inhibited and, by extension, there will be no incentives for
2 The often heard view that Taiwan's unique historical experience enabled the Taiwan government to 
take a leading role in economic development, and is primarily responsible for Taiwan's rapid 
development, can be contrasted with Olson's (1982) explanation of intercountry differences in growth 
rates. Olson argues that social stability engenders rigidity in the form of inefficiency fostering special 
interest groups. Those nations previously suffering from 'invasion' and 'upheaval' were those 
possessing less entrenched interest groups and enjoying the highest rates of economic growth. The 
resulting social and economic fluidity enhanced the workings of the market as a means to allocate 
resources efficiently and to generate economic growth (Miller 1987:20-21). Wade (1988:162) 
contends that 'East Asia's abundant 'social coalitions’ or 'cartels' do not have the stagnation-inducing 
effects that Olson's theory (1982) would predict... That theory is posited on the assumption that a free 
market works best, and that inferior performance is explained by such that 'interferences’ (by politics 
and special interest groups) with the free market. It is just this assumption which the East Asian 
experience questions.'
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Schumpeterian entrepreneurs to seek out technical innovations that might speed overall 
growth (Shapiro and Taylor 1990:864). On the supply side, politicians are prone to 
grant protection to industries where the expected returns are larger, such that they are 
likely to be concerned with the voting strength of an industry.3 Evidence presented by 
quantitative studies centred around these various models offers strong support for the 
proposition that in industrial economies tariff assistance tends to be directed towards 
industries at a low and decreasing international comparative advantage. Protection 
appears to have little to do with the promotion of industries which are expected to 
become internationally competitive in the future.
8.2.2 National Interest (autonomous) Model
In direct contrast to the interest group model, the national interest (autonomous) model 
claims that the state has its own preference function for handling economic policy. 
The implicit assumption is that the state has its own logic or rationality in pursuing a 
particular development objective. This 'national interest' may cover broad areas such 
as national security, price stability, rapid economic growth, equity, and the nurturing of 
infant industries. The two models thus represent two contrasting styles of policy 
making. In the interest group model, the government responds to the demands of 
pressure groups, with the sensitivity of response in line with the groups political 
leverage. In the national interest model, the government behaves according to certain 
'principles' which it applies irrespective of the amount of pressure (Lavergne 1983:3) 
and fits well with that of an authoritative regime or the 'bureaucratic authoritarian' 
model by Findlay and Wellisz (1982). Moreover, the notion of social welfare is 
defined as being identical to national income. Hence incentives nurture infant/strategic 
industries that will sometime in the future gain an international comparative advantage.
Haggard (1990) stresses that the reason why the newly industrialised economies have 
not in the past fallen prey to rent-seeking proclivities of societal groups can be related 
to the particular institutional arrangements employed to insulate the state from such 
groups. At the same time, well-trained bureaucrats and political leaders are motivated 
by an ideology of rapid growth. Consequently, it makes no sense in these countries to
3 An alternative approach in analysing the structure of protection is that o f Anderson (1978). Anderson 
views protection as being determined in a political market in which import competing producers are 
the demanders and the government is the supplier. Here the demand for assistance is affected by 
factors determining both the expected benefits o f favourable action to import competing producers and 
the expected lobbying costs, while the supply of protection is determined by the benefits of assistance 
to the government, for example, loss o f financial support and votes (Baldwin 1984:578).
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see public policy as the vector of particular interests bearing on the state, or to see 
government agencies as the fiefdoms of particular private interests (Wade 1988:158- 
9).4
The interest-group model, while originally developed around a pluralist-democratic 
framework is not confined to Western-type democratic systems. Tullock (quoted in 
Amelung 1989:518) found that under authoritarian rule, small and exclusive interest 
groups become even more effective than under a democratic system because 
authoritarian rulers are much more dependent on these small groups. Moreover, Olson 
(1982) assesses that the uneven income distribution in developing countries can be 
attributed to the dominance of small but powerful groups, while large groups are less 
successful in exerting pressures on politicians. Since protection benefits small groups 
of producers against large groups of consumers, the interest group model should be of 
special relevance for the explanation of protection in developing countries (Amelung 
1989:518).
Similarly Yoo (1991:10-11) points out that the basic logic underlying the collective 
actions expounded by Olson (1965) would appear to differ little across countries. In 
particular, the ease or difficulty in organising a group and have it take a collective 
action does not mainly depend on whether a country has a long established tradition of 
parliamentary democracy. Insofar as the objective that a collective action attempts to 
achieve has the nature of a public good, the free-rider problem exists in any country. 
For instance, as there are no professional lobbyists in Korea, industry associations tend 
to play this role to a certain extent and the industrialists themselves attempt to 
influence trade and other policies.
Despite the increased focus on East Asia by policy analysts during the 1980s, there 
have been few studies undertaken to examine the causal significance of government 
incentives and the performance of industries. The work of Miller (1987) appears to be 
unique in its approach to assessing quantitatively the determinants of the tariff structure 
of Japan using cross-sectional regression techniques. Miller concludes that tariff policy 
in Japan during the period 1965-1975 was motivated primarily by a desire to 
redistribute income to factors of production engaged in industries at an increasing 
comparative disadvantage with concern for maintaining sectoral incomes appearing to 
outweigh the goal of maximising national income. To the extent that tariff policy is
4 As mentioned in Chapter 2, this view cannot adequately accommodate the success o f pressure groups 
in lobbying for the maintenance of high levels of agricultural protection.
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employed as the prime example of the tendency for government intervention to 
promote income distribution at the expense of income maximisation, it appeared that 
during this period Japan was similar in this regard to other industrial democracies 
(Miller 1987).5 Yoo (1991), in testing for the determinants of the Korean structure of 
assistance during the 1980s, finds that the Korean government's promotion of heavy 
and chemical 'strategic' industries had a strong influence on the assistance structure in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, but appears to have become insignificant later in the 
decade.6
Chang (1987) tests for the determinants of the rates of tariff protection for the years 
1981 and 1985 and for nontariffs for the years 1966, 1972 and 1984 in the case of 
Taiwan.7 His overall conclusion is that the state in Taiwan formulated industry policy 
independently and did not play an intermediary role with regard to interest groups. A 
similar study by Chen and Hou (1991) for the years 1981 and 1986 assesses the 
determinants of Taiwan's tariff and nontariff structure.8 Their results indicate that 
tariff and nontariff protection was not being directed towards 'strategic' industries. 
Rather, strategic industries were likely to be low tariff industries.9 Public enterprises
5 Although, as is noted by Miller (1987:209), Japan's industrial policy approach taken as a whole may 
still be considered unique among the industrial economies. While it is found that Japan's tariffs are 
meant to slow structural change rather than accelerate it, the possibility remains that the remaining 
industry-specific policies could serve to nullify the effects of tariffs.
6 In his survey of the literature of developing countries, Amelung (1989) finds that the explanatory 
power of the majority of these models is quite low. See for example, Alikhani and Havrylyshyn (1982) 
for Colombia; Pangestu and Boediono (1986) for Indonesia; Tan (1986) for the Philippines; Lee (1986) 
for Malaysia; Lachler (1986) for Mexico; and Amelung (1989) for Brazil.
7 The two models used are the interest group model (developed around an Olsonian view), and the 
national policy model (based on the notion of the state as an autonomous decision maker formulating 
policies in line with national interest criteria). Chang finds that the national policy model fares well 
statistically in explaining the determinants of assistance, with the interest group model exhibiting a low 
degree of statistical significance in explaining the level of nominal tariff rates. Neither model however 
is found to provide an adequate interpretation to explain the rate of tariff reduction during the early to 
mid-1980s. The structure of non-tariff barriers is found to be explained by both the interest group 
model and national policy model, although the coefficients of determination in the former are stronger 
than in the latter.
8 The national interest model is found to provide a better explanation of the structure of protection, 
especially with respect to tariffs, and again support can be found for the view that the Taiwan 
government has acted autonomously in the formulation of industry policy. Intermediate goods and 
capital equipment are found to be consistently favoured imports, while labour was found not to benefit 
either from tariff or nontariff barrier protection.
9 Wade (1990a: 136) in reviewing Chang's results states that "strategic' industries (in economic or 
security terms) are less likely to have tariffs reduced.' However, Chang finds the dummy variable, 
representative of key industries, is insignificant in explaining the level of the tariff structure, is positive 
in explaining the rate of reduction of weighted tariff rates, and is positive but insignificant in 
explaining the rate of reduction of simple-average rates. While as Chang (1987:174) notes, some 
evidence is provided that the government is more reluctant in reducing tariffs on strategic industries,
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were found to be a powerful interest group in lobbying for protection whereby they 
often benefited from being sole importers of goods which were directly substitutable 
for their own products or could be used to produce substitutes.
Taiwan's international and domestic history like that of Korea, shows an authoritarian 
state which independently formulated industry policy, enabling it to implement policy 
with little resistance from domestic interest groups. Because the political environment 
for democracy was not yet mature, it seemed that an 'autonomous' government would 
have relatively strong powers of policy formulation, given also that interest groups 
were not well organised (Amsden 1979). Towards the end of the 1980s this may have 
been changing given the movement to democracy, the labour reforms which were 
taking place, and the pressures facing declining industries over the period,10 such that 
domestic interest groups could have increasingly been able in some instances to 
influence the formulation of industry policy. Also, in an apparently autonomous state 
like Taiwan, pressure groups may find ways and means to influence political decisions. 
For example, Chu (quoted in Chen and Hou 1991:54) notes that in order to consolidate 
its power base, economic interests were important resources that the state used to weld 
together its loyalists. This power base included mainland entrepreneurs and local 
business conglomerates who maintained a close relationship with the governing party. 
In an autonomous regime, these favoured constituents may act as de-facto pressure 
groups, as has in fact been verified in past attempts in quantifying this feature (Chu 
1989).
8.3 The Problem of Evaluation
According to Krugman (1987b:267), 'the case for a targeted industry policy would 
seem to stand or fall on the issue of criteria for selection'. Those criteria, that are 
explicit in some discussions and implicit in many others, fall into two groups: popular 
criteria such as high value added per worker, linkage to the rest of the economy, 
prospect for future international competitiveness, and targeting by foreign 
governments; and more sophisticated criteria of economies of scale and imperfect
overall Chang concludes that the key industrial variable is ambiguous in its ability to explain the tariff 
structure.
10 From 1986 through to 1989, following the implementation of the Labour Standard Law, labour 
disputes took place in both public and private companies, focusing on issues relating to retirement and 
severance payments, overtime pay and the distribution of bonuses.
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competition, externalities, and the incentive-distorting effects of government policies.11 
In spite of the huge literature on industrial policy, Krugman (1987b:294) believes the 
criteria generally used for evaluation can be misleading, with most authors going to 
painstaking detail on the technology and history of an industry, then becoming sloppy 
and casual when they come to the difficult task of economic evaluation. Wade 
(1990b:247) is a case in point:
For Taiwan, my sectoral histories in cotton textiles, artificial fibres, plastics, metals, autos, 
and information concentrated on public enterprise initiatives as an indicator of leadership. 
The conclusion is straightforward. Even using just this one indicator, we have to say that the 
Taiwan government has been rather active in leading the market in some industries some of 
the time. And this, for my purposes is enough, because it undermines the implicit or explicit 
argument of the bulk of the literature on Taiwan’s economic development that the role of the 
government in promoting the development of targeted industries has been unimportant. We 
could also — though not here — consider the importance of various subsidy and trade policies 
as they impact of different industries, and how these decisions are made to grant subsidies and 
import protection. These considerations would reinforce the central conclusion, by showing, 
for example, that industry representatives have little input into such decisions.
Proponents of the new trade policy advocate support for sectors that are high 
technology, pay high wages, have high value added per worker, are intensive in 
research and development, have strong links to other industries, or show rapid growth 
in productivity. But as Lawrence and Schultze (1990) point out, proponents generally 
talk of high technology sectors rather than specifying the ones meeting the precise 
conditions required to warrant government intervention, with almost any industry able 
to make a claim under one or another of these headings. Thus,
11 Krugman in 1985 described his support for the broad thrust of new trade theory as a 'cautious non- 
activist'. By 1992, as Krugman himself acknowledges, he had shifted ground somewhat to become a 
'cautious activist'. The following discussion draws upon Krugman's former position. 'Cautious non­
activists' share the doubts of the stronger opponents of government intervention, but are willing to 
reconsider. In particular, they are willing to take seriously charges of predatory strategic political 
abuse. 'Cautious activists', on the other hand, think they know enough to do some good with an activist 
trade/industrial policy, but it should be small-scale and restricted to only the very clearest cases, in 
order to limit the risks that the program will turn into pure pork barrel (1992:439). Tyson (1990:161) 
is more specific when including herself in the category 'cautious activist’, 'which would limit 
immediate policy action to those industries in which a case for intervention seems the clearest. Likely 
candidates for such industries are semiconductors, sophisticated telecommunications equipment, 
computers and aircraft. This view also implies a change in the philosophy of United States trade 
policy from one of free trade to one of sophisticated intervention. 'Cautious activism’, on the other 
hand, implies that the uncertainties of any immediate changes in United States trade and other policies 
to promote particular industries outweigh any expected benefits. At most, one might advocate some 
general policy measures to promote high technology industries, such as permanent R&D tax credit and 
a relaxation of some antitrust laws, and careful monitoring of the effects of foreign policies on United 
States producers. Overall, United States commitment to free trade would be maintained.'
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[i]n the real world of scarce information, uncertainty and pervasive rent seeking, policy 
makers will inevitably miss the crucial and subtle distinction between profits that are high 
because of rents and those that are high because of risk; between wages that are high because 
of rents, and those that are high because of skills; and between sectors that provide inputs, and 
those that result in spillover externalities. Moreover, policy makers would find it extremely 
difficult to identify appropriate sectors and confine public largesse to sectors meeting such 
criteria (1990:20-21).
Thus the applicability of one or more of these characteristics to an industry highlights 
the identification problem inherent in the policy. As discussed in Chapter 4, selection 
of strategic industries in Taiwan during the 1980s was based on the criteria identified 
by government as technology-intensity, market potential, value added, energy- 
intensity, low pollution and linkage effects. In seeking to account for Taiwan's past 
industrialisation experience, Wade (1990a:335) notes that the criteria used by the 
Japanese government was henceforth adopted by the Taiwan government.
MITI officials studied income elasticities of demand for various items in major markets, 
examined trends in technological change in various industries; checked industries with high 
income elasticities and high potential for technological change against Japan’s specialisation 
index, or the share of each industry in Japan’s industrial exports over the share of that industry 
in world trade; they checked this trend against another index called the 'export and industrial 
estrangement coefficient’. This measured the relationship between an item's importance in 
Japan's total industrial output against the importance in exports.
In applying this criterion:
[i]t is likely that both Taiwan and Korea used similar methods to help select industries for 
promotion, supplemented by study of import composition, demand and supply linkages, and 
Japan's industrial structure. Export performance and the discrepancy between domestic costs 
and international prices have then been used, in all three countries, to guide subsequent 
government policies for the chosen industries (Pack and Westphal 1986) (Wade 1990a:335).
8.3.1 Value Added per Worker12
There is great plausibility to the idea that reallocating workers into high value added 
industries can lead to higher national income per capita. Other things being equal, a 
higher share of workers in high value added industries would mean higher national 
income per capita. But the question remains as to why there is variation among 
industries in value added per worker and why labour does not move into high value 
added sectors without encouragement? The answer is that typically high output per 
worker reflects high input per worker: large quantities of capital, extensive training and 
education. Sectors with high value added per worker generally have low value added 
per unit of capital or per skilled worker (Krugman 1987b:269).
12 The following discussion draws heavily on Krugman (1987b:269-71).
262
Krugman (1987b:270) cites the theoretical scenario in which governments encourage 
investment in high value added sectors (sectors with high ratios of physical and human 
capital to labour) without at the same time increasing the overall rate of investment. 
Since the capital-labour ratio in high value added industries is higher than in low value 
added industries, a given amount of investment would employ fewer people. 
Employment growth would slow and unemployment rise and since the capital-output 
ratio is also higher in high value added industries, the rate of economic growth would 
actually be reduced. While output per worker would be rising, the slowdown in 
employment growth would more than offset the rise in productivity growth. Overtime 
market forces, if allowed to operate would tend to correct some of these effects. Rising 
unemployment would place downward pressure on real wages, and lower real wages 
would lead firms to move into labour-intensive techniques. In the long run, 
employment would be restored, with more workers in high value added sectors but 
lower productivity in each sector, with the possibility of lower output per worker in the 
economy as a whole. Some advocates of high value added targeting, however, would 
try to prevent this adjustment:
As a national strategy, the substitution of lower real relative wages for productivity 
improvements would eventually make America a relatively poor country, albeit one with a 
healthy balance of payments. Accordingly, a rational industry policy should encourage firms 
to invest in productivity improvements and increased output rather than reduce real wages 
(Magaziner and Reich 1982:339).
Thus, as unemployment rose, real wages would be sustained through government 
legislation or less formal suasion.
Moreover, practical experience shows that for much of the postwar period, 
encouragement of capital-intensive, high value added industries was a key element of 
development strategy in developing countries. It is generally acknowledged that these 
policies tended to produce 'dualistic' economies, divided between high-wage, capital- 
intensive but economically inefficient favoured sectors and a low-wage, high 
unemployment residual sector (Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1970). Meanwhile the 
successful developing countries exploited their comparative advantage in exporting 
labour-intensive products rather than prematurely developing capital-intensive 
industries (Krugman 1987b: 271).
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8.3.2 Wages
Many of the high-wage industries in industrialised countries such as the United States 
(including cars, steel, primary nonferrous metals, oil refining, glass, paper and pulp 
mills, coal mining and tobacco) are not generally considered high technology 
industries. On the other hand, high technology industries such as computers and 
electronic components and accessories, while paying at or a little above the 
manufacturing average, are not typically at the top end of the wage scale. A policy of 
supporting the highest-wage industries would not be fully congruent with a policy of 
supporting high technology industries. This is borne out in the case of Taiwan, 
whereby those industries receiving the highest average earnings were not those 
typically characterised as being 'strategic'. Rather, those sectors with the highest 
average earnings in Taiwan in both the early and late 1980s (of which many were state 
enterprises) were chemical fertilisers, petroleum refining products, industrial 
chemicals, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, steel, cement, petrochemical raw materials 
and sugar.
8.3.3 Linkages
A frequently advanced criterion for industrial targeting is that encouragement should 
be given to 'linkage' sectors in the sense that their output is in turn used as an input by a 
number of other industries. Similar views recur through much of the industrial policy 
literature, the need to target 'basic' industries such as steel, for example, which have 
important multiplier consequences throughout the economy. But the fact that some 
industries are inputs into other industries is not in itself a source of market failure and 
does not itself indicate that markets underinvest in the industry. Thus as Krugman 
(1987b:274) notes:
saying that steel is used in many industries conveys the impression of multiple returns to 
output. But while steel is used in many industries, a particular ingot of steel is used once. A 
linkage of industry's products can be made to sound like 'catalysts' for the rest of the economy, 
but unlike a real catalyst steel does not get to be reused many times.
8.3.4 Externalities
The case of externalities can be linked to the traditional case of infant industry 
protection whereby there may be market imperfections that inhibit a new industry from 
undertaking particular activities. Typically it is thought that high technology industries
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generate important external economic benefits for the economy. Because of these 
benefits, the fate of these industries cannot be left solely to market forces, particularly 
when it is believed that these forces are heavily influenced by activist government 
policies. This represents one of the most influential arguments for industry targeting 
based on the premise that strategic policies must be used to counter foreign competition 
and these strategies are thought to loom large in East Asian policies. As Tyson notes 
(1990:151) 'the newly industrialising countries continue to promote and protect their 
domestic producers in industries in which United States producers have competitive 
strength'. The importance of externalities is stressed on positive grounds because their 
expansion is thought to confer special productivity-improving advantage, and on 
defensive grounds to avoid shrinkage of markets resulting from the aggressive trade 
practices of other countries.
As discussed in Chapter 3, very few externalities associated with R&D can be kept 
within national boundaries. In addition, intense competition in innovative industries 
suggests the real possibility that firms can over invest in technology (Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz 1980a, 1980b). The result may be a duplication of investment as established 
firms invest heavily in R&D in order to deter potential competitors. This may lead 
them to develop technologies 'too soon', leading to a situation where the social returns 
to more R&D are actually quite low. As Lawrence and Schultze point out:
there is one particular respect in which the case for protection of high technology industries 
based on the existence of external economies has been quite misleading. An important part of 
the output of high technology industries is intermediate products, whose availability at 
reasonable prices is important to the pace of productivity and innovation in other high 
technology-using industries. Rather than promote productivity-raising spillovers, policies that 
restrict the availability and raise the price of high-technology parts and components, as the 
new protectionism often does, may actually suppress them (1990:46).
Bhagwati (1988:40-41) expresses the concerns that the protectionist capture of this 
market is unusually easy in high-tech, R&D-intensive industries to which new trade 
theory is allegedly applicable. This is precisely because most governments want these 
industries due to an implicit belief in the economic and political advantages of having 
them at any cost, making the resistance to protectionist demands therefore less likely.
8.4 Identifying Proxy Variables
Past quantitative studies on the determinants of assistance have drawn upon the 
following features: characteristics of the production process, the composition of the
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productive factors, the market and the industrial organisation and structure. For this 
study, the proxy variables used to reflect these characteristics are those that have been 
employed in past studies, and those thought to reflect various 'strategic' industry 
considerations. As Miller (1987:85) cautions in his case study of Japan:
... the quantitative approach has had difficulty distinguishing between the various 
hypothesised motivations for income redistribution through tariff protection. This is largely 
because the variables that are unique to a given model are rarely statistically significant, 
whereas the significant variables are not unique. The statistically significant variables are 
proxies for industry comparative disadvantage and they (or variables closely related in logic 
and highly correlated) are common to many of the models. These proxies for comparative 
disadvantage receive varying interpretation so that no one model of income redistribution can 
be shown to be preferable.
A case in point is the economies of scale variable which, given Taiwan's industrial 
structure, would seem to require a different interpretation from that of usual 
quantitative studies.
Moreover, Baldwin (1984) has highlighted two concerns with quantitative studies of 
this nature, namely the neglect in the majority of past studies of forms of industry 
assistance other than tariffs. If subsidies or quotas, for example, are substitutes for 
tariffs, regression results based only on tariffs can be misleading.13 Secondly, 
problems of interpreting the results from the regression analysis also arise because of 
the high degree of correlation among some of the independent variables.14 Moreover, 
there is a problem of a two-way causal relationship between some of the variables 
employed.15
In spite of the limitations inherent in the quantitative approach to political analysis, it 
has, as Miller (1987:64) notes, the virtue of being relatively untried. And as Salamon 
and Siegfried (1977) contend, the marginal unit of research effort channelled into a
13 Baldwin argues this problem is not severe given that both nominal and effective rates of assistance 
are usually found to be highly correlated. However, both this study and past studies in estimating the 
incentive structure for Taiwan have found this not to be the case.
14 This problem is difficult to overcome. Miller (1987:201), for example, found that multivariate 
regression analysis added little to the results obtained, primarily for the reason that the independent 
variables are all associated with comparative (dis)advantage in international trade and are therefore 
interrelated such that multicollinearity was a problem.
15 For example, as Baldwin (1984:58) notes, even if (potentially) high import-penetration levels lead to 
high levels of protection, there may be no statistically significant relationship across industries at a 
given point in time between duty levels and the actual ratio of imports to consumption because high 
duty levels reduce the ratio of imports to consumption.
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quantitative study is very likely to have a high return in its ability to generate results 
that usefully contrast with and complement the existing case studies and anecdotes.
In undertaking a systematic, empirical test of the economic structure/political influence 
hypothesis using cross-sectional data and regression techniques, we do not intend to dismiss 
the existing case study material or deny its importance. To the contrary, as will become 
readily apparent, this material has provided the crucial insights upon which our hypotheses are 
based. The contention here, therefore is not that the case study literature is wrong or 
irrelevant, but rather that this approach has taken us as about as far as it can, and that the field 
is now ripe for more rigorous hypothesis testing. While we make no claim that the test we 
have devised are in any sense comprehensive or conclusive, we believe that they throw some 
interesting, new empirical light on a question that has been treated far less systematically in 
the past; and that, in the process, they may suggest some fruitful new ways to explore the 
important question of the political implications of economic structure more generally 
(Salamon and Siegfried 1977:1028).
In this study the two competing models are defined in the sense of the neoclassical 
theory of politics and the new trade/govemed market view as discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3. This is possible because the two models place opposing emphasis on the 
importance of government industry policy interventions. The quantitative approach to 
the analysis of political economy of protection parallels similar work focusing on the 
industry-government, or economic power-political influence relationship. Following 
the work of Stigler (1971), these studies are built around cross-sectional regressions of 
political benefits received by industries on structural characteristics of the sample 
industries. As Miller (1987:63-64) notes:
The quantitative approach to the analysis of industry-government interaction abstracts from 
the institutional detail of policy making and instead relates political outcomes directly to 
observable characteristics of industries ... Part of the interest in this way of analysing the 
business-government relationship stems from frustration with some of the shortcomings of the 
traditional approaches to political science. In particular, there are two problems with the case 
study and anecdotal approaches' focus on the observable face of political decision making. 
First, much of the real decision making is done in secrecy, and the statements made by the 
actors concerning their motivations and reasoning governing their actions are for the most part 
unreliable. Second, much of the behaviour of politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen and 
their lobbyists that can be observed is consistent with the various alternative models of 
business-government relationship.
In this study estimates of nominal rates of assistance, effective rates of assistance and 
effective rates of subsidy, and their (proportionate) rates of change over time, have been 
applied to proxies representing industry structural characteristics in an attempt to 
identify the determinants of the incentive structure to manufacturing in Taiwan during 
the 1980s. The industry structural characteristics used as explanatory (independent) 
variables listed below are those that have been important in past studies of this nature
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and/or have been prominent within the context of the debate relating to the new 
trade/govemed market model.
• Value added as a share of output (VASO)
• Value of output per worker (VOPW)
• Value added per worker (VAPW)
• Labour's share of value added (LSVA)
• Labour's share of output (LSO)
• Workers average earnings (WAGES)
• Rate of growth in value added (DVA)
• Rate of growth in industry output (DOUTPUT)
• Rate of growth in industry employment (DEMP)
• Rate of change in export share of production (DEXP)
• Rate of change in import penetration ratio (DIMP)
• Import penetration ratio (gross) (IPGRS)
• Import penetration ratio (net) (IPNET)
• Total R&D expenditure per industry, 1983 and 1989 (RDE)
• R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales, 1982 and 1989 (SALES)
• R&D expenditure per $NT million sales, 1989
• Total R&D manpower 1983 and 1989 (SC)
• Proportional change in R&D manpower, 1983 and 1989 (DSC)
• Total number of researchers, 1989 (TR)
• Number of inventions approved (as a proxy for patents granted), 1989 (INV)
• Number of firms, 1981 and 1986 (NOF)
• Proportion of self-employed and family workers, 1981 and 1986 (SELF)
• Number of firms with > 300 employees, 1981, and > 100 employees, 1986
• Proportion of enterprises with > 300 employees, 1981 and 1986 (LSE)16
• Proportion of firms with assets > NT$100 000 000, 1981 and 1986 (ASSETS)
Data was obtained from the Industrial and Commercial Census Taiwan-Fukien Area, 
The Republic o f China (V o l.ll l)  for 1981 and 1986; Yearbook o f Earnings and 
Productivity Statistics Taiwan Area, Republic o f China, 1989; and from Input-Output 
tables for the years 1981 and 1989. Data relating to science and technology indicators
16 Proxy variables 'number of firms with > 300 employees, 1981, and > 100 employees, 1986' and 
'proportion of enterprises with > 300 employees, 1981 and 1986', are based on two varying levels of 
aggregation contained in Taiwan's Industrial and Commercial Census 1981 and 1986. In the case of 
the former proxy variable, data has been derived from Table 1 and Table 30 of the 1981 Census, and 
for the latter proxy variable, from Table 4 and Table 34 of the 1986 Census.
268
was obtained from the National Science Council's Indicators o f Science and Technology 
Republic of China (1991) and the Statistical Yearbook o f Patent and Trademark 
(1990), Ministry of Economic Affairs. Data relating to science and technology 
indicators is available on an industry basis for 20 industrial sectors. Thus the limited 
degrees of freedom need to be taken into account when interpreting these results. 
Reliable census data is available every five years and while interim data is available for 
other years, it was too aggregated for our purposes and moreover was not considered 
particularly reliable.17 The Industrial and Commercial Census for the year 1991 was 
unavailable at the time of completing this study.
8.5 Summary of Hypotheses
8.5.1 Pressure for Trade Liberalisation
Since the late 1970s Taiwan has faced strong pressures from the United States in 
seeking unilateral tariff reduction. This scenario conforms most closely with what 
Baldwin's (1984) survey of the literature dealing with the political economy of 
protection calls the 'international bargaining model'. First proposed by Helleiner 
(1977), this model can be adapted to the interest group model in that it deals with the 
ability of one government to influence the trade policies of another government. On 
the assumption that a country's bargaining power is affected by its own preparedness to 
lower trade barriers when others reduce their trade barriers, tariff levels in industrial 
countries may be higher (and reduced less) on products of export interest to developing 
countries than on items supplied by countries practicing reciprocity. The cumulative 
effect of this is thought to have been the skewing of the protective structure of 
advanced economies toward protection of products produced most efficiently by 
developing countries.
In testing this proposition, Helleiner employs average wages and an economies of scale 
variable to indicate those manufacturing products in which developing countries have 
an export interest. A more direct measure employed by Lavergne (1981)18 is the share 
of developing country exports in United States imports. This measure is also used here 
to determine the extent to which externally applied pressure was significant in bringing 
about trade reform in the 1980s, or whether the government had an alternative agenda 
centred on domestic efficiency and welfare considerations in undertaking trade reform.
17 Based on discussions with academics at Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
18 As found in Baldwin (1984:578).
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8.5.2 Value Added and Assistance
One major difference presented by the competing models concerns the relationship 
between industry performance and value added. Proponents of the new trade 
view/govemed market model contend that governments have systematically sought to 
create an industrial structure by providing incentives to industries characterised by a 
high ratio of value added to total output. This model thus predicts a positive 
relationship between protection and value added as a share of output (VASO) across a 
sample of manufacturing industries. Past quantitative studies centred on the interest 
group model contend the opposite relationship, whereby governments tend to supply 
assistance to low value added industries. As a result, levels of assistance received and 
VASO are expected to be negatively correlated.
While value added as a share of output is one of the most commonly tested, and often 
most statistically significant, variables employed in quantitative models of tariff policy, 
Lavergne (1983) notes that its interpretation varies between different models. 
Anderson and Baldwin (1981), for example, have raised the hypothesis that a low 
VASO implies that a small change in nominal tariffs will have a relatively large impact 
on effective tariffs. This implies that interest in tariff protection will be high, and that 
lobbying will be relatively intense so that both nominal and effective tariffs should 
therefore be higher. Lavergne (1983:93) however notes that care is needed in 
interpreting such results, given VASO may simply be reflecting the tariff escalation 
phenomenon and the net effect of protecting inputs and outputs at different rates. In 
the presence of tariff escalation, effective tariffs will be higher when VASO is low 
provided only that nominal tariffs are the same across industries, and that this may 
happen even if VASO is not associated with differential levels of political pressure.
In addition, the theoretical validity of the pressure-group argument for VASO can be 
questioned for two reasons. First, typically it is assumed that it is not the absolute rent 
and quasi-rent generating potential of a tariff which determines the amount of 
lobbying, but rather the rents and quasi-rents per unit of value added. This 
questionable assumption, according to Lavergne (1983:94), is crucial to the argument 
because for any particular level of production, supply elasticity etc, a given increase in 
tariffs yields the same absolute increase in rents and quasi-rents, irrespective of VASO. 
It is not obvious why lobbying should be more intense when VASO is low. When 
VASO is low, a higher share of rents and quasi-rents generated by tariffs will leak to 
the suppliers of inputs, and since these may be highly dispersed, the tariff lobby would
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tend to be relatively weak and tariffs low, rather than high. Second, due to the tariff 
escalation phenomenon, a low VASO will tend to be associated with a low prohibitive 
tariff level, and to the extent that the prohibitive tariff level acts as a ceiling on tariff 
rates, the relationship between VASO and tariffs may well be positive rather than 
negative.
According to the new trade/govemed market model, as assistance represented an 
attempt to shift resources toward high value added industries away from low value 
added industries, low value added industries would tend to suffer larger reductions in 
levels of assistance than would high value added industries. A positive correlation 
between proportionate changes in incentives and VASO would thus be predicted on the 
basis that the largest reductions in incentives are associated with the industries adding 
the least value to the value of inputs, thereby encouraging the flow of resources into 
higher value industries. The neoclassical model draws the opposite conclusion on the 
basis that low VASO industries facing potential reductions in assistance generate 
political pressure for exemption, and thus predict a negative correlation between 
proportionate changes in assistance and VASO on the basis that the smallest tariff 
reductions are associated with industries adding least value, thereby continuing to 
encourage these industries at the expense of high value added industries.
8.5.3 Productivity and Assistance
The relationship across industries between incentives to industry and productivity is 
another of the major points of contrast between the two opposing views of the role of 
government in Taiwan's industrialisation. According to the new trade/govemed market 
model, consistent with the infant industry argument for assistance, the Taiwan 
government systematically protected import competing industries in which productivity 
was anticipated to grow relatively rapidly. In contrast, the neoclassical theory of 
political economy predicts assistance is typically directed to those industries in which 
productivity is low and increasing relatively slowly. In order to test this relationship, a 
widely accepted measure of industry productivity, value of output per worker (VOPW) 
is employed. In addition, the relationship between the rate of change of value of output 
per worker and assistance is also tested. This is useful in establishing whether 
productivity grew the slowest/fastest in those industries receiving the highest levels of 
assistance.
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A further proxy variable often employed to complement value of output per worker is 
the relationship across industries between assistance received and value added per 
worker (VAPW). Again, both models make opposite predictions about the relationship 
between these variables. The new trade/govemed market models predict that incentives 
are directed to highly skilled, technology-intensive industries in which comparative 
advantage is emerging. The neoclassical theory of politics posits that incentives will be 
directed to industries characterised by low value added per worker. Industries with low 
value added per worker are likely to be low wage, labour-intensive, low technology 
industries; industries in which Taiwan may have been exhibiting a growing comparative 
disadvantage.
8.5.4 Labour-Intensity and Assistance
Many quantitative studies have tested the relationship between tariff assistance and 
labour-intensity based on the hypothesis that the demand for assistance is positively 
correlated with labour-intensity — as measured by labour’s share of value added 
(LSVA) and/or labour's share of output (LSO) across industries. As previously 
demonstrated, Taiwan was becoming increasingly more capital and technology­
intensive over the 1980s as traditional labour-intensive industries were losing 
comparative advantage. While the influence of labour unions until the mid-1980s can 
be discounted, this may have changed following the introduction of the Labour 
Standards Law in 1986. The government may also have been concerned about the 
displacement of labour and/or the restructuring of declining industries. Thus, 
according to the neoclassical (interest-group) model, labour-intensive industries could 
be recipients of more protection because of the bureaucracy's concern about equity, 
adjustment-costs or because of the collective power of labour unions through the 
mechanism of the adding machine or interest group models.
In contrast, the new trade/govemed market model argues that government incentives 
accelerated the flow of resources into more capital and technology-intensive sectors, 
and thus posits a negative relationship between incentives and labour-intensity across 
industries. Neoclassical political economy, on the other hand, posits that incentives have 
largely hindered this structural change by assisting industries with declining comparative 
advantage, and thus predicts a positive relationship between incentives and labour 
intensity.19
19 This can also be explained in terms of the conservative social welfare function model. This model 
explains government attempts to minimise short-run labour adjustment costs as part of a social
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8.5.5 Wages and Assistance
This variable is used to determine the extent to which incentives may/may not have been 
biased towards industries paying high or low wages as predicted in particular by the new 
trade model. Industry wages are typically thought of as being highly correlated with 
human capital intensity. Thus the relationship between assistance and wages (WAGES) 
may indicate the extent to which policy serves to encourage or discourage the flow of 
resources into industries employing more highly skilled and educated workers. The new 
trade/govemed market model predicts that resources will be directed to sophisticated 
industries employing highly paid skilled workers, whereas the neoclassical political 
economy model posits that Taiwan increasingly came to protect industries characterised 
as lower skilled, employing lower-wage workers. But as Miller (1987:177) notes, a 
positive correlation between wages and assistance would be consistent with the new 
trade and governed market model, but inconclusive, as the tariff assistance may be the 
cause of higher wage rates. A negative correlation would support the neoclassical 
position by demonstrating that assisted industries received lower wage rates, despite 
their assistance.
8.5.6 Industry Health and Assistance
Both the new trade model and governed market model contend that the Taiwan 
government successfully nurtured infant industries to become internationally 
competitive. This model thus predicts a positive correlation between incentives and 
proxy variables representative of industry health. On the other hand, the neoclassical 
political economy model contends that government assistance is often employed as a 
device for protecting the incomes of owners of factors of production dependent upon 
industries losing their international competitiveness, and thus predicts a negative
consensus bought about by the risk aversion of the polity and its desire to have a system of income 
insurance in which income relativities are not allowed to change rapidly in response to economic 
circumstances. Miller (1987:79-8) notes that because of the high costs of information required to 
deliver this type of insurance directly through incomes policy, it is possible that unwanted changes in 
income relativities can be avoided most efficiently through the fixing of price relativities through the 
incentive structure. Thus tariffs can be a first best way of achieving the socially desired income 
redistribution. Other things being equal, tariffs will be used to protect industries at an increasing 
comparative advantage. Anderson (1980:132) points out that while society may have a conservative 
social welfare function that on average slows down economic change brought about by increased 
imports, casual observation makes it obvious that some tariffs are cut, some industries are allowed to 
decline, and some relative prices and incomes do change. The conservative social welfare function 
argues that policy will work to ensure that such change will occur more slowly than it would otherwise, 
but it does not address the issue of where change will occur first or most rapidly.
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correlation. This is based on past quantitative studies which show a positive 
relationship between the pressures industries face to decline and the protection they 
receive. Past proxy variables used include value added as a share of output, labour 
intensity, various indicators of industry stagnation such as a low rate of growth of 
output, and increases in import penetration. It should be noted that these variables, 
which are strongly associated with comparative advantage, receive different 
interpretations in other models of tariff policy making, resulting in ambiguity in their 
interpretation when they are statistically significant (Lavergne 1983).
The following variables have been employed in order to determine whether incentives 
were being directed to industries with increasing comparative disadvantage: rate of 
growth of value added (DVA); rate of growth of output (DOUTPUT); rate of growth in 
industry employment (DEMP); proportionate increase in exports as a share of 
production (DEXP);20 and the proportionate change in the import penetration ratio 
(DIMP).
8.5.7 Skill and Technology-Intensity and Assistance
The new trade model predicts government incentives can promote the exports of high 
technology goods by encouraging the flow of resources into technology-intensive 
industries. This model predicts a positive relationship between skill and technology- 
intensity across industries. The neoclassical model makes the opposite prediction, 
based on the view that incentives are directed to industries at a decreasing rather than 
increasing comparative advantage, characterised by low-skill and low technology- 
intensity. To test this proposition a number of R&D indicators are employed as proxies 
of both skill and technology intensity.21
20 Industries with a comparative advantage will tend to lobby against tariffs on their product for fear of 
retaliation by their trading partners. Based on this reasoning, it has been suggested that protection will 
be negatively correlated with exports as a share of production (Anderson and Baldwin 1981:9). The 
higher this ratio, the more competitive are the goods in the world market, hence, the lesser need for 
assistance. Thus the change in the share of exports in domestic production could serve as a 
measurement of competitiveness. Moreover, if products within an industry are competitive relative to 
other countries, then protection afforded to these products becomes largely redundant.
21 Krugman (1984b: 106-7) notes that there are two problems with using input measures as proxies for 
technology intensiveness. Firstly, the measures capture only formal research activity, which may be 
misleading in industries where leaming-by-doing is important or where innovative firms are too small 
to have a formal distinction between research and other activities. Secondly, the calculations focus on 
a Fixed set of industries over time. This may be misleading insofar as innovative industries mature and 
become less dynamic or industries with low innovation develop new branches with high rates of 
technological change. Another problem is that of a two-way causal relationship between variables
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8.5.8 Economies of Scale and Assistance
The final characteristic cited by the new trade theory is that industries exhibiting 
economies of scale have been major recipients of assistance as governments have 
enabled domestic producers to capture the domestic market and reap the benefits 
associated with large-scale production. Similarly, proponents of the governed market 
model contend that the Taiwan government pursued a policy of reserving the domestic 
market for industries subject to economies of scale, predominantly state enterprises. 
Together these models predict a positive correlation across industries between 
assistance and economies of scale.
However, in Taiwan's case a different interpretation is warranted. Small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) still comprised a large proportion of Taiwan’s domestic 
production in the 1980s, and as noted elsewhere, these sectors are generally not 
considered to have been major recipients of incentives. While the new trade/govemed 
market model predicts a positive relationship between economies of scale and 
industrial incentives, we anticipate this relationship may be positive in the case of 
Taiwan, but not overwhelmingly conclusive, given SMEs are generally acknowledged 
as the driving force behind Taiwan's industrialisation.
In support of this it is worth briefly reviewing the contribution that SMEs made to 
Taiwan’s economy during the 1980s by evaluating their performance in terms of the 
number of firms, number of employees, output shares, sales shares, export ratios and 
export shares. By 1989, SMEs constituted 98.5 per cent of all firms in the 
manufacturing sector, accounted for 68 per cent of total employment, with an output 
share in manufacturing of 48 per cent, and contributed to 47 per cent22 of total sales.
Moreover, while typically large enterprises are thought to dominate the domestic 
market, the SMEs have been major contributors to Taiwan's export performance. A 
comparison of export ratios of SMEs and large enterprises shows that between 1976- 
1988, large enterprises exported 37 per cent of their domestic production, with SMEs 
exporting 64 per cent of their domestic production over the same period. SMEs’ share 
of exports in the manufacturing sector ranged from 62.5 per cent to 73.5 per cent
associated with technology-intensity, whereby those firms operating in the international market may be 
more efficient users of more sophisticated technology than domestic firms.
22 Data for total sales for 1987.
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between 1981 and 1988, while their shares in the trade sector were also significant, 
ranging from 53 per cent to 63 per cent during the same period (C. J. Lee 1992).23
TABLE 8.1: The Size Structure of Taiwan Manufacturing
Sector
Average number of 
persons engaged
Number of firms 
1966-1970 1986
Food processing 17 1129 217
Beverages, tobacco 160 13 9
Textiles 37 428 1039
Clothing 44 112 17
Leather, fur 63 156 18
Wood products 15 505 60
Paper, printing, publishing 12 478 093
Chemical materials 67 70 73
Chemical products 25 265 113
Petroleum, chemicals 465 2 1
Plastic products 29 388 603
Rubber products 28 88 283
Non-metallic minerals 27 270 402
Basic metals 27 189 213
Fabricated metals 9 722 3728
Machinery 11 504 1091
Electrical equipment 61 274 1010
Transportation equipment 30 209 445
Precision equipment 29 53 169
Miscellaneous 26 261 765
Source: Pack (1992a: 104); Number of firms —  the Report on 1986 Industrial and Commercial Census 
Taiwan-Fukien Area, General Report, Table 28; average firm size —  Table 19.
By international standards the typical size of firms in each sector is also remarkably 
small.24 Pack (1992a: 105) notes that while the measurement of firm size by 
employment can understate the ability to realise scale economies if each plant is very 
capital-intensive, it is extremely unlikely that firms at this level of employment are 
obtaining them; moreover, scale economies are unlikely to be a major source of 
growing total factor productivity. This is illustrated by Table 8.1 above which shows 
the growth in the number of firms operating between the period 1966-1970 and 1986,
23 Data was obtained from three sources: Small and Medium Enterprises Overview in Taiwan 1988; 
Small and Medium Enterprise Statistics 1989; and Industrial and Financial Situation Survey, various 
issues, Economic Research Department, Bank of Taiwan.
24 Based on comparative international data by Berry (1992) and C. J. Lee (1992).
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and indicates the considerable growth in the number of firms, particularly plastics and 
electronics.
The governed market model argues that because of an absence of pioneering 
innovation in driving manufacturing activity, late industrialisation has tended to be 
driven to a great degree by state-owned enterprises (Amsden 1992:48-9). Similarly, 
Wade (1990a) has stressed the contribution of the large (state assisted) firms to 
Taiwan's industrial development. But the significance of state enterprises varies 
greatly depending on which statistics are used in support of their contribution. 
Amsden, for instance, notes that while the importance of state-owned enterprises has 
declined overtime, 'at least 20 per cent of manufacturing value added was still state- 
owned at the beginning of the 1990s and tended to be concentrated in the commanding 
heights of the economy' (Amsden 1992:48-9). Wade (1990a:68) notes that almost half 
of the manufacturing production in 1971 and 1981 came from firms with more than 
500 employees; only a quarter came from firms with less than 100 employees. He also 
notes that the share of manufacturing value added held by firms with 500 or more was 
unusually high by world standards, with 82 per cent of firms with less than 20 
employees in 1971 producing only 12 per cent of production.
As already discussed, SMEs were the dominant exporters. Biggs and Levy (1988) note 
that in 1985, firms with less than 300 employees accounted for 65 per cent of 
manufactured exports, and in 1976, the top 500 domestically owned firms by sales 
accounted for only 27 per cent of total exports. They find that in 1982, the five largest 
Korean conglomerates accounted for 22.6 per cent of that nation’s manufacturing 
shipments; the corresponding figure for Taiwan was only 4.7 per cent. The fifty 
largest firms (not conglomerates) also accounted for 38.5 per cent of Korean 
manufacturing sales in 1982, but only 16 per cent25 of Taiwan manufacturing sales 
(Biggs and Levy 1988:23). Employment figures show that by 1986, establishments 
with 500 or more workers accounted for only 24 per cent of Taiwan manufacturing 
employment (compared to 41 per cent in Korea in 1981). Table 8.2 shows also that 
private enterprises have consistently produced the majority of output, increasing then- 
contribution over time.
25 1980 figure.
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TABLE 8.2: Share of Gross Output by Public and Private Enterprises,Taiwan
(per cent)
Year Private
Enterprises
Public
Enterprises
Government
Enterprises
Total
1951 67.1 22.1 10.8 100
1955 71.4 17.7 10.9 100
1960 71.2 18.4 10.4 100
1965 74.1 16.8 9.1 100
1970 76.7 14.7 8.6 100
1975 77.3 15.8 6.9 100
1980 76.8 16.9 6.3 100
1985 78.9 14.3 6.8 100
1989 80.9 11.9 7.2 100
Source: Table 3, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, National Income 
in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China (1990:76-83).
The definition and scope of what is classified as a SME has been revised several times. 
Since July 1982, SMEs have been classified as those enterprises with a paid-in capital 
of less than $NT 40 000 000; or having total assets of not more than NT$120 000 000; 
or employing no more than 300 regular employees.26
A number of proxy variables thought to reflect economies of scale have been employed 
in various studies with varying degrees of success.27 But as discussed, given the 
importance of SMEs in Taiwan's industrial performance, what needs to be empirically
26 This was less than 100 persons prior to August 1977.
27 Tests of the hypothesis that governments protect industries in accordance with size have been 
measured in a number of ways — employment, value added, and value added per worker on the basis 
that industries able to deliver more votes receive more protection. The use of employment and value 
added as explanatory variables has not found to be statistically successful, as well as having been 
criticised on grounds of faulty logic. Other empirical work on the importance of scale economies has 
met with mixed results. Hufbauer (1970) found a positive correlation between the importance of scale 
economies in export industries and measures of country size. Baldwin (1971) on the other hand failed 
to identify a scale economy variable as a significant determinant of United States trade. Katrak (1973) 
found strong support for scale economies as a determinant of the relative export performance of the 
United States and United Kingdom. Deardorff (1984:511) however disputes the argument that 
inclusion of relative industry size in the measure of scale economies does not bias Katrak's results. 
Miller (1987) uses a test for economies of scale based on Hufbauer's (1970) estimates of economies of 
scale for United States industries in 1963 on the premise that Japan lagged behind the United States 
and its industrial upgrading consisted to a large degree of importation of United States technology. It 
is hypothesised that if the Japanese government protected industries it expected to experience 
significant productivity via the exploitation of economies of scale, there may exist a positive 
correlation between Japanese protection (during the period 1965 to 1975) and economies of scale in the 
United States. While some evidence was found for the hypothesis that higher levels of protection were 
granted to industries with lower levels of economies of scale, due to concordance problems and the 
shortcomings of the measure used, little weight was given to the results obtained.
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established is whether these small-scale firms, in dominating the export sector, were 
not the major recipients of incentives.
The first proxy employed to reflect industry economies of scale is the number of firms 
(NOF). Following the logic of Olson (1965), small groups are thought more likely to 
gain trade protection, having lower costs of organisation. They have an incentive to 
refrain from contributing to the cost of lobbying and organisation, while they cannot be 
excluded from the gains of protection-seeking interest group. A smaller group is more 
likely to discipline these free-riders, as they face lower costs of information and 
coordination. Similarly, Anderson (1980:135) points out that the free rider problem 
undermines the incentive for a rational, self-interested individual to contribute to an 
interest group's seeking of an assistance policy which, if adopted, would benefit that 
individual regardless of whether the individual contributed. Unless a group has some 
purpose for forming other than to lobby, it is less likely to receive support from 
potential members the larger the number of individuals involved. Other things being 
equal, and subject to certain qualifications, it could be expected an industry's rate of 
assistance to be greater, the smaller the number of firms.
The second proxy for industry economies of scale is the proportion of self-employed and 
family workers to total workers in each industry (SELF). Typically, neoclassical 
political economy predicts that those industries with the highest proportion of self 
employed and family workers receive the most protection. This is because the more 
sophisticated, capital-intensive, highly skilled industries generally tend not to have a 
large proportion of these kinds of workers; employing mostly full-time employees. On 
the other hand, unsophisticated small-scale industries employing simple technology, 
smaller amounts of capital, and requiring lesser skills will tend to have a larger 
proportion of these workers.
Taiwan's industrial structure is predominantly composed of small-scale enterprises with 
a high proportion of self-employed and family workers. Because of the importance of 
small-scale enterprises in Taiwan's industrial structure it is hypothesised that this proxy 
would not be significantly correlated with the incentive structure.
The third proxy for economies of scale (large-scale enterprises (LSE)) follows that of 
Baldwin (1971:135) in using the number of employees in establishments with 250 or
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more employees divided by total industry employment.28 In this study firms have been 
classified according to those firms employing more than 300 employees in the case of 
1981 and more than 100 employees in 1986. The limitations associated with this 
classification are obvious but are unavoidable given the change in classification 
procedures between the 1981 and 1986 Industrial Census. Moreover, data was only 
available for a sample of 20 industries.
As firms with assets exceeding NT$120 000 000 were classified as large enterprises, this 
proxy variable (ASSETS) may also provide an insight into the relationship between the 
incentives and economies of scale. However, because Taiwan's industrial census does 
not provide industry data for this amount, a classification based on assets exceeding 
$NT100 000 000 is used instead.
8.6 Analysis of Results
The policy recommendations that emerge from the new trade/govemed market model 
are based on the view that the Taiwan government has promoted industries with 
emerging comparative advantage, with the government's focus during the 1980s shifting 
towards the development of high technology industries. In assessing the competing 
hypotheses, if the variables thought to indicate comparative disadvantage are found on 
balance to be significant but with signs opposite to those found in similar studies of this 
nature, this would indicate that government policy formulation in Taiwan was in fact 
'different' to that of other industrial democracies. Moreover, if those variables thought 
to reflect strategic industry considerations are found to be positively significant in 
relation to the incentive structure, this would also be evidence that Taiwan had provided 
incentives to strategic winners rather than losers. On the other hand, if the comparative 
disadvantage variables are found significant and with the same sign as that of previous 
studies,29 this would be evidence that government incentives in Taiwan protect declining 
industries with the aim of redistributing income.30
28 Koekkoek, Kol and Mennes (1981) employ this measure, but use employees in establishments with 
500 employees or more as the numerator.
29 Although it needs to be recognised that both 'private interests' and 'national interests' may have 
differing interindustry distributions to those of other countries.
30 As Miller (1987:89) points out, if tariffs were the prime industry policy instrument the results 
obtained would be powerful. However, Taiwan is more likely to be representative of the case in which 
the relevant dependent variable is not only tariffs, but a more complete measure of government 
assistance such that tariffs can be regarded as but one of a interchangeable set of government 
interventions.
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Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) techniques are used in relating a range of 
independent variables (incentives) to a series of dependent variables reflecting proxies 
for industry structural characteristics. This is undertaken in order to determine the 
strength of the relationship and to compare the interaction between the variables. It is 
important to note that OLS may provide biased, inconsistent estimates if the relationship 
between some of the explanatory variables and incentives are interdependent. This was 
in fact the case with many of the proxy variables used in this study. Therefore, rank 
correlation coefficients have been estimated first in order to determine the strength and 
direction of the relationship between incentives and individual industry structural 
characteristics. Those independent variables showing a weak relationship are then 
excluded from the multivariate analysis.
8.6.1 Rank Correlation Coefficients
Before the results pertaining to the determinants of incentives are presented, results 
relating to the possible motivation for trade reform during the 1980s are discussed 
below. The results presented in Table 8.3(1) provide some support for a relationship 
between United States pressure for trade liberalisation, as measured by the share of 
United States imports sourced from Taiwan, and tariff reform in the early 1980s. 
However this relationship did not appear to hold by the end of the 1980s. While initial 
impetus for trade reform may have come from the United States, ongoing liberalisation 
by the end of the 1980s was being undertaken for domestic reasons and/or may reflect 
Taiwan’s commitment to joining GATT. Moreover, Taiwan's persistent trade surpluses 
have created pressures to liberalise quite separately from United States policy, with 
liberalisation of manufactured imports also being promoted within the economic 
bureaucracies. Importantly though, the considerable import liberalisation which took 
place in the mid-1980s may reflect earlier pressure from the United States. After the 
mid-1980s, United States concern for intellectual property rights and agricultural 
protection emerged as major sources of trade friction between the two economies with 
the United States applying pressure to Taiwan via its 'Super 30T legislation.
Table 8.3(11) presents rank correlation coefficients between levels of incentive measures 
and value added as a share of output (VASO). All of the coefficients are positive, with 
half of these coefficients being significant, providing some support to the view that in 
the early 1980s, high value added industries tended to receive more tariff assistance than 
low value added industries. This is consistent with the new trade/govemed market 
model.
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Also presented are rank correlation coefficients between proportionate changes (rates of 
change over time) in the level of incentives over time and VASO. While the results 
relating to tariff assistance in the late 1980s are positive, the relationship is not strongly 
significant so little can be concluded from the results.31
Table 8.3(111) presents rank correlations between incentive variables and the value of 
output per worker (VOPW).32 More than half of the correlations are negative providing 
some support to the view that assistance was directed to industries with low 
productivity and to industries with a comparative disadvantage. However, the 
correlation coefficients are not significant, and three out of the 12 observations are 
positive and significant, making it difficult to conclude that either model was important 
in explaining whether the incentives were directed to industries of increasing or 
decreasing productivity.
Also shown are rank correlation coefficients between proportionate changes in the levels 
of incentives and VOPW. All of the correlations are positive, with the rank correlation 
coefficients significant in the case of effective rates of protection and subsidy. These 
positive correlations imply that industries with the highest productivity tended to receive 
the smallest reductions in assistance over time, while those with the lowest productivity 
were granted exemptions in rounds of tariff cutting.
In addition, the possibility that the technical progress/productivity growth criterion was 
applied systematically, as predicted by the new trade/govemed market model, is also 
tested. This may be useful in determining the extent in which assistance may have been 
directed towards industries which subsequently recorded higher levels of productivity 
growth and/or the extent to which reductions in incentive rates occurred in industries in 
which productivity growth was low. The rank correlation coefficients between the rate 
of change of value of output per worker (productivity growth) and incentives are 
presented in Table 8.3(IV). The correlations are all positive and, in the case of effective 
rates of assistance and subsidy, are significant, providing some support to the view that 
productivity grew fastest in those industries receiving the highest levels of assistance. 
Table 8.3(IV) also reports rank correlation coefficients between proportionate changes
31 The considerable reduction in tariff rates after the mid-1980s also meant that by the end of the 
period, the average tariff rate was quite low and more uniformly dispersed.
32 Results are reported for 60 industries (NRA) and for 59 industries (ERA, ERS) for the proxy 
variables WAGES, VAPW and VOPW as data for the slaughtering sector were unavailable. A similar 
case exists for some of the economies of scale proxy variables whereby data for the alcoholic 
beverages sector were not available.
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in incentives and proportionate changes in VOPW. The correlations are negative for 
tariff assistance indicating some support for the view that those industries in which 
productivity grew the least rapidly received the smallest reductions in tariff assistance, a 
result inconsistent with the new trade/govemed market model. However the opposite 
results hold for effective rates of assistance and subsidy, and in all cases the correlations 
are insignificant.
Table 8.3(111) also shows rank correlations coefficients between levels of incentives and 
VAPW. The majority of the correlations are negative and many statistically significant, 
indicating those industries that had the lowest levels of value added per worker received 
the highest incentives. All incentive measures in 1981 were strongly negatively 
correlated with value added per worker in 1989, such that those industries in which 
workers added least value in 1981 and 1989 were those which received the highest 
levels of incentives. The results are consistent with those predicted by neoclassical 
political economy as already established in Chapter 6, and are inconsistent with the new 
trade/govemed market hypothesis. Also shown are the rank correlation coefficients 
between proportionate changes in levels of incentives and VAPW. The results are 
mixed and in all cases insignificant, and therefore little evidence can be found to support 
either hypothesis.
Rank correlation coefficients between incentive variables and measures of labour- 
intensity —  labour's share of value added (LSVA) and labour's share of output (LSO) 
—  are shown in Table 8.3(V). In both cases, the majority of rank correlation 
coefficients are positive, and most of the coefficients are significant, indicating that some 
confidence can be placed on the interpretation that incentives tended to be directed to 
labour-intensive industries. This result is consistent with that predicted by neoclassical 
political economy, and inconsistent with the new trade/govemed market hypothesis. 
Also reported are rank correlation coefficients between proportionate changes in 
incentives and LSVA. While the majority of coefficients are negative, implying that 
those industries receiving the largest reductions in incentives were labour-intensive 
industries, these coefficients are not significant and is thus not conclusive evidence in 
support of the new trade/govemed market model.
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Table 8.3(VI) provides rank correlation coefficients between levels of assistance and 
average weekly earnings per worker (WAGES).33 Half of the correlations are negative, 
with the rank correlation coefficients between tariff levels and WAGES significantly 
negative, providing support for the view that those industries in which workers received 
the lowest average wages were those that received the highest levels of tariff assistance. 
Some evidence exists then that tariff assistance in Taiwan was used to redistribute 
resources toward industries paying lower wages and lower skilled industries, rather than 
higher paid, higher skilled industries as predicted by the new trade model. Also shown 
are rank correlation coefficients between proportionate changes in incentives and 
WAGES. All the coefficients are positive, but are significant only in the case of tariff 
assistance. These results suggest that those industries with the lowest average wages in 
1981 and 1989 received the largest tariff cuts between 1981 and 1989. This is 
inconsistent with the neoclassical political economy model, and offers some support for 
the new trade/govemed market model.
Table 8.3(VII) provides rank correlation coefficients between the incentive structure and 
the first measure of industry health, the rate of growth of value added (DVA). The 
majority of coefficients are negative, providing some support to the hypothesis that 
incentives were being directed to industries in which value added was growing the 
slowest. But given that none of the coefficients are significant, the results cannot be 
taken to lend strong support to the neoclassical political economy model.
Also presented are the correlation coefficients between incentives and the second 
measure of industry health —  the rate of growth of industry output (DOUTPUT). The 
signs of the coefficients are mixed and none are significant, such that the results do not 
lend strong support to either hypothesis.
The rank correlation coefficients between incentives and the third measure of industry 
health —  the rate of growth of industry employment (DEMP) —  indicate that the 
majority of the correlations are negative (and significant in the case of the effective rate 
of subsidy). This provides some support for the hypothesis that incentives were highest 
in those industries in which employment grew least rapidly during the 1980s, or 
alternatively those industries in which employment grew fastest did so without the 
benefit of incentives.
33 Average weekly earnings are defined to include total industry wages and salaries of regular and 
casual employees plus self employed and family workers (but excluding wages of processing services 
of other families) divided by the total number of persons employed in the industry.
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Also shown are correlation coefficients between levels of incentives and the fourth 
measure of industry health —  the proportionate increase in exports as a share of 
production (DEXP). The results provide some of the strongest results in support of the 
neoclassical political economy model. The majority of the coefficients are negative and 
significant. This suggests that incentives tended to be granted to industries that were 
least successful in increasing their export sales. Thus industries with the highest levels 
of incentives were those whose export performance was least successful over the period.
Finally, we seek to determine whether the poor performance in international markets of 
the more highly assisted industries was accompanied by poor performance in the 
domestic market. Table 8.3(VII) presents correlation coefficients between levels of 
incentives and proportionate changes in the import penetration ratio (DIMP). All the 
correlations are positive and in eight (of 12) cases, the rank correlations are positively 
significant Despite their higher levels of assistance, the most assisted industries 
appeared to be losing market share to imports. This suggests that the existing incentive 
structure has more to do with slowing adjustment to changing comparative advantage 
than with protecting infant industries that once having been established within the 
domestic market are in a position to compete in the international market.
Also presented in Table 8.3(VIII) are rank correlation coefficients between the gross 
import penetration (the share of gross imports in total demand) and net import 
penetration ratio (the share of net imports in total domestic demand). This latter proxy 
is employed by Chang (1987) on the basis that within Taiwan's manufacturing sector, a 
large quantity of products are both imported and exported within the same industry. 
Typically it is hypothesised that if import penetration has resulted in substantial 
damage to domestic producers, then the demand for protection comes either from 
producers or the government. Thus the higher import penetration ratio, the higher the 
tariff expected. However, the correlations are in most cases negative and in the case of 
tariffs in the early 1980s are significant. This result is expected given Taiwan's 
dependence on imports of intermediate inputs during the 1980s, in which the higher the 
import needs of an industry, the lower the tariff rates anticipated on that industry.34
Table 8.3(IX) presents rank correlation coefficients between incentives and indicators 
of technology intensity. In the case of the first proxy —  total R&D expenditure per 
industry (RDE) —  all of the correlations are negative and are significant in the case of
34 Chang in his study finds the import penetration ratio is negative and significant in explaining the 
levels of the tariff structure, but insignificant with respect to the rate of reduction in tariffs.
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tariff assistance in 1981 and 1989, and for effective rates of assistance and subsidy in 
1989. This provides support for the view that incentives were not being directed to 
high technology industries but rather were supporting industries characterised by a 
declining index of export specialisation. Also presented are correlation coefficients 
between changes in the levels of incentives and R&D expenditure per industry. While 
the signs are mixed, changes in the levels of effective rates of assistance and subsidy 
are negative and significant, leading to the acceptance of the neoclassical political 
economy model that industries with low technology and skill-intensity were 
systematically exempt from reductions in incentives.
In the case of the second proxy variable — R&D expenditure as a percentage of total 
sales (SALES) — all of the correlations are negative, but are not significant which may 
reflect the small sample size. Also shown are correlations between proportionate 
changes in assistance and technology-intensity. Similarly the results pertaining to the 
effective rates of assistance and subsidy indicate that by the late 1980s, those industries 
characterised by low technology-intensity tended to be exempt from reductions in 
incentives. Further support is found for this conclusion using another indicator of 
technology intensity — R&D expenditure per $NT million sales. All the coefficients 
are negative and significant in the case of effective rates of assistance and subsidy for 
1989, providing support to the hypothesis that incentives were not directed to high 
technology, skill-intensive industries.
Rank correlation coefficients are presented in Table 8.3(IX) between incentives and the 
following other measures of technology sophistication — total R&D manpower 
(scientists, engineers, technicians and researchers in each industry) (SC); the 
proportionate change in R&D manpower (DSC); and the total number of researchers 
(TR). Together these results show that the majority of coefficients are negative and a 
number of them significant. Results for proportionate changes in incentives and skill 
indicators are also reported. These provide further evidence that industries employing 
a relatively greater number of skilled workers were not the main recipients of 
incentives; or alternatively, industries with low proportions of employment of 
scientists, engineers, technicians and researchers tended to be systematically exempted 
from reductions in incentives. These results therefore appear consistent with 
neoclassical political economy in that those low-skill, less technology-intensive 
industries characterised by a declining index of export specialisation received the most 
protection.
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Finally, rank correlation coefficients between incentives and an alternative indicator of 
technology-intensity, the number of inventions (INV) approved are shown.35 Four 
(out of 6) of the correlations are negative, and in the case of tariffs strongly significant. 
Like the preceding indicators of technology-intensity, this provides support to the view 
that by the late 1980s, tariff assistance was not being directed to industries with 
increasing comparative advantage.
Table 8.3(X) presents rank correlation coefficients between incentive variables and the 
first of the economies of scale variables —  the number of firms (NOF). While the 
majority of correlations are positive, the correlation coefficients for effective rates of 
assistance and subsidy are both negative and significant. This implies that industries 
with fewer firms tended not to be major recipients of effective rates of assistance and 
subsidy.36 Care is required when interpreting these results. By the late 1980s, a 
number of electronic and machinery firms were classified as large firms and it has been 
shown elsewhere that these sectors were not highly assisted.
Also shown are rank correlation coefficient between incentives and the proportion of 
self employed and family workers to total workers (SELF). In most cases the 
coefficients are negative and significant This provides support for the view that 
industries with small-scale enterprises were not favoured by government incentives,37 
but cannot be considered as support for the new trade/govemed market model.
Table 8.3(X) presents rank correlation coefficients for incentives and the number of 
employees. The results for both 1981 and 1986 were predominantly negative and 
insignificant. But because SMEs in 1986 were classified as enterprises having less than 
300 employees (not less than 100 employees as used here), it is difficult to draw 
conclusions and little significance can be attached to these results.38 Also presented are 
results for proportionate changes in incentives and economies of scale. The negative 
and significant relationship between proportionate changes in incentives and economies 
of scale for 1986 provide some support for the view that those industries with low 
economies of scale received the smallest reduction in incentives.
35 As details were not available of the number of patents granted and pending, the number of 
inventions approved for the year 1989 has been used as a proxy.
36 Although 1986 data will not reflect the result that some of the state enterprises tended to be 
recipients of government incentives by the late 1980s.
37 Miller finds that in the case of Japan, those industries with the highest proportion of self-employed 
and family workers are those that received the most protection.
38 As previously noted, Taiwan's Industrial and Commercial Census for 1990 was due for release at the 
end of January 1994. This survey was not available in time to update those results based on 1986 data.
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Table 8.3(X) presents rank correlation coefficients between incentive measures and the 
number of firms with 300 or more employees divided by the total number of firms (LSE) 
(on the basis that SMEs are defined as firms employing less than 300 employees). While 
the signs are mixed, the positive correlations imply that assistance in the early 1980s was 
being directed to firms having larger number of employees and was not being directed to 
SMEs. This did not appear to be the case by the late 1980s, although this may reflect 
the usage of 1986 data.
Finally, Table 8.3(X) presents rank correlation coefficients between incentives and the 
proportion of firms with assets > NT$100 000 000 (ASSETS). Again the signs of the 
correlation coefficients are mixed, but are positive in the case of effective rates of 
assistance and subsidy. Despite the limitations of this proxy, some support is found for 
the view that assistance was not directed to SMEs.
8.6.2 Multivariate Regression Results
The following results are based on a linear functional form. Other nonlinear 
formulations were attempted but these did not improve on the reported results 
statistically. While not particularly robust, the results as shown in Tables 8.4 and Table 
8.5 are generally comparable in direction and strength with past studies of this nature in 
other economies. That is, incentives tended to be directed to industries with a declining 
comparative advantage, not to industries with emerging comparative advantage. 
Despite the reduced number of independent variables multicollinearity was still a 
problem, with all the independent variables associated with comparative (dis)advantage 
in international trade. To minimise the problem of multicollinearity different equations 
were estimated with different explanatory variables. As is usually the case with this 
form of cross-sectional analysis, the predictive power of the preferred regression 
equations was not high. The adjusted R square statistics are low (at best around 40 per 
cent), and the standard errors are high. Three of the estimated equations were found to 
exhibit heteroscedasticity. In these cases White’s Heteroskedastic-consistent covariance 
matrix estimation has been carried out in order to correct the estimates for unknown 
forms of heteroskedasticity.
(i) Nominal Rates of Assistance in 1981 (NRA81) —  The best explanators of nominal 
assistance in 1981 were found to be indicators of comparative disadvantage. Equation 
(1) in Table 8.4 shows that nominal assistance in 1981 was positively and significantly
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TABLE 8.4: Determinants of Nominal, Effective Rates of Assistance and Effective 
Rates of Subsidy, Taiwan :1981
Dependent Variable NRA81 ERA81 ERS81
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent Variabl es
VAS081 0.662
(4.054)***
WAGE81 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(-3.918)*** (-2.519)** (-2.814)* **
LSVA81 0.002
(3.377)***
EPGRS81 -0.391 -0.457
(-2.870)*** (-4.125)***
SELF81 -0.576 -0.623 -1.255 -1.218
(-2.378)** (-2.079)** (-3.542)*** (-3.468)***
ASSETS 81 -4.432 -4.548
(-2.106)** (-2.198)**
NOF81 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.763)* (-1.743)*
LSE81 0.247 4.402 4.570
(1.631) (1.888)* (1.979)*
DEXP81 -.208 -0.264 -0.690 -0.613
(-1.419) (-1.055) (-2.201)** (-2.076)**
US89 0.004
(1.162)
LS089 0.210
(2.052)**
DEMP89 -0.596
(-1.475)
Intercept 77.56 45.63 38.50 62.50 30.78 138.30 137.71
R-squared 0.39 0.38 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.37 0.36
F-stat 8.61 12.99 2.89 4.64 3.13 7.77 7.57
Chi-square 3.36 6.79(a) 1.35 0.11 1.76 21.09(a) 21.13(a)
No. of Observations 60 60 60 60 61 59 59
Notes: 1) t-values are shown in parentheses; significance levels - * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.
2) Heteroscedastidty is measured as E=f(yhat) and distributed as a chi-square with 1 degree 
of freedom, (a) rejects the null hypothesis at 5 per cent. In these cases heteroscedastidty 
has been corrected for using White's Hcterosked as tic-consistent covariance matrix estimation.
2) VASO - value added as a share of output; WAGE - workers average earnings; LSVA - 
labour's share of value added; IPGRS - gross import penetration ratio; SELF - proportion 
of self employed and family workers; ASSETS - proportion of firms with assets >
NTS 100 000 000; NOF - number of firms; LSE - proportion of enterprises with > 300 
employees; DEXP - rate of change in export share of production; US - US share of imports; 
LSO - labour's share of output; DEMP - rate of growth in industry employment
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influenced by labour's share of value added (LSVA) and negatively correlated with 
average earnings per worker (WAGE), and the gross import penetration ratio (IPGRS). 
Equation (2) shows that nominal tariffs in 1981 increases by 0.662 units for an unit 
increase in the value added as a share of output (VASO). Just like in equation (1), 
nominal tariffs seem to be negatively correlated with average earnings per worker 
(WAGES) and the gross import penetration ratio (IPGRS). Equation (3) shows that an 
1 unit increase in the proportion of self employed and family workers to total workers 
(SELF) results in an 0.623 unit reduction in nominal rates of assistance indicating that in 
1981 small-scale firms were likely to receive greater reductions in nominal assistance 
than were large-scale firms. Equation (3) also shows that an 1 unit rise in exports 
(DEXP) leads to an 0.264 unit fall in the rate of assistance indicating those export 
industries were likely to receive greater reductions in assistance than were domestic 
industries. Equation (4) shows that in 1981 an 1 unit increase in average earnings per 
worker (WAGES) results in an 0.003 unit fall in the nominal rate of assistance indicating 
that those higher-wage sectors were more likely to receive reductions in nominal rates 
of assistance than were lower-wage industries. Equation (4) also indicates that an 1 unit 
rise in the proportion of enterprises with > 300 (LSE) results in an 0.247 unit rise in the 
nominal rate of assistance, indicating that large-scale enterprises were more likely to 
receive greater increases in assistance than were small-scale enterprises. Finally, 
equation (5) shows that nominal assistance in 1981 was positively correlated with the 
United States share of imports, and labour's share of output (LSO), and negatively 
influenced by the proportionate change in employment (DEMP).
(ii) Effective Rates of Assistance and Effective Rates of Subsidy in 1981 (ERA81), 
(ERS81) —  Equations (6) and (7) in Table 8.4 show that both effective rates of 
assistance and effectives rates of subsidy in 1981 were showing a declining trend with an 
unit increase in economy of scale variables as measured by the proportion of self 
employed and family workers (SELF), the number of firms (NOF), and the 
proportionate change in exports (DEXP), and that both are indicating an increasing 
tendency with large scale enterprises (LSE). Some support is then found that large scale 
industries had the highest effective rates of assistance and subsidy in 1981. 
Alternatively, small-scale industries as major exporters were not the major recipients of 
incentives.
(iii) Nominal Rates of Assistance in 1989 (NRA89) —  Equation (1) in Table 8.5 shows 
that an 1 unit rise in exports (DEXP) leads to an 0.161 unit fall in the nominal rate of
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assistance. Those industries in 1989 characterised by strong outward-orientation were 
most likely to receive greater reductions in assistance than were domestic industries.
Equation (1) also indicates that an 1 unit rise in the proportion of firms with assets 
greater than NT$ 100 000 000 (ASSETS) results in an 0.119 unit increase in the 
nominal rate of assistance in 1989. Those large-scale industries that were not major 
exporters received the highest rates of nominal assistance in 1989.
(iv) Effective Rates of Assistance in 1989 (ERA89) —  The best explanators of effective 
rates of assistance in 1989 (equation 2, Table 8.5) were found to be indicators 
associated with low productivity, high labour-intensity and low technology-intensity. 
Effective rates of assistance in 1989 were negatively influenced by the value of output 
per worker (VOPW) and positively determined by labour intensity as measured by 
labour's share of value added (LSVA), and the proportion of firms with assets greater 
than NT$ 100 000 000 (ASSETS). Equation (3) shows that technology-intensity as 
measured by R&D expenditure (RDE) and total R&D manpower (SC) significantly 
reduces effective rates of assistance given in 1989. Equation (4) indicates that an 1 unit 
increase in R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales leads to an 162 unit 
reduction in effective rates of assistance in 1989. Similarly, a 1 unit increase in R&D 
manpower (SC) results in an 0.183 unit fall in the effective rate of assistance. Therefore 
technology-intensive industries were likely to receive the greatest reductions in effective 
rates of assistance, or alternatively, the highest effective rates of assistance in 1989 were 
being directed to industries at a decreasing rather than an increasing comparative 
advantage, characterised by low skill and technology-intensity.
(v) Effective Rates of Subsidy in 1989 (ERA89) —  Equation (5) in Table 8.5 shows that 
an 1 unit increase in the value of output per worker (VOPW) in 1989 leads to an 0.035 
unit fall in the effective rate of subsidy. Industries characterised by a higher value of 
output per worker were likely to received larger reductions in effective rates of subsidy 
than were industries characterised by low value of output per worker. Equation (5) also 
shows that an 1 unit increase in the proportion of firms with assets greater than NT$ 
100 000 000 (ASSETS) results in an 3.38 unit rise in the effective rate of subsidy. 
Those large-scale industries and industries with the lowest productivity had the highest 
subsidy assistance in 1989. Support was also found for the proposition that those 
industries characterised by high skill and technology-intensity had the lowest effective 
rate of subsidy in 1989. Equation (6) indicates that effective subsidy rates in 1989 were 
negatively correlated with technology-intensity as measured by R&D expenditure (RDE)
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and total R&D manpower (SC). Equation (7) shows that effective rates of assistance in 
1989 were negatively (although not significantly) correlated with R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of total sales (SALES) and total R&D manpower (SC).
(vi) Rates of Change in Effective Rates of Assistance and Effective Rates of Subsidy in 
1981-8939 (DERA81-89) —  Equations (8) and (9) indicate that the best explanatory of 
proportionate changes in effective rates of assistance and effective rates of subsidy are 
not those associated with increasing comparative advantage. For example, equation (8) 
shows that an 1 unit increase in R&D expenditure (RDE) results in an 20.77 unit fall in 
the rate of change in effective rates of assistance, while an 1 unit increase in total R&D 
manpower (SC) results in an 0.263 unit fall in the rate of change in effective rates of 
assistance over the period 1981-89. Similarly equation (9) shows that an 1 unit increase 
in R&D expenditure as a percentage of sales (SALES) results in an 164.05 unit fall in 
the rate of change in effective rates of subsidy, while an 1 unit increase in total R&D 
manpower (SC) results in an 0.219 unit fall in the rate of change in effective rates of 
subsidy. Technology-intensive were thus likely to receive the greatest reductions in 
both effective rates of assistance and effective rates of subsidy over the 1980s. 
Equations (10) and (11) also show that effective rates of assistance and effective rates of 
subsidy are negatively correlated with R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales 
(SALES) and total R&D manpower (SC). Thus, those industries characterised by high 
skill and technology-intensity had the lowest rates of assistance and subsidy in 1989 and 
over the ten year period.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter employed quantitative techniques to compare the validity of the new 
trade/govemed market and neoclassical interpretations of the role of government 
industrial policy interventions in Taiwan’s industrialisation over the 1980s. In short the 
results offer little support for the strong relationships advanced by the new 
trade/govemed market model. While the levels of statistical significance are not 
uniformly high, and in some cases neither model is significant, on balance it appears that 
government incentives were not directed to industries with perceived current and future 
comparative advantage. Instead, incentives tended to be directed towards industries at 
an increasing comparative disadvantage. These results are, with the exception of some
39 There was no equation involving proportionate changes in nominal rates of assistance that warrants 
discussion.
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of the productivity variables, similar in direction to previous studies of this nature, but 
do not exhibit the strength associated with Miller's study of Japan's tariff structure.40
Specifically, it could be said that the results provide some support for the proposition 
that the incentive structure during the 1980s discriminated in favour of industries with 
low value added (VAPW), low average earnings (WAGE), were labour— intensive 
(LSO, LSVA), low levels of skill and technology— intensity, low rates of growth (as 
measured by DEMP, DVA), and low international competitiveness (as measured by 
DEXP and DIMP). The results pertaining to export share and technology and 
skill—intensity present some of the strongest results in support of the neoclassical 
political economy model. This lack of association between the incentive structure and 
export growth and indicators of technology— intensity indicates that the policy regime 
was not significant in contributing to sustained industrial and export growth over this 
period. The relationship between the incentive structure and the economies of scale 
variable is a special one in the case of Taiwan, where it is found the incentive structure 
discriminated against SMEs who were important contributors to Taiwan’s 
industrialisation performance. While some support is provided for the new 
trade/governed market view that incentives favoured industries in which productivity 
was growing rapidly (as measured by VOPW), the evidence is not overwhelmingly 
conclusive and is subject to conflicting interpretation.
Overall, the fundamental determinant of incentives to Taiwan's manufacturing industry 
during the 1980s appears not to have been its potential for developing international 
competitiveness in the future. Instead, as predicted by the neoclassical model, the 
incentive structure appeared to be designed to assist industries at an increasing 
comparative disadvantage.
40 Two possible additional explanations of government policy should also be mentioned. One is the 
deliberate creation of certain heavy industries to support Taiwan's autonomous defence production, 
which may account for the dominant role of large-scale enterprises in certain industries. Second, the 
government may have been concerned with the problems and time paths of structural adjustment for 
declining industries in the 1980s, and ameliorated that process by reducing incentives less rapidly than 
for other industries.
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- CHAPTER 9 -
THE INFANT/STRATEGIC INDUSTRY TEST FOR
INTERVENTION
9.1 Introduction
External economies have traditionally been considered a valid justification for the 
infant industry argument with assistance provided to an industry if the costs associated 
with assistance are recouped as a result of productivity improvements over time. The 
new trade model rests on similar notions to this argument where the existence of 
market imperfections or dynamic externalities may inhibit a new industry from 
undertaking particular activities. New trade theorists, in associating the learning 
process with knowledge-intensive industries, advocate a rapid shift in the industrial 
structure toward these activities, even if they are not internationally competitive at 
present levels of scale, knowledge, and factor prices. Similarly, the governed market 
model in citing the Taiwan experience asserts governments can successfully overcome 
externalities associated with the development process by promoting infant industries in 
the presence of economies of scale and learning. Both contend there are important 
links between government industrial policies and industrial productivity performance.
This chapter assesses whether industry policy interventions centred on the above 
rationale have been significant in affecting rates of productivity growth. If this is found 
to be the case, it would be evidence that interventions had a pronounced impact on the 
sectoral evolution of the industrial structure. On the other hand, if interventions are not 
found to be associated with rates of productivity growth, this begs the question of what 
was the factor underlying sectoral growth. Did the adoption of an export-oriented 
strategy and its associated competitive disciplines, as predicted by neoclassical 
economics, offer the best route to industrialisation through the fostering of efficient 
allocation of resources and dynamic scale economies?
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Section 9.2 discusses recent empirical studies applying new trade theory to developing 
countries and, in a case study of Taiwan's semiconductor industry, describes the 
various industrial strategies adopted in order to internalise externalities. Two tests are 
then applied to determine whether infant/strategic industry performance has matched 
expectations by exhibiting higher sectoral productivity growth. Section 9.3 outlines the 
first of these tests; the infant industry (total factor productivity (TFP) measurement) 
test as developed by Krueger and Tuncer. By incorporating empirical results on 
Taiwan's incentive structure and estimates of TFP, it seeks to determine whether there 
is a tendency for more assisted industries in Taiwan to exhibit a higher growth of 
output per unit of input than less assisted industries. The second test seeks to 
determine whether there is a relationship between rates of productivity growth and the 
characteristics put forth by the new trade theorists as important in achieving dynamic 
industrialisation. These results, along with other related research discussed in section 
9.4 are used to assess the determinants of total factor productivity growth over the 
period 1961-86.
9.2 Externalities in Developing Countries
While there have been few empirical studies applying new trade theory to developing 
countries, Richard Baldwin (1992) and Yoon (1992) have deployed approaches used to 
study strategic trade policy in the industrialised countries to analyse, respectively, the 
civil aircraft industry in Brazil and the semiconductor industry in Korea. Baldwin’s 
case study of strategic trade in an oligopolistic Brazilian export industry is innovative 
in its incorporation of positive training externalities into social cost-benefit analysis. 
Using a calibration model, Baldwin shows that taking account of labour-training 
effects, government subsidies may have been justified. However, Yoon demonstrates 
how a private Korean firm, without government support, successfully penetrated a 
high-technology oligopolistic global industry by filling a market 'niche' left in 
consequence of investment 'wars' among leading United States and Japanese firms 
seeking to capture an advantage in the next stages of technological and product 
development.
Employing a calibration model, Yoon models the competitive conditions Korean firms 
faced in their entry into the 64K memory commodity market, showing that a late 
entrant can successfully enter and survive intense competition without direct 
government subsidy or trade-restricting policies to protect them from foreign 
competition.1 While the government initiated incentive schemes to allow the leading
1 As Yoon notes, while strategic trade policies in the early stages of industrial development might have 
strengthened the competitive position of the Korean firms, the Korean government had already 
abandoned policy efforts to promote specific targeted industries by the early 1980s. Most o f the 
previous direct government subsidies, including preferential low-interest loans, had been abolished.
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firms to share the cost and diffuse information in R&D activities to the higher-density 
memory market, this governmental response followed only after firms had achieved 
successful entry. Yoon in fact argues it would have been impossible for the Korean 
government to collect all the necessary information to stimulate the complex incentives 
operating inside the internal organisation of the private firm. These firms later moved 
into, and became profitable in, the 56K and 1M chip market. Given spillover effects or 
external economies, Yoon concludes their positive profit implies that the successful 
entry was welfare improving without governmental subsidies or market restrictions that 
might have had harmful effects on other industries. The fact that efficient Korean 
firms remain major suppliers in the lower segment of the commodity memory market 
suggests that their entry contributed to an increase in global welfare as well.
As foreshadowed in Chapter 3, the Taiwan experience has been to largely internalise 
externalities through the adoption of various industrial strategies. Taiwan's electronics 
industry is an example. The semiconductor industry is characterised by heavy 
investment, high risk and intense competition.* 2 This provides strong incentives for 
strategic alliances, especially for R&D. For example, Taiwan's integrated circuit 
design industry was established in 1977 when the government's research body, the 
Industrial Technology Research Institution signed a technology transfer contract with 
RCA. After the technology had been established, a private company, United 
Microelectronics Company (UMC), was formed to commercialise innovations; UMC 
received 25 per cent its initial start up capital from the Bank of Communications 
(Chiao Tung), the public bank for industrial development. UMC then set up a 
subsidiary in Silicon Valley and signed joint research agreements with two United 
States firms in Silicon Valley.
Technology for this sector has continued to be acquired by Taiwan firms making a 
number of small-scale acquisitions of United States firms and overseas mergers.3
Within the semiconductor industry the tariff on imported capital equipment, plus insurance fees and 
transportation increased initial capital equipment costs by 30 per cent for Korean semiconductor firms, 
and the domestic loan rate of interest exceeded 11 per cent. In addition, foreign access to the Korean 
market has been virtually free. Wade (1990a:312) however regards as unpersuasive Yoon's view that 
the government's role was not important in the development of the Korean semiconductor industry. 
However, this view is based on an assessment of the historical evolution of the electronics sector. 
Wade provides no empirical evidence to support his view that government intervention was significant 
in this sectors development.
2 For comprehensive surveys of the electronics industries of both Taiwan and Korea see Simon and 
Schive (1984); Schive (1990); Emst and O'Connor (1989); Ernst and O'Connor (1992); O'Connor and 
Wang (1992); and Wade (1990a, 1990b).
3 For example, in March 1990, Microtek, a leading Taiwan computer peripherals maker, bought a share 
of the United States firm C-Cube Systems to develop video technology; in late 1989, a consortium of 
Taiwan firms bought Wyse Technology in the United States, a world leader in computer terminals; 
other means of acquiring technology have included Acer Group's merger with a minicomputer 
manufacturing company, and a computer-controlling printing system company, both of which are
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Many Taiwan firms have also become enmeshed in global sourcing and subcontracting 
with multinational firms serving as critical suppliers of key components and final 
products. Statistics as at the end of 1991 show some 2182 cases of technical 
cooperation agreements with Japan and 848 agreements with the United States 
(O'Connor and Wang 1992:47).* 4
In addition, original equipment manufacturing (OEM) has proven one of the most 
important methods of technology acquisition for electronic firms in Taiwan and Korea. 
OEM arrangements provide the supplier with a high volume of business which permits 
realisation of scale economies. In addition, the customer often offers technical 
assistance in engineering and manufacturing processes in order to ensure quality and 
cost efficiency. At the very least, the customer must supply detailed technical 
blueprints to allow the contractor to produce according to specifications, and to take 
responsibility for marketing and distribution. While there are drawbacks to such an 
arrangement, OEM contracting still represents one of the least costly ways for a firm to 
enter international electronics markets as a supplier for the first time. Even in Korea 
and Taiwan, reliance on OEM export sales remains high. In the case of Korea's 
consumer electronics industry, OEM exports accounted for anywhere from 33 per cent 
to 81 per cent of total exports in 1986, depending on the item. Taiwan firms appear 
somewhat less dependent on average on OEM arrangements than Korea, at least for 
computer products. In 1987 about two-thirds of computer and related equipment 
exports by Taiwan companies consisted of OEM exports to foreign firms (Ernst and 
O'Connor 1992:152-3).
Taiwan's industrial development has been characterised by a more substantial presence 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) than in Japan and Korea. Ranis and Schive 
(1985) have shown that while MNC activities accounted for only a small share of 
manufacturing value added and employment though the late 1970s, the cumulative 
spillover effects can be quite substantial if even a small percentage of employees leave 
firms each year. Scott (1979:339) cites anecdotal evidence that this occurred. 
Evidence from labour force surveys (which also holds for the 1980s) indicates quite 
substantial labour market turnover at the industry level (particularly in electric and 
electronic equipment) though separate data on MNCs, joint ventures, and local firms
located in the United States; Microtex's 20 per cent share purchase of the United States Mouse System
Company and Acer Group's joint venture with Texas Instruments to produce DRAMs in Taiwan.
4 Within the consumer electronics industry, from 1952 to 1990, strategic alliances cases (mostly 
technology cooperation) with Japan accounted for 61 per cent (589 cases) o f the total; alliances with 
the United States accounted for 30 per cent (289 cases) and alliances with Europe accounted for 8.8 per 
cent (85 cases) (O'Connor and Wang 1992:47).
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are not available. Moreover, this trend is most pronounced in newer higher technology 
sectors which Ranis and Schive find are often entered by non-Chinese owned MNCs.5
In 1980 the Taiwan government also established the Hsinchu Industrial Science Park. 
Designed around Silicon Valley in the United States, the park aims to attract high-tech 
investments and stimulate domestic growth of technology and to attract returning 
nationals. Its geographic setting is important as it is situated near two major 
universities and Taiwan's largest industrial laboratory, the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ITRI) and is close to major transport links. In 1990, of the total 120 
firms located in the Park, 84 were domestic, 36 were foreign (the majority of these 
from the United States). In seeking to acquire technology and investment, government 
incentives are available equally to both domestic and foreign firms. In 1990 foreign 
capital contributed to around half of all capital investment within the Science Park.
Most importantly, the industrial structure of Taiwan, composed of relatively small 
firms, has been conducive to rapid adjustment to changing product markets.6 Firms 
have been able to move towards products which have just been developed or towards 
existing products whose relative price has increased. Rapid change in the industrial 
structure has been brought about by the large supply of trading firms which search for 
new product niches appropriate for Taiwan's smaller producers. The effect of this 
structure has enabled firms to begin production with small amounts of capital for both 
production facilities and for the acquisition of specialised market information. This 
highlights the ease of entry for new innovative participants and the ability to avoid 
large investment in informational requirements which is arguably more constraining 
than obtaining financing, especially in the Taiwan context.
Scitovsky (1985) suggests that the small size structure of Taiwan firms encouraged 
workers to begin their own firms and made it easier to accumulate enough capital 
through informal channels to finance the establishment of the firms. He also links this 
phenomenon to the rapid growth in the household saving rate. For example, a number 
of electronics firms were started as family-owned businesses, frequently as part of a
5 Ranis and Schive (1985) provide a detailed account of the benefits conferred upon other firms by 
their interaction with the Singer sewing machine company. The linkages described and the 
productivity gains obtained by other firms as a result constitute an example o f external economies. In 
the case of Singer, the external benefits arose at least partly as the firm attempted to satisfy local 
content requirements imposed by the government. Bell (1986) however has suggested that examples of 
real externalities may be rather limited in some developing countries. Amsden (1977) for example, 
notes non-diffusion in Taiwan from the modem sector, using foreign technology, to local machine-tool 
firms.
6 In 1990 there were about 490 telecommunications firms, with nearly three-fourths having less than 50 
employees, and more than 82 per cent having less than US$160 million in equity; 700 information 
hardware manufacturers and 300 software service firms, with 85 per cent having less than 50 
employees; within the semiconductor industry (with the most important category being the integrated 
circuit industry) there were 50 firms (O'Connor and Wang 1992).
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diversification away from more traditional trading or manufacturing activities. Funds 
for investment are either generated internally, or borrowed, often through informal 
channels. Private borrowers were forced to the much higher cost 'curb market' which 
tended to limit borrowing, keeping investments relatively labour-intensive and firms 
relatively small. Taiwan firms had difficulty entering sectors where economies of scale 
are important, being forced instead to focus on market niches and exploit their 
flexibility. This in turn explains why Taiwan electronics firms are especially 
competitive in rapidly changing markets. Thus as Pack (1992a:93) argues, in the case 
of Taiwan there is reason to be sceptical of the quantitative importance of the impact of 
government intervention in the capital market. The view that government lending 
made a decisive difference in the sectoral pattern of investment is not very plausible in 
an economy in which domestic saving was at a high level, rapidly growing, and the 
capital market closed for much of the period, making investment abroad difficult. 
Such conditions must have led to a growing and intense effort by private investors to 
identify high quality local projects. While the impact of asymmetric information 
would continue to be felt, the growing ratio of investment to GNP implies that an 
increasing number of projects with positive present discounted value at market rates 
would be financed. While it is possible that the sectoral structure of investment was 
affected, an overwhelming feature has been the rapid growth of the capital stock for the 
entire manufacturing sector.
9.3 The Infant/Strategic Industry Tests7
9.3.1 Testing the Governed Market Hypothesis
The efficacy of government intervention via subsidies or trade policy based on the 
infant industry argument hinges upon the degree to which learning, and therefore 
productivity improvement (cost reduction), occurs with experience and/or time. The 
same applies to governmental intervention motivated by the newer 'strategic' 
arguments. Attempts to measure such benefits and costs have been virtually non­
existent, with very few efforts to relate learning to trade or subsidy policies in a 
systematic manner. Only one known attempt has been made ex post to examine the 
pattern of decline in costs accompanying protection, reflecting the paucity of empirical 
evidence. Krueger and Tuncer (1982a) showed that in the case of Turkey there was no 
evidence to suggest that more protected industries experienced a higher rate of decline 
in costs than less protected industries.
Assessing the infant industry argument involves determining whether performance has 
matched expectations according to some defined criteria. It is a necessary condition for
7 The following section draws heavily on Krueger and Tuncer (1982a).
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the validity of the infant industry argument justification of assistance that the costs 
associated with assistance to an industry are recouped as a result of productivity 
improvements over time. The question is whether production costs relative to 
international prices fall to levels below those in well established industries, and after 
how long. Moreover, the costs of production of those benefiting by the development of 
the activity must fall enough to repay the initial losses and to provide a reasonable rate 
of return on those losses.
The test as developed by Krueger and Tuncer (1982a) for an infant industry case to be 
valid is as follows: the necessary (but not sufficient) condition is that costs in 
(temporary) assisted industries should fall over time more rapidly than costs in non- 
assisted or less-assisted industries.8 There are three ways that one industry's costs per 
unit of output (or value added) can change relative to another's: either its share- 
weighted inputs per unit of output must fall more (or rise less) than the other's, or the 
relative price per unit of output must fall more (or rise less) than the other’s, or the 
relative price of the factor it uses relatively intensively in production may fall.
The test is derived as follows. Defining total cost, C, of the /th industry as
(9.1) G  = X w ,V j,
where Wj is the reward to the jth factor of production and Vjj is the quantity of the jth 
factor employed in the ith industry. The change in /'s costs is
(9.2) dQ  = ^dW jV ji + dVjiWj and the change in costs per unit of output
(93) df C i ^ y  dWj WjVü G ] y  dV* WjVji G dXi C 
 ^ ’ VXiJ Y  Ci Xi j v * Ci Xi Xi x
Denoting the share of the jth factor in total costs in industry i by ay, equation (9.3) can 
be rewritten as:
(9.4) d
[G/Xi]
G/Xi X aj
dWj
Wj
aij
dVji
Vji
dXi
Xi
8 This assumes that prices in the rest of the world are given, and do not change over time due to 
differential rates of technical change in the rest of the world.
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Thus the proportionate change in costs per unit of output in the ith industry represents 
the share-weighted sum of changes in input prices plus the share-weighted sum of factor
inputs less the rate of change of output. Letting G  represent the proportionate rate of 
change in costs per unit of output. Contrasting changes in cost between the ith and the 
kth industry yields
(9.5) G - G  = X ( a i j - a * ) ^ +
^  dVji dXi
> aij-----------------
V  Vü Xi x^ dVjkVjk dXkXk
The first term on the right represents a change in relative costs due to changing relative 
input prices. That relative input prices may change in the process of growth is not 
grounds for infant industry assistance. If there is to be a dynamic cost reduction, it must 
be reflected in a difference between the two bracketed terms on the right hand side. 
Thus if there are dynamic factors warranting intervention, they will be reflected in the 
difference in the two right hand side terms of equation (9.5).
dA;
Defining (9.6)9 -----=
A;
dXi
X.
dVji
V,
Substituting (9.6) into (9.5) and dropping the first term as irrelevant for infant industry 
purposes,
(9.7) C i - C k =  —  
Ak
dAi
Ai
In order for infant industry considerations to have warranted intervention in favour of 
industry i, costs per unit of output must have fallen more in i than in k. Equation (9.7) 
shows that a necessary condition for this to occur is that inputs per unit of output 
decrease more rapidly in industry i than in industry k. As formulated, this unit cost 
reduction could come about because of technical change, the overcoming of 
indivisibilities, the realisation of scale economies, or for genuine infant industry 
reasons.10
9 Thus the dA/A is the conventional formula for TFP growth, which is the rate of growth of output less 
the share-weigh ted rate of growth of inputs per unit of output. For our purposes, however, the 
assumptions necessary to justify the use of dA/A as a measure are far weaker than those necessary for a 
TFP growth interpretation.
10As Krueger and Tuncer (1980:23) note, rates of TFP growth provide no clue as to absolute levels of 
efficiency. The fact that TFP growth is higher in one industry than another can, in a straightforward 
way, be interpreted to mean that profitability is growing more rapidly (or that losses are shrinking) in
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Should industry i have been protected on infant industry grounds and its costs have 
fallen relative to k, it will be judged that there were some dynamic factors in industry i 
that may have warranted intervention (although there is no presumption that 
intervention was optimal). Passing the test is a necessary condition for there to have 
been an infant industry. It is not sufficient to prove that the infant industry protection 
was warranted because: (i) the industry might have developed anyway; (ii) the reduction 
in costs might have come about for reasons other than externalities; or (iii) the reduction 
in costs was not sufficient to provide an adequate rate of return on earlier losses. It may 
not have been optimal as an alternative intervention instrument or a lower level of 
assistance may have achieved the same or better results with lower costs. If, however, 
costs in industry i did not fall relative to industry k, then protection was not warranted. 
It is in this sense that a contrast of rates of growth of output per unit of input between 
more and less assisted industries constitutes a first test for the empirical validity of the 
infant industry argument (Krueger and Tuncer 1982a: 1145).* 11
The governed market model asserts that industrial policy interventions induced some 
sectors to emerge much earlier than would have occurred in the absence of government 
incentives. This intervention is seen to have successfully captured various external 
economies associated with development, resulting in a more rapid expansion of output.
the former, if world prices (and the country’s structure of assistance) are constant. It cannot, however, 
be used as an indication that efficiency, in the sense of total use of inputs, is higher in the first industry 
than in the second. While in some circumstances (such as the infant industry argument) one can use 
observations on TFP growth rates to reject certain types of hypotheses about the relative performance 
of various sectors over time, rates of TFP growth can never confirm hypotheses with respect to 
efficiency.
11 As Krueger and Tuncer (1982a: 1146) explain, the infant industry argument presumes both dynamic 
factors and externalities. The test described is straightforward in evaluating the presence of dynamic 
factors, but does not indicate to which units it might apply. Since assistance is granted at different 
rates to different industries, it seems natural to suppose that the relevant i and k to contrast would be 
different industries subject to different levels of assistance. Thus a higher dA/A would be required for 
a more assisted industry than for a less assisted one to satisfy the infant industry test. Most proponents 
of the infant industry argument seem to adopt this notion that the benefits are external to the firm but 
internal to the industry, implying that rates of growth of output per unit of input should be higher for 
the industry than for new firms. It is possible, however, that externalities spread across new entrants, 
and do not affect more traditional firms within industries. In that event, one would expect output per 
unit of input to grow more rapidly in newly established firms or activities than preexisting ones. 
However it could also be argued that the benefits of new industries are spread across the entire 
industrial sector, and are not centred in the assisted industries themselves. Thus, one may be sceptical 
of the argument, on the grounds that it is difficult to see why different levels of temporary assistance 
should be accorded to different industries unless their own costs would fall differentially. But if the 
relevant source of externalities is the entire industrial sector, the industrial sector as a whole should be 
observed to have experienced a relative high rate of growth of output per unit of input in contrast to the 
rest of the economy. Moreover, it has always been noted that if the appropriate mix of infant industries 
was encouraged at the optimal rate, superior growth performance would emerge as a result. Both the 
classical defence of free trade and the infant industry argument presume that domestic factor and 
product markets are fairly competitive, a phenomenon not always observed in developing countries 
(Krueger 1981:7). But as Baldwin (1969) demonstrated, in circumstances that might result in gains in 
output per unit of input, the appropriate policy was to subsidise the source of the gain. Such a 
prescription was not always followed by developing countries.
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The implicit view is that new sectors promoted by the government subsequently 
yielded a greater level of total factor productivity for a given commitment of resources. 
If selective intervention was a critical component of Taiwan's successful economic 
growth, it would need to be demonstrated that intervention increased productivity 
growth rates in specific industries, given that the major benefit of industrial policy 
would be to increase the rate of long-term productivity growth.
TABLE 9.1: TFP, Export, and Output Growth Rates, Annual Average, Taiwan: 
1968-82
(per cent)
In d u s t r y TFP
G r o w t h
E x p o r t
G r o w t h
O u t p u t
G r o w t h
Food processing -0.15 6.78 7.30
Beverages and tobacco 0.88 6.67 9.46
Textiles 3.46 18.36 18.54
Apparel* 2.02 23.46 20.23
Leather and fur 4.13 17.60 27.40
Lumber and furniture -0.76 11.47 8.19
Paper and paper products -0.01 13.26 9.38
Chemicals -0.67 18.54 12.96
Petroleum and coal -0.63 8.35 11.83
Rubber 2.07 19.49 15.66
Clay, stone, and glass 0.99 13.46 11.05
Basic metals 0.04 18.76 16.18
Fabricated metals 1.42 24.36 15.85
Machinery 3.63 24.17 15.81
Electronics & electrical mach. 2.12 23.14 19.44
Transportation equipment 2.26 33.00 18.37
Note: *Data for the apparel industry cover the years 1969-82.
Source: Table 1, Chen and Tang (1990:580)
In order to assess this, results from three TFP studies of the Taiwan economy are 
reviewed and the relationship between the incentive structure and TFP growth 
assessed. The first of these studies, undertaken by Chen and Tang (1990), calculates 
rates of TFP growth for 16 two digit sectors for the period 1968-1982. Their results in 
Table 9.1 above show that total factor productivity growth was highest in the leather 
and fur industry, followed by machinery, textiles, transport equipment, and electrical 
equipment industries. Food processing, lumber and furniture, chemicals, petroleum 
and coal, and paper and paper products exhibited negative TFP growth over the 
period.12
12 Pack (1992a:99) in assessing these results concludes that there appears no systematic tendency for 
more assisted industries to have a higher growth of TFP growth than less assisted industries.
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Secondly, Liang (1989) measures total factor productivity for 19 manufacturing sectors 
for the period 1961-81. Estimated real output growth rates for the period 1961-1981 
(Table 9.2(a)), indicates that the manufacturing sector as a whole grew by 14.2 per cent 
per annum. The relatively outstanding performers were electrical machinery (27.2 per 
cent), miscellaneous manufacturing (22.0 per cent), transportation equipment (21.0 per 
cent), chemicals (18.7 per cent), clothing and apparel (18.5 per cent), rubber (16.9 per 
cent), textiles (14.9 per cent) and metal products (14.7 per cent). Relatively poor 
performers were wood and bamboo (7.7 per cent), printing (8.8 per cent) and 
beverages (9.3 per cent).13 Within the manufacturing sector, intermediate inputs was 
the main contributor to the growth rate of output (71.6 per cent), followed by capital 
input (7.0 per cent), labour input (6.4 per cent) and energy input (3.1 per cent). On 
average though, the relative contribution of all inputs toward the growth of real output 
was greater (88 per cent) than that of total factor productivity (12 per cent).
Table 9.2(b) presents the average rate of TFP growth during the period 1961-1981. 
This shows that rubber products enjoyed the highest TFP growth, an 8.8 per cent 
increase per annum during 1961-1981. This was followed by electrical machinery (7.3 
per cent), miscellaneous manufacturing (6.6 per cent), leather (5.1 per cent), textiles 
(3.7 per cent) and transport equipment (3.7 per cent). The poorer performing sectors 
included wood (-7.8 per cent), printing (-6.5), chemicals (-3.8), petroleum and coal 
products (-2.1 per cent), basic metals (-1.4 per cent), paper (-0.9 per cent) and 
beverages (-0.5 per cent).
Results are also provided for the sub-period 1973-81, regarded as Taiwan's secondary 
import substitution period, following the end of the labour surplus. According to the 
governed market model (Wade 1990b:236-241) this is the period when government 
'leadership' was significant. This model thus argues industrial deepening through 
development of heavy and chemical industries in the early to mid-1970s, was in 
response to, rather than in anticipation of, changes in comparative advantage (Wade 
1990b:236). Liang's results however show that many of these sectors known to have 
been more highly assisted than others were the poorer performing sectors over the 
period: wood (-25.1 per cent), chemicals (-16.4), petroleum and coal (-2.1), non- 
metallic minerals (-1.4) metal products (-1.3 per cent), beverages (-0.5 per cent) and 
transport equipment (-0.2 per cent). In particular, the results from Table 6.9 (Chapter 6) 
show that by 1981, all of the above sectors exhibited above average effective rates of 
assistance and effective rates of subsidy.14 In the particular, the petroleum industry
13 When measured by value added the manufacturing sector as a whole registered a 12.8 per cent 
annual growth rate in real value added during 1961-81, a result similar to that found by Kuo (1983).
14 An exception to this was the beverages and tobacco sector and the transport equipment sector where 
the effective rate of assistance was slightly below the average rate of assistance.
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exhibited the highest rate of assistance and subsidy, while the beverages industry 
exhibited the highest rate of nominal assistance. Those sectors in which Taiwan had 
traditionally exhibited a comparative advantage (textiles, clothing, leather and sections 
of miscellaneous manufacturing) and those sectors with emerging comparative 
advantage (electronics) were not the major recipients of assistance. Despite the policy 
instruments employed to encourage such industries there is no evidence that import 
substitution industries increased their output per unit of input any more rapidly than 
traditional industries such as wearing apparel and footwear.
While not conclusive, due to the varying levels of aggregation and classification 
procedures employed, it is interesting to compare both Liang's (1989) results and those 
of Chen and Tang (1990) with the study by Lee and Liang (1982),15 which measured 
Taiwan's incentive structure for the year 1969. Unfortunately, detailed sectoral data for 
the 1980s was not available in time for these results to be incorporated into the study.16 
However the results from earlier studies remain valid in determining whether the 
performance of those infant industries thought to have been targeted by the Taiwan 
government during the 1960s and the industries purported by the governed market 
model to have been promoted during the period of industrial deepening in the 1970s 
has matched expectations in terms of subsequent productivity growth in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.17
According to the classification employed by Lee et al. (1975:111), the following 
(manufacturing) sectors were classified in the trade category 'import competing' in 
1969: non-metallic minerals, tobacco, pulp, paper and paper products, miscellaneous 
industrial chemicals, miscellaneous chemical manufactures and motor vehicles. 
Comparing these results with Chen and Tang's results reveal that over the period 1968- 
82, paper and paper products, chemicals, and petroleum exhibited negative TFP 
growth. Also, non-metallic minerals (containing the clay, stone and glass industries), 
basic metals, and the beverages and tobacco sector displayed low productivity growth 
compared to other sectors. A similar picture emerges in the case of Liang's study, 
particularly for the chemicals sector and transportation sector. The electrical 
machinery sector (a 'strategic' sector) was not a major recipient of assistance relative to 
other sectors, but nonetheless achieved a high TFP growth. Despite the limitations of 
this comparison, it does not appear that over the period 1961-86, government
15 In Balassa et al. (1982).
16 At the time of submission Liang was still in the process of updating his results for the period 1980- 
89.
17 Wade in noting Westphal's conclusion on the achievement of international competitiveness of 
'many' Korean infant industries, concludes in the case of Taiwan that '[Although I have not seen data 
for Taiwan on what has happened subsequently to those highly protected import competing industries 
of 1969, they could be found (Wade 1988:150).
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incentives elicited the sort of growth in output per unit of input on which infant 
industry proponents base their claim for assistance.
Thirdly, Wang (1990) measures TFP for 15 sectors18 for the period 1966-86. Table 9.3 
indicates that the annual growth rate of TFP over 1966-86 was 3.9 per cent for the 
capital-intensive group and 6.8 per cent for the labour-intensive one. Although in the 
capital-intensive group basic metals and machinery recorded high growth rates of TFP 
(7.2 per cent and 6.7 per cent, respectively), other capital-intensive industries such as 
non-metal products, chemicals and transport equipment had lower rates of growth 
ranging from 2.4 per cent to 3.3 per cent per annum. Nearly all of the labour-intensive 
industries realised rapid growth of TFP, particularly textiles, electronics, miscellaneous 
manufactures, clothing, and leather. Comparing the results for Taiwan with the Dollar 
and Sokoloff (1990) study on Korean TFP growth for the period 1963-79, Wang finds 
the annual rate of growth of labour productivity for manufacturing was 11.0 per cent 
and 6.7 per cent in Korea and Taiwan respectively. The annual rate of capital per 
worker for Korean manufacturing was also higher, 6.8 per cent compared to 2.3 per 
cent for Taiwan.
While the preceding discussion suggests there was not a strong relationship between 
industries known to have been more highly assisted and their TFP growth rate, 
quantitative evidence is needed to support this proposition. The results from the above 
three TFP studies have been applied to the measures of the Taiwan incentive structure 
derived in Chapter 6. In addition to the estimated results for 1981 and 1989, the results 
from the study by Lee et al. (1975) of Taiwan's incentive structure for 1969 are also 
incorporated. Data from all three studies has been reclassified in accordance with the 
TFP studies. In the case of the results for 1981 and 1989, nominal rates of assistance 
have been averaged using gross output at unassisted prices, while effective rates of 
subsidy and assistance have been averaged using value added in domestic prices (in 
keeping with the methodology employed in Chapter 6). In the case of effective rates of 
assistance and subsidy, outliers have been included, which in some cases will 
understate the reported rates of assistance and subsidy. This is the case for the paper 
and chemicals sectors for 1981 and for chemicals, non-metallic minerals and transport 
equipment for 1989,19 when in fact these industries were known to be more highly 
assisted relative to other sectors. The results for 1969 have been averaged using a 
simple average method. In the case of nominal rates of assistance, the adjusted tariff 
rate has been used, rather than the implicit rates based on a comparison of domestic and 
world prices. The adjusted tariff rates on manufactured products were considerably
18 Wang's study (doctoral dissertation) calculates rates for 24 industries. However, results for only 15 
of these sectors are reported in her study.
19 See Chapter 6, Table 6.10
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TABLE 9.3: Total Factor Productivity, Taiwan Manufacturing: 1966-86
Average Annual Growth Rates
Labour
(L)
Capital
(K)
Value Added 
(Y)
Y/L K/L TFP
K- intensive Industries: 7.2 10.8 13.6 6.5 3.6 3.9
Basic Metals 7.6 13.5 19.3 11.7 5.9 7.2
Non-metallic Minerals 4.1 7.4 8.6 4.5 3.3 2.4
Chemicals 7.8 10.0 12.7 4.9 2.2 3.3
Transport Equipment 8.7 14.3 15.3 6.6 5.6 2.7
Machinery 4.8 9.1 13.9 9.1 4.3 6.7
L-Intensive Industries: 9.0 8.8 15.7 6.7 -0.1 6.8
Paper and Printing 4.7 9.9 10.3 5.6 5.2 2.3
Textiles 4.8 7.6 13.9 9.1 2.8 7.6
Wood Products 4.2 7.1 5.9 1.7 2.8 0.3
Electrical 10.9 11.1 18.1 7.2 0.2 7.1
Metal Products 10.9 8.6 14.4 3.5 -2.3 4.4
Rubber Products 7.3 11.4 15.7 8.4 4.1 6.3
Other Industries 12.6 6.9 19.3 6.7 -5.7 11.0
Clothing 11.0 8.2 18.2 7.2 -2.8 9.2
Leather 15.3 9.2 23.2 7.9 -6.1 12.0
Food Industries -0.6 5.8 6.8 7.4 6.4 2.0
All Manufacturing: 6.9 9.2 13.6 6.7 2.3 5.2
Source: Table 4.4, Wang (1990:63).
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higher than the implicit rates. While there are obvious limitations in reclassifying this 
data, the results for 1969 are useful because 1969 marks, or is close to, the starting year 
for the TFP studies outlined earlier.
In presenting rank correlation coefficients between incentive measures and measures of 
total factor productivity Table 9.4 shows that the majority of the coefficients are 
insignificant. An exception is the positive and significant relationship between 
nominal rates of assistance in 1981 and the rate of TFP growth as measured by Liang, 
and Wang’s results which indicate a negative relationship between nominal rates of 
assistance in 1989 and TFP growth. When Chen and Tang's results are used, the 
majority of the coefficients are negative, supporting the view that the incentive 
structure was not correlated with TFP growth. Consistent in all three studies is the 
positive but insignificant relationship between nominal rates of assistance in 1981 and 
TFP growth. Also consistent among the studies is the negative but insignificant 
relationship between TFP growth and effective rates of assistance and effective rates of 
subsidy in 1981. The variability of the results amongst the studies would seem to be 
the result of three factors — differing levels of aggregation and classifications 
procedures in both the indicators of incentives and in the measures of TFP; the 
differing time periods of the studies; and variations in the methodology employed in 
the three studies, particularly that used to construct the capital stock series. In spite of 
this, the overall lack of significance of the coefficients indicates there was not a strong 
relationship between the incentive structure and rates of productivity growth.
The governed market model is premised on the view that industries with external 
economies, scale economies and learning economies can be identified and can benefit 
from government support. In particular, it is emphasised that effective learning in 
developing countries requires sector-specific intervention. In the absence of 
intervention it is asserted, these externalities would result in slower productivity gains 
due to underinvestment in R&D, human capital, and leaming-by-doing. Based on this 
simple test, the results do not support the governed market view that industrial policy 
interventions were the mechanism that successfully overcame these market failures. 
Those industries that were more highly assisted did not achieve substantially higher 
productivity growth than those that were not. The test required input per unit of output 
to rise more rapidly in more highly assisted industries for there to be any rationale for 
infant industry assistance. In Taiwan's case, there was no such tendency over the 
period covered.
TABLE 9.4: Total Factor Productivity and Assistance, Taiwan
_________(rank correlation coefficients)_______________
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1. Liang 1973-81 1961-81
NRA69 .3193 .2158
ERA69 .2053 .1859
ERS69 .2053 .1859
NRA81 .4649* .3246
ERA81 -.0385 .0157
ERS81 -.1175 .0333
2. Cheng and Tang 1968-82
NRA69 .0058
ERA69 -.2353
ERS 69 -.0352
NRA81 .0323
ERA81 -.0117
ERS81 -.0117
NRA89 -.0970
ERA89 -.1206
ESR89 -.3617
2. Wang 1966-86
NRA69 .1964
ERA69 -.1071
ERS 69 -.1035
NRA81 .1286
ERA81 -.0321
ERS 81 -.0321
NRA89 -.5464**
ERA89 .1071
ESR89 .0467
NR A - nominal rate of assistance 
ERA - effective rate of assistance 
ERS - effective rate of assistance
* statistical significance (90 per cent confidence)
** statistical significance (95 per cent confidence)
(Liang - 10 observations; Wang - 15 observations; Cheng and Tang -16 observations). 
Source: Table 3, Liang 1989; Table 4.4, Wang (1990:63); and Table 1, Cheng and Tang (1990:580).
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9.3.2 Testing the New Trade Hypothesis
The traditional neoclassical explanation of the link between TFP growth and exports 
emphasises such static and dynamic factors as economies of scale, capacity utilisation, 
the maintenance of a competitive business environment and the rate of absorption of 
superior technology. It is also recognised that while these may account for an initial 
surge of productivity soon after the start of an export push, they are insufficient to 
explain continuing high TFP growth rates. Rather, the relationship between exports 
and productivity growth is thought to arise from the role of exports in helping 
economies adopt and master international best-practice technologies.
This view is supported by evidence from cross-economy estimates and is further 
supported by a number of recent microeconomic studies that attempt to test the link 
between exports and productivity growth (World Bank 1993).20 Recent studies by 
Pack and Page (1993) present evidence from Korea and Taiwan that at the sectoral 
level rapid export growth is correlated with the pattern of productivity change; 
exporting sectors have higher sectoral rates of TFP growth. Aw and Huang (1993) 
using microeconomic firm data from Taiwan, find a statistically significant relationship 
between productivity differences among manufacturing firms and export orientation.21 
The results from all of these studies are consistent with the hypothesis that East Asia’s 
manufactured export orientation and high labour force skills interact to facilitate the 
acquisition and mastery of technology with attendant spillovers (World Bank 
1993:324).22 Wang's (1990) study (discussed in the following section) provides similar 
evidence.
Taiwan is seen as an example of successful export-led industrialisation in which the 
composition of exports adapted in response to changing factor endowments and the 
international market environment. Export expansion has contributed to efficient 
industrialisation by permitting specialisation according to comparative advantage,
20 As The World Bank (1993:317) explains, it is ’possible that the move to a higher production 
function occurred before the growth in exports —  that TFP growth caused export growth rather than 
the reverse. But even if exports began on the basis of productivity change due to such domestic efforts 
as plant reorganisation, the cumulative magnitude of productivity growth over many years is most 
unlikely to have been a result of purely domestic efforts. It stretches credibility to suggest that the 
large cumulative effects of TFP growth in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan could have been achieved by the 
plant floor innovations proposed as important sources of productivity growth as lower TFP growth 
rates (Pack and Page 1993). Were that the case, it would be difficult to explain why these gains far 
outstrip productivity increases in the industrial economies during their own rapid-growth periods, when 
TFP growth was attributable largely to domestic factors. Clearly, then, an increased ability to tap 
world technology has been an important benefit o f exports'.
21 For studies on Taiwan see Chen (1977), Kuo (1983), and Huang (1985). For Korea see Seong Min 
Yoo (1991), Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) and Zeile (1991).
22 The studies by Pack and Page (1993) and Aw and Roberts (1993) have not been sighted by the 
author.
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encouraging capital accumulation and technological improvement. New trade theory, 
on the other hand, asserts there may be a role for government through the 'creation' of 
comparative advantage via R&D and leaming-by-doing. Technological spillovers are 
considered to be inherent in some industries and important to the growth process, 
requiring intervention to ensure their capture. In these cases, assistance or 
subsidisation can expand the externality-generating activity and create social gain. 
New trade theory therefore implicitly assumes that TFP growth was greater in the 
selectively promoted sectors as a result of static and dynamic scale economies.
The following tests seek to determine whether differential rates of TFP growth were 
largely the result of that predicted by the neoclassical explanation centred on export 
growth and the associated dynamic externalities accompanying this growth, or was the 
result of government efforts promoting sectors characterised by increasing returns to 
scale and high technology-intensity. If the sectors that grew are characterised for 
example by low wages, or low capital and technology-intensity as measured by various 
proxy variables, this would be consistent with growth according to comparative 
advantage. If, on the other hand, sectors grew more rapidly in terms of factor 
commitment than would have occurred in the absence of intervention, this would be 
consistent with that predicted by the new trade (and governed market) model.
Using Chen and Tang's results for the period 1968-82, several of the proxy variables 
(introduced in Chapter 8) thought to reflect skill-intensity, technology-intensity and 
economies of scale are used in testing for the determinants of TFP growth.23 Value 
added per worker (VAPW) and wages (WAGE) are used to reflect both skill and 
capital-intensity, and also represent a proxy for technology complexity. WAGE is also 
used as a proxy for the new trade view that high-wage sectors were targets for 
government intervention. Variables used to reflect economies of scale include the 
proportion of self-employed and family workers (SELF); the proportion of firms with 
assets greater than NT$100 000 000 (ASSETS); and the proportion of enterprises with 
greater than 300 employees (LSE). Variables used to reflect technology-intensity are 
total R&D expenditure per industry (RDE); R&D expenditure as a percentage of total 
sales (SALES); and total R&D manpower (SC).
Table 9.5 presents the signs of the regression coefficients (and the coefficients in the 
case of the scale variable, LSE, and the technology variable, SALES) and their level of 
significance over the period 1968-82. The results are based on a linear functional 
form. While the predictive power of the regression equations are not high, the results
23 Chen and Tang (1990) use their results to derive the factors contributing to productivity growth 
using cost functions to separate out the scale effect from the influences of export growth. They find 
that when both scale and export expansion are taken into account, the scale effect is the dominant 
explanatory variable for productivity growth, although export expansion leads to scale enlargement.
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consistently show the growth rate of exports to be positive and significant, suggesting 
that export growth largely explains growth in TFP over the period 1968-82. The 
negative coefficients on indicators of skill and technology-intensity (WAGE, SC, and 
RDE) imply that at the two-digit level, despite expanding labour skills and capital 
stock, the most rapid growth in TFP occurred in lower wage sectors. While it would 
have been expected that the labour-intensive sectors would have declined in 
importance, these labour-intensive sectors increased or maintained their productivity 
over the period.24 The remaining coefficients reflecting technology-intensity and 
economies of scale are mixed in sign but are all insignificant. While not all of the 
incentive indicators (NRA, ERA and ERS) are presented, they were in the majority of 
cases insignificant, and all were consistent with the results obtained in the previous test. 
The scale coefficient (LSE) is positive in all the regressions, but is insignificant 
implying only mildly increasing returns. Similarly the technology-intensity variable 
(SALES) shows only a small excess gross return to R&D investment.25
9.4 Further Evidence26
In focusing on the question of what accounts for TFP growth, Wang (1990) 
concentrates on the hypothesis concerning efficiency gains from organisation change 
and the hypothesis concerning externalities brought about from export growth. The 
former is measured by the growth of average firm size, or employment per firm, and 
the latter is indicated by the export-to-sales ratio. Wang notes that the average firm 
size remained virtually unchanged for Taiwan's total manufacturing during the past two 
decades, a strong contrast to what Korean manufacturing experienced during the 1963- 
79. The annual growth rate of average firm size was 6.1 per cent in Korea, compared 
with 0.2 per cent in Taiwan. Also, in contrast to the Korean experience, Taiwan's 
labour-intensive industries did not generally exhibit a more rapid increase in the 
number of employees per firm when compared with capital-intensive industries. With 
the exception of the leather industry, many labour-intensive industries in fact 
experienced a decrease in average production scale over time. The decrease in average 
firm size in labour-intensive industries was possibly due to the emergence of many 
small firms which did not require large investments in production facilities or mastery 
of sophisticated modem technologies. Wang concludes that this strongly suggests that
24 The Wodd Bank reports a similar result over the period 1966-86 using the change in current price 
share of value added relative to value added in all manufacturing as the dependent variable, and value 
added per worker and wage per worker at the beginning and end of the period as the independent 
variables. They find that the signs of the wage and value added variables are negative, although 
insignificant, and conclude that growth was market conforming; government intervention did little to 
alter the structure of production at the sectoral level.
25 As Griliches and Mairesse (1983) note, it is an excess return because much of the R&D input is 
typically already counted once in the construction of labour and capital, and is gross because no 
allowance has been made for possible depreciation of R&D capital.
26 The following draws heavily from Wang (1990:80-119).
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organisational changes from traditional shops to the modem plant could not explain the 
significant growth in TFP in the labour-intensive industries, or the observed TFP 
differential between labour and capital-intensive industries.
Thus the unchanged (or decrease in) firm size in nearly all manufacturing industries 
suggests the 'unimportance' of scale economies in Taiwan's growth over this period. 
Wang's comparison of TFP level and average firm size between Korea and Taiwan in 
1983 (Table 9.6) provides additional support for this claim. It shows that although 
average Korean firms were 2.8 times larger than their Taiwan counterparts, TFP 
performance was not generally and substantially lower in Taiwan than in Korea. In 
particular, in the labour-intensive industries, Korea's TFP level was 78 per cent of that 
in Taiwan while its firm size was 2.3 times larger. As would be expected, the effects 
of firm size appeared to be more significant in the capital-intensive industries, where 
the 32 per cent increase in average TFP level went hand in hand with a 170 per cent 
increase in firm size.27 Export shares seem to have more power than firm size in 
explaining the rates of TFP growth. The capital-intensive group exported 11.9 per cent 
of its output in 1966 while the labour-intensive group exported nearly one-third of its 
output. This pattem did not alter much over the two decades except that most 
manufacturing industries became more export-oriented. Within the labour-intensive 
group, high TFP growth generally accompanied high export-sale ratios. The most 
significant examples were textiles, miscellaneous manufactures, electronics, clothing, 
and leather.
In examining the relationship between export activity and productivity performance, 
Wang firstly estimates a simple model using the growth of TFP as the dependent 
variable and the current levels of exports, the growth of exports, and the growth of 
domestic sales as the independent variables. The average annual growth rates of TFP, 
real exports, and real domestic sales are calculated in four-year intervals: 1961-65, 
1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, and 1981-85. The current level of exports is measured in 
terms of export-output ratio at the beginning of the period over which TFP is 
computed. From Table 9.7, the first and third regressions indicate that there is a 
significantly positive relationship between future TFP performance and current export- 
output ratio. This suggests that industries which enjoyed larger export markets or were 
less domestic-oriented in the initial period were able to achieve higher TFP growth. In 
addition to the current level of exports, the coefficients on the growth rate of real 
exports are also shown to be significantly positive, and are larger than those on the 
growth of domestic sales in all regressions. This implies that industries able to export 
at a higher rate seemed to have higher TFP growth, and such higher TFP growth could
27 However, it should be noted that capital-intensive industries are not necessarily larger when size is 
measured by persons per firm.
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TABLE 9.6: Average Firm Size (persons per firm) and TFP Level in Taiwan 
and Korea: 1983
Taiwan
(1981)
Average Firm  Size 
Korea Korea relative 
(1979) to Taiwan
TFP Level 
Korea relative 
to Taiw an (1983)
K-Intensive Industries: 76 205 2.7 1.32
Basic M etal 34 105 3.1 1.80
Non-m etallic Minerals 27 42 1.6 1.19
Chemicals 31 62 2.0 1.64
T ransport Equipment 33 127 3.8 0.71
M achinery 12 55 4.6 0.67
L-Intensive Industries: 41 96 2.3 0.78
Paper and Printing 13 42 3.2 1.11
Textiles 50 89 1.8 0.91
W ood Products 13 32 2.5 1.19
Electrical 66 159 2.4 0.94
M etal Products 9 43 4.8 0.84
R ubber Products 39 253 6.5 0.68
O ther Industries 25 74 3.0 0.62
Clothing 45 68 1.5 0.61
Leather 50 68 1.4 0.61
Food Industries 14 40 2.9 1.22
All Manufacturing: 24 66 2.8 1.12
Notes: 1) The average firm size is measured in terms of average number of persons per firm.
2) The figures for Taiwanese manufacturing are derived from the Industrial and 
Commercial Census in Taiwan 1986, while those for Korean manufacturing are 
calculated from the U.N. Industrial Statistics Yearbook.
3) The internationally comparable data for calculation of the relative TFP level are 
from Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) who computed value added per workhour and net 
capital stock per workhour for these two economies in 1983. Capital productivity 
is obtained from dividing value added per workhour by net capital stock
per workhour. The TFP level is then computed as the geometric weight average 
of labour and capital productivity with weights equal to factor shares or output 
elasticity.
Source: Table 4.6, Wang (1990:72).
TABLE 9.7: Regressions with the Growth of TFP Level as the Dependent 
Variable for Taiwan Manufacturing: 1961-86
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Independent V ariables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -13.789** -13.779** -0.567 -0.744
Log (TFP) -0.249** -0.243**
Export growth 0.077** 0.048** 0.104** 0.088**
Domestic sales growth 0.023 0.035 0.019 0.025
Log (exports/gross
output) 0.009** 0.005
Year 0.007* 0.007** 0.0002 0.0003
R-squared 0.711 0.688 0.276 0.269
Number of observations 73 73 73 73
Notes: **Significant at 5 per cent and * at 10 percent
Source: Table 4.7, Wang (1990:77).
not entirely be attributable to the scale effects associated with the growth of output. In 
fact the smaller coefficients on the growth of domestic sales and the bigger coefficients 
on the growth of exports suggest that 'something other than scale effects of output 
expansion' must have played a role in TFP advancement. Wang identifies one reason 
as the technology transferred by multinational firms.
Secondly, in concentrating on the determinants of TFP growth for the period of the 
1980s, Wang undertakes analysis at the firm level by estimating a modified production 
function without the restriction of constant returns to scale. The production function is 
constructed using firm data on output, labour and capital for the period 1983-87, based 
on a survey of Taiwan's one thousand largest firms.28 As the data set does not contain 
data on firm output, imputed value added is used as a proxy for output. The data set 
contains information of firm sales, profit, total assets and the number of employees, 
and qualitative characteristics such as which of the firms are foreign, state-owned, top 
exporters, and also the location of firms. Foreign firms are those with foreign 
ownership exceeding 50 per cent of total, while state-owned firms are those in which 
the government possesses more than half of the equity. Top exporters are those which 
have been selected and honoured by the government every year for excellent 
performance in terms of export volume. The location of firms is indicated by those 
areas particularly designated by the government for export processing zones (EPZ) and 
the scientific parks. The EPZs were first established in 1965 with the purpose of
28 The data was obtained from the Commonwealth Magazine (in Chinese). In the year 1983 and 1984 
data on the largest 500 manufacturing firms is reported. Since 1985 data on die one thousand largest 
firms have been provided.
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promoting exports. Firms located in them are granted various forms of preferential 
treatment such as tax holidays and low import duties. The scientific park was 
established in the early 1980s with the aim of encouraging selective high-tech 
industries. Overall, the sample is thought to represent a predominant share of total 
manufacturing sales and employment and accords each individual industry its relative 
importance. The sample covers 91.3 per cent of firms with more than 1000 employees 
and 74 per cent of firms with between 500-1000 employees. However, the smaller 
firms are largely unrepresented. Firms with less than 300 employees account for only 
0.2 per cent of the sample.
In summarising Wang's results Table 9.8 shows that the scale coefficient is rather small 
(s = 0.040), but is significantly positive, implying mildly increasing returns to scale in 
Taiwan manufacturing. The scale parameters are found to be more significant in the 
capital-intensive industry group (0.058) than the labour-intensive group (0.035), 
reflecting the dominance of larger firms in the capital-intensive industry group. Of 
significant importance, is the scale coefficient on the dummy variables for state-owned 
firms which are shown to be significantly negative suggesting lower productivity of 
these firms. The coefficient indicates that the average productivity of state-owned 
firms is 30 per cent lower than that of private firms in general. It is also interesting to 
note that the performance of the state-owned firms is worse in the capital-intensive 
industry group, compared to the labour-intensive group, which is shown to be 
moderately more productive.
Table 9.8 also indicates that foreign firms are 15 per cent more productive than their 
domestic counterparts, and in particular are 28 per cent more productive than domestic 
firms in capital-intensive industries, reflecting the advanced technology and 
organisational skills embodied in foreign investment primarily from Japan and the 
United States. The gap has narrowed to 9 per cent in the labour-intensive industries 
reflecting the significance advances made by domestic firms in the rapid expansion of 
labour-intensive industries in the past two decades. The coefficient on the dummy for 
the top-exporters is significantly positive, although its magnitude is small (0.051). 
This shows that the productivity of the top-exporters is only 5 per cent higher than the 
non-top exporters. Finally, the dummy for firms located in the export processing zones 
and science park is insignificant. This is significant for our purposes in that it implies 
similar productivity performance between firms inside and outside these areas. This is 
explained by the declining importance of the zones over time as more and more firms 
outside the zones engaged in exporting activity. Year dummies are included to capture 
the technical change over time. The coefficients on the year dummies demonstrate a 
continuing improvement in productivity in the 1980s, with the exception of 1985.
TABLE 9.8: Estimation erf Modified Translog Production Functions for 
Taiwan Manufacturing: 1983-87
Dependent Variable: Log (value added/labour)
Independent Variables Total K-intensive
Industries
L-intensive
Industries
Intercept -3.032 -2.592*** -3.998**
Log(labour) 0.040** 0.058** 0.035**
Log(capital/labour) 1.177** 1.272** 0.818**
Log(capital/labour) * 0.087* 0.089** 0.057**
Qualitative variables
Dummy for G -0.312 -0.708** 0.283**
Dummy for F 0.147** 0.275** 0.089**
Dummy for E 0.051** 0.017 0.063**
Dummy for Z -0.052 0.292 -0.044
Year dummies:
1987 0.489** 0.678** 0.387**
1986 0.326** 0.493** 0.240**
1985 0.095** 0.228** 0.035
1984 0.163** 0.287** 0.092**
R-squared 0.417 0.458 0.328
Number of Observations 3234 1173 2060
Notes: 1) ** Significant at 5 per cent and * significant at 10 percent
2) G, F, E, Z represent state-owned firms, foreign-firms, top-exporters, and firms 
located in EPZs and the science park.
3) * *  Represents annual growth rates of capital-labour ratio before and after 
adjustment for inventories. This variables reflects the addition of industry- 
level data on inventories.
Source: Table 5.6, Wang (1990:100).
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Wang then calculates an index of TFP, defined as value added per composite inputs. 
The TFP level is regressed on the various qualitative variables previously outlined. In 
order to investigate the effects of export orientation, the sales variable is included to 
determine whether the top-exporters have a higher export-sales ratio than those which 
are not. Export volume is also included in order to explore the effect of technology 
diffusion within industries. Year dummies are used to control for TFP progress over 
time, while industry dummies (not shown) are included to reduce ambiguities of 
interpretation when very different industries are pooled together.
Table 9.9 shows the results when the TFP level is regressed upon various qualitative 
variables including dummies for state-owned firms, foreign firms, top-exporters, and 
firms located in the export processing zone. Table 9.10 provides results for individual 
years. Regression (1) in Table 9.9 shows that the coefficient of the export dummy is 
small and insignificant, which seems to suggest that export orientation is not an 
important source of TFP growth. The relationship between TFP level and export 
orientation may well vary with the size of the firm. In order to investigate whether the 
change in TFP level was affected by the destination of the market, irrespective of the 
size of the firm, an interaction term between the dummy for export-orientation and the 
size of firm, by the weighted average of labour and capital stock is included. 
Regression (2) then shows a large and significantly positive coefficient on the dummy 
for export-orientation firms (about 0.335) and a significantly negative coefficient on 
the interaction term (about -0.074). These two coefficients together suggest that small 
export-oriented firms are more productive than small domestic-oriented ones, but the 
gap between large export-oriented firms and their domestic counterpart is narrower. 
Small exporting firms may exhibit higher productivity than non-exporting firms simply 
because they are in the exporting industries which are more dynamic and thus tend to 
accelerate technological diffusion among firms. This industry effect is captured in the 
industry exports variable in regression (3). The significantly positive coefficient 
(0.422) on the industry exports variable suggests that firms in the high-exporting- 
industries are more productive than their counterparts in the low-exporting industries, 
reflecting diffusion effects of technology brought about by export activity. According 
to the coefficient, a 1 per cent increase in industry export volume will bring about 
almost 0.42 per cent increase in the TFP level.
In addition, the coefficients on the export dummy and the interaction term between the 
export dummy and firm size are still significant suggesting that the firm effects are not 
dominated by the industry effects. The positive sign of the former and the negative 
sign on the latter provide evidence that small exporting firms realise higher levels of 
TFP than their domestic counterparts in low-exporting as well as high-exporting
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TABLE 9.9: Regression with the TFP Level as the Dependent Variable For Taiwan 
Manufacturing: 1983-87
Independen t V ariab le 0 ) (2) (3) (4)
In te rcep t -5 .633** -5.617* -10 .791** -18 .306**
Industrial variables:
L og  (export volum e) 0.422**
Qualitative variables:
D um m y fo r G
In te rac tio n  betw een  G  dum m y
-0.445** -0.527** -0.612** -0.875*
0.155**
and  y e a r
D um m y fo r F
In te rac tio n  betw een  F  dum m y
0.147** 0.143** 0.132** 0.202**
-0.029
and  y e a r
D um m y fo r Z
In te rac tio n  betw een  Z  dum m y
-0 .009 0 .010 0 .040 0.141
-0 .056
and  y e a r
L og  (sales) 0.092** 0.134** 0.158** 0.155**
D um m y fo r E 0.036** 0.355** 0.552** 0.509**
In te rac tion  betw een  E dum m y -0.074** -0.114** -0.083**
and log  (com posite  inputs)
In te rac tion  betw een  E dum m y -0.054**
and y ea r 
Year dummies:
1987 0.485** 0.476**
1986 0.333** 0.330** 0.187**
1985 0.130** 0.129** 0.047
1984
Y ear
0.156** 0.152** 0.084**
0.151**
R -squared 0.737 0.737 0.695 0.738
N um ber o f  O bservations 3234 3234 2450 3234
Notes: 1) In the fourth regression, the year variable is used to replace year dummies to capture the
technical changeover time. The year variable is normalised such that the year 1983 is 
represented by 0; 1984 by 1; ... ;1987 by 4.
2) Coefficients are reported; ** significant at 5 per cent.
3) G, F, E, Z stand for state-owned firms, foreign firms, top exporters and firms located in EPZs 
and science park, repectively.
4) Industry dummies are not reported here.
Source: Table 5.7, Wang (1990:110).
TABLE 9.10: Regressions with TFP Level as the Dependent Variable 
for Taiwan Manufacturing: 1983-87
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Independent Variables 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Intercept -5.671** -5.263** -5.478** -5.279** -5.370**
Qualitative variables:
Dummy for G -1.364** -0.132 -0.546** -0.441** -0.318**
Dummy for F 0.167* 0.088 0.234** 0.044 0.114
Dummy for Z -0.036 0.131 -0.016 -0.002 -0.016
Log (sales) 0.248** 0.179** 0.078** 0.119** 0.192**
Dummy for E 0.909** 0.694** 0.434** 0.232** 0.176
Interaction between E 
dummy and log
composite inputs) -0.176** -0.131** 0.086** -0.065** -0.050*
R-squared 0.628 0.684 0.756 0.813 0.789
Number of Observations 422 426 785 814 78
Notes: l)** Significant at 5 per cent
2) G, F, E, Z stand for state-owned firms, foreign firms, top-exporters and firms 
located in EPZs.
Source: Table 5.8, Wang (1990:115).
industries. The higher productivity of small exporting firms should not be attributed 
entirely to the effects brought about by industry-wide expansion of exports. Their 
productivity advantage also derives from learning-by-doing effects, frequent contact 
with foreign buyers, and cost-reducing innovations under competitive pressure.
In addition to the effects of export orientation, Wang's results relating to the qualitative 
variables are indicated in Table 9.9. The coefficient on the dummy for state-owned 
firms is significantly negative. Its magnitude suggests that on average state-owned 
firms are about 50 per cent lower in TFP growth than their private counterparts. While 
this may be partly due to the sample problem of the exclusion of small and inefficient 
firms, this coefficient gives strong support to the notion that the TFP growth rests 
mainly in the private sector. In contrast to the state-owned firms, foreign firms exhibit 
significantly (14 per cent) higher productivity than the average domestic firm. 
Combined with the result of production function estimation in the preceding section, it 
implies that foreign direct investment is important to the developing countries not only 
because of foreign capital inflow, but also because of its provision of superior 
technology and management. Firms located inside the HPZ are shown to be no more
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productive than those outside. This insignificant coefficient is again consistent with 
the estimation of the production functions in the preceding section.29
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the question of whether industrial policy intervention has 
been the necessary factor in determining the rate of industrial productivity growth. The 
two simple tests employed here indicated little correlation between promoted sectors 
and growth. Export growth was found largely to explain TFP growth, while scale and 
technology-intensity were insignificant; although given the small size of Taiwan's 
domestic market, export expansion has been an essential way of achieving scale 
economies. There are, however, limitations and caveats to these results. This type of 
study requires a longer period of time-series data for the 1980s which was not 
available. Consequently, the explanatory power of the regression equations was not 
high. In addition, tests for the presence and the significance of spillovers from R&D 
require further disaggregated data at the firm level. Overall though, the tests employed 
tend to capture the general hypothesis of the competing explanations. The quantitative 
importance of government intervention to alter the structure of production is not 
confirmed at the sectoral level.
While new trade theories emphasise differences in factor endowments as subordinate to 
increasing returns, these theories are more likely to describe intra-industry patterns of 
trade among industrial economies than the evolution of the sectoral structure of 
production of developing economies whose production structure is likely to reflect 
differences in factor proportions. As the World Bank (1993:100) points out, the 
benefits of coordinated behaviour are not great in small, highly open economies with 
good entrepreneurial skills and small nontraded sectors and the benefits of coordination 
of investment decisions or sharing of information are likely to be small. Even in cases 
where coordination benefits are potentially large — in nontraded goods, externalities, 
or interdependent investments — governments may not be able to enforce 
performance-based coordination rules. Taiwan is an example. With a large number of 
SMEs, the institutional costs of attempting to coordinate all but the simplest activities 
were prohibitive.
29 A problem with the qualitative variables is that one firm may be in more than one of the dummy 
categories. In testing for this, Wang runs regressions with only one dummy at a time. The results 
concerning the direction and significance of the dummies were robust under such specifications. There 
is also the problem of autocorrelation arising form pooling lime series and cross section data together 
whereby least-square estimators, although still defined, linear and unbiased, and consistent, no longer 
exhibit minimum variance. To overcome this, Wang estimates separate regressions for each year from 
1983 to 1987. The results showed that the direction of various categorical effects remained robust to 
different specifications.
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Wang's (1990) results are significant in that they provide support for some of the points 
raised both in this chapter and elsewhere in the study. Using firm level data, Wang 
finds evidence that supports the role of exports in improving productivity, especially 
for the small and medium firms. Industry-wide expansion of exports, on the other 
hand, is found to stimulate TFP growth for an individual firm, implying diffusion of 
technology from exporting firms to the rest of the firms in the industry. These results 
also suggest that the general pattern is that the private sector is the source of economic 
dynamism in the process of economic growth, and that foreign direct investment is 
important not only because of capital inflow but also because of foreign firms' superior 
technology and skills, which constitutes another channel of technology transfer to the 
domestic firms. A particularly important finding of this study is that firms located 
inside the EPZs and the science park are no more productive than firms outside the 
zones. Export-led prosperity is not confined to EPZs only. It extends to the entire 
economy.
The indication that government industrial policy interventions did not have a 
pronounced impact on the sectoral evolution of Taiwan industry, raises the question as 
to what were the necessary causes of high growth over this period? In attempting to 
answer this question, support is found here for the neoclassical view stressing the 
contribution of export orientation to TFP growth. While static factors such as 
economies of scale and capacity utilisation may account for an initial surge of 
productivity soon after the start of an export push, they are insufficient to explain 
continuing high TFP growth rates. In the East Asian context, high rates of growth of 
exports and human capital are considered to have interacted to contribute to sustained 
productivity growth by permitting firms to adopt and master international best-practice 
technologies. In facilitating this, the adoption of an export-oriented strategy would 
thus appear to be a necessary condition underlying growth in this period.
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- CHAPTER 10 -
CONCLUSION
To say that the Left critics got it wrong is not to say that the neoliberals 
got it right. The neoliberals have tended either to ignore evidence or to 
acknowledge it without thought for its theoretical implication. The 
selective inattention to data would upset the approved way o f interpreting 
things and the use of repetition as a chief weapon of argument are two 
strong signs that the neoliberal paradigm is in a degenerative stage, 
taking on attributes of a disciplined delusion system (Wade 1992:279-80).
The question of the importance of industrial policy interventions in East Asian 
industrialisation is controversial. Using Taiwan's adoption in the early 1980s of a 
strategic industry policy as a case study, this thesis has employed quantitative 
techniques to answer the question of whether government industrial policy intervention 
was the factor explaining Taiwan's industrialisation in the 1980s. Such an approach is 
useful because of the opposing relationships between industrial incentives and industry 
comparative advantage suggested by the two alternative models of economic policy 
formulation in Taiwan. The major finding of this study is that interventions are not the 
factor explaining Taiwan's industrial growth during this period. Rather than the 
incentive structure being designed for industries with a potential and future 
comparative advantage, strong support is found for the proposition that incentives were 
directed to industries with declining comparative advantage.
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Neoclassical economics attributes East Asian industrial success, insofar as industry 
policy considerations are important at all, to the adoption of market promotion and 
aggregate economic policies producing fewer price distortions than in other developing 
countries, resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources. In particular, the 
adoption of a relatively neutral policy regime, is considered an important factor in 
explaining the industrial growth of Taiwan and Korea.
Two sources of heterodoxy emerged in the 1980s to challenge this explanation. The 
governed market model has argued that interventions leading to departures from a 
neutral trade regime are the necessary factor explaining Taiwan's industrial growth. 
These interventions, it is asserted, have been correcting for market failures associated 
with externalities and have been on a large enough scale to make a sizeable difference 
in investment and industrial production patterns. The Taiwan government is thus 
thought to have possessed a forward looking strategic view on how the industrial 
structure should be evolving and designed the incentive structure to promote industries 
with potential and future comparative advantage. Rather than relinquishing the role of 
facilitator of industrial development, the governed market view claims East Asian 
governments became more, rather than less, interventionist during the process of 
industrial upgrading in the 1980s.
Similarly, new trade theory has argued that the existence of externalities of a particular 
kind may provide a case for government intervention to help shift the pattem of 
comparative advantage thereby raising national welfare. By focusing on geographical 
boundaries and scale economies in giving rise to linkage effects, they claim to have 
narrowed the scope within which externalities may justify government intervention. 
Externality-generating activities, new trade theorists assert, are most likely to be 
prevalent in technology intensive-industries.
In arguing that the presence of externalities in high technology industries may provide 
a legitimate case for intervention, new trade theorists acknowledge that the 
circumstances giving rise to such externalities appear to be very limited. Special 
national advantage from a externality-generating sector is likely to arise only if the 
sector generates broad spillovers to the rest of the economy which are country-specific. 
A review of the literature concerned with 'internalising' externalities also shows that 
most intersectoral spillovers are increasingly appropriable. Even if technological or 
linkage externalities are national in scope, the benefits of the externality may end up
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being shared internationally. Discussion of the limited circumstances in which 
externalities may in fact give rise to a legitimate case for intervention suggests that the 
case for intervention to ensure their capture has been somewhat overstated by the 
governed market and new trade models.
New trade theory has also sought to show how trade policy can be used to achieve a 
permanent shift in comparative advantage whereby a government protecting a series of 
sectors in succession can steadily increase its market share. By showing how 
governments can shift the pattern of comparative advantage by protecting domestic 
markets and promoting exports, such models are also believed to offer an insight into 
what the Taiwan government actually did in promoting industrial growth. Mainstream 
neoclassical economists however stress these models have not applied the same 
rigorous principles of welfare analysis as traditional neoclassical economics had in 
presenting policy conclusions. In particular, new trade theorists have largely ignored 
the postwar literature on domestic distortions that demonstrated that the existence of 
externalities in certain industries did not provide a prima-facie case for intervention to 
encourage expansion of output in the industry. Moreover, the new trade theorists have 
ignored the fact that providing import protection to one industry discriminates against 
other industries which may have excellent export prospects. The policy relevance of 
such models is thus considered to be greatly constrained by the lack of attention to the 
welfare implications.
Highlighting the limited circumstances in which externalities may warrant intervention 
raised the question of whether Taiwan's industry policy regime exhibited the 
characteristics associated with both the new trade and governed market model. The 
government's adoption of a 'strategic industry policy' in the early 1980s designed to 
provide preferential finance to high technology industries in order to facilitate 
industrial upgrading of the economy provided the ideal case study in which to assess 
this proposition.
However, an assessment of Taiwan's industry policies during the 1980s showed that the 
process of industrial upgrading tended to be driven more by market-based economic 
forces than by industry policy initiatives. External pressure, particularly from the 
United States, was influential in bringing about trade reforms in the early 1980s. But 
trade liberalisation was also taking place in response to domestic pressures. 
Considerable import liberalisation took place in the second half of the 1980s and many
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of the previous fiscal and financial incentive schemes shown to be ineffective were 
wound back.
Examination of the government's implementation of the 'strategic industry policy' 
found that strategic high technology industries were not the major recipients of 
incentives. In fact many of the changes in the incentive structure during the 1980s 
were not related to strategic industries, making it difficult to determine the 
government's rationale in designing the policy. The suggestion that strategic 
allocations were not very important also implies that the Taiwan government did not 
possess a rational, forward looking view of how the industrial structure should be 
evolving.
The Korean economy, characterised by greater government involvement in investment 
decisions and an oligopolistic market structure, would appear a better candidate for the 
propositions of the new trade and governed market models. However, the discussion 
of Korea's shift to technology-intensive industries in the 1980s reveals that this process 
was largely designed around functional policies supportive of industrial upgrading. 
Rather than directing resources to industries considered 'strategic', the government's 
industrial initiatives have instead focused on the restructuring of declining industries 
and measures to promote a greater role for small-scale enterprises. The reduced role of 
the Korean government and the greater reliance on private sector investment decisions 
suggests that the government became less dirigiste over the 1980s. This flexible policy 
response, a hallmark of the East Asian growth experience, demonstrates the ability of 
governments to become less dirigiste in response to changing circumstances. This 
feature has gone largely unacknowledged by the governed market literature.
The central purpose of the study was to determine the relationship between industry 
policy interventions and comparative advantage. The first step in this process involved 
measuring the structure of incentives to industry for the years 1981 and 1989. 
Attention focused on determining firstly, whether the incentive structure was non­
neutral and secondly, whether any departures from neutrality encouraged industries 
characterised by comparative advantage. The first question was assessed by measuring 
the interindustry distribution of assistance, the second by focusing on Taiwan's pattem 
of export specialisation.
334
The results indicate that the levels of incentives were uniformly high in 1981, and 
neutral in the sense that incentives were not overly biased towards specific industries. 
This was not the case by the late 1980s with resources being directed towards 
industries characterised by an import substitution bias. Those industries regarded as 
strategic (high technology) industries exhibited low nominal and effective rates of 
assistance and effective rates of subsidy. This was particularly the case in 1989 with 
the machinery, information and electronics industries characterised by low rates of 
incentives relative to other industries. By the late 1980s, major recipients of subsidies 
were those with a declining comparative advantage such as textiles, and industries in 
which Taiwan did not have an established comparative advantage such as the heavy 
and chemical industries. By the late 1980s the incentive structure discriminated against 
those industries with comparative advantage and in favour of industries with declining 
comparative advantage. Therefore departures from neutrality were not associated with 
characteristics of industries associated with superior growth performance. In fact, the 
high and variable rates of assistance and subsidy for the 1980s indicates that the 
structure of incentives was unrelated to stated industrial objectives. An examination of 
the pattern of export specialisation also suggests that, at least as far as tariff assistance 
was concerned, incentives were directed to industries with a declining comparative 
advantage (as indicated by low value added per worker).
Three tests were undertaken to assess empirically this relationship between the 
incentive structure and comparative advantage. The first of these tests examined the 
changing export share and trends in Taiwan's export specialisation over the 1980s. The 
focus was to determine whether the industrial structure evolved in line with a shifting 
(factor-based) comparative advantage and changing factor endowment, and whether 
there was a distinct tendency for strategic industries to display increasing export 
specialisation following the introduction of the strategic industry policy. Strong 
support was found for a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson comparative-advantage-based 
explanation of Taiwan's export specialisation. Specifically, there was no distinct 
tendency for technology-intensive industries to display increasing export specialisation, 
and by implication comparative advantage, following the introduction of the strategic 
industry policy. Many industries already possessed an export specialisation prior to the 
introduction of the policy. The export specialisation of other strategic products 
actually fell over the period. The high technology 'strategic' industries purported to 
have been the chief recipients of incentives, were in fact not found to be so.
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This again highlights how government plans often differed from actual implementation 
of policy and that the government did not possess a strategic view in designing the 
industrial structure. That the government's 'strategic industry policy' was not 
significant in furthering the export performance of strategic and technology-intensive 
industries suggests also that the emergence and subsequent strong export performance 
of the high technology sector during the 1980s owed more to the institutional support 
of the government in providing a favourable environment for development of this 
sector than to industry-specific interventions.
An important element of the thesis was to explore the relationship between on the one 
hand, government sectoral interventions, and on the other, the expansion of industry 
output and achievement of international competitiveness. Cross-sectional regression 
analysis was used to determine which, if either, of the competing interpretations (and 
their associated hypotheses) were statistically significant. Proxy variables were used to 
represent the industry structural characteristics associated with the interpretations of the 
competing models. The results indicate that the fundamental determinant of incentives 
to Taiwan’s manufacturing industry during the 1980s was not its potential for 
developing future international competitiveness. Rather, the incentive structure 
appeared to be designed to assist industries with declining comparative advantage. In 
particular, the incentive structure during the 1980s discriminated in favour of industries 
with low value added, low average earnings, high labour-intensity, low levels of skill 
and technology-intensity and low international competitiveness. Some of the most 
conclusive results leading to a rejection of the new trade/govemed market hypothesis 
were those indicating a negative relationship between the incentive structure and 
Taiwan's changing export share and the negative association between the incentive 
structure and indicators of skill and technology-intensity.
The fundamental determinant of incentives to Taiwan's manufacturing industry during 
the 1980s was not its potential for developing international competitiveness in the 
future. Instead the incentive structure appeared to be designed to assist industries with 
declining comparative advantage. Moreover, the lack of association between the 
incentive structure and indicators of export growth and technology-intensity indicates 
that the policy regime was not causally significant in the sense of contributing to 
sustained industrial and export growth over the 1980s.
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The third test centred on determining whether there were important links between the 
incentive structure and industrial productivity performance. Rates of productivity 
growth across more or less assisted industries were used as a test for the empirical 
validity of the infant industry argument. In testing whether there was a systematic 
tendency for more assisted industries to exhibit higher total factor productivity growth 
than less assisted industries, it was found that industrial policy interventions did not 
have a pronounced impact on the sectoral evolution of the industrial structure. 
Attention also focused on determining the factors explaining Taiwan's productivity 
growth over the period 1960-86. In particular, tests for a relationship between rates of 
productivity growth and the industry characteristics seen as important by new trade 
theory in achieving dynamic industrialisation were not found to be significant.
What factor then explained the industrial growth of the Taiwan economy over the 
1980s? The evidence presented here suggests that strong export growth significantly 
contributed to increasing productivity. This result accords with the neoclassical notion 
of the dynamic gains associated with an export-oriented trade strategy and that of the 
Virtuous trade cycle' (Gamaut 1989) centred on strong export growth assisting the 
process of 'catching up' technologically. Thus the adoption of an outward-oriented 
strategy and its associated competitive disciplines would appear to be the factor 
explaining growth over this period. This result adds support to similar studies showing 
a significant relationship between productivity differences across industries and export 
orientation.
The evidence provided in this study lends strong support to a market-based explanation 
rather than a government-led explanation of Taiwan's industrialisation over the 1980s. 
This study has shown that asserting the selective deployment of many policy 
instruments is not the same as providing evidence that they had a significant 
quantitative impact on the sectoral structure of production. While it is impossible to 
undertake the counterfactual (that is, what would have occurred in the absence of 
intervention) a contribution can be made by analysing prominent cases of past domestic 
policies. The results presented in this study provide strong reasons to reject the view 
that government industrial policies were an important factor in explaining Taiwan's 
industrialisation during the 1980s. These results may go some way to temper calls for 
targeted intervention by policy activists. Rather than being in a degenerative stage, the 
neoclassical account of Taiwan's industrialisation experience remains robust.
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